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Intertemporal choices 1 require decision-makers to trade-off costs and

benefits at different points in time. These decisions may be about

savings, work effort, education, nutrition, exercise, health care and so

forth.

3m�÷*²LÆ¥§·�^ªÏ£interpemporal¤½Ä�

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1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intertemporal choice

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�,3m�²L^�e§��I[�±ÏLIS/�éÀÂ?1�

À§�K]Ú/�7LÉ��Ïý��å£long-run budget

constraint, LRBC¤���"

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�.m�²L£small open economy¤µ�I´­.¢S|Çr∗��

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ü>=£Ú]�âr{��""

NUT = KA = 0, CA = TB + NFIA

ÏÐÜãL�W§Ø�3ÜãL�]�ÂÃ"

VAL = 0, ∆W = CA

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∆WT = CAT = TBT︸︷︷︸Trade balancethis period

+ r∗WT−1︸ ︷︷ ︸Interest paid/received

on last period′s external wealth

WT︸︷︷︸External wealth atthe end of this period

= TBT︸︷︷︸Trade balancethis period

+ (1 + r∗)WT−1︸ ︷︷ ︸Last period′s external wealthplus interest paid/received

^4í�{���Ïý��å£LRBC¤^�µ

WT =WT+1 − TBT+1

1 + r∗=

WT+2 − TBT+2

(1 + r∗)2− TBT+1

1 + r∗= ...

−WT︸ ︷︷ ︸minus present wealth

=∞∑s=1

TBT+s

(1 + r∗)s︸ ︷︷ ︸Present value of future trade balances

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−WT =∞∑s=1

TBT+s

(1 + r∗)s⇔WT +

∞∑s=1

GDPT+s

(1 + r∗)s=∞∑s=1

GNET+s

(1 + r∗)s

LRBC^�¿�Xµ

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ãL�m�²ï§/þ\�Ñ0´�Ïý��å���"

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g20­V80c�¥Ï±5§{I©ª´ÀÅÖI£=ÜãLW < 0¤§

1990c�±5KÑyã��!Øä*��²~�8»i§J�{IØ

ÉLRBC^���åíº

ÚOêâw«{I3¤�ÀÅÖI�Ó�%U¼���À��Â\§'�

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¦r∗A− rL > 0"@320­V60c�{IÒ��{IPkLÝ�A�

£Exorbitant Privilege¤§={I|^$EIÅé/±§Ó�ÏLFDIÚ

é�¦Ý]¼��pÂÃ"$/p��E�£²þ�1.5%*2%¤¿�

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∆WT = CAT + VALT = TBT + r∗AT−1 − rLT−1 + KGT

= TBT + r∗WT−1︸ ︷︷ ︸Conventional effects

+ (r∗ − r) LT−1 + KGT︸ ︷︷ ︸Additional effects

ü���A£|�Â\Ú]

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µ4²L^�e£TB = 0¤§TI�Ï��ÑÚ�¤þ�100ü µ

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3µ4²L£closed economy¤^�e§TB = 0, Q = C§Ïd

10Ï��¤�ò��eü21�ü "�Ñ�CÄòÚå�¤��

þCÄ∆Q = ∆C"

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m�²L£open economy¤^�eTB 6= 0, Q 6= C§TI�±3÷

vLRBC^��Ó�§ÏLIS/�5²w�¤!JpI¬4|"

−WT =∞∑s=1

QT+s−CT+s

(1+r∗)s= 0⇒ 79

1+r∗ + 100(1+r∗)2

+ 100(1+r∗)3

... = Cr∗

⇒ C = 100− 21× 0.05/1.05 = 99

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I[1995*2004c�êâïÄL²§7Km�I�������p�§

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−WT =∞∑s=1

QT+s − CT+s − IT+s

(1 + r∗)s= 0⇒ 100

1 + r∗+

105

(1 + r∗)2+ ...− 16

1 + r∗=

C

r∗

⇒ C = 105− 21× 0.05

1.05= 104

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TÃ{áý β̂ = 0 �"b�µ

(I/Y )i = α + β(S/Y )i + εi

Feldstein and Horioka£1980¤

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The Lucas paradox was put forward in his widely cited 1990 article Why

Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?.

The theoretical explanations2 can be grouped into two categories.

The first group attributes the limited amount of capital received by poorer

nations to differences in fundamentals that affect the production structure of

the economy, such as technological differences, missing factors of production,

government policies, and the institutional structure.

The second group of explanations focuses on international capital market

imperfections, mainly sovereign risk (risk of nationalization) and asymmetric

information. Although the expected return on investment might be high in

many developing countries, it does not flow there because of the high level of

uncertainty associated with those expected returns.

2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucas paradox

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