37
Derivative (finance) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search This article needs additional citations for verification . Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (October 2010) Financial markets Public market Exchange Securities Bond market Fixed income Corporate bond Government bond Municipal bond Bond valuation High-yield debt Stock market Stock Preferred stock Common stock Registered share Voting share Stock exchange Derivatives market Securitization Hybrid security Credit derivative Futures exchange OTC, non organized Spot market Forwards Swaps

Aima Study

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 1/37

Derivative (finance)From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search 

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve thisarticle by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged andremoved. (October 2010)

Financial markets

Public market

ExchangeSecurities

Bond market

Fixed incomeCorporate bond

Government bondMunicipal bondBond valuationHigh-yield debt

Stock market

Stock Preferred stock Common stock 

Registered shareVoting share

Stock exchange

Derivatives market

SecuritizationHybrid securityCredit derivativeFutures exchange

OTC, non organized

Spot marketForwards

Swaps

Page 2: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 2/37

Options

Foreign exchange

Exchange rateCurrency

Other markets

Money marketReinsurance marketCommodity marketReal estate market

Practical trading

ParticipantsClearing house

Financial regulation

Finance seriesBanks and bankingCorporate financePersonal financePublic finance

v · d · e

A derivative instrument is a contract between two parties that specifies conditions—in particular, dates and the resulting values of the underlying variables—under which payments, or  payoffs, are to be made between the parties.[1][2]

One of the oldest derivatives is rice futures, which have been traded on the Dojima RiceExchange since the eighteenth century.[3] Derivatives are broadly categorized by the relationship between the underlying asset and the derivative (e.g., forward, option, swap); the type of underlying asset (e.g., equity derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives, interest rate derivatives,commodity derivatives, or credit derivatives); the market in which they trade (e.g., exchange-traded or over-the-counter ); and their pay-off profile.

Derivatives can be used for speculating purposes ("bets") or to hedge ("insurance"). For example,a speculator may sell deep in-the-money naked calls on a stock, expecting the stock price to plummet, but exposing himself to potentially unlimited losses. Very commonly, companies buycurrency forwards in order to limit losses due to fluctuations in the exchange rate of twocurrencies.

Contents[hide]

• 1 Usage

○ 1.1 Hedging

○ 1.2 Speculation and arbitrage

• 2 Types

Page 3: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 3/37

○ 2.1 OTC and exchange-traded

○ 2.2 Common derivative contracttypes

○ 2.3 Examples

• 3 Valuation

○ 3.1 Market and arbitrage-free prices

○ 3.2 Determining the market price

○ 3.3 Determining the arbitrage-free price

• 4 Criticism

○ 4.1 Risk 

○ 4.2 Counter-party risk 

4.3 Large notional value○ 4.4 Leverage of an economy's debt

• 5 Benefits

• 6 Government regulation

• 7 Glossary

• 8 See also

• 9 References

• 10 Further reading

• 11 External links

[edit] Usage

This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged andremoved. (March 2011)

Derivatives are used by investors to:

•  provide leverage (or gearing), such that a small movement in the underlying value can causea large difference in the value of the derivative;

• speculate and make a profit if the value of the underlying asset moves the way they expect

(e.g., moves in a given direction, stays in or out of a specified range, reaches a certain level);• hedge or mitigate risk in the underlying, by entering into a derivative contract whose value

moves in the opposite direction to their underlying position and cancels part or all of it out;

• obtain exposure to the underlying where it is not possible to trade in the underlying (e.g.,weather derivatives);

• create option ability where the value of the derivative is linked to a specific condition or event (e.g. the underlying reaching a specific price level).

Page 4: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 4/37

[edit] Hedging

This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged andremoved. (October 2010)

Derivatives allow risk related to the price of the underlying asset to be transferred from one partyto another. For example, a wheat farmer and a miller could sign a futures contract to exchange aspecified amount of cash for a specified amount of wheat in the future. Both parties have reduceda future risk: for the wheat farmer, the uncertainty of the price, and for the miller, the availabilityof wheat. However, there is still the risk that no wheat will be available because of eventsunspecified by the contract, such as the weather, or that one party will renege on the contract.Although a third party, called a clearing house, insures a futures contract, not all derivatives areinsured against counter-party risk.

From another perspective, the farmer and the miller both reduce a risk and acquire a risk whenthey sign the futures contract: the farmer reduces the risk that the price of wheat will fall belowthe price specified in the contract and acquires the risk that the price of wheat will rise above the

 price specified in the contract (thereby losing additional income that he could have earned). Themiller, on the other hand, acquires the risk that the price of wheat will fall below the pricespecified in the contract (thereby paying more in the future than he otherwise would have) andreduces the risk that the price of wheat will rise above the price specified in the contract. In thissense, one party is the insurer (risk taker) for one type of risk, and the counter-party is the insurer (risk taker) for another type of risk.

Hedging also occurs when an individual or institution buys an asset (such as a commodity, a bond that has coupon payments, a stock that pays dividends, and so on) and sells it using afutures contract. The individual or institution has access to the asset for a specified amount of time, and can then sell it in the future at a specified price according to the futures contract. Of course, this allows the individual or institution the benefit of holding the asset, while reducing

the risk that the future selling price will deviate unexpectedly from the market's currentassessment of the future value of the asset.

Derivatives traders at the Chicago Board of Trade

Derivatives can serve legitimate business purposes. For example, a corporation borrows a largesum of money at a specific interest rate.[4] The rate of interest on the loan resets every six months.The corporation is concerned that the rate of interest may be much higher in six months. Thecorporation could buy a forward rate agreement (FRA), which is a contract to pay a fixed rate of 

Page 5: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 5/37

interest six months after purchases on a notional amount of money.[5] If the interest rate after sixmonths is above the contract rate, the seller will pay the difference to the corporation, or FRA buyer. If the rate is lower, the corporation will pay the difference to the seller. The purchase of the FRA serves to reduce the uncertainty concerning the rate increase and stabilize earnings.

[edit] Speculation and arbitrage

Derivatives can be used to acquire risk, rather than to insure or hedge against risk. Thus, someindividuals and institutions will enter into a derivative contract to speculate on the value of theunderlying asset, betting that the party seeking insurance will be wrong about the future value of the underlying asset. Speculators look to buy an asset in the future at a low price according to aderivative contract when the future market price is high, or to sell an asset in the future at a high price according to a derivative contract when the future market price is low.

Individuals and institutions may also look for arbitrage opportunities, as when the current buying price of an asset falls below the price specified in a futures contract to sell the asset.

Speculative trading in derivatives gained a great deal of notoriety in 1995 when Nick Leeson, atrader at Barings Bank , made poor and unauthorized investments in futures contracts. Through a

combination of poor judgment, lack of oversight by the bank's management and regulators, andunfortunate events like the Kobe earthquake, Leeson incurred a US$1.3 billion loss that bankrupted the centuries-old institution.[6]

[edit] Types

[edit] OTC and exchange-traded

In broad terms, there are two groups of derivative contracts, which are distinguished by the waythey are traded in the market:

• Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives are contracts that are traded (and privately negotiated)directly between two parties, without going through an exchange or other intermediary.Products such as swaps, forward rate agreements, and exotic options are almost always

traded in this way. The OTC derivative market is the largest market for derivatives, and islargely unregulated with respect to disclosure of information between the parties, since theOTC market is made up of banks and other highly sophisticated parties, such as hedge funds.Reporting of OTC amounts are difficult because trades can occur in private, without activity being visible on any exchange. According to the Bank for International Settlements, the totaloutstanding notional amount is US$684 trillion (as of June 2008).[7] Of this total notionalamount, 67% are interest rate contracts, 8% are credit default swaps (CDS), 9% are foreignexchange contracts, 2% are commodity contracts, 1% are equity contracts, and 12% areother. Because OTC derivatives are not traded on an exchange, there is no central counter- party. Therefore, they are subject to counter-party risk, like an ordinary contract, since eachcounter-party relies on the other to perform.

• Exchange-traded derivative contracts (ETD) are those derivatives instruments that aretraded via specialized derivatives exchanges or other exchanges. A derivatives exchange is amarket where individuals trade standardized contracts that have been defined by theexchange.[8] A derivatives exchange acts as an intermediary to all related transactions, andtakes initial margin from both sides of the trade to act as a guarantee. The world's largest[9]

derivatives exchanges (by number of transactions) are the Korea Exchange (which listsKOSPI Index Futures & Options), Eurex (which lists a wide range of European productssuch as interest rate & index products), and CME Group (made up of the 2007 merger of the

Page 6: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 6/37

Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade and the 2008 acquisition of the New York Mercantile Exchange). According to BIS, the combined turnover in theworld's derivatives exchanges totaled USD 344 trillion during Q4 2005. Some types of derivative instruments also may trade on traditional exchanges. For instance, hybridinstruments such as convertible bonds and/or convertible preferred may be listed on stock or  bond exchanges. Also, warrants (or "rights") may be listed on equity exchanges.Performance Rights, Cash xPRTs and various other instruments that essentially consist of acomplex set of options bundled into a simple package are routinely listed on equityexchanges. Like other derivatives, these publicly traded derivatives provide investors accessto risk/reward and volatility characteristics that, while related to an underlying commodity,nonetheless are distinctive.

[edit] Common derivative contract types

There are three major classes of derivatives:

1. Futures/Forwards are contracts to buy or sell an asset on or before a future date at a pricespecified today. A futures contract differs from a forward contract in that the futurescontract is a standardized contract written by a clearing house that operates an exchange

where the contract can be bought and sold, whereas a forward contract is a non-standardized contract written by the parties themselves.

2. Options are contracts that give the owner the right, but not the obligation, to buy (in thecase of a call option) or sell (in the case of a  put option) an asset. The price at which thesale takes place is known as the strike price, and is specified at the time the parties enter into the option. The option contract also specifies a maturity date. In the case of aEuropean option, the owner has the right to require the sale to take place on (but not before) the maturity date; in the case of an American option, the owner can require thesale to take place at any time up to the maturity date. If the owner of the contractexercises this right, the counter-party has the obligation to carry out the transaction.

3. Swaps are contracts to exchange cash (flows) on or before a specified future date basedon the underlying value of currencies/exchange rates, bonds/interest rates, commodities,stocks or other assets.

More complex derivatives can be created by combining the elements of these basic types. For example, the holder of a swaption has the right, but not the obligation, to enter into a swap on or  before a specified future date.

[edit] Examples

The overall derivatives market has five major classes of underlying asset:

• interest rate derivatives (the largest)

• foreign exchange derivatives

• credit derivatives

• equity derivatives

• commodity derivatives

Some common examples of these derivatives are:

UNDERLYING CONTRACT TYPES

Exchange- Exchange- OTC swap OTC forward OTC option

Page 7: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 7/37

traded futures traded options

Equity

DJIA IndexfutureSingle-stock future

Option on DJIA Index futureSingle-shareoption

Equity swapBack-to-back Repurchaseagreement

Stock optionWarrantTurbo warrant

Interest rateEurodollar futureEuribor future

Option onEurodollar futureOption onEuribor future

Interest rateswap

Forward rateagreement

Interest ratecap and floor SwaptionBasis swapBond option

Credit Bond futureOption on Bondfuture

Credit defaultswapTotal returnswap

Repurchaseagreement

Credit defaultoption

Foreignexchange

Currency futureOption oncurrency future

Currencyswap

Currencyforward

Currencyoption

Commodity WTI crude oilfutures

Weather derivatives

Commodityswap

Iron oreforwardcontract

Gold option

Other examples of underlying exchangeables are:

• Property (mortgage) derivatives

• Economic derivatives that pay off according to economic reports[10]  as measured and reported by national statistical agencies

• Freight derivatives

• Inflation derivatives

• Weather derivatives

• Insurance derivatives[citation needed ]

• Emissions derivatives[11] 

[edit] Valuation

Page 8: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 8/37

Total world derivatives from 1998–2007[12] compared to total world wealth in the year 2000 [13]

[edit] Market and arbitrage-free prices

Two common measures of value are:

• Market price, i.e., the price at which traders are willing to buy or sell the contract;

• Arbitrage-free price, meaning that no risk-free profits can be made by trading in thesecontracts; see rational pricing.

[edit] Determining the market price

For exchange-traded derivatives, market price is usually transparent ( making it difficult toautomatically broadcast prices. In particular with OTC contracts, there is no central exchange tocollate and disseminate prices.

[edit] Determining the arbitrage-free price

The arbitrage-free price for a derivatives contract can be complex, and there are many differentvariables to consider. Arbitrage-free pricing is a central topic of financial mathematics. For futures/forwards the arbitrage free price is relatively straightforward, involving the price of theunderlying together with the cost of carry (income received less interest costs), although therecan be complexities.

However, for options and more complex derivatives, pricing involves developing a complex pricing model: understanding the stochastic process of the price of the underlying asset is oftencrucial. A key equation for the theoretical valuation of options is the Black–Scholes formula, 

which is based on the assumption that the cash flows from a European stock  option can bereplicated by a continuous buying and selling strategy using only the stock. A simplified versionof this valuation technique is the binomial options model.

OTC represents the biggest challenge in using models to price derivatives. Since these contractsare not publicly traded, no market price is available to validate the theoretical valuation. Andmost of the model's results are input-dependant (meaning the final price depends heavily on howwe derive the pricing inputs).[14] Therefore it is common that OTC derivatives are priced by

Page 9: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 9/37

Independent Agents that both counterparties involved in the deal designate upfront (whensigning the contract).

[edit] CriticismDerivatives are often subject to the following criticisms:

[edit] Risk 

See also: List of trading losses

The use of derivatives can result in large losses because of the use of leverage, or borrowing.Derivatives allow investors to earn large returns from small movements in the underlying asset's price. However, investors could lose large amounts if the price of the underlying moves againstthem significantly. There have been several instances of massive losses in derivative markets,such as:

• American International Group (AIG) lost more than US$18 billion through asubsidiary over the preceding three quarters on Credit Default Swaps (CDS).[15] TheUS federal government then gave the company US$85 billion in an attempt to

stabilize the economy before an imminent stock market crash. It was reported that thegifting of money was necessary because over the next few quarters, the company waslikely to lose more money.

• The loss of US$7.2 Billion  by Société Générale in January 2008 through mis-use of futures contracts.

• The loss of US$6.4 billion in the failed fund Amaranth Advisors, which was longnatural gas in September 2006 when the price plummeted.

• The loss of US$4.6 billion in the failed fund Long-Term Capital Management in1998.

• The loss of US$1.3 billion equivalent in oil derivatives in 1993 and 1994 by

Metallgesellschaft AG.[16]

• The loss of US$1.2 billion equivalent in equity derivatives in 1995 by Barings Bank .[17]

[edit] Counter-party risk 

Some derivatives (especially swaps) expose investors to counter-party risk . Different typesof derivatives have different levels of counter-party risk. For example, standardized stock options by law require the party at risk to have a certain amount deposited with theexchange, showing that they can pay for any losses; banks that help businesses swap variablefor fixed rates on loans may do credit checks on both parties. However, in privateagreements between two companies, for example, there may not be benchmarks for 

 performing due diligence and risk analysis.[edit] Large notional value

Derivatives typically have a large notional value. As such, there is the danger that their usecould result in losses that the investor would be unable to compensate for. The possibilitythat this could lead to a chain reaction ensuing in an economic crisis, has been pointed out byfamed investor Warren Buffett in Berkshire Hathaway's 2002 annual report. Buffett calledthem 'financial weapons of mass destruction.' The problem with derivatives is that theycontrol an increasingly larger notional amount of assets and this may lead to distortions in

Page 10: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 10/37

the real capital and equities markets. Investors begin to look at the derivatives markets tomake a decision to buy or sell securities and so what was originally meant to be a market totransfer risk now becomes a leading indicator. (See Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report for 2002)

[edit] Leverage of an economy's debt

Derivatives massively leverage the debt in an economy, making it ever more difficult for the underlying real economy to service its debt obligations, thereby curtailing real economicactivity, which can cause a recession or even depression. In the view of Marriner S. Eccles,U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman from November, 1934 to February, 1948, too high a level of debt was one of the primary causes of the 1920s–30s Great Depression. (See BerkshireHathaway Annual Report for 2002)

[edit] BenefitsThe use of derivatives also has its benefits:

• Derivatives facilitate the buying and selling of risk, and many financial professionalsconsider this to have a positive impact on the economic system. Although someone losesmoney while someone else gains money with a derivative, under normal circumstances,trading in derivatives should not adversely affect the economic system because it is notzero sum in utility.

[edit] Government regulationIn the context of a 2010 examination of the ICE Trust, an industry self-regulatory body, Gary Gensler , the chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission which regulates mostderivatives, was quoted saying that the derivatives marketplace as it functions now "adds upto higher costs to all Americans." More oversight of the banks in this market is needed, healso said. Additionally, the report said, "[t]he Department of Justice is looking intoderivatives, too. The department’s antitrust unit is actively investigating 'the possibility of 

anticompetitive practices in the credit derivatives clearing, trading and information servicesindustries,' according to a department spokeswoman."[18]

[edit] Glossary• Bilateral netting: A legally enforceable arrangement between a bank and a counter-party

that creates a single legal obligation covering all included individual contracts. Thismeans that a bank’s obligation, in the event of the default or insolvency of one of the parties, would be the net sum of all positive and negative fair values of contractsincluded in the bilateral netting arrangement.

• Credit derivative: A contract that transfers credit risk from a protection buyer to a credit protection seller. Credit derivative products can take many forms, such as credit defaultswaps, credit linked notes and total return swaps.

• Derivative: A financial contract whose value is derived from the performance of assets,interest rates, currency exchange rates, or indexes. Derivative transactions include a wideassortment of financial contracts including structured debt obligations and deposits,swaps, futures, options, caps, floors, collars, forwards and various combinations thereof.

• Exchange-traded derivative contracts: Standardized derivative contracts (e.g., futurescontracts and options) that are transacted on an organized futures exchange.

Page 11: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 11/37

• Gross negative fair value: The sum of the fair values of contracts where the bank owesmoney to its counter-parties, without taking into account netting. This represents themaximum losses the bank’s counter-parties would incur if the bank defaults and there isno netting of contracts, and no bank collateral was held by the counter-parties.

• Gross positive fair value: The sum total of the fair values of contracts where the bank is

owed money by its counter-parties, without taking into account netting. This representsthe maximum losses a bank could incur if all its counter-parties default and there is nonetting of contracts, and the bank holds no counter-party collateral.

• High-risk mortgage securities: Securities where the price or expected average life ishighly sensitive to interest rate changes, as determined by the FFIEC policy statement onhigh-risk mortgage securities.

•  Notional amount: The nominal or face amount that is used to calculate payments madeon swaps and other risk management products. This amount generally does not changehands and is thus referred to as notional.

• Over-the-counter (OTC) derivative contracts: Privately negotiated derivative contractsthat are transacted off organized futures exchanges.

• Structured notes: Non-mortgage-backed debt securities, whose cash flow characteristicsdepend on one or more indices and / or have embedded forwards or options.

• Total risk-based capital: The sum of tier 1 plus tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital consists of common shareholders equity, perpetual preferred shareholders equity with non-cumulative dividends, retained earnings, and minority interests in the equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries. Tier 2 capital consists of subordinated debt, intermediate-term preferred stock , cumulative and long-term preferred stock, and a portion of a bank’sallowance for loan and lease losses.

[edit] See also

 Book: Finance

Wikipedia books are collections of articles that can bedownloaded or ordered in print.

• Dual currency deposit

• Forward contract

• FX Option

[edit] References

1. ^ Rubinstein, Mark (1999). Rubinstein on derivatives. Risk Books. ISBN 1899332537.2. ^ Hull, John C. (2006). Options, Futures and Other Derivatives, Sixth Edition. Prentice Hall.

 pp. 1.

3. ^ Kaori Suzuki and David Turner (December 10, 2005). "Sensitive politics over Japan'sstaple crop delays rice futures plan". The Financial Times. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d9f45d80-6922-11da-bd30-0000779e2340.html. RetrievedOctober 23, 2010.

4. ^ Chisolm, Derivatives Demystified (Wiley 2004)

Page 12: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 12/37

5. ^ Chisolm, Derivatives Demystified (Wiley 2004) Notional sum means there is no actual principal.

6. ^ News.BBC.co.uk , "How Leeson broke the bank – BBC Economy"

7. ^ BIS survey: The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) semi-annual OTC derivativesstatistics report, for end of June 2008, shows US$683.7 billion total notional amounts

outstanding of OTC derivatives with a gross market value of US$20 trillion. See also  Prior  Period Regular OTC Derivatives Market Statistics.

8. ^ Hull, J.C. (2009). Options, futures, and other derivatives . Upper Saddle River, NJ :Pearson/Prentice Hall, c2009

9. ^ Futures and Options Week : According to figures published in F&O Week 10 October 2005. See also FOW Website.

10.^ "Biz.Yahoo.com". Biz.Yahoo.com. 2010-08-23. http://biz.yahoo.com/c/e.html. Retrieved2010-08-29.

11.^ FOW.com, Emissions derivatives, 1 December 2005

12.^ "Bis.org". Bis.org. 2010-05-07. http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm. Retrieved 2010-

08-29.13.^ "Launch of the WIDER study on The World Distribution of Household Wealth: 5

December 2006". http://www.wider.unu.edu/events/past-events/2006-events/en_GB/05-12-2006/. Retrieved 9 June 2009.

14.^ Boumlouka, Makrem (2009),"Alternatives in OTC Pricing", Hedge Funds Review, 10-30-2009. http://www.hedgefundsreview.com/hedge-funds-review/news/1560286/otc-pricing-deal-struck-fitch-solutions-pricing-partners

15.^ Kelleher, James B. (2008-09-18). ""Buffett's Time Bomb Goes Off on Wall Street" byJames B. Kelleher of Reuters". Reuters.com.http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN1837154020080918. Retrieved 2010-08-29.

16.^ Edwards, Franklin (1995), "Derivatives Can Be Hazardous To Your Health: The Case of 

Metallgesellschaft",  Derivatives Quarterly (Spring 1995): 8–17,http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/fedwards/papers/DerivativesCanBeHazardous.pdf  

17.^ Whaley, Robert (2006).  Derivatives: markets, valuation, and risk management . John Wileyand Sons. p. 506. ISBN 0471786322. http://books.google.com/books?id=Hb7xXy-wqiYC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. 

18.^ Story, Louise, "A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Trading in Derivatives", The New York Times, December 11, 2010 (December 12, 2010 p. A1 NY ed.). Retrieved 2010-12-12.

[edit] Further reading• John C. Hull (2011), Options, Futures and Other Derivatives, Pearson Education, 8th

Edition

• Michael Durbin (2011), All About Derivatives, McGraw-Hill, 2nd Edition

• Mehraj Mattoo (1997), Structured Derivatives: New Tools for Investment ManagementA Handbook of Structuring, Pricing & Investor Applications (Financial Times)

[edit] External links• BBC News – Derivatives simple guide

• European Union proposals on derivatives regulation – 2008 onwards

Page 13: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 13/37

• Derivatives in Africa

• Derivatives Litigation

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derivative_(finance)"

View page ratings

Rate this pageRate this pagePage ratingsWhat's this?

Current average ratings.

Trustworthy

Objective

Complete

Well-written

I am highly knowledgeable about this topic (optional)

I have a relevant college/university degree

It is part of my profession

It is a deep personal passion

The source of my knowledge is not listed here

I would like to help improve Wikipedia, send me an e-mail (optional)

email@exa

 We will send you a confirmation e-mail. We will not share your address with anyone. (Privacy policy)

Submit ratingsSaved successfullyYour ratings have not been submitted yet

Your ratings have expiredPlease reevaluate this page and submit new ratings.

An error has occured. Please try again later.

Page 14: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 14/37

Thanks! Your ratings have been saved.

Please take a moment to complete a short survey.Start surveyMaybe later 

Thanks! Your ratings have been saved.

Do you want to create an account?An account will help you track your edits, get involved in discussions, and be a part of thecommunity.

Create an accountorLog inMaybe later 

Thanks! Your ratings have been saved.

Did you know that you can edit this page?Edit this pageMaybe later 

Categories: Derivatives (finance

In calculus, a branch of mathematics, the derivative is a measure of how a function changes asits input changes. Loosely speaking, a derivative can be thought of as how much one quantity ischanging in response to changes in some other quantity; for example, the derivative of the position of a moving object with respect to time is the object's instantaneous velocity.

The derivative of a function at a chosen input value describes the best linear approximation of the function near that input value. For a real-valued function of a single real variable, thederivative at a point equals the slope of the tangent line to the graph of the function at that point.In higher dimensions, the derivative of a function at a point is a linear transformation called thelinearization.[1] A closely related notion is the differential of a function.

The process of finding a derivative is called differentiation

What Does Derivative Mean?

A security whose price is dependent upon or derived from one or more underlying assets. The derivative itself is

merely a contract between two or more parties. Its value is determined by fluctuations in the underlying asset. The

most common underlying assets include stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates and market indexes.

Most derivatives are characterized by high leverage.

Page 15: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 15/37

Investopedia explains Derivative

Futures contracts, forward contracts, options and swaps are the most common types of derivatives. Derivatives are

contracts and can be used as an underlying asset. There are even derivatives based on weather data, such as the

amount of rain or the number of sunny days in a particular region.

Derivatives are generally used as an instrument to hedge risk, but can also be used for speculative purposes. For 

example, a European investor purchasing shares of an American company off of an American exchange (using U.S.

dollars to do so) would be exposed to exchange-rate risk while holding that stock. To hedge this risk, the investor 

could purchase currency futures to lock in a specified exchange rate for the future stock sale and currency conversion

back into Euros.

Read more: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/derivative.asp#ixzz1WUB0NOGp

Definition of DERIVATIVE 1: a word formed by derivation 2: something derived 3: the limit of the ratio of the change in a function to the corresponding change in its independent variableas the latter change approaches zero4a : a chemical substance related structurally to another substance and theoretically derivable from it b : asubstance that can be made from another substance5

: a contract or security thatderives

its value from that of an underlying asset (as another security) or fromthe value of a rate (as of interest or currency exchange) or index of asset value (as a stock index)

See derivative defined for English-language learners » See derivative defined for kids » 

Examples of DERIVATIVE 1. The word “childish” is a derivative of “child.”

2. Tofu is one of many soybean derivatives

Page 16: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 16/37

Did you know that the foreign exchange market (also known as FX or  forex) is the largest market in the world? In fact, more

than $3 trillion is traded in the currency markets on a daily basis as of 2009. This article is certainly not a primer for currency

trading, but it will help you understand exchange rates and why some fluctuate while others do not.

What Is an Exchange Rate?

An exchange rate is the rate at which one currency can be exchanged for another. In other words, it is the value of another 

country's currency compared to that of your own. If you are traveling to another country, you need to "buy" the local

currency. Just like the price of any asset, the exchange rate is the price at which you can buy that currency. If you are

traveling to Egypt, for example, and the exchange rate for U.S. dollars 1:5.5 Egyptian pounds, this means that for every U.S.

dollar, you can buy five and a half Egyptian pounds. Theoretically, identical assets should sell at the same price in different

countries, because the exchange rate must maintain the inherent value of one currency against the other.

Fixed Exchange Rates

There are two ways the price of a currency can be determined against another. A fixed, or pegged, rate is a rate the

government (central bank) sets and maintains as the official exchange rate. A set price will be determined against a major 

world currency (usually the U.S. dollar, but also other major currencies such as the euro, the yen or a basket of currencies).

In order to maintain the local exchange rate, the central bank buys and sells its own currency on the foreign exchange

market in return for the currency to which it is pegged. (To learn more, read What Are Central Banks?  and Get To Know The

Major Central Banks.)

If, for example, it is determined that the value of a single unit of local currency is equal to US$3, the central bank will have to

ensure that it can supply the market with those dollars. In order to maintain the rate, the central bank must keep a high level

of  foreign reserves. This is a reserved amount of foreign currency held by the central bank that it can use to release (or 

absorb) extra funds into (or out of) the market. This ensures an appropriate money supply, appropriate fluctuations in the

market (inflation/deflation), and ultimately, the exchange rate. The central bank can also adjust the official exchange rate

when necessary.

Floating Exchange Rates

Unlike the fixed rate, a floating exchange rate is determined by the private market through supply and demand. A floating

rate is often termed "self-correcting", as any differences in supply and demand will automatically be corrected in the market.

Take a look at this simplified model: if demand for a currency is low, its value will decrease, thus making imported goods

Page 17: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 17/37

more expensive and stimulating demand for local goods and services. This in turn will generate more jobs, causing an auto-

correction in the market. A floating exchange rate is constantly changing.

In reality, no currency is wholly fixed or floating. In a fixed regime, market pressures can also influence changes in the

exchange rate. Sometimes, when a local currency does reflect its true value against its pegged currency, a "black market",

which is more reflective of actual supply and demand, may develop. A central bank will often then be forced to revalue or 

devalue the official rate so that the rate is in line with the unofficial one, thereby halting the activity of the black market.

In a floating regime, the central bank may also intervene when it is necessary to ensure stability and to avoid inflation;

however, it is less often that the central bank of a floating regime will interfere.

The World Once Pegged

Between 1870 and 1914, there was a global fixed exchange rate. Currencies were linked to gold, meaning that the value of 

a local currency was fixed at a set exchange rate to gold ounces. This was known as the gold standard. This allowed for 

unrestricted capital mobility as well as global stability in currencies and trade; however, with the start of World War I, the

gold standard was abandoned. (For more on the gold standard, see The Gold Standard Revisited .)

At the end of World War II, the conference at Bretton Woods, an effort to generate global economic stability and increase

global trade, established the basic rules and regulations governing international exchange. As such, an international

monetary system, embodied in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was established to promote foreign trade and to

maintain the monetary stability of countries and therefore that of the global economy. (For further reading on the IMF,

see What Is The International Monetary Fund? )

It was agreed that currencies would once again be fixed, or pegged, but this time to the U.S. dollar, which in turn was

pegged to gold at US$35 per ounce. What this meant was that the value of a currency was directly linked with the value of 

the U.S. dollar. So, if you needed to buy Japanese yen, the value of the yen would be expressed in U.S. dollars, whose

value in turn was determined in the value of gold. If a country needed to readjust the value of its currency, it could approach

the IMF to adjust the pegged value of its currency. The peg was maintained until 1971, when the U.S. dollar could no longer 

hold the value of the pegged rate of US$35 per ounce of gold.

From then on, major governments adopted a floating system, and all attempts to move back to a global peg were eventually

abandoned in 1985. Since then, no major economies have gone back to a peg, and the use of gold as a peg has been

completely abandoned.

Why Peg?

The reasons to peg a currency are linked to stability. Especially in today's developing nations, a country may decide to pegits currency to create a stable atmosphere for foreign investment. With a peg, the investor will always know what his or her 

investment's value is, and therefore will not have to worry about daily fluctuations. A pegged currency can also help to lower 

inflation rates and generate demand, which results from greater confidence in the stability of the currency.

Fixed regimes, however, can often lead to severe financial crises since a peg is difficult to maintain in the long run. This was

seen in the Mexican (1995), Asian (1997) and Russian (1997) financial crises: an attempt to maintain a high value of the

local currency to the peg resulted in the currencies eventually becoming overvalued. This meant that the governments could

no longer meet the demands to convert the local currency into the foreign currency at the pegged rate. With speculation and

panic, investors scrambled to get their money out and convert it into foreign currency before the local currency was devalued

against the peg; foreign reserve supplies eventually became depleted. In Mexico's case, the government was forced to

devalue the peso by 30%. In Thailand, the government eventually had to allow the currency to float, and by the end of 1997,

the Thai bhat had lost 50% of its as the market's demand and supply readjusted the value of the local currency. (For more

insight, see What Causes A Currency Crisis? )

Countries with pegs are often associated with having unsophisticated capital markets and weak regulating institutions. The

peg is therefore there to help create stability in such an environment. It takes a stronger system as well as a mature market

to maintain a float. When a country is forced to devalue its currency, it is also required to proceed with some form of 

economic reform, like implementing greater transparency, in an effort to strengthen its financial institutions.

Some governments may choose to have a "floating," or "crawling" peg, whereby the government reassesses the value of the

peg periodically and then changes the peg rate accordingly. Usually this causes devaluation, but it is controlled to avoid

market panic. This method is often used in the transition from a peg to a floating regime, and it allows the government to

"save face" by not being forced to devalue in an uncontrollable crisis.

Page 18: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 18/37

Conclusion

Although the peg has worked in creating global trade and monetary stability, it was used only at a time when all the major 

economies were a part of it. And while a floating regime is not without its flaws, it has proved to be a more efficient means of 

determining the long-term value of a currency and creating equilibrium in the international market.

Read more: http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/020603.asp#ixzz1WUE6ICPf 

What Does Gold Standard Mean?

A monetary system in which a country's government allows its currency unit to be freely converted into fixed amounts

of gold and vice versa. The exchange rate under the gold standard monetary system is determined by the economic

difference for an ounce of gold between two currencies. The gold standard was mainly used from 1875 to 1914

and also during the interwar years.

Investopedia explains Gold Standard 

The use of the gold standard would mark the first use of formalized exchange rates in history. However, the system

was flawed because countries needed to hold large gold reserves in order to keep up with the volatile nature of 

supply and demand for currency.

After World War II, a modified version of the gold standard monetary system, the Bretton Woods monetary

system, was created as its successor. This successor system was initially successful, but because it also depended

heavily on gold reserves, it was abandoned in 1971 when U.S President Nixon "closed the gold window".

Read more: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/goldstandard.asp#ixzz1WUIAQM9p

Since the early 1990s, there have been many cases of currency investors who have been caught off guard, which lead to

runs on currencies and capital flight. What makes currency investors and international financiers respond and act like this?

Do they evaluate the minutia of an economy, or do they go by gut instinct? In this article, we'll look at currency instability and

uncover what really causes it.

What Is a Currency Crisis?

A currency crisis is brought on by a decline in the value of a country's currency. This decline in value negatively affects an

economy by creating instabilities in exchange rates, meaning that one unit of the currency no longer buys as much as it

used to in another. To simplify the matter, we can say that crises develop as an interaction between investor expectations

and what those expectations cause to happen. (Still learning about currencies? Check out Common Questions About 

Currency Trading  and our  Forex Special Feature.)

Government Policy, Central Banks and the Role of Investors

Page 19: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 19/37

Page 20: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 20/37

• A self-fulfilling crisis resulted when investors feared a defaulton debt by the government.

When the government finally decided to devalue the currency in

December of 1994, it made major mistakes. It did not devalue the

currency by a large enough amount, which showed that while still

following the pegging policy, it was unwilling to take the necessary

painful steps. This led foreign investors to push the peso exchange

rate drastically lower, which ultimately forced the government to

increase domestic interest rates to nearly 80%. This took a major toll

on the country's GDP, which also fell. The crisis was finally alleviated

by an emergency loan from the United States.

Example 2: Asian Crisis of 1997 

Southeast Asia was home to the "tiger " economies, and the Southeast

Asian crisis. Foreign investment had poured in for years.

Underdeveloped economies experience rapid rates of growth and high

levels of exports. The rapid growth was attributed to capital investment

projects, but the overall productivity did not meet expectations. While

the exact cause of the crisis is disputed, Thailand was the first to run

into trouble. (Keep reading about these economies in Dragons,

Samurai Warriors And Sushi On Wall Street and What Is An Emerging 

Market Economy? )

Much like Mexico, Thailand relied heavily on foreign debt, causing it

to teeter on the brink of illiquidity. Primarily, real estate dominated

investment was inefficiently managed. Huge current account deficits

were maintained by the private sector, which increasingly relied on

foreign investment to stay afloat. This exposed the country to a

significant amount of foreign exchange risk. This risk came to a head

when the United States increased domestic interest rates, which

ultimately lowered the amount of foreign investment going into

Southeast Asian economies. Suddenly, the current account deficits

became a huge problem, and a financial contagion quickly developed.

(For more insight, read Current Account Deficits.)

The Southeast Asian crisis stemmed from several key points:

• As fixed exchange rates became exceedingly difficult tomaintain, many Southeast Asian currencies dropped invalue.

• Southeast Asian economies saw a rapid increase inprivately-held debt, which was bolstered in several countriesby overinflated asset values. Defaults increased as foreign

capital inflows dropped off.

• Foreign investment may have been at least partiallyspeculative, and investors may not have been paying closeenough attention to the risks involved.

Lessons Learned

There several key lessons from these crises:

Page 21: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 21/37

• An economy can be initially solvent and still succumb to a crisis. Having a low amount of debt is not enough tokeep policies functioning.

• Trade surpluses and low inflation rates can diminish the extent at which a crisis impacts an economy, but in caseof financial contagion, speculation limits options in the short run.

• Governments will often be forced to provide liquidity to private banks, which can invest in short-term debt that willrequire near-term payments. If the government also invests in short-term debt, it can run through foreign reservesvery quickly.

• Maintaining the fixed exchange rate does not make a central bank's policy work simply on face value. Whileannouncing intentions to retain the peg can help, investors will ultimately look at the central bank's ability tomaintain the policy. The central bank will have to devalue in a sufficient manner in order to be credible.

(To keep reading about this, see Forces Behind Exchange Rates.)

Conclusion

Growth in developing countries is generally positive for the global economy, but growth rates that are too rapid can create

instability and a higher chance of capital flight and runs on the domestic currency. Efficient central bank management can

help, but predicting the route an economy will ultimately take is a tough journey to map out.

Read more: http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/currency-crises.asp#ixzz1WUJHNWal

What Does Crawling Peg Mean?

A system of exchange rate adjustment in which a currency with a fixed exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate within aband of rates. The par value of the stated currency is also adjusted frequently due to market factors such as inflation.

This gradual shift of the currency's par value is done as an alternative to a sudden and significant devaluation of the

currency.

Investopedia explains Crawling Peg For example, in the 1990s, Mexico had fixed its peso with the U.S. dollar. However, due to the significant inflation in

Mexico, as compared to the U.S., it was evident that the peso would need to be severely devalued. Because a rapid

devaluation would create instability, Mexico put into place a crawling peg exchange rate adjustment system, and the

peso was slowly devalued toward a more appropriate exchange rate.

Read more: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/crawlingpeg.asp#ixzz1WUJcTlfw

1997 Asian financial crisisFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search 

Page 22: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 22/37

Countries most affected by the Asian Crisis.

The Asian financial crisis was a period of financial crisis that gripped much of  Asia beginningin July 1997, and raised fears of a worldwide economic meltdown due to financial contagion.

The crisis started in Thailand with the financial collapse of the Thai baht caused by the decisionof the Thai government to float the baht, cutting its peg to the USD, after exhaustive efforts tosupport it in the face of a severe financial overextension that was in part real estate driven. At thetime, Thailand had acquired a burden of foreign debt that made the country effectively bankrupt even before the collapse of its currency. As the crisis spread, most of  Southeast Asia and Japan saw slumping currencies, devalued stock markets and other asset prices, and a precipitous rise in private debt.[1]

Though there has been general agreement on the existence of a crisis and its consequences, whatis less clear are the causes of the crisis, as well as its scope and resolution. Indonesia, South

Korea and Thailand were the countries most affected by the crisis. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Laos and the Philippines were also hurt by the slump. The People's Republic of China, India, Taiwan,Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam were less affected, although all suffered from a loss of demandand confidence throughout the region.

Foreign debt-to-GDP ratios rose from 100% to 167% in the four large ASEAN economies in1993–96, then shot up beyond 180% during the worst of the crisis. In South Korea, the ratiosrose from 13 to 21% and then as high as 40%, while the other northern newly industrializedcountries fared much better. Only in Thailand and South Korea did debt service-to-exports ratiosrise.[2]

Although most of the governments of Asia had seemingly sound fiscal policies, the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) stepped in to initiate a $40 billion program to stabilize the currencies of 

South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, economies particularly hard hit by the crisis. The effortsto stem a global economic crisis did little to stabilize the domestic situation in Indonesia, however. After 30 years in power, President Suharto was forced to step down on 21 May 1998 inthe wake of widespread rioting that followed sharp price increases caused by a drasticdevaluation of the rupiah. The effects of the crisis lingered through 1998. In 1998 the Philippinesgrowth dropped to virtually zero. Only Singapore and Taiwan proved relatively insulated fromthe shock, but both suffered serious hits in passing, the former more so due to its size and

Page 23: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 23/37

geographical location between Malaysia and Indonesia. By 1999, however, analysts saw signsthat the economies of Asia were beginning to recover .[3]

Contents[hide]

• 1 History

• 2 IMF Role

○ 2.1 IMF and high interestrates

• 3 Thailand

• 4 Indonesia

• 5 South Korea

• 6 Philippines

7 Hong Kong• 8 Malaysia

• 9 Singapore

• 10 China

• 11 United States and Japan

• 12 Consequences

○ 12.1 Asia

○ 12.2 Outside Asia

• 13 See also

• 14 References

• 15 External links

[edit] HistoryUntil 1997, Asia attracted almost half of the total capital inflow into developing countries. Theeconomies of Southeast Asia in particular maintained high interest rates attractive to foreigninvestors looking for a high rate of return. As a result the region's economies received a largeinflow of money and experienced a dramatic run-up in asset  prices. At the same time, theregional economies of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and South Korea experiencedhigh growth rates, 8–12% GDP, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This achievement was widely

acclaimed by financial institutions including the IMF and World Bank , and was known as part of the "Asian economic miracle".

In 1994, noted economist Paul Krugman published an article attacking the idea of an "Asianeconomic miracle".[4] He argued that East Asia's economic growth had historically been the resultof increasing capital investment. However, total factor productivity had increased onlymarginally or not at all. Krugman argued that only growth in total factor productivity, and notcapital investment, could lead to long-term prosperity. Krugman's views would be seen by many

Page 24: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 24/37

as prescient after the financial crisis had become apparent, though he himself stated that he hadnot predicted the crisis nor foreseen its depth.[5]

The causes of the debacle are many and disputed. Thailand's economy developed into a bubblefueled by "hot money". More and more was required as the size of the bubble grew. The sametype of situation happened in Malaysia, and Indonesia, which had the added complication of 

what was called "crony capitalism".[6]

 The short-term capital flow was expensive and oftenhighly conditioned for quick  profit. Development money went in a largely uncontrolled manner to certain people only, not particularly the best suited or most efficient, but those closest to thecenters of power.[7]

At the time of the mid-1990s, Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea had large private currentaccount deficits and the maintenance of fixed exchange rates encouraged external borrowing andled to excessive exposure to foreign exchange risk in both the financial and corporate sectors. Inthe mid-1990s, two factors began to change their economic environment. As the U.S. economyrecovered from a recession in the early 1990s, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank  under  AlanGreenspan  began to raise U.S. interest rates to head off inflation. This made the U.S. a moreattractive investment destination relative to Southeast Asia, which had been attracting hot money

flows through high short-term interest rates, and raised the value of the U.S. dollar. For theSoutheast Asian nations which had currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar, the higher U.S. dollar caused their own exports to become more expensive and less competitive in the global markets.At the same time, Southeast Asia's export growth slowed dramatically in the spring of 1996,deteriorating their current account position.

Some economists have advanced the growing exports of China as a contributing factor toASEAN nations' export growth slowdown, though these economists maintain the main cause of the crises was excessive real estate speculation.[8] China had begun to compete effectively withother Asian exporters particularly in the 1990s after the implementation of a number of export-oriented reforms. Other economists dispute China's impact, noting that both ASEAN and Chinaexperienced simultaneous rapid export growth in the early 1990s.[9]

Many economists believe that the Asian crisis was created not by market psychology or technology, but by policies that distorted incentives within the lender  –  borrower relationship. Theresulting large quantities of credit that became available generated a highly leveraged economicclimate, and pushed up asset prices to an unsustainable level.[10] These asset prices eventually began to collapse, causing individuals and companies to default on debt obligations. Theresulting panic among lenders led to a large withdrawal of credit from the crisis countries,causing a credit crunch and further bankruptcies. In addition, as foreign investors attempted towithdraw their money, the exchange market was flooded with the currencies of the crisiscountries, putting depreciative pressure on their exchange rates. To prevent currency valuescollapsing, these countries' governments raised domestic interest rates to exceedingly high levels(to help diminish flight of capital by making lending more attractive to investors) and tointervene in the exchange market, buying up any excess domestic currency at the fixed exchangerate with foreign reserves. Neither of these policy responses could be sustained for long. Veryhigh interest rates, which can be extremely damaging to an economy that is healthy, wreakedfurther havoc on economies in an already fragile state, while the central banks werehemorrhaging foreign reserves, of which they had finite amounts. When it became clear that thetide of capital fleeing these countries was not to be stopped, the authorities ceased defendingtheir fixed exchange rates and allowed their currencies to float. The resulting depreciated valueof those currencies meant that foreign currency-denominated liabilities grew substantially indomestic currency terms, causing more bankruptcies and further deepening the crisis.

Page 25: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 25/37

Other economists, including Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs, have downplayed the role of thereal economy in the crisis compared to the financial markets. The rapidity with which the crisishappened has prompted Sachs and others to compare it to a classic  bank run prompted by asudden risk shock. Sachs pointed to strict monetary and contractory fiscal policies implemented by the governments on the advice of the IMF in the wake of the crisis, while Frederic Mishkin  points to the role of asymmetric information in the financial markets that led to a "herdmentality" among investors that magnified a small risk in the real economy. The crisis has thusattracted interest from behavioral economists interested in market psychology. Another possiblecause of the sudden risk shock may also be attributable to the handover of Hong Kongsovereignty on 1 July 1997. During the 1990s, hot money flew into the Southeast Asia region butinvestors were often ignorant of the actual fundamentals or risk profiles of the respectiveeconomies. The uncertainty regarding the future of Hong Kong led investors to shrink evenfurther away from Asia, exacerbating economic conditions in the area (subsequently leading tothe depreciation of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997).[11]

The foreign ministers of the 10 ASEAN countries believed that the well co-ordinatedmanipulation of their currencies was a deliberate attempt to destabilize the ASEAN economies.Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad accused George Soros of ruiningMalaysia's economy with "massive currency speculation." (Soros claims to have been a buyer of the ringgit during its fall, having sold it short in 1997.) Mahathir's claims were couched inantisemitic terms,[12] and in 2006 he apologized and withdrew the accusations.[13]

At the 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Subang Jaya, Malaysia, the foreign ministersissued a joint declaration on 25 July 1997 expressing serious concern and called for further intensification of ASEAN's cooperation to safeguard and promote ASEAN's interest in thisregard.[14] Coincidentally, on that same day, the central bankers of most of the affected countrieswere at the EMEAP (Executive Meeting of East Asia Pacific) meeting in Shanghai, and theyfailed to make the 'New Arrangement to Borrow' operational. A year earlier, the financeministers of these same countries had attended the 3rd APEC finance ministers meeting inKyoto, Japan on 17 March 1996, and according to that joint declaration, they had been unable to

double the amounts available under the 'General Agreement to Borrow' and the 'EmergencyFinance Mechanism'. As such, the crisis could be seen as the failure to adequately build capacityin time to prevent Currency Manipulation. This hypothesis enjoyed little support amongeconomists, however, who argue that no single investor could have had enough impact on themarket to successfully manipulate the currencies' values. In addition, the level of organizationnecessary to coordinate a massive exodus of investors from Southeast Asian currencies in order to manipulate their values rendered this possibility remote.[citation needed ]

[edit] IMF RoleSuch was the scope and the severity of the collapses involved that outside intervention,considered by many as a new kind of colonialism,[15] became urgently needed. Since the

countries melting down were among not only the richest in their region, but in the world, andsince hundreds of billions of dollars were at stake, any response to the crisis had to becooperative and international, in this case through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). TheIMF created a series of   bailouts ("rescue packages") for the most affected economies to enableaffected nations to avoid default, tying the packages to reforms that were intended to make therestored Asian currency, banking, and financial systems as much like those of the United Statesand Europe as possible. In other words, the IMF's support was conditional on a series of drasticeconomic reforms influenced by neoliberal economic principles called a "structural adjustment 

Page 26: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 26/37

 package" (SAP). The SAPs called on crisis-struck nations to cut back on government spending toreduce deficits, allow insolvent banks and financial institutions to fail, and aggressively raiseinterest rates. The reasoning was that these steps would restore confidence in the nations' fiscalsolvency, penalize insolvent companies, and protect currency values. Above all, it was stipulatedthat IMF-funded capital had to be administered rationally in the future, with no favored partiesreceiving funds by preference. In at least one of the affected countries the restrictions on foreignownership were greatly reduced.[16] There were to be adequate government controls set up tosupervise all financial activities, ones that were to be independent, in theory, of private interest.Insolvent institutions had to be closed, and insolvency itself had to be clearly defined. In short,exactly the same kinds of financial institutions found in the United States and Europe had to becreated in Asia, as a condition for IMF support. In addition, financial systems had to become"transparent", that is, provide the kind of reliable financial information used in the West to makesound financial decisions.[17]

However, the greatest criticism of the IMF's role in the crisis was targeted towards its response.[18] As country after country fell into crisis, many local businesses and governments that hadtaken out loans in US dollars, which suddenly became much more expensive relative to the localcurrency which formed their earned income, found themselves unable to pay their creditors. Thedynamics of the situation were closely similar to that of the Latin American debt crisis. Theeffects of the SAPs were mixed and their impact controversial. Critics, however, noted thecontractionary nature of these policies, arguing that in a recession, the traditional Keynesian response was to increase government spending, prop up major companies, and lower interestrates. The reasoning was that by stimulating the economy and staving off recession, governmentscould restore confidence while preventing economic loss. They pointed out that the U.S.government had pursued expansionary policies, such as lowering interest rates, increasinggovernment spending, and cutting taxes, when the United States itself entered a recession in2001, and arguably the same in the fiscal and monetary policies during the 2008–2009 GlobalFinancial Crisis.

Although such reforms were, in most cases, long needed[citation needed ]), the countries most involved

ended up undergoing an almost complete political and financial restructuring. They suffered permanent currency devaluations, massive numbers of bankruptcies, collapses of whole sectorsof once-booming economies, real estate  busts, high unemployment, and social unrest. For mostof the countries involved, IMF intervention has been roundly criticized. The role of theInternational Monetary Fund was so controversial during the crisis that many locals called thefinancial crisis the "IMF crisis".[19] Many commentators in retrospect criticized the IMF for encouraging the developing economies of Asia down the path of "fast track capitalism", meaningliberalization of the financial sector (elimination of restrictions on capital flows); maintenance of high domestic interest rates to attract portfolio investment and bank capital; and pegging of thenational currency to the dollar to reassure foreign investors against currency risk.[18]

[edit] IMF and high interest rates

The conventional high-interest-rate economic wisdom is normally employed by monetaryauthorities to attain the chain objectives of tightened money supply, discouraged currencyspeculation, stabilized exchange rate, curbed currency depreciation, and ultimately containedinflation.

In the Asian meltdown, highest IMF officials rationalized their prescribed high interest rates asfollows:

Page 27: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 27/37

From then IMF First Deputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer (Stanley Fischer, "The IMF andthe Asian Crisis," Forum Funds Lecture at UCLA, Los Angeles on March 20, 1998):

”When their governments "approached the IMF, the reserves of Thailand and South Korea were perilously low, and the Indonesian Rupiah was excessively depreciated. Thus, the first order of  business was... to restore confidence in the currency. To achieve this, countries have to make it

more attractive to hold domestic currency, which in turn, requires increasing interest ratestemporarily, even if higher interest costs complicate the situation of weak banks andcorporations...

"Why not operate with lower interest rates and a greater devaluation? This is a relevant tradeoff, but there can be no question that the degree of devaluation in the Asian countries is excessive, both from the viewpoint of the individual countries, and from the viewpoint of the internationalsystem. Looking first to the individual country, companies with substantial foreign currencydebts, as so many companies in these countries have, stood to suffer far more from… currency(depreciation) than from a temporary rise in domestic interest rates…. Thus, onmacroeconomics… monetary policy has to be kept tight to restore confidence in the currency..."

From the then IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus himself ("Doctor Knows Best?"

Asiaweek, 17 July 1998, p. 46):

"To reverse (currency depreciation), countries have to make it more attractive to hold domesticcurrency, and that means temporarily raising interest rates, even if this (hurts) weak banks andcorporations."

[edit] Thailand Further information: Economy of Thailand 

From 1985 to 1996, Thailand's economy grew at an average of over 9% per year, the highesteconomic growth rate of any country at the time. Inflation was kept reasonably low within arange of 3.4–5.7%.[20] The baht was pegged at 25 to the US dollar.

On 14 May and 15 May 1997, the Thai baht was hit by massive speculative attacks. On 30 June1997, Prime Minister  Chavalit Yongchaiyudh said that he would not devalue the baht. This wasthe spark that ignited the Asian financial crisis as the Thai government failed to defend the baht,which was pegged to the basket of currencies in which the U.S. dollar was the main component,[21] against international speculators. Thailand's booming economy came to a halt amid massivelayoffs in finance, real estate, and construction that resulted in huge numbers of workersreturning to their villages in the countryside and 600,000 foreign workers being sent back to their home countries.[22] The baht devalued swiftly and lost more than half of its value. The bahtreached its lowest point of 56 units to the US dollar in January 1998. The Thai stock marketdropped 75%. Finance One, the largest Thai finance company until then, collapsed.[23]

The Thai government was eventually forced to float the Baht, on 2 July 1997. On 11 August

1997, the IMF unveiled a rescue package for Thailand with more than $17 billion, subject toconditions such as passing laws relating to bankruptcy (reorganizing and restructuring) procedures and establishing strong regulation frameworks for banks and other financialinstitutions. The IMF approved on 20 August 1997, another bailout package of $3.9 billion.

By 2001, Thailand's economy had recovered. The increasing tax revenues allowed the country to balance its budget and repay its debts to the IMF in 2003, four years ahead of schedule. The Thai baht continued to appreciate to 29 Baht to the Dollar in October 2010.

Page 28: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 28/37

[edit] IndonesiaSee also: Fall of Suharto and  Economy of Indonesia

In June 1997, Indonesia seemed far from crisis. Unlike Thailand, Indonesia had low inflation, atrade surplus of more than $900 million, huge foreign exchange reserves of more than $20

 billion, and a good banking sector. But a large number of Indonesian corporations had been borrowing in U.S. dollars. During the preceding years, as the rupiah had strengthened respectiveto the dollar, this practice had worked well for these corporations; their effective levels of debtand financing costs had decreased as the local currency's value rose.

In July 1997, when Thailand floated the  baht, Indonesia's monetary authorities widened therupiah trading band from 8% to 12%. The rupiah suddenly came under severe attack in August.On 14 August 1997, the managed floating exchange regime was replaced by a free-floatingexchange rate arrangement. The rupiah dropped further. The IMF came forward with a rescue package of $23 billion, but the rupiah was sinking further amid fears over corporate debts,massive selling of rupiah, and strong demand for dollars. The rupiah and the Jakarta Stock Exchange touched a historic low in September. Moody's eventually downgraded Indonesia's

long-term debt to ' junk bond'.[24]

Although the rupiah crisis began in July and August 1997, it intensified in November when theeffects of that summer devaluation showed up on corporate balance sheets. Companies that had borrowed in dollars had to face the higher costs imposed upon them by the rupiah's decline, andmany reacted by buying dollars through selling rupiah, undermining the value of the latter further. In February 1998, President Suharto sacked Bank Indonesia Governor J. SoedradjadDjiwandono, but this proved insufficient. Suharto resigned under public pressure in May 1998and Vice President B. J. Habibie was elevated in his place. Before the crisis, the exchange rate between the rupiah and the dollar was roughly 2,600 rupiah to 1 USD.[25] The rate plunged toover 11,000 rupiah to 1 USD on 9 January 1998, with spot rates over 14,000 during January 23– 26 and trading again over 14,000 for about six weeks during June–July 1998. On 31 December 

1998, the rate was almost exactly 8,000 to 1 USD.

[26]

Indonesia lost 13.5% of its GDP that year.[edit] South Korea Further information: Economy of South Korea

Economy of South Korea

  History  Miracle on the Han River   1997 financial crisis

  Companies  List of companies  Chaebol

Page 29: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 29/37

  Samsung (Chaebol)  Hyundai (Chaebol)  LG (Chaebol)  SK (Chaebol)

  Industry  Currency  Communications  Tourism  Transportation  Real estate  Financial services   Nuclear power 

  Rankings  Regions by GDP per capita  International rankings

  Related topics  Science and technology  Cities

This box: view · talk  · edit

Macroeconomic fundamentals in South Korea were good but the banking sector was burdenedwith non-performing loans as its large corporations were funding aggressive expansions. Duringthat time, there was a haste to build great conglomerates to compete on the world stage. Many businesses ultimately failed to ensure returns and profitability. The South Korean conglomerates,more or less completely controlled by the government, simply absorbed more and more capitalinvestment. Eventually, excess debt led to major failures and takeovers. For example, in July1997, South Korea's third-largest car maker, Kia Motors, asked for emergency loans. In the wakeof the Asian market downturn, Moody's lowered the credit rating of South Korea from A1 to A3,on 28 November 1997, and downgraded again to B2 on 11 December. That contributed to afurther decline in South Korean shares since stock markets were already bearish in November.The Seoul stock exchange fell by 4% on 7 November 1997. On 8 November, it plunged by 7%,its biggest one-day drop to that date. And on 24 November, stocks fell a further 7.2% on fearsthat the IMF would demand tough reforms. In 1998, Hyundai Motors took over Kia Motors.Samsung Motors' 5 billion dollar venture was dissolved due to the crisis, and eventually Daewoo Motors was sold to the American company General Motors (GM).

The South Korean Won, meanwhile, weakened to more than 1,700 per dollar from around 800.Despite an initial sharp economic slowdown and numerous corporate bankruptcies, South Koreahas managed to triple its per capita GDP in dollar terms since 1997. Indeed, it resumed its role asthe world's fastest-growing economy—since 1960, per capita GDP has grown from $80 innominal terms to more than $21,000 as of 2007. However, like the chaebol, South Korea'sgovernment did not escape unscathed. Its national debt-to-GDP ratio more than doubled (app.13% to 30%) as a result of the crisis.

In South Korea, the crisis is also commonly referred to as the IMF crisis.

[edit] Philippines

Page 30: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 30/37

 Further information: Economy of the Philippines

The Philippine central bank raised interest rates by 1.75 percentage points in May 1997 andagain by 2 points on 19 June. Thailand triggered the crisis on 2 July and on 3 July, the PhilippineCentral Bank was forced to intervene heavily to defend the peso, raising the overnight rate from15% to 32% right upon the onset of the Asian crisis in mid-July 1997. The peso fell significantly,

from 26 pesos per dollar at the start of the crisis, to 38 pesos as of mid-1999, and to 54 pesos asof first half August 2001.

The Philippine economy recovered from a contraction of 0.6% in GDP during the worst part of the crisis to GDP growth of some 3% by 2001, despite scandals of the administration of JosephEstrada in 2001, most notably the "jueteng" scandal, causing the PSE Composite Index, the mainindex of the Philippine Stock Exchange, to fall to some 1000 points from a high of some 3000 points in 1997. The peso fell even further, trading at levels of about 55 pesos to the US dollar.Later that year, Estrada was on the verge of impeachment but his allies in the senate votedagainst the proceedings to continue further. This led to popular protests culminating in the"EDSA II Revolution", which finally forced his resignation and elevated Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency. Arroyo managed to lessen the crisis in the country, which led to the

recovery of the Philippine peso to about 50 pesos by the year's end and traded at around 41 pesosto a dollar by end 2007. The stock market also reached an all time high in 2007 and the economyis growing by at least more than 7 percent, its highest in nearly 2 decades.

[edit] Hong Kong Further information: Economy of Hong Kong 

In October 1997, the Hong Kong dollar , which had been pegged at 7.8 to the U.S. dollar since1983, came under speculative pressure because Hong Kong's inflation rate had been significantlyhigher than the U.S.'s for years. Monetary authorities spent more than US$1 billion to defend thelocal currency. Since Hong Kong had more than US$80 billion in foreign reserves, which isequivalent to 700% of its M1 money supply and 45% of its M3 money supply,[citation needed ] the

Hong Kong Monetary Authority (effectively the city's central bank) managed to maintain the peg.

Stock markets became more and more volatile; between 20 October and 23 October the HangSeng Index dropped 23%. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority then promised to protect thecurrency. On 15 August 1998, it raised overnight interest rates from 8% to 23%, and at one pointto 500%.[citation needed ] The HKMA had recognized that speculators were taking advantage of thecity's unique currency-board system, in which overnight rates automatically increase in proportion to large net sales of the local currency. The rate hike, however, increased downward pressure on the stock market, allowing speculators to profit by short selling shares. The HKMAstarted buying component shares of the Hang Seng Index in mid-August.

The HKMA and Donald Tsang, then the Financial Secretary, declared war on speculators. The

Government ended up buying approximately HK$120 billion (US$15 billion) worth of shares invarious companies,[27] and became the largest shareholder of some of those companies (e.g. thegovernment owned 10% of HSBC) at the end of August, when hostilities ended with the closingof the August Hang Seng Index futures contract. In 1999, the Government started selling thoseshares by launching the Tracker Fund of Hong Kong, making a profit of about HK$30 billion(US$4 billion).

[edit] Malaysia

Page 31: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 31/37

 Further information: Economy of Malaysia

Before the crisis, Malaysia had a large current account deficit of 5% of its GDP. At the time,Malaysia was a popular investment destination, and this was reflected in KLSE activity whichwas regularly the most active stock exchange in the world (with turnover exceeding evenmarkets with far higher capitalization like the  NYSE). Expectations at the time were that the

growth rate would continue, propelling Malaysia to developed status by 2020, a government policy articulated in Wawasan 2020. At the start of 1997, the KLSE Composite index was above1,200, the ringgit was trading above 2.50 to the dollar, and the overnight rate was below 7%.

In July 1997, within days of the Thai baht devaluation, the Malaysian ringgit was "attacked" byspeculators. The overnight rate jumped from under 8% to over 40%. This led to ratingdowngrades and a general sell off on the stock and currency markets. By end of 1997, ratingshad fallen many notches from investment grade to junk , the KLSE had lost more than 50% fromabove 1,200 to under 600, and the ringgit had lost 50% of its value, falling from above 2.50 tounder 4.57 on (Jan 23, 1998) to the dollar. The then premier, Mahathir Mohammad imposedstrict capital controls and introduced a 3.80 peg against the US dollar 

In 1998, the output of the real economy declined plunging the country into its first recession for 

many years. The construction sector contracted 23.5%, manufacturing shrunk 9% and theagriculture sector 5.9%. Overall, the country's gross domestic product plunged 6.2% in 1998.During that year, the ringgit plunged below 4.7 and the KLSE fell below 270 points. InSeptember that year, various defensive measures were announced to overcome the crisis. The principal measure taken were to move the ringgit from a free float to a fixed exchange rate regime. Bank Negara fixed the ringgit at 3.8 to the dollar. Capital controls were imposed whileaid offered from the IMF was refused. Various task force agencies were formed. The CorporateDebt Restructuring Committee dealt with corporate loans. Danaharta discounted and bought badloans from banks to facilitate orderly asset realization. Danamodal recapitalized banks.

Growth then settled at a slower but more sustainable pace. The massive current account deficit became a fairly substantial surplus. Banks were better capitalized and NPLs were realised in an

orderly way. Small banks were bought out by strong ones. A large number of PLCs were unableto regulate their financial affairs and were delisted. Compared to the 1997 current account, by2005, Malaysia was estimated to have a US$14.06 billion surplus.[28] Asset values however, havenot returned to their pre-crisis highs. In 2005 the last of the crisis measures were removed as theringgit was taken off the fixed exchange system. But unlike the pre-crisis days, it did not appear to be a free float, but a managed float, like the Singapore dollar .

[edit] Singapore Further information: Economy of Singapore

As the financial crisis spread the economy of Singapore dipped into a short recession. The shortduration and milder effect on its economy was credited to the active management by the

government. For example, the Monetary Authority of Singapore allowed for a gradual 20%depreciation of the Singapore dollar to cushion and guide the economy to a soft landing. Thetiming of government programs such as the Interim Upgrading Program and other constructionrelated projects were brought forward. Instead of allowing the labor markets to work, the National Wage Council pre-emptively agreed to Central Provident Fund cuts to lower labor costs, with limited impact on disposable income and local demand. Unlike in Hong Kong, noattempt was made to directly intervene in the capital markets and the Straits Times Index was

Page 32: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 32/37

allowed to drop 60%. In less than a year, the Singaporean economy fully recovered andcontinued on its growth trajectory.[29]

[edit] China Further information: Economy of the People's Republic of China

The Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB), had been pegged to the US dollar at a ratio of 8.3RMB to the dollar, in 1994. Having largely kept itself above the fray throughout 1997–1998there was heavy speculation in the Western  press that China would soon be forced to devalue itscurrency to protect the competitiveness of its exports vis-a-vis those of the ASEAN nations,whose exports became cheaper relative to China's. However, the RMB's non-convertibility  protected its value from currency speculators, and the decision was made to maintain the peg of the currency, thereby improving the country's standing within Asia. The currency peg was partlyscrapped in July 2005 rising 2.3% against the dollar, reflecting pressure from the United States.

Unlike investments of many of the Southeast Asian nations, almost all of China's foreigninvestment took the form of factories on the ground rather than securities, which insulated thecountry from rapid capital flight. While China was unaffected by the crisis compared to

Southeast Asia and South Korea, GDP growth slowed sharply in 1998 and 1999, calling attentionto structural problems within its economy. In particular, the Asian financial crisis convinced theChinese government of the need to resolve the issues of its enormous financial weaknesses, suchas having too many non-performing loans within its banking system, and relying heavily on tradewith the United States.

[edit] United States and Japan Further information: Economy of the United States and  Economy of Japan

The "Asian flu" had also put pressure on the United States and Japan. Their markets did notcollapse, but they were severely hit. On 27 October 1997, the Dow Jones industrial plunged 554 points or 7.2%, amid ongoing worries about the Asian economies. The New York Stock 

Exchange  briefly suspended trading. The crisis led to a drop in consumer and spendingconfidence (see 27 October 1997 mini-crash). Indirect effects included the dot-com bubble, andyears later the housing bubble and the Subprime mortgage crisis. Japan was affected because itseconomy is prominent in the region. Asian countries usually run a trade deficit with Japan because the latter's economy was more than twice the size of the rest of Asia together; about 40%of Japan's exports go to Asia. The Japanese yen fell to 147 as mass selling began, but Japan wasthe world's largest holder of currency reserves at the time, so it was easily defended, and quickly bounced back. GDP real growth rate slowed dramatically in 1997, from 5% to 1.6% and evensank into recession in 1998, due to intense competition from cheapened rivals. The Asianfinancial crisis also led to more bankruptcies in Japan. In addition, with South Korea's devaluedcurrency, and China's steady gains, many companies complained outright that they could not

compete.[30]

Another longer-term result was the changing relationship between the U.S. and Japan, with theU.S. no longer openly supporting the highly artificial trade environment and exchange rates thatgoverned economic relations between the two countries for almost five decades after World War II.[31]

[edit] Consequences

[edit] Asia

Page 33: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 33/37

The crisis had significant macro-level effects, including sharp reductions in values of  currencies,stock markets, and other asset prices of several Asian countries.[32] The nominal US dollar GDPof ASEAN fell by US$9.2 billion in 1997 and $218.2 billion (31.7%) in 1998. In South Korea,the $170.9 billion fall in 1998 was equal to 33.1% of the 1997 GDP.[33] Many  businessescollapsed, and as a consequence, millions of people fell below the  poverty line in 1997–1998.Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand were the countries most affected by the crisis.

Currency

Exchange rate(per

US$1)[34] Change

June1997

July1998

Thai baht 24.5 41 40.2%

Indonesian

rupiah

2,38

0

14,

150 83.2%

Philippine peso 26.3 42 37.4%

Malaysianringgit

2.5 4.1 39.0%

South Koreanwon

8501,290 34.1%

Country

GNP (US$1

billion)[34]

Change

June1997

July1998

 Thailand 170 102 40.0%

 Indonesia 205 34 83.4%

 Philippines 75 47 37.3%

 Malaysia 90 55 38.9%

 SouthKorea

430 283 34.2%

The above tabulation shows that despite the prompt raising of interest rates to 32% in thePhilippines upon the onset of crisis in mid-July 1997, and to 65% in Indonesia upon theintensification of crisis in 1998, their local currencies depreciated just the same and did not perform better than those of South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia, which countries had their high interest rates set at generally lower than 20% during the Asian crisis. This created gravedoubts on the credibility of IMF and the validity of its high-interest-rate prescription to economiccrisis.

The economic crisis also led to a political upheaval, most notably culminating in the resignationsof President Suharto in Indonesia and Prime Minister General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh inThailand. There was a general rise in anti-Western sentiment, with George Soros and the IMF in particular singled out as targets of criticisms. Heavy U.S. investment in Thailand ended, replaced by mostly European investment, though Japanese investment was sustained.[citation needed ] Islamic and other separatist movements intensified in Southeast Asia as central authorities weakened.[35]

More long-term consequences included reversal of the relative gains made in the boom years just preceding the crisis. Nominal US dollar GDP per capital fell 42.3% in Indonesia in 1997, 21.2%in Thailand, 19% in Malaysia, 18.5% in South Korea and 12.5% in the Philippines.[33] The CIAWorld Factbook  reported that the per capita income (measured by purchasing power parity) inThailand declined from $8,800 to $8,300 between 1997 and 2005; in Indonesia it declined from$4,600 to $3,700; in Malaysia it declined from $11,100 to $10,400. Over the same period, world per capita income rose from $6,500 to $9,300.[36] Indeed, the CIA's analysis asserted that theeconomy of Indonesia was still smaller in 2005 than it had been in 1997, suggesting an impact on

Page 34: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 34/37

that country similar to that of the Great Depression. Within East Asia, the bulk of investment anda significant amount of economic weight shifted from Japan and ASEAN to China and India.[37]

The crisis has been intensively analyzed by economists for its breadth, speed, and dynamism; itaffected dozens of countries, had a direct impact on the livelihood of millions, happened withinthe course of a mere few months, and at each stage of the crisis leading economists, in particular 

the international institutions, seemed a step behind. Perhaps more interesting to economists wasthe speed with which it ended, leaving most of the developed economies unharmed. Thesecuriosities have prompted an explosion of literature about financial economics and a litany of explanations why the crisis occurred. A number of critiques have been leveled against theconduct of the IMF in the crisis, including one by former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz. Politically there were some benefits. In several countries, particularly South Korea andIndonesia, there was renewed push for improved corporate governance. Rampaging inflation weakened the authority of the Suharto regime and led to its toppling in 1998, as well asaccelerating East Timor 's independence.[38]

[edit] Outside Asia

After the Asian crisis, international investors were reluctant to lend to developing countries, 

leading to economic slowdowns in developing countries in many parts of the world. The powerful negative shock also sharply reduced the price of oil, which reached a low of about $11 per barrel towards the end of 1998, causing a financial pinch in OPEC nations and other oilexporters. This reduction in oil revenue contributed to the 1998 Russian financial crisis, which inturn caused Long-Term Capital Management in the United States to collapse after losing $4.6 billion in 4 months. A wider collapse in the financial markets was avoided when Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York  organized a $3.625 billion bail-out. Major emergingeconomies Brazil and Argentina also fell into crisis in the late 1990s (see Argentine debt crisis).[39]

The crisis in general was part of a global backlash against the Washington Consensus andinstitutions such as the IMF and World Bank , which simultaneously became unpopular in

developed countries following the rise of the anti-globalization movement in 1999. Four major rounds of world trade talks since the crisis, in Seattle, Doha, Cancún, and Hong Kong, havefailed to produce a significant agreement as developing countries have become more assertive,and nations are increasingly turning toward regional or bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) asan alternative to global institutions. Many nations learned from this, and quickly built up foreignexchange reserves as a hedge against attacks, including Japan, China, South Korea. Pan Asian currency swaps were introduced in the event of another crisis. However, interestingly enough,such nations as Brazil, Russia, and India as well as most of East Asia began copying theJapanese model of weakening their currencies, restructuring their economies so as to create acurrent account surplus to build large foreign currency reserves. This has led to an ever increasing funding for US treasury bonds, allowing or aiding housing (in 2001–2005) and stock 

asset bubbles (in 1996–2000) to develop in the United States.[edit] See also• Financial crisis

• Liquidity crisis

• Financial contagion

• List of finance topics

Page 35: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 35/37

• Stock disasters in Hong Kong

[edit] ReferencesBooks

• Kaufman, GG., Krueger, TH., Hunter, WC. (1999) The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins,

 Implications and Solutions. Springer. ISBN 0-7923-8472-5

• Pettis, Michael (2001). The Volatility Machine: Emerging Economies and the Threat of  Financial Collapse. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-514330-2.

• Blustein, Paul (2001). The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF . PublicAffairs. ISBN 1-891620-81-9.

• Fengbo Zhang: Opinion on Financial Crisis, 6. Defeating the World Financial Storm ChinaYouth Publishing House (2000)

•  Noland, Markus, Li-gang Liu, Sherman Robinson, and Zhi Wang. (1998) Global Economic Effects of the Asian Currency Devaluations. Policy Analyses in International Economics, no.56. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

• Pempel, T. J. (1999) The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis. Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press.

• Ries, Philippe. (2000) The Asian Storm: Asia's Economic Crisis Examined .

• Tecson, Marcelo L. (2005) Puzzlers: Economic Sting (The Case Against IMF, CentralBanks, and IMF-Prescribed High Interest Rates) Makati City, Philippines: Raiders of theLost Gold Publication

• Muchhala, Bhumika, ed. (2007) Ten Years After: Revisiting the Asian Financial Crisis.Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Asia Program.

• Ito, Takatoshi and Andrew K. Rose (2006).  financial sector development in the Pacific Rim.University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-38684-3.

Papers

•  Ngian Kee Jin (March 2000). Coping with the Asian Financial Crisis: The Singapore Experience. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. ISSN 0219-3582

• Tiwari, Rajnish (2003). Post-crisis Exchange Rate Regimes in Southeast Asia, Seminar Paper, University of Hamburg.

• Kilgour, Andrea (1999). The changing economic situation in Vietnam: A product of the Asian crisis?

• S. Radelet, J.D. Sachs, R.N. Cooper, B.P. Bosworth (1998). The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.

• Stiglitz, Joseph (1996). Some Lessons From The East Asian Miracle. The World Bank Research Observer.

• Weisbrot, Mark (August 2007). Ten Years After: The Lasting Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis. Center for Economic and Policy Research.

• Tecson, Marcelo L. (2009), "IMF Must Renounce Its Weapon of Mass Destruction: High Interest Rates" (4-part paper on high-interest-rate fallacies and alternatives, emailed to IMFand others on 27 January 2009)

Page 36: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 36/37

Other 

• Is Thailand on the road to recovery, article by Australian photo-journalist John Le Fevre thatlooks at the effects of the Asian Economic Crisis on Thailand's construction industry

• Women bear brunt of crisis, article by Australian photo-journalist John Le Fevre examiningthe effects of the Asian Economic Crisis on Asia's female workforce

• The Crash (transcript only), from the PBS series Frontline

Specific

1. ^ Kaufman: pp. 195–6

2. ^ http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2003/pdf/rt29.pdf 

3. ^ Pempel: pp 118–143

4. ^ Krugman, Paul. "The Myth of Asia's Miracle" Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 1994): 62-78

5. ^ The Myth of Asia's Miracle A Cautionary Fable by Paul Krugman.

6. ^ Hughes, Helen. Crony Capitalism and the East Asian Currency Financial 'Crises'.  Policy. Spring 1999.

7. ^ Blustein: p. 73

8. ^ The Three Routes to Financial Crises: The Need for Capital Controls. Gabriel Palma (CambridgeUniversity). Center for Economic Policy Analysis. November 2000.

9. ^ Bernard Eccleston, Michael Dawson, Deborah J. McNamara (1998). The Asia-Pacific Profile. Routledge(UK). ISBN 0-415-17279-9. http://books.google.com/books?visbn=0415172799&id=l07ak-yd6DAC&pg=RA1-PA311&lpg=RA1-PA311&ots=XgqmmGV3CC&dq=%22Bangkok+Declaration%22+ASEAN&ie=ISO-8859-1&output=html&sig=u2ddDhzn-yVhEn5Fwu3d8iih0OA. 

10.^ FIRE-SALE FDI by Paul Krugman.

11.^ Stiglitz: pp. 12–16

12.^ "Mahathir's dark side". The Daily Telegraph (London). 24 October 2003.http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3597972/Mahathirs-dark-side.html.

13.^ http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200612/s1812946.htm

14.^ Joint Comminuque The 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) The Thirtieth ASEAN MinisterialMeeting was held in Subang Jaya, Malaysia from 24 to 25 July 1997.

15.^ Halloran, Richard. China's Decisive Role in the Asian Financial Crisis. Global Beat Issue Brief No. 24.27 January 1998.

16.^ Woo-Cumings, Meredith (July 2003), "South Korean Anti-Americanism", Working Paper No. 93 (JapanPolicy Research Institute), http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp93.html Korea:"[T]heceiling on foreign ownership of publicly traded companies was raised to 50 percent from 26 percent; andthe ceiling on individual foreign ownership went up from 7 percent to 50 percent."

17.^ Noland: pp. 98–103

18.^a

 b

 IMF's Role in the Asian Financial Crisis  by Walden Bello.

19.^ The IMF Crisis Editorial. Wall Street Journal. 15 April 1998.

20.^ http://www.columbia.edu/cu/thai/html/financial97_98.html

21.^ Haider A. Khan, Global Markets and Financial Crises in Asia, University of Denver 2004

22.^ Kaufman: pp. 193–8

23.^ Liebhold, David. Thailand's Scapegoat? Battling extradition over charges of embezzlement, a financier says he's the fall guy for the 1997 financial crash. TIME.com. 27 December 1999.

Page 37: Aima Study

8/4/2019 Aima Study

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aima-study 37/37

24.^ Raghavan, Anita (26 December 1997). "Japan Stocks Slide Again On Fears About Stability". Wall StreetJournal Online. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB882840058627490500.html?mod=googlewsj. Retrieved 2September 2009.

25.^ http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory August 13 = 2673; August 14 = 2790; August 15 = 2900;August 31 = 2930; October 31 = 3640; December 31 = 5535. Accessed 2009-08-20. Archived 2009-09-04.

26.^ http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory January 31 = 10,100; March 31 = 8,650; May 31 = 11,350; July31 = 13,250; September 30 = 10,800. Accessed 2009-08-20. Archived 2009-09-04.

27.^ Bayani Cruz, We will hold on to blue-chip shares: Tsang, The Standard, 29 August 1998.

28.^ The CIA World Factbook - Malaysia

29.^ Ngian Kee Jin: p. 12

30.^ Pettis: pp. 55–60

31.^ Pettis: p. 79

32.^ Tiwari: pp. 1–3

33.^ a b http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2001/rt11_ki2001.xls

34.^

a

 

b

 Cheetham, R. 1998. Asia Crisis. Paper presented at conference, U.S.-ASEAN-Japan policy Dialogue.School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, June 7–9, Washington, D.C.

35.^ Radelet: pp. 5–6

36.^ The Asian financial crisis ten years later: assessing the past and looking to the future. Janet L. Yellen.Speech to the Asia Society of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, 6 February 2007

37.^ Kilgour, Andrea (1999). The changing economic situation in Vietnam: A product of the Asian crisis?

38.^ Weisbrot: p. 6

39.^ The Crash transcript. PBS Frontline.

[edit] External links