Cal Berkeley Martin Epner Aff Gonzaga Round1 (1)

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  • 8/9/2019 Cal Berkeley Martin Epner Aff Gonzaga Round1 (1)

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    1AC

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    1AC Plan

    The United States federal judiciary should require that the president cannotcontinue the detention of personnel that have successfully won a habeas corpushearing.

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    1AC egiti!acy

    Contention "ne is egiti!acy

    The #iye!ba court ruled the right to habeas doesn$t give the power to release a

    detainee or stop transfer%il&o 1'[Winter, 2012, Jennifer L. Milko, Separation of Powers and Guantanamo etainees! efinin"t#e Proper $oles of t#e %&e'uti(e and Judi'iar) in *a+eas ases and t#e -eed for SupremeGuidan'e , /0 u . L. $e(. 1 3

    After t#e (ou!ediene and %unaf 'ases, it was clear that the U nited S tates district courtshave habeas jurisdiction over detainee cases , and the )istrict of Colu!bia Circuithas ta&en center stage in *uantana!o cases. n/4 W#ile man) felt t#at 5oumediene "ranted federal 6ud"es 'onsidera+le 'ontrol o(er t#e le"al fate of detainees, t#e . . ir'uit ourt of 7ppeals used t#e Supreme ourt8s warnin" notto 9se'ond:"uess9 t#e %&e'uti(e as its mantra in detainee 'ases.Though the district court ruled in severalcases that a re!edy , in'ludin" a'tual release, was proper+ the ).C. Circuit Court of Appealshas never approved such a release and has struc& down district court orders

    see&ing to control the fate of detainees . n/; 1.nited StatesE and C D an alternati(e le"al 6ustifi'ation #as not +een pro(ided for 'ontinued detention.Fn'e t#ese elements are met, furt#er detention is un'onstitutional.9 n@ >nder t#is framework,the court decided thatthe ti!e for wind/up authority had ended+ and loo&ed to the re!edies the judiciary could utili e under its habeas jurisdiction . n@ The court concluded that based onseparation of powers+ the courts had authority to protect individual liberty , espe'iall) w#en t#e %&e'uti(e 5ran'# +rou"#t t#e person into t#e 'ourt8s 6urisdi'tion and t#en undermined t#e efforts of release. n@/ -otin"t#at the 0 ecutive could not have the power to li!it the scope of habeas by !erelyassuring the court that it was using its best efforts to release the detainees , thecourt held that under the syste! of chec&s and balances and the i!portance ofseparation of powers to the protection of liberty+ the !otion for release wasgranted . n@@ =n t#e 'ase renamed nited States, and #a+eas 'ouldnot interfere wit# t#e %&e'uti(e8s power to 'ontrol t#e +orders. n 0 B#e Supreme ourt "ranted t#e Petitioner8s writ of 'ertiorari in w#i'# t#e) ar"ued t#at t#e 'ourts #ad t#e aut#orit) to issue release of unlawfull) detained prisoners under its #a+eas power and to#old ot#erwise 'onstituted a 'onfli't wit# 5oumediene. n 1 5) t#e t ime t#e 'ase rea'#ed t#e *i"# ourt for determination on t#emerits, all of t#e detainee:Petitioners re'ei(ed resettlement offers, and onl) fi(e #ad re6e'ted t#ese offers. n 2 ue to t#e possi+ilit)of a fa'tual differen'e +ased on t#is new information, t#e Supreme ourt remanded t#e 'ase to t#e . . ir'uit ourt of 7ppeals.n B#e remanded 'ase +e'ame known as

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    too !uch deference to that branch and se(erel) li!iting the re!edies that courtshave had the power to issue in the past. B#ou"# t#e petitioners #a(e made se(eral ar"uments for relief,the !ain argu!ents for judicial power ste! fro! the idea that the court of appealshas been i!properly applying Supreme ourtprecedent . Petitioners #a(e ar"ued t#at the ).C.Court of Appeals e panded the scope of %unaf too broadly as t#e Supreme ourt noted t#at t#e

    de'ision was limited to t#e fa'ts of t#at 'ase. n114 =n Munaf,the Court was pri!arily concerned aboutallowing the 6raqi govern!ent to have the power to punish people w#o #ad 'ommitted'rimes in t#at territor) w#en fas#ionin" its #oldin", and t#e petitioners in t#at 'ase #ad t#e opportunit) of noti'e +e'ause t#e) weretold a+out t#eir transfer and were a+le to petition t#e 'ourt to tr) and pre(ent it. n11; Petitioners #a(e ar"ued t#at those factsare entirely different than cases such as %oha!!ed and #hadr where there wasconcern of torture in foreign nations but no need to allow those nations to havethe ability to prosecute the detainees for cri!es , there was potential for torture atthe hands of non/govern!ent entities , and no notice of transfer was per!itted . n120[A1;03 7dditionall), Petitioners #a(e ar"ued t#at the use of %unaf has i!per!issibly li!ited(ou!ediene by preventing courts fro! fashioning equitable relief for habeaspetitions . n121There has been concern that the ability to use the writ of habeas will

    be essentially eli!inated if there is no chance for a petitioner to challenge the %&e'uti(e 5ran'#8sdeter!inations regarding safe transfers . B#e 5oumediene ourt spent 'onsidera+le timedis'ussin" t#e #istor) of t#e writ n122 and noted t#at t#e tri+unals implemented in t#at 'ase to determine enem) 'om+atant status were not a suffi'ient repla'ement for t#e writ of #a+eas +e'ause t#e) la'ked, in part, t#e aut#orit) to issue an order of release. n12*ere, the ).C. Circuit Court of Appeals has effectively prevented the other courtsfro! deter!ining if there is a right not to be transferred , which has been arguedto be an inadequate state!ent of the right of habeas . n12 Similarl), it #as +een ar"ued t#at byaccepting the 0 ecutive (ranch-s assurances of its efforts to release the detainees ,the courts are not properly using the power of habeas corpus that has beengranted to the! +) t#e onstitution. n12/ 5) refusin" to uestion t#ese assertions, the courts would beunable to offer a re!edy to the petitioners who have the privilege of habeas

    corpus . n12@ B#e Petitioners also ar"ued a due pro'ess ri"#t to '#allen"e transfers as t#e detainees #a(e a ri"#t to a meanin"ful#earin" to at least #a(e t#e opportunit) to '#allen"e t#e Go(ernment8s 'on'lusions re"ardin" safet). n12 (y refusing tosecond/guess the 0 ecutive+ the judiciary !ay be losing an i!portant chec& on thefor!er-s power because there is no guarantee that the 0 ecutive is ensuring safetyor !a&ing the best effort to protect the unlawfully &ept detainees. 8ithoutallowing courts to have the power to enjoin a transfer in order to e a!ine theseconcerns , there is the potential that the detainee could be har!ed at the hands offoreign terrorists. 8ithout the ability to challenge the 0 ecutive (ranch throughthe judicial tool of habeas corpus + there has been genuine concern that the courtsare losing too !uch power and that their authority [A1;13is being i!properly

    li!ited+ as they are not utili ing their constitutional power properly.

    #iye!ba decisions under!ined legiti!acy of our co!!it!ent to the rule of lawglobally

    9aughn and 8illia!s+ Professors of aw+ 13 [201 ,

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    M%7-=-G F? ?$%% FM, S%P7$7B=F- F? PFW%$S, 7- B*% $>L% F? L7W B%- %7$S 7?B%$ ;K11 , 7sian 7meri'an Law Journal, Iol. 20, 201 ,#ttp!KKpapers.ssrn.'omKsol Kpapers.'fm a+stra't idN21 4 0 3=n 200 , -int# ir'uit Jud"e 7. Walla'e Bas#ima o+ser(ed t#at the rule of law 7touted by the UnitedStates throughout the world sin'e t#e end of World War ==Ohas been : steadily under!ined . .. since we began the so/called ; 8ar on Terror . 14/ The A!erican legal !essenger , Bas#ima notes, has been regarded throughout the world as a trusted figure of goodwill ,mainl) by virtue of close identification with the !essage borne

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    e&plained, the e ercise of @the e ecutive$s Co!!ander/in/Chief powers is vindicated ,not eroded, when @or+ if confir!ed< by the judiciary .20/ 7s t#e Milli"an ourt stated, t#e foundin" fat#ersknewOt#e #istor) of t#e world told t#emOt#e nation t#e) were foundin", +e its e&isten'e s#ort of lon", would +e in(ol(ed in war. 20@ *ow fre uentl) or of w#at len"t#, #uman foresi"#t 'ould not tell. 20 5ut, t#e founders knew t#at unlimited power, w#ere(er lod"ed at su'# a time, was espe'iall) #aHardous to freemen. 204 ?or t#is reason, t#e) se'ured t#e in#eritan'e t#e) #adfou"#t to maintain, +) in'orporatin" in a written 'onstitution t#e safe"uards w#i'# time #ad pro(ed were essential to itspreser(ation. 20; B#ese safe"uards 'annot +e distur+ed +) an) one +ran'#, unless t#e onstitution so pro(idesOand wit# t#e

    '#e'ks aut#oriHed t#erein.210 =ndeed, [t3o #old [t#at3 t#e politi'al +ran'#es #a(e t#e power to swit'# t#e onstitution on or off at will . . . would permit a strikin" anomal) in our tripartite s)stem of "o(ernment, leadin" to a re"ime in w#i'# on"ress and t#ePresident, not [t#e 'ourts3 sa) Qw#at t#e law is. 211 Fur +asi' '#arter 'annot +e 'ontra'ted awa) like t#is. 212To the e tentthat it has been O through e ecutive action+ paired with judicial inaction Othe ruleof law is under!ined . We 'an and we must do +etterOt#e onstitution, and t#ose w#o drafted it, demand so.

    The aff is &ey7perception of US provision of habeas rights is critical to US softpower7the vital aspect of US legal jurisprudence7court action is &ey Sidhu 11[2011, awinder S. Sid#u, J. ., B#e Geor"e Was#in"ton >ni(ersit)E M.7., Jo#ns *opkins>ni(ersit)E 5.7., >ni(ersit) of Penns)l(ania, Judi'ial $e(iew as Soft Power! *ow t#e ourts an*elp >s Win t#e Post:;K11 onfli't , -7B=F-7L S% >$=B L7W 5$=%?, Iol. 1, =ssue 1#ttp!KKdi"ital'ommons.w'l.ameri'an.eduK'"iK(iew'ontent.'"i arti'leN100 R'onte&tNnsl+3B#e Great Wall The writ of habeas corpus enables an individual to challenge thefactual basis and legality of his detention ,;1 activating the judiciary$s reviewfunction in the separation of powers s'#eme.;2 (ecause the writ acts to secureindividual liberty by way of the judicial chec&ing of unlawful e ecutive detentions ,the writ has been regarded as a bulwar& of liberty . B#e Supreme ourt #as o+ser(ed, for e&ample,

    t#at There is no higher duty of a court , under our 'onstitutional s)stem, than the carefulprocessing and adjudication of petitions for writs of habeas corpus . . . . ; The writ isseen as a vital aspect of A!erican jurisprudence + and an essential ele!ent of thelaw sin'e t#e time of t#e ?ramers.; The U nited S tates is a conspicuous actor in the world theater+subject to the interests and inclinations of other players+ and possessing a si!ilar+natural desire to shape the global co!!unity in a !anner !ost favorable to itsown objects. B#e tenden') to attempt to in uen'e ot#ers is an ine(ita+le s)mptom of international #etero"eneit) and, atpresent, t#e >nited States is mired in an epi' +att le wit# fundamentalists +ent on usin" terrorism as a means to repel,;/ if notdestro), 7meri'a.;@ A!erican success in foreign policy depends on the internal assetsavailable to and usable by the United States , including its soft power . The law in

    A!erica is an aspect of its national soft power . =n parti'ular, the !oderates in the%usli! world Ot#e intended audien'e of 7meri'a s soft powerO!ay Bnd attractive the A!ericanconstitutional syste! of governance in which 1D t#e people are t#e so(erei"n and t#e "o(ernment 'onsistsof merel) temporar) and re'alla+le a"ents of t#e people, 2Dfederal power is diffused so as to diminis# t#e possi+ilit)t#at an) +ran'# of t#e "o(ernment, or an) of t#em a'tin" in tandem, 'an infrin"e upon t#e li+ert) of t#e people, D stru'turalprote'tions notwit#standin", t#e people are entitled to certain substantive rights in'ludin" t#e ri"#t to +e free of "o(ernmental interferen'e wit# respe't to reli"ious e&er'ise, D t#e di(ersit) of interests in#erent in its popula'e is

    'onsidered a 'riti'al safe"uard a"ainst t#e a+ilit) of a ma6orit) "roup to oppress t#e minorit) 'onstituents, /D the courts areto ensure that the people$s rights to life+ liberty+ and property are not abridged ,a''ordin" to law, +) t#e "o(ernment or ot#ers, and @Dindividuals deprived of liberty have available tothe! the writ of habeas corpus to invo&e the judiciary$s chec&ing function as toe ecutive detention decisions . B#e onstitution, in t#e e)es of Jud"e Learned *and, is t#e +est politi'al

    do'ument e(er made. ; =f t#e aforementioned 'onstitutional prin'iples are part of t#e 'losest appro&imation to a 6ust and reasonedso'iet) produ'ed +) man, surel) they !ay have so!e persuasive appeal to the rest of the world+including !oderate %usli!s w#o "enerall) li(e in areas less respe'tful of minorit) ri"#ts and reli"ious pluralism.

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    Such reverence is to be e pected and warranted only if the U nited S tates hasre!ained true to these constitutional principles in practice , and in parti'ular, in its +e#a(ior in

    t#e aftermat# of t#e ;K11 atta'ks, w#en national stress is #ei"#tened and t#e option of de(iatin" from su'# (alues in fa(or of ane&pedient law of ne'essit) similarl) temptin".;4 B#e e&tent to w#i'# t#e >nited States #as remained true to itself as a nation oflawsOand t#us ma) 'redi+l) 'laim su'# le"al soft powerOis t#e su+6e't of t#e ne&t se'tion. ==. B*% F>$BS 7- SF?B PFW%$B#e Judi'iar) =n Wartime The United States has been charged with being unfaithful to its

    own laws and values in its prosecution of the post/>?11 ca!paign againsttransnational terroris!. Wit# respe't to its 'ondu't outside of t#e >nited States, followin" ;K11, A!erica has

    been alleged to have tortured captured individuals in (iolation of its domesti' and international le"alo+li"ations,;; and detained individuals indeBnitely wit#out +asi' le"al prote'tions.100 loser to #ome, t#e>nited States is t#ou"#t to #a(e proT led Muslims, 7ra+s, and Sout# 7sians in airports and ot#er settin"s,101 'ondu'tedimmi"ration sweeps tar"etin" Muslims,102 and en"a"ed in mass pre(entati(e detention of Muslims in t#e >nited States,10 amon"ot#er t#in"s. B#ese are serious 'laims. The !ere perception that they bear any rese!blance tothe truth undoubtedly i!pairs the way in which the United States is viewed by%usli!s around the world , in'ludin" Muslim:7meri'ans, and thus di!inishes the UnitedStates$ soft power resources .10 The degree to which they are valid degrades theability of the United States to argue persuasively that it not only touts the rule of

    law+ but e hibits actual Bdelity to the law in ti!es of crisis . B#ese 'laims relate to 'ondu't of t#ee&e'uti(e andKor t#e le"islature in t#e aftermat# of t#e ;K11 atta'ks. B#is 7rti'le is 'on'erned, #owe(er, wit# t#e 6udi'iar), t#at is w#et#er t#e 'ourts #a(e up#eld t#e rule of law in t#e post:;K11 'onte&tOand t#us w#et#er t#e 'ourts ma) +e a sour'e of soft powertoda) Ce(en if t#e ot#er +ran'#es #a(e en"a"ed, or are alle"ed to #a(e en"a"ed, in 'ondu't t#at is ille"al or unwiseD. 7s to t#e 'ourts,it is m) 'ontention t#at the judiciary has been faithful to the rule of law after >?11 and assuch should be considered a positive instru!ent of A!erican soft power . Prior todis'ussin" post:;K11 'ases supportin" t#is 'ontention, it is important to pro(ide a #istori'al +a'kdrop to relations#ip +etween t#e'ourts and wartime situations +e'ause 6udi'ial de'ision:makin" in 'ases impli'atin" t#e wars in 7f"#anistan and =ra does not takeo''ur on a +lank slate, despite t#e uni ue and modern 'ir'umstan'es of t#e post:;K11 'on i't.

    6ndefinite detention is the &ey factor 7 prefer statistical data 8elsh 11 , J. . from >ni(ersit) of >ta# and o'toral student[Mar'#, 2011, a(id Wels# #as a J. . from t#e >ni(ersit) of >ta#. *e is 'urrentl) a do'toralstudent in t#e %ller S'#ool of 5usiness at t#e >ni(ersit) of 7riHona w#ere #is resear'# fo'useson or"aniHational fairness and et#i's, 9Pro'edural Justi'e Post:;K11! B#e %ffe'ts of Pro'edurall)>nfair Breatment of etainees on Per'eptions of Glo+al Le"itima') , ; >.-.*. L. $e(. 2@13Boda), !any individuals throughout the world question whether the U nited S tateshas engaged in e cess in response to t#e atta'ks of >?11 . 7 200 poll su""ests t#at man) people in

    rance DEFGH+ *er!any DI>GH+ and (ritain D33GH felt that the United Statesoverreacted in response to terroris! . n 0 A!ong %iddle 0astern countries , as man) asthree/fourths of individuals stated that the U nited S tates overreacted in t#e War on Berror. n 1 7dditionall), appro i!ately two/thirds of citi ens in rance+ *er!any+ Tur&ey+ andPa&istan questioned the sincerity of the U nited S tates in the 8ar on Terror . n 2 Wit#in t#e>nited States, nationwide 'onfiden'e in t#e W#ite *ouse [A2@ 3 dropped 0U +etween 2002 and 200 w#ile 'onfiden'e in

    on"ress fell +) 2/U durin" t#is period. n Although this worldwide drop in legiti!acy is the

    result of !ultiple factors +e)ond t#e s'ope of t#is paper, su'# as t#e >.S. de'ision to in(ade =ra , detentionre!ains a controversial topic that continues to negatively affect globalperceptions of the United States . 7lt#ou"# t#is paper fo'uses spe'ifi'all) on t#e detention of suspe'ted

    terrorists at t#e *uantana!o (ay etention amp CGuantanamo 5a)D, n t#is fa'ilit)is but one of !anydetention centers holding suspected terrorists on behalf of the U nited S tates. n / Boda),appro&imatel) 2/0 prisoners Cout of appro&imatel) 400D remain at t#is >.S.:run militar) +ase in u+a t#at is outside >.S. le"al 6urisdi'tion. n @ *owe(er, it is 'riti'al to note t#at t#ese 2/0 indi(iduals represent a mere 1U of 9appro&imatel) 2/,000 detainees worldwide #eld dire'tl) or indire'tl) +) or on +e#alf of t#e >nited States.9 n Prisoners have alleged torture+

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    se ual degradation+ religious persecution+ n3= and !any other specific for!s of!istreat!ent w#ile +ein" detained. n ;6n !any detention facilities in'ludin" Guantanamo 5a), 7+uG#rai+, and 5a"ram, these allegations are substantiated by significant evidence and havegained worldwide attention . n 0 [A2@43 W#ile some "rap#i' and s#o'kin" 'ases of a+use #a(e +een +rou"#t to

    li"#t, n 1 a more t)pi'al e&ample is t#e prose'ution of si&teen:)ear:old Mo#amed Jawad +) Lt. ol. arrel Iande(eld atGuantanamo 5a). n 2 7t first, t#e 'ase a"ainst Jawad looked strai"#tforward, as #e #ad 'onfessed to t#rowin" a "renade t#atin6ured two >.S. soldiers and a translator in e'em+er 2002. n *owe(er, a deeper in(esti"ation 9un'o(ered a 'onfession o+tainedt#rou"# torture, two sui'ide attempts +) t#e a''used, a+usi(e interro"ations, t#e wit##oldin" of e&'ulpator) e(iden'e from t#edefense,9 and ot#er pro'edural pro+lems. n Iande(eld dis'o(ered t#at t#e militar) #ad o+tained 'onfessions from two ot#erindi(iduals for t#e same offenseE #e ultimatel) left #is post after attempts to pro(ide 9+asi' fair trial ri"#ts9 failed. n / =n ?e+ruar)200@,the U nited 2 ations Workin" Group on 7r+itrar) etention spo&e out against international lawand hu!an rights violations at *uantana!o (ay+ stating that the facility should beclosed ,without further delay .9 n @This report paralleled earlier criticis! fro!

    A!nesty 6nternational t#at Guantanamo 5a) (iolates minimum standards for t#e treatment of indi(iduals. n =nresponse, t#e >nited States #as ar"ued t#at detainees are not prisoners of war +ut are rat#er 9unlawful 'om+atants9 w#o are notentitled to t#e prote'tions of t#e Gene(a on(ention +e'ause t#e) do not a't in a''or [A2@;3 dan'e wit# t#e a''epted rules of war.n 4 et,regardless of the debatable legal !erit of this argu!ent+ legiti!acy is an,elusive quality , grounded in worldwide opinion that will not let the U nited S tatesoff the hoo& on a !ere technicality when !oral duties and international custo!shave been violated . n ; =n t#e ne&t se'tion, = dis'uss t#e importan'e of le"itima') and t#e wa)s in w#i'# it #as +eenundermined +) >.S. 'ondu't in t#e War on Berror. 5) understandin" w#at dri(es "lo+al per'eptions of >.S. le"itima'), 'urrentdetention poli'ies and t#eir ramifi'ations 'an +e more a''uratel) assessed and restru'tured. =I. Le"itima')! B#e riti'al Missin"%lement in t#e War on Berror6n the conte t of the 8ar on Terror+ legiti!acy is the critical!issing ele!ent under t#e 'urrent >.S. detention re"ime. Le"itima') 'an +e defined as 9a ps)'#olo"i'al propert) of an

    aut#orit), institution, or so'ial arran"ement t#at leads t#ose 'onne'ted to it to +elie(e t#at it is appropriate, proper, and 6ust.9 n/0 7s far +a'k as Plato and 7ristotle, p#ilosop#ers #a(e re'o"niHed t#at influen'in" ot#ers merel) t#rou"# 'oer'ion and power is 'ostl)and ineffi'ient. n/1 Boda), e!pirical evidence suggests that legiti!acy , rat#er t#an deterren'e, ispri!arily what causes individuals to obey the law . n/2 B#us, w#ile le"al aut#orities ma) possess t#eimmediate power to stop ille"al a'tion,long/ter! co!pliance requires that the general publicperceives the law to be legiti!ate . n/ Terroris! is primaril) an ideological war thatcannot be won by technology t#at is more sop#isti'ated or in'reased militar) for'e. n/ W#ile nations

    co!bating terroris! must 'ontinue to address immediate t#reats +) detainin" suspe'ted terrorists, t#e) !ust alsoconsider the prevention of future threats by analy ing how their policies areperceived by individuals throughout the world . >ltimatel), in t#e War on Berror, 9the benefitsto be derived fro! !a i!i ing legiti!acy are too i!portant to neglect., n// F(er time,

    perceptions of legiti!acy create a ,reservoir of support, for an institution thatgoes beyond !ere self/interest. n/@ =n t#e 'onte&t of "o(ernment! egiti!acy is an endorphinof the de!ocratic body politic E it is t#e su+stan'e t#at oils t#e ma'#iner) of demo'ra'), reducing thefriction that inevitably arises when people are not able to get everything they wantfro! politics . egiti!acy is loyalty Eit is a reservoir of goodwill t#at allows t#e institutions of"o(ernment to "o a"ainst w#at people ma) want at t#e moment wit#out sufferin" de+ilitatin" 'onse uen'es. n/ The

    widespread acceptance of #i"#l) controversial decisions +) t#e >.S. Supreme ourt illustrates

    the power of institutional legiti!acy . n/4 B#e ourt itself noted t#at it 9'annot +u) support for its de'isions +) spendin" mone) and, e&'ept to a minor de"ree, it 'annot independentl) 'oer'e o+edien'e to its de'rees.9 n/; 9B#e ourt8s powerlies, rat#er, in its le"itima') . . . .9 n@0 ?or e&ample, +) emp#asiHin" 9e ual treatment,9 9#onest) and neutralit),9 9"at#erin"information +efore de'ision makin",9 and 9makin" prin'ipled, or rule +ased, de'isions instead of politi'al de'isions,9 t#e ourtmaintained [A2 13 le"itima') t#rou"# t#e 'ontro(ersial a+ortion 'ase Planned Parent#ood of Sout#eastern Penns)l(ania (. ase) in1;;2. n@1 B#us, alt#ou"# appro&imatel) #alf of 7meri'ans oppose a+ortion, n@2 t#e (ast ma6orit) of t#ese indi(iduals "i(e deferen'eto t#e ourt8s rulin" on t#is issue. n@ =n t#e post:World War == era,the U nited S tates built up a worldwidereservoir of support based upon four pillars ! 9its 'ommitment to international law , itsa''eptan'e of consensual decision/!a&ing , its reputation for!oderation , and its identifi'ation wit# thepreservation of peace .9 n@ Although so!e U.S. policies +etween 1;/0 and 2001 did not align

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    with these pillars , on a whole the U nited S tates legiti!i ed itself as a worldsuperpower durin" t#is period. n@/ =n t#e 1;40s, President $onald $ea"an spoke of 7meri'a as a 9s#inin" 'it) on a #ill,9

    su""estin" t#at it was a model for t#e nations of t#e world to look to. n@@ W#ile t#e >nited States re'ei(ed a (irtuall) unpre'edentedoutpourin" of support from t#e international 'ommunit) followin" ;K11, anation-s reservoir of support willquic&ly evaporate when its govern!ent overreacts . 7'ross t#e "lo+e, individuals have

    e pressed a growing dissatisfaction with U.S. conduct in the 8ar on Terror+ and by '44J+ even western allies of the United States lobbied for the i!!ediate closure of*uantana!o (ay + calling it ,an e!barrass!ent., n@ ?ormer Se'retar) of State olin Powellpro'laimed t#at 9Guantanamo #as +e'ome a ma6or, ma6or pro+lem . . . in t#e wa) t#e world per'ei(es 7meri'a and if it were up tome = would 'lose Guantanamo not tomorrow +ut t#is afternoon . . . .9 n@4 Similarl), [A2 23 President"ba!a noted in hisca!paign that ,*uantana!o has beco!e a recruiting tool for our ene!ies .9 n@;

    Current U.S. detention policies erode each of the four pillars on which the U nitedS tates established global legiti!acy . =n fa't,critics have argued that the , U nited S tateshas assu!ed man) of the very features of the -rogue nations- against which it has r#etori'all)::and sometimes literall):: done battle over the years., n 0 8hile legiti!acy cannot beregained overnight+ the recent election of President (arac& "ba!a presents a

    critical opportunity for a re/articulation o f U.S. detention policies . 7lt#ou"# PresidentF+ama issued an e&e'uti(e order 'allin" for t#e 'losure of Guantanamo 5a) onl) two da)s after +ein" sworn into offi'e, n 1si"nifi'ant 'ontro(ers) remains a+out t#e kind of alternate detention s)stem t#at will repla'e it. n 2 =n 'ontrast to t#e 'urrentmodel, w#i'# #as lar"el) rendered ineffi'ient de'isions +ased on ad #o' poli'ies, = ar"ue for t#e esta+lis#ment of a domesti' terror'ourt C B D 'reated spe'ifi'all) to deal wit# t#e uni ue pro'edural issues 'reated +) a "rowin" num+er of suspe'ted terrorists.

    egiti!acy is critical to !a&e US leadership durable and effective7judicial actionon indefinite detention is crucial#nowles > [Sprin", 200;, $o+ert nited States operated for all of its #istor) until 1;;1.The lac& of

    balancing !eans that the U nited S tates, and by e tension the e ecutive branch+ faces mu'# wea&er e ternal constraints on its e ercise of power t#an in t#e past. n 2 B#erefore,theinternal processes of the U.S. !atter now !ore than any other nations- have in

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    history . n 7ndit is these internal processes , as mu'# as e&ternal de(elopments, that willdeter!ine the durability of A!erican unipolarity . 7s one realist s'#olar #as ar"ued, the U.S.can best ensure the @K1I1 stability of this unipolar order by ensuring that itspredo!inance appears legiti!ate . n Lege!onic orders ta&e on hierarchicalcharacteristics , wit# t#e preeminent power #a(in" denser politi'al ties wit# ot#er nations t#an in a unipolar order. n /Stability in hege!onic orders is !aintained in part through security guaranteesand trade relationships that result in econo!ic speciali ation amon" nations. n @ ?ore&ample, if -ation 8s se'urit) is supplied +) *e"emon , -ation 'an de:emp#asiHe militar) power and fo'us on e'onomi' power.=n a #e"emoni' s)stem, the pree!inent state has ,the power to shape the rules ofinternational politics according to its own interests., n The hege!on , in return,provides public goods for the syste! as a whole . n 4The hege!on possesses not onl)

    superior 'ommand of militar) and e'onomi' resour'es +ut 9 soft, power + the ability to guide other states-preferences and interests. n ; The durability and stability of hege!onic ordersdepends on other states- acceptance of the hege!on-s role. The hege!on-sleadership !ust be seen as legiti!ate . n 0 [A1 23The U nited S tates qualifies as a globalhege!on . =n man) wa)s,the U.S. acts as a world govern!ent . n 16t provides publicgoods for the world , su'# as se'urit) "uarantees, t#e prote'tion of sea lanes, and support for open markets. n 2 7fter World War ==, t#e >.S. for"ed a s)stem of militar) allian'es and transnational e'onomi' and politi'al institutions : su'# as t#e>nited -ations, -7BF, t#e =nternational Monetar) ?und, and t#e World 5ank : t#at remain in pla'e toda). B#e >.S. pro(idesse'urit) for allies su'# as Japan and German) +) maintainin" a stron" militar) presen'e in 7sia and %urope. n 5e'ause of itso(erw#elmin" militar) mi"#t, t#e >.S. possesses w#at amounts to a 9 uasi:monopol)9 on t#e use of for'e. n B#is pre(ents ot#ernations from laun'#in" wars t#at would tend to +e trul) desta+iliHin". Similarl),the United States provides apublic good through its efforts to co!bat terroris! and 'onfront : e(en t#rou"# re"ime '#an"e :ro"ue states. n / The U nited S tates also provides a public good through its pro!ulgationand enforce!ent of international nor!s. 6t e ercises a do!inant influence on thedefinition of international law because it is the largest ,consu!er, of such law andthe only nation capable of enforcing it on a global scale. n @ B#e >.S. was t#e primar) dri(er +e#ind t#e esta+lis#ment of t#e >nited -ations s)stem and t#e de(elopment of 'ontemporar) treaties and institutional re"imes toeffe'tuate t#ose treaties in +ot# pu+li' and pri(ate international law. n Moreo(er,

    controlling internationalnor!s are [A1 3 sometimese!bodied in the U.S. Constitution and do!estic law ratherthan in treaties or custo!ary international law. ?or e&ample, whether terrorist threats

    will be countered effectively depends ,in large part on U.S. law regarding ar!edconflict+ fro! rules that define the circu!stances under which the President canuse force to those that define the proper treat!ent of ene!y co!batants. 9 n 4These public goods provided by the United States stabili e the syste! bylegiti!i ing it and decreasing resistance to it . The transnational politi'al and e'onomi'

    institutions created by the U nited S tates provide other countries with infor!alaccess to policy!a&ing and tend to reduce resistance to A!erican hege!ony+encouraging others to ,bandwagon , wit# t#e >.S. rat#er t#an seek to 'reate alternati(e 'enters of power. n ; 7meri'an #e"emon) also 'oin'ided wit# t#e rise of "lo+aliHation : t#e in'reasin" inte"ration and standardiHation of markets and'ultures : w#i'# tends to sta+iliHe t#e "lo+al s)stem and redu'e 'onfli't. n /0 The legiti!acy of A!ericanhege!ony is strengthened and sustained by the de!ocratic and accessible natureof the U.S. govern!ent . The A!erican constitutional separation of powers is aninternational public good. The ris& that it will hinder the ability of the U.S. to actswiftly+ coherently or decisively in forei"n affairs is counter/balanced by the benefits itprovides in per!itting foreigners !ultiple points of access to the govern!ent . n /1

    ?orei"n nations and 'itiHens lo++) on"ress and e&e'uti(e +ran'# a"en'ies in t#e State, Breasur), efense, and ommer'eepartments, w#ere forei"n poli') is made. n /2 B#e) use t#e media to +road'ast t#eir point of (iew in an effort to influen'e t#e

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    opinion of de'ision:makers. n / 5e'ause t#e >nited States is a nation of immi"rants, man) 7meri'an 'itiHens #a(e a spe'ifi'interest in t#e fates of parti'ular 'ountries and form 9et#ni' lo++ies9 for t#e purpose of affe'tin" forei"n poli'). n / Thecourts + too,are accessible to foreign nations and non/citi ens . The Alien TortStatute is e!erging as an [A1 3i!portant vehicle for adjudicating tort clai!s a!ongnon/citi ens in U.S. courts. n // %mpires are more 'omple& t#an unipolar or #e"emoni' s)stems.0!piresconsist of a ,ri!less/hub/and/spo&e structure+ 9 wit# an imperial 'ore : t#e preeminent state : rulin" t#eperip#er) t#rou"# intermediaries. n /@ B#e 'ore institutionaliHes its 'ontrol t#rou"# distin't, as)mmetri'al +ar"ainsC#etero"eneous 'ontra'tin"D wit# ea'# part of t#e perip#er). n / Bies amon" perip#eries Ct#e spokesD are t#in, 'reatin" firewallsa"ainst t#e spread of resistan'e to imperial rule from one part of t#e empire to t#e ot#er. n /4The success of i!perialgovernance depends on the lac& of a ,ri! .9 n /; Stability in i!perial orders is!aintained through ,divide and rule+, preventing the for!ation of countervailingalliances in the periphery +) e&ploitin" differen'es amon" potential '#allen"ers. n @0 i(ide:and:rule strate"iesin'lude usin" resour'es from one part of t#e empire a"ainst '#allen"ers in anot#er part and multi:(o'al 'ommuni'ation :le"itimatin" imperial rule +) si"nalin" 9different identities ... to different audien'es.9 n @1 7lt#ou"# t#e >.S. #as often +een la+eledan empire, t#e term applies onl) in limited respe'ts and in 'ertain situations. Man) forei"n relations s'#olars uestion t#e'omparison. n @2 *owe(er, t#e >.S. does e&er'ise informal imperial rule w#en it #as routine and 'onsistent influen'e o(er t#eforei"n poli'ies of ot#er nations, w#o risk losin" 9'ru'ial militar), e'onomi', or politi'al support9 if t#e) refuse to 'ompl). n @ B#e9Status of ?or'e 7"reements9 C9SF?7s9D t#at "o(ern le"al ri"#ts and responsi+ilities of >.S. militar) personnel and ot#ers on >.S. +ases t#rou"#out t#e world are t)pi'all) one:sided. n @ 7nd t#e >.S. o''upations in =ra and 7f"#anistan #ad a stron" imperiald)nami' +e'ause t#ose re"imes depended on 7meri'an support. n @/ [A1 /3 5utthe !anage!ent of e!pire isincreasingly difficult in the era of globali ation . *etero"eneous 'ontra'tin" and di(ide:and:rulestrate"ies tend to fail w#en perip#eries 'an 'ommuni'ate wit# one anot#er. B#e >.S. is less a+le 'ontrol 9t#e flow of information ...a+out its +ar"ains and a'ti(ities around t#e world.9 n @@ =n late 2004, ne"otiations on t#e Status of ?or'e 7"reement +etween t#e>.S. and =ra were t#e su+6e't of intense media s'rutin) and +e'ame an issue in t#e presidential 'ampai"n. n @ 7not#er 'lassi'imperial ta'ti' : t#e use of +rutal, o(erw#elmin" for'e to eliminate resistan'e to imperial rule : is also unlikel) to +e effe'ti(e toda).The success of counterinsurgency operations depends on winning a battle of ideas ,and collateral da!age is used by violent e tre!ists+ through the 6nternet andsatellite !edia+ to ,create widespread sy!pathy for their cause., n @4The abuses at Abu *hraib+ once public+ har!ed A!erica-s ,brand, and di!inished support forU.S. policy abroad. n3J> 6!perial rule+ li&e hege!ony+ depends on !aintaininglegiti!acy. 5. onstru'tin" a *e"emoni' Model =nternational relations s'#olars are still stru""lin" to define t#e 'urrent era.

    B#e >.S.:led international order is unipolar, #e"emoni', and, in some instan'es, imperial. =n an) e(ent, t#is order di(er"es fromtraditional realist assumptions in important respe'ts. =t is unipolar, +ut sta+le. =t is more #ierar'#i'al.The U.S. is not thesa!e as other states Eit perfor!s unique functions in the world and has agovern!ent open and accessible to foreigners. 7nd t#e sta+ilit) and le"itima') of t#e s)stem dependsmore on su''essful fun'tionin" of t#e >.S. "o(ernment as a w#ole t#an it does on +alan'in" allian'es 'rafted +) elite statesmenpra'ti'in" realpolitik. 9 8orld power politics are shaped pri!arily not by the structurecreated by interstate anarchy but by the foreign policy developed in 8ashington .9n 0 These differences require a new !odel for assessing the institutionalco!petences of the e ecutive and judicial branches in foreign affairs. [A1 @3 Fne

    approa'# would +e to adapt an institutional 'ompeten'e model usin" insi"#ts from a ma6or alternati(e t#eor) of internationalrelations : li+eralism. Li+eral =$ t#eor) "enerall) #olds t#at internal '#ara'teristi's of states : in parti'ular, t#e form of "o(ernment :di'tate states8 +e#a(ior, and t#at demo'ra'ies do not "o to war a"ainst one anot#er. n 1 Li+eralists also re"ard e'onomi'interdependen'e and international institutions as important for maintainin" pea'e and sta+ilit) in t#e world. n 2 ean 7nne:Marie Slau"#ter #as proposed a +inar) model t#at distin"uis#es +etween li+eral, demo'rati' states and non:demo'rati' states. n5e'ause domesti' and forei"n issues are 9most 'on(er"ent9 amon" li+eral demo'ra'ies, Slau"#ter reasons, t#e 'ourts s#ould de'ide

    issues 'on'ernin" t#e s'ope of t#e politi'al +ran'#es8 powers. n Wit# respe't to non:li+eral states, t#e position of t#e >.S. is more9realist,9 and 'ourts s#ould deplo) a #i"# le(el of deferen'e. n / Fne stren"t# of t#is +inar) approa'# is t#at it would tend toredu'e t#e un'ertaint) in forei"n affairs ad6udi'ation. Professor -Heli+e #as o+ser(ed t#at it would put 'ourts in t#e diffi'ult positionof determinin" w#i'# 'ountries are li+eral demo'ra'ies. n @ 5ut e(en if 'ourts are 'apa+le of makin" t#ese determinations, t#e) would still fa'e t#e same dilemmas ad6udi'atin" 'ontro(ersies re"ardin" non:li+eral states. W#ere is t#e appropriate +oundar) +etween forei"n affairs and domesti' matters *ow mu'# dis'retion s#ould +e afforded t#e e&e'uti(e w#en indi(idual ri"#ts anda''ounta+ilit) (alues are at stake Bo resol(e t#ese dilemmas, an institutional 'ompeten'e model s#ould +e appli'a+le to forei"naffairs ad6udi'ation a'ross t#e +oard. =n 'onstru'tin" a new realist model, it is wort# re'allin" t#at t#e fun'tional 6ustifi'ations forspe'ial deferen'e are aimed at addressin" pro+lems of a parti'ular sort of role effe'ti(eness : w#i'# allo'ation of power amon" t#e +ran'#es will +est a'#ie(e "eneral "o(ernmental effe'ti(eness in forei"n affairs. =n t#e twent):first 'entur), A!erica-sglobal role has changed+ and the best !eans of achieving effectiveness in foreign

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    affairs have changed as well . The international real! re!ains highly political : if notas mu'# as in t#e past : +ut it is A!erican politics that !atters !ost. =f t#e >.S. is trul) an empire : [A1 3and in some respe'ts it is : t#e pro+lems of imperial mana"ement will +e far different from t#e pro+lems of mana"in" relations wit#one ot#er "reat power or man) "reat powers. Similarl),the !anage!ent of hege!ony or unipolarityrequires a different set of co!petences. 7lt#ou"# 7meri'an predominan'e is re'o"niHed as a salient fa't,t#ere is no 'onsensus amon" realists a+out t#e pre'ise nature of t#e 'urrent international order. n B#e #e"emoni' model = offer#ere adopts 'ommon insi"#ts from t#e t#ree =$ frameworks : unipolar, #e"emoni', and imperial : des'ri+ed a+o(e. ?irst, t#e9#)+rid9 #e"emoni' model assumes t#at t#e "oal of >.S. forei"n affairs s#ould +e t#e preser(ation of 7meri'an #e"emon), w#i'# ismore sta+le, more pea'eful, and +etter for 7meri'a8s se'urit) and prosperit), t#an t#e alternati(es. 6f the U nited S tates were to withdraw fro! its global leadership role+ no other nation would becapable of ta&ing its place . n3F= The result would be radical instability and agreater ris& of !ajor war . n ; =n addition, t#e >nited States would no lon"er +enefit from t#e pu+li' "oods it #ad

    formerl) produ'edE as t#e lar"est 'onsumer, it would suffer t#e most. Se'ond, t#e #e"emoni' model assumes t#at A!ericanhege!ony is unusually stable and durable . n 40 7s noted a+o(e, other nations have !anyincentives to continue to tolerate the current order . n 41 7nd alt#ou"# ot#er nations or "roups ofnations : #ina, t#e %uropean >nion, and =ndia are often mentioned : ma) e(entuall) o(ertake t#e >nited States in 'ertain areas,su'# as manufa'turin", the U.S. will re!ain do!inant in !ost !easures of capability for

    decades . 7''ordin" to 200 estimates, t#e >.S. e'onom) was pro6e'ted to +e twi'e t#e siHe of #ina8s in 202/. n 42TheU.S. accounted for half of the world-s !ilitary spending in '44F and holdsenor!ous advantages in defense technology that far outstrip would/beco!petitors. n3=3 Predictions of A!erican decline are not new+ and they havethus far proved pre!ature. n 4 [A1 43 B#ird,the hege!onic !odel assu!es thatpreservation of A!erican hege!ony depends not just on power+ but legiti!acy .n 4/ 7ll t#ree =$ frameworks for des'ri+in" predominant states : alt#ou"# unipolarit) less t#an #e"emon) or empire : su""est t#atlegiti!acy is crucial to the stability and durability of the syste!. Although e!piresand predo!inant states in unipolar syste!s can conceivably !aintain theirposition through the use of force + this is !uch !ore li&ely to e haust the resourcesof the predo!inant state and to lead to counter/balancing or the loss of control . n 4@ egiti!acy as a !ethod of !aintaining predo!inance is far !ore efficient . B#e#e"emoni' model "enerall) (alues 'ourts8 institutional 'ompeten'es more t#an t#e anar'#i' realist model. The courts- strengths in offering a stable interpretation of the law + relative insulation fro!political pressure+ and power to bestow legiti!acy are i!portant for reali ing thefunctional constitutional goal of effective U.S. foreign policy . B#is means t#at 'ourts8 treatment

    of deferen'e in forei"n affairs will, in most respe'ts, resem+le its treatment of domesti' affairs. Gi(en t#e amorp#ous ualit) offorei"n affairs deferen'e, t#is 9domesti'ation9 redu'es un'ertaint). The increasing boundary proble!scaused by the proliferation of treaties and the infiltration of do!estic law byforeign affairs issues are lessened by reducing the deference gap . 7nd the dile!!acaused by the need to weigh different functional considerations : li+ert), a''ounta+ilit), andeffe'ti(eness : against one another is !ade less intractable because it beco!es part ofthe sa!e project that the courts constantly grapple with in adjudicating do!esticdisputes.

    5udicial action clarifying a !eaningful right to habeas is &ey #nowles > [Sprin", 200;, $o+ert

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    syste!+ while enforceable international legal nor!s !ay still be political+ theircontent is heavily influenced by the politics of one nation : t#e >nited States. n 12 As aninstitution of that sa!e govern!ent+ the courts are well/positioned to understandand interpret international law that has been incorporated into U.S. law. 5e'ause t#e'ourts #a(e t#e 'apa'it) to tra'k international le"al norms, there was no longer a justification fore ceptional deference to the Ad!inistration-s interpretation of the *enevaConventions as applied to the detainees. Professors Posner and Sunstein #a(e ar"ued for e&'eptionaldeferen'e on t#e "round t#at, unless t#e e&e'uti(e is t#e (oi'e of t#e nation in forei"n affairs, ot#er nations will not know w#om to#old a''ounta+le for forei"n poli') de'isions. n 1 5ut t#e Guantanamo liti"ation demonstrated t#at 7meri'an #e"emon) #asaltered t#is 'lassi' assumption as well. The [A1/ 3transparent and accessible nature of the U.S.govern!ent !ade it possible for other nations to be infor!ed about the detaineepolicy and+ conceivably+ to have a role in changing it. B#e

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    requires !a i!u! fle ibility to defeat the ene!y+ who !ay not adhere tointernational law. =ndeed,the precedents relied on !ost heavily by the

    Ad!inistration in the ene!y co!batant cases date fro! the 1>34s and 1>I4s / aperiod when the international syste! was radically unstable , and t#e >nited States was one ofse(eral "reat powers ()in" for ad(anta"e. n 0 5ut durin" t#at time, t#e e&e'uti(e +ran'# fa'ed mu'# more e&o"enous pressurefrom ot#er "reat powers to 'ompl) wit# international law in t#e treatment of 'aptured enemies. =f t#e >nited States stra)ed too farfrom esta+lis#ed norms, it would risk retaliation upon its own soldiers or ot#er 'onse uen'es from [A1/@3 powerful ri(als. Boda),t#ere are no su'# 'onstraints! enemies su'# as al Xaeda are not "reat powers and are not likel) to o+e) international law an)wa).=nstead,the danger is that A!erican rule/brea&ing will set a pattern of rule/brea&ingfor the world+ leading to instability . nI31 A!erica-s !ilitary predo!inanceenables it to set the rules of the ga!e. 8hen the U.S. brea&s its own rules+ it loseslegiti!acy. B#e Supreme ourt8s response to t#e detainee poli') ena+led t#e >.S. "o(ernment as a w#ole to #ew more

    'losel) to esta+lis#ed pro'edures and norms, and to re"ulariHe t#e pro'ess for departin" from t#em. 7fter *amdi, n 2 t#eepartment of efense esta+lis#ed a pro'ess, t#e S$Bs, for makin" an indi(idual determination a+out t#e enem) 'om+atant status

    of all detainees at Guantanamo. 7fter t#e ourt re'o"niHed #a+eas 6urisdi'tion at Guantanamo, on"ress passed t#e B7, nesta+lis#in" dire't 6udi'ial re(iew of S$B determinations in lieu of #a+eas. Similarl), after t#e ourt de'lared t#e militar)'ommissions unlawful in *amdan, n t#is for'ed t#e 7dministration to seek 'on"ressional appro(al for 'ommissions t#atrestored some of t#e ri"#ts afforded at 'ourts martial. n / =n 5oumediene, t#e ourt re6e'ted t#e e&e'uti(e +ran'#8s forei"n poli')ar"uments, and +u'ked on"ress as well, to restore t#e norm of #a+eas re(iew. n @Throughout this ene!y

    co!batant litigation+ it has been the courts - relative insulation fro! politics thathas enabled the! to ta&e the long view . =n 'ontrast, the President-s Cand on"ress8sDresponsiveness to political concerns in the wa&e of >?11 has encouraged the! todepart fro! established nor!s for the nation-s perceived short/ter! advantage + e(en at t#e e&pense of t#e nation8s lon":term interests. n 7s erek Jinks and -eal .S.'itiHens of Japanese an'estr) li(in" in t#e >nited States. n @6n (ou!ediene+ the Court @K1E= pointedlydeclined to defer to the e ecutive branch -s factual assess!ents of !ilitary

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    necessity . n The court !ay have recogni ed that a !ore aggressive role inprotecting the rights of non/citi ens was required by A!erican hege!ony . =n fa't,the argu!ents for deference with respect to the rights of non/citi ens are even

    wea&er because aliens lac& a political constituency in the United States . n 4Thisoutward/loo&ing for! of representation /reinforce!ent serves i!portantfunctions. 6t strengthens the legiti!acy of U.S. hege!ony by establishing equalityas a bench!ar& and reinforces the sense that our constitutional values reflectuniversal hu!an rights . n ;

    US benevolent hege!ony is critical to global peace7the alternative causes !assive wars#ro!ah >+ %asters in 6O [?e+ruar) 200;, Lamii Moi(i - i(il 7ffairs Fffi'er, $esear'#er Y =nstitute for Pea'e andSe'urit) Studies, M7 from >ni(ersit) of t#e Witwatersrand, B#e =nstitutional -ature of >.S. *e"emon)!Post ;K11 , #ttp!KKwiredspa'e.wits.a'.HaK+itstreamK#andleK10/ ;K 01KM7$$U200;.pdf3

    A final !ajor gain to the U nited S tates fro! the benevolent hege!ony has per#aps been less widel) appre'iated. =t ne(ert#eless pro(ed of "reat si"nifi'an'e in t#e s#ort as well as in t#e lon" term!the pervasivecultural influence of the U nited S tates. ; B#is dimension of power +ase is often ne"le'ted. After 8orld

    8ar 66 the authoritarian political cultures of 0urope and 5apan were utterl)discredited+ and the liberal de!ocratic ele!ents of those cultures revivified . B#ere(i(al was most e&tensi(e and deli+erate in t#e o''upied powers of t#e 7&is, w#ereit was nurtured by draftingde!ocratic constitutions+ building de!ocratic institutions+ curbing the power ofindustrial trusts +) de'arteliHation and t#e re+uildin" of trade unions,and i!prisoning or dis'reditin" !uchof the warti!e leadership. A!erican liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. B#e effe't was not so dramati' in t#e 9(i'tor9 states w#ose re"imes were reaffirmed C5ritain, t#e Low and S'andina(ian 'ountriesD, +ut e(en t#ere t#e >nited States and its 'ulture was widel) admired. B#e upper 'lasses ma) often #a(e t#ou"#t it too 9'ommer'ial,9 +ut in man) respe'ts 7meri'an mass 'onsumption 'ulture was t#e most per(asi(e part of 7meri'a8s impa't. 7meri'an st)les, tastes,and middle:'lass 'onsumption patterns were widel) imitated, in a pro'ess t#at8 #as 'ome to +ear t#e la+el 9 'o'a:'oloniHation.9 0

    After 8866 policy !a&ers in the USA set about re!a&ing a world to facilitatepeace. The hege!onic project involves using politi'al and e'onomi' advantages gained in

    world war to restructure the operation of the world !ar&et and interstate syste!in the hege!on-s own i!age . The interests of the leader are projected on auniversal planeN 8hat is good for the hege!on is good for the world. Thehege!onic state is successful to the degree that other states e!ulate it . 0!ulationis the basis of the consent t#at lies at t#e #eart of t#e #e"emoni' pro6e't. 1 Sin'e wealt# depended on pea'etheU.S set about creating institutions and regi!es that pro!oted free trade+ andpeaceful conflict resolution . U.S. benevolent hege!ony is what has &ept the peacesince the end of 8866 . B#e ups#ot is t#atU.S. hege!ony and liberalis! have producedthe !ost stable and durable political order that the world has seen sin'e t#e fall of t#e

    $oman %mpire. =t is not as formall) or #i"#l) inte"rated as t#e %uropean >nion, +ut it is 6ust as profound and ro+ust as a politi'alorder, #ant$s Perpetual Peace requires that the syste! be diverse and not !onolithic

    because then tyranny will be the outco!e. As long as the syste! allows forde!ocratic states to press clai!s and resolve conflicts+ the syste! will perpetuateitself peacefully. A state such as the United States that has achieved internationalpri!acy has every reason to atte!pt to !aintain that pri!acy through peaceful!eans so as to preclude the need of having to fight a war to maintain it. 2This view ofthe post/hege!onic 8estern world does not put a great deal of e!phasis on U.S.leadership in the traditional sense . U.S. leadership ta&es the for! of providing

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    the venues and !echanis!s for articulating de!ands and resolving disputes notunlike t#e '#ara'ter of politi's wit#in domesti' pluralisti' s)stems. A!erica as a big and powerful statehas an incentive to organi e and !anage a political order that is consideredlegiti!ate by the other states . 6t is not in a hege!onic leader-s interest to presideover a global order that requires constant use of !aterial capabilities to get otherstates to go alon ". egiti!acy e ists when politi'al order is +ased on re'ipro'al 'onsent. =t emer"es w#ensecondary states buy into rules and nor!s of the political order as a !atter ofprinciple , and not simpl) +e'ause t#e) are for'ed into it. 5ut if a hege!onic power wants to encouragethe e!ergence of a legiti!ate political order+ it !ust articulate principles andnor!s , and en"a"e in ne"otiations and 'ompromises t#at #a(e (er) little to do wit# t#e e&er'ise of power. So s#ould t#is#e"emoni' power +e 'alled leaders#ip, or domination Well, it would tend toward t#e latter. *ierar'#) #as not "one awa) from t#iss)stem. ore states #a(e perip#eral areas! 'olonial empires and neo:'olonial +a'k)ards. *e"emon), in ot#er words, in(ol(es astru'ture in w#i'# t#ere is a #e"emoni' 'ore power. B#e pro+lem wit# 'allin" t#is #e"emoni' power 9leaders#ip9 is t#at leaders#ip isa wonderful t#in":e(er)one needs leaders#ip. 5ut sometimes = #a(e noti'e t#at leaders#ip is also an ideolo") t#at le"itimatesdomination and e&ploitation. =n fa't, t#is is often t#e 'ase. 5ut t#is is a different kind of domination t#an in earlier s)stems. =tsdifferen'e 'an +e seen in a related uestion! is it pro"ressi(e =s it e(olutionar) in t#e sense of +ein" +etter for most people in t#es)stem = t#ink it a'tuall) is a little +it +etter. B#e tri'kle down effe't is +i""er:it is not (er) +i", +ut it is +i""er. / =t is to t#is t#eor),*e"emoni' Sta+ilit) t#at t#e "lass slipper properl) +elon"s, +e'ause both U.S. security and econo!icstrategies fit the e pectations of hege!onic stability theory !ore co!fortably t#ant#e) do ot#er realist t#eories. We must first dis'uss t#e t#ree pillars t#at >.S. #e"emon) rests on stru'tural, institutional, andsituational. C1D Stru'tural leaders#ip refers to t#e underl)in" distri+ution of material 'apa+ilities t#at "i(es some states t#e a+ilit) todire't t#e o(erall s#ape of world politi'al order. -atural resour'es, 'apital, te'#nolo"), militar) for'e, and e'onomi' siHe are t#e'#ara'teristi's t#at s#ape state power, w#i'# in turn determine t#e 'apa'ities for leaders#ip and #e"emon). =f leaders#ip is rooted int#e distri+ution of power, t#ere is reason to worr) a+out t#e present and future. B#e relati(e de'line of t#e >nited States #as not +een mat'#ed +) t#e rise of anot#er #e"emoni' leader. 7t its #e"emoni' Henit# after World War ==, t#e >nited States 'ommandedrou"#l) fort) fi(e per'ent of world produ'tion. =t #ad a remarka+le arra) of natural resour'e, finan'ial, a"ri'ultural, industrial, andte'#nolo"i'al assets. 7meri'a in 1; / or 1;/0 was not 6ust #e"emoni' +e'ause it #ad a +i" e'onom) or a #u"e militar)E it #ad anunusuall) wide ran"e of resour'es and 'apa+ilities. B#is situation ma) ne(er o''ur a"ain. 7s far as one looks into t#e ne&t 'entur), itis impossi+le to see t#e emer"en'e of a 'ountr) wit# a similarl) 'ommandin" power position. C2D6nstitutionalleadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in placeprinciples and procedures that guide their relations. 6t is not power 'apa+ilities as su'# or t#einter(entions of spe'ifi' states t#at fa'ilitate 'on'erted a'tion, +ut the rules and !utual e pectations thatare established as institutions. 6nstitutions are , in a sense,self/i!posed constraintsthat states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate thereali ation of !utual interests . 7 'ommon t#eme of re'ent dis'ussions of t#e mana"ement of t#e world e'onom)is t#at institutions will need to pla) a "reater role in t#e future in pro(idin" leaders#ip in t#e a+sen'e of 7meri'an #e"emon).5er"sten ar"ues, for e&ample, t#at 9institutions t#emsel(es will need to play a !uch !ore i!portantrole . @ =nstitutional mana"ement is important and 'an "enerate results t#at are internationall) "reater t#an t#e sum of t#eirnational parts. B#e ar"ument is not t#at international institutions i!pose outco!es on states+ butthat institutions shape and constrain how states conceive and pursue theirinterests and policy goals. B#e) pro(ide '#annels and me'#anisms to rea'# a"reements. B#e) set standards andmutual e&pe'tations 'on'ernin" #ow states s#ould a't. They ,bias, politics in internationalistdirections 6ust as, presuma+l), 7meri'an #e"emoni' leaders#ip does. C D Situational leaders#ip refers to t#e a'tions andinitiati(es of states t#at indu'e 'ooperation uite apart from t#e distri+ution of power or t#e arra) of institutions. =t is more'le(erness or t#e a+ilit) to see spe'ifi' opportunities to +uild or reorient international politi'al order, rat#er t#an t#e power'apa'ities of t#e state, t#at makes a differen'e. =n t#is sense, leaders#ip reall) is e&pressed in a spe'ifi' indi(idual:in a president orforei"n minister:as #e or s#e sees a new openin", a pre(iousl) unidentified passa"e forward, a new wa) to define state interests, andt#ere+) transforms e&istin" relations. *e"emoni' sta+ilit) t#eorists ar"ue t#at international politi's is '#ara'teriHed +) a su''essionof #e"emonies in w#i'# a sin"le powerful state dominates t#e s)stem as a result of its (i'tor) in t#e last #e"emoni' war. %spe'iall) after t#e 'old war 7meri'a 'an +e des'ri+ed as tr)in" to keep its position at t#e top +ut also inte"ratin" ot#ers more t#orou"#l) int#e international s)stem t#at it dominates. =t is assumed t#at t#e differential "rowt# of power in a state s)stem would undermine t#estatus uo and lead to #e"emoni' war +etween de'linin" and risin" powers 4, +ut6 see a different pattern ! theU.S. hege!onic stability pro!oting liberal institutionalis! , t#e e(ents followin" ;K11 are a +riefa+normalit) from t#is pat#, but the general trend will be toward institutional liberalis!. Lege!onic states are the crucial co!ponents in !ilitary alliances that turn bac&the !ajor threats to !utual sovereignties and hence political do!ination of thesyste! . =nstead of +ein" territoriall) a""ressi(e and eliminatin" ot#er states, #e"emons respe't ot#er8s territor). B#e) aspire to

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    +e leaders and #en'e are up#olders of inter:stateness and inter:territorialit). ; The nature of the institutions t#emsel(es must, #owe(er, +e e&amined. B#e) were shaped in the years i!!ediately after 8orld

    8ar 66 by the United States. The A!erican willingness to establish institutions , t#e World 5ank to deal with finance and trade , >nited -ations to resolve global conflict , -7BF toprovide security for Western %urope,is e plained in ter!s of the theory of collectivegoods . =t is 'ommonpla'e in t#e re"imes literature t#at the U nited S tates, in so doin", was providing not only private goods for its own benefit but also Cand per#aps espe'iall)Dcollective goods desired

    by , and for t#e +enefit of,other capitalist states and !e!bers of the international syste! ingeneral. CParti'ular 'are is needed #ere a+out e uatin" state interest wit# 9national9 interest.D -ot onl) wasthe UnitedStates prote'tin" its own territor) and 'ommer'ial enterprises, it was providing !ilitary protection forso!e fifty allies and al!ost as !any neutrals . -ot onl) was it ensurin" a li+eral, open, near:"lo+ale'onom) for its own prosperit), it was providing the basis for the prosperity of all capitaliststates and e(en for some states or"aniHed on non'apitalist prin'iples Ct#ose willin" to a+ide +) t#e +asi' rules esta+lis#ed to"o(ern international trade and finan'eD. W#ile su'# +e#a(iour was not e&a'tl) selfless or altruisti', 'ertainl) t#e +enefits:#owe(erdistri+uted +) 'lass, state, or re"ion:did a''rue to man) ot#ers, not 6ust to 7meri'ans./0 ?or t#e trut# a+out >.S. dominant role int#e world is known to most 'lear:e)ed international o+ser(ers. 7nd t#e trut# is t#at the benevolent hege!onye ercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world-s population .6t is certainly a better international arrange!ent than all realistic alternatives. Boundermine it would 'ost man) ot#ers around t#e world far more t#an it would 'ost 7meri'ans:and far sooner. 7s Samuel*untin"ton wrote fi(e )ears a"o, +efore #e 6oined t#e plet#ora of s'#olars distur+ed +) t#e 9arro"an'e9 of 7meri'an #e"emon)E9 A

    world without U.S. pri!acy will be a world with !ore violence and disorder andless de!ocracy and econo!ic growth than a world where the United Statescontinues to have !ore influence than any other country s#apin" "lo+al affairs . /1 = ar"ue t#atthe overall A!erican/shaped syste! is still in place. 6t is this !acro politicalsyste! :a le"a') of 7meri'an power and its li+eral polit) that re!ains and serves to foster agree!entand consensus. This is precisely what people want when they loo& for U.S.leadership and hege!ony ./2 =f t#e >.S. retreats from its #e"emoni' role, w#o would supplant it, not %urope, not

    #ina, not t#e Muslim world Zand 'ertainl) not t#e >nited -ations. >nfortunatel), the alternative to a singlesuperpower is not a !ultilateral utopia+ but the anarchic night!are of a 2ew )ar&

    Age . Moreo(er, the alternative to unipolarity would not be !ultipolarity at all. 6t would be ;apolarity$ a global vacuu! of power ./ Sin'e t#e end of WW==the United States #as +eent#e 'lear and dominant leader politi'all), e'onomi'all) and militar). 5ut its leadership as been uniqueM it hasnot been tyrannical+ its leadership and hege!ony has focused on relative gains andhas forgone absolute gains . The difference lies in the e ercise of power . Thestrength acquired by the United States in the after!ath of 8orld 8ar 66 was fargreater than any single nation #ad e(er possessed, at least sin'e t#e $oman %mpire. 7meri'a8s s#are of t#e worlde'onom), t#e o(erw#elmin" superiorit) of its militar) 'apa'it):au"mented for a time +) a monopol) of nu'lear weapons and t#e'apa'it) to deli(er t#em::"a(e it t#e '#oi'e of pursuin" an) num+er of "lo+al am+itions. B#at t#e 7meri'an people 9mi"#t #a(e sett#e 'rown of world empire on t#eir +rows,9 as one 5ritis# statesman put it in 1;/1, +ut '#ose not to, was a de'ision of sin"ularimportan'e in world #istor) and re'o"niHed as su'#./ Leaders#ip is reall) an ele"ant word for power.To e erciseleadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do. 6tinvolves the ability to shape+ directly or indirectly+ the interests or actions ofothers. eadership !ay involve the ability to not just ,twist ar!s, but also to getother states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in new ways . B#is su""ests ase'ond element of leaders#ip, w#i'# in(ol(es not 6ust t#e mars#allin" of power 'apa+ilities and material resour'es.6t alsoinvolves the ability to project a set of political ideas or principles about the properor effective ordering of po1itics. 6t suggests the ability to produce concerted orcollaborative actions by several states or other actors. eadership is the use ofpower to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end. // 5) (alidatin" re"imesand norms of international +e#a(iour the U.S. has given incentives for actors , small and lar"e, in t#e

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    international arena to behave peacefully. The uni/polar U.S. do!inated order has led to astable international syste! . Woodrow Wilson s Hoo of mana"ed relations amon" states as supposed to #is 6un"le

    met#od of 'onstant 'onfli't. B#e >.S. t#rou"# (arious international treaties and or"aniHations as +e'ome a uasi world "o(ernmentE=t resol(es t#e pro+lem of pro(ision +) imposin" itself as a 'entraliHed aut#orit) a+le to e&tra't t#e e ui(alent of ta&es. B#e fo'us oft#e t#eor) t#us s#ifts from t#e a+ilit) to pro(ide a pu+li' "ood to t#e a+ilit) to 'oer'e ot#er states. 7 +eni"n #e"emon in t#is sense'oer'ion s#ould +e understood as +eni"n and not t)ranni'al. =f si"nifi'ant 'ontinuit) in t#e a+ilit) of t#e >nited States to "et w#at it wants is a''epted, t#en it must +e e&plained. B#e e&planation starts wit# our notin" t#at t#e institutions for politi'al and e'onomi'

    'ooperation #a(e t#emsel(es +een maintained. .S. workin" t#rou"# -7BF pro(ided t#e se'urit) and impetus for a 'onfli't prone re"ion to unite and +enefit from "reater 'ooperation. Sin'e t#e >nited States emer"ed as a "reat power, t#e identifi'ation of t#e interests of ot#ers wit#its own #as +een t#e most strikin" ualit) of 7meri'an forei"n and defen'e poli'). 7meri'ans seem to #a(e internaliHed and madese'ond nature a 'on(i'tion #eld onl) sin'e World War ==! -amel), t#at t#eir own well+ein" depends fundamentall) on t#e well:+ein"of ot#ersE t#at 7meri'an prosperit) 'annot o''ur in t#e a+sen'e of "lo+al prosperit)E t#at 7meri'an freedom depends on t#e sur(i(aland spread of freedom elsew#ereE t#at a""ression an)w#ere t#reatens t#e dan"er of a""ression e(er)w#ereE and t#at 7meri'annational se'urit) is impossi+le wit#out a +road measure of international se'urit). / 6 see a !ulti/polar world asone being filled with instability and higher chances of great power conflict . The*reat Power jostling and (ritish hege!onic decline that led to 886 is an e a!pleof how !ulti polar syste!s are prone to great power wars. = furt#er posit t#atU.S.hege!ony is significantly different fro! the past (ritish hege!ony because of itsreliance on consent and its !utilaterist nature . B#e most si"nifi'ant would +e t#e >- and its (arious

    +ran'#es finan'ial, de(elopmental, and 'onfli't resolution . 6t is co!!on for the international syste! togo through cataclys!ic changes with the fall of a great power . = feel t#at 7meri'an #e"emon) is

    so different espe'iall) wit# its relian'e on li+eral institutionalism and 'omple& interdependen'e t#at >.S. #e"emoni' order and"o(ernan'e will +e maintained +) ot#ers, if states (ar) in siHe, t#en 'ooperation +etween t#e lar"est of t#e former free riders Candin'ludin" t#e de'linin" #e"emoni' powerD ma) suffi'e to preser(e t#e 'ooperati(e out'ome. B#us we need to amend t#e assumptiont#at 'olle'ti(e a'tion is impossi+le and in'orporate it into a fuller spe'ifi'ation of t#e 'ir'umstan'es under w#i'# international'ooperation 'an +e preser(ed e(en as a #e"emoni' power de'lines./4 6f hege!ony !eans the ability tofoster cooperation and co!!onalty of social purpose a!ong states+ U.S.leadership and its institutional creations will long outlast the decline of its post

    war position of !ilitary and econo!ic do!inance M and it will outlast the foreignpolicy stu!bling of particular ad!inistrations. /; >.S. #e"emon) will 'ontinue pro(idin" t#e pu+li'

    "ood t#at t#e world is asso'iated wit# despite t#e rise of ot#er powers in t#e s)stem cooperation !ay persist afterhege!onic decline because of the inertia of e isting regi!es. =nstitutional fa'tors and differentlo"i's of re"ime 'reation and maintenan'e #a(e +een in(oked to e&plain t#e failure of t#e 'urrent e'onomi' re"ime to disinte"raterapidl) in response to t#e de'line of 7meri'an predominan'e in world affairs. @0Since the end of 8866 the!ajority of the states t#at are represented in t#e 'ore have co!e to depend on the security thatU.S. hege!ony has provided , so alt#ou"# t#e) #a(e t#eir own national interest, they forgo short ter!gains to !aintain U.S. hege!ony . W#) would ot#er states for"o a leaders#ip role to a forei"n #e"emon +e'ause itis in t#eir interestsE one parti'ularl) am+itious appli'ation is Gilpin8s anal)sis of war and #e"emoni' sta+ilit). *e ar"ues t#atthepresence of a hege!onic power is central to the preservation of stability and

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    peace in t#e international s)stem. Mu'# of Gilpin8s ar"ument resem+les #is own and

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    two world wars. B#at 'omes to an a(era"e of 2 million deat#s a )ear in a world of appro&imatel) 2 +illion souls. Boda), wit# far more 'ompre#ensi(e worldwide reportin", resear'#ers report an a(era"e of less t#an 100,000 +attle deat#s annuall) ina world fast approa'#in" +illion people. B#ou"# admittedl) 'rude+these calculations suggest a >4percent absolute drop and a >> percent relative drop in deaths due to war . 8eare clearly headed for a world order characteri ed by !ultipolarity+ somet#in" t#e 7meri'an:+irt#ed s)stem was desi"ned to +ot# en'oura"e and a''ommodate. (ut given how things turned

    out the last ti!e we collectively faced such a fluid structure+ we would do well to&eep U.S. power + in all of its for!s+ deeply e!bedded in the geo!etry to co!e. QBo 'ontinue t#e #istori'al sur(e), after sal(a"in" Western %urope from its #alf:'entur) of 'i(il war, the U.S. e!ergedas the progenitor of a new+ far !ore just for! of globali ation // one based onactual free trade rather than colonialis! . A!erica then successfully replicatedglobali ation further in 0ast Asia over the second half of the '4th century+setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

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    1AC )e!ocracy

    Contention two is )e!ocracyN

    #iye!ba created a !odel of runaway e ecutive power under!ining the global rule

    of law 9aughn and 8ilia!s+ Professors of aw+ 13 [201 ,

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    did the Ad!inistration$s bidding Oproviding al!ost a blan& chec& for any actionsthe 0 ecutive wished to underta&e . =n su'# a situation, it is all the !ore i!portant thatthe Court act to preserve our tripartite syste! of govern!ent , parti'ularl) +e'ause national

    se'urit) is an area (ulnera+le to a+use and e&'ess. B#e Supreme ourt was on +oard wit# refusin" to endorse a +lank '#e'k for four )ears runnin". 5ut, the Court dropped the ball when it dis!issed7at the 0 ecutive$surging 7the certiorari petitions in #iye!ba 6 and 666 . 7s stated in t#e >i"#urs 'ertiorari petition, as a'onstitutional matter, the President$s discretionary release of a prisoner is no differentfro! his discretionary i!prison!entN each proceeds fro! unchec&ed power . 242 Bo (iew t#e uestion of release as +ased on so(erei"n prero"ati(e in t#e administration of immi"ration law, w#ile (iewin" t#e uestionof imprisonment as +ased on 'onstitutional aut#orit) is, put simpl), senseless and wit#out pre'edent. =t 'annot +e t#at t#e twoin uiries are unrelatedE t#e) +ot# undou+tedl) impli'ate indi(idual 'onstitutional ri"#ts and t#e separation of powers.

    )e!ocratic transitions are co!ing now 7 Supre!e Court influence is thedeter!ining factorSuto 11+ Oesearch Associate at Tahrir 6nstitute and 5.).[0 K1/K11, $)an Suto is a $esear'# 7sso'iate at Ba#rir =nstitute for Middle %ast Poli'), #as de"rees in de"rees in law, post:'onfli'tre'onstru'tion, international relations and pu+li' relations from S)ra'use Law, Judi'ial iploma')! B#e =nternational =mpa't of t#eSupreme ourt , #ttp!KK6urist.or"KdatelineK2011K0 Kr)an:suto:6udi'ial:diploma').p#p3The Court is certainly the best institution to e plain to scholars+ govern!ents +lawyers and lay people ali&e the enduring legal values of the US+ why they have

    been chosen and how they contribute to the develop!ent of a stable andde!ocratic society . A return to the !entality that one of A!erica-s !ost i!portante ports is its legal traditions would certainly benefit the US and stands to benefitnations building and developing their own legal traditions , and our relations wit# t#em.?urt#ermore, it stands to increase the influence and higher the profile of the bench . B#e

    ourt alread) en"a"es in t#e e&er'ise of dispensin" 6usti'e and interpretin" t#e onstitution, and to deli(er its opinions wit# an e)etoward t#eir diplomati' (alue would take onl) minimal effort and #as t#e potential for #i"# returns. 8hile the Court isindeed the best body to conduct legal diplo!acy+ it has been falling short in doingso in recent sessions . 8e are at a critical !o!ent in world history . People in the%iddle 0ast and 2orth Africa are asserting discontent with their govern!ents .

    %any nations in Africa+ Asia+ and 0urasia are grappling with new technologies +

    repressive regi!es and econo!ic despair . Wit# the develop!ent of new countries+such as South Sudan + the for!ation of new govern!ents + as is occurring in 0gypt +and the develop!ent of new constitutions+ as is occurring in 2epal+ it isi!portant that the US welco!e and engage in legal diplo!acy and infor!ativetwo/way dialogue . 7s a nation wit# lastin" and sustaina+le le"al (alues and traditions,the Supre!e Courtshould be at the forefront of public legal diplo!acy. 8ith each decision+ theSupre!e Court has the opportunity to better define+ e plain and defend &ey legalconcepts. This is an opportunity that should not be wasted.

    Pro!oting a strong judiciary is necessary to !a&e those transitions stable and

    de!ocratic7detention policies guarantee global authoritarianis!C5A 3 , enter for Justi'e and 7''ounta+ilit) [F BF5%$ 200 , B#e enter for Justi'e R 7''ounta+ilit) C J7 D seeks, +) use of t#e le"als)stems, to deter torture and ot#er #uman ri"#ts a+uses around t#e world., 5$=%? F? t#e

    %-B%$ ?F$ J>SB= % 7- 7 F>-B75=L=B , t#e =-B%$-7B=F-7L L%7G>% ?F$*>M7- $=G*BS, and =- =I= >7L 7 IF 7B%S for t#e =- %P%- %- % of t#eJ> = =7$ in %M%$G=-G %MF $7 =%S as 7M= = >$=7% =- S>PPF$B F?P%B=B=F-%$S , #ttp!KKwww.'6a.or"KdownloadsK7l:Fda# Fda# ( >S $asul ( 5us# J7 7mi'us S FB>S.pdf3

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    7 SB$F-G, =- %P%- %-B J> = =7$ =S %SS%-B=7L BF B*% P$FB% B=F- F? =- =I= >7L ?$%% FMS 7- B*%%SB75L=S*M%-B F? SB75L% GFI%$-7- % =- %M%$G=-G %MF $7 =%S 7$F>- B*% WF$L . 7. =ndi(idual -ations*a(e 7''epted and 7re Seekin" to =mplement Judi'ial $e(iew 5) 7 Stron", =ndependent Judi'iar). %any of the newlyindependent govern!ents that have proliferated over the past five decades haveadopted these ideals . They have e!erged fro! a variety of less/than/free conte ts+including the end of 0uropean colonial rule in the 1>E4-s and 1>J4-s+ the end of theCold 8ar and the brea&up of the for!er Soviet Union in t#e late 1;408s and 1;;08s, thedisintegration of Rugoslavia+ and the continuing tur!oil in parts of Africa+ atin

    A!erica and southern Asia. So!e countries have successfully transitioned tostable and de!ocratic for!s of govern!ent t#at prote't indi(idual freedoms and #uman ri"#ts by!eans of judicial review by a strong and independent judiciary. "thers havesuffered the rise of tyrannical and oppressive rulers who consolidated their holdon power in part by di!inishing or abolishing the role of the judiciary . 7nd stillothers hang in the balance + struggling against the onslaught of tyrants toestablish stable+ de!ocratic govern!ents. =n t#eir attempts to s#ed t#eir t)ranni'al pasts and to ensure

    t#e prote'tion of indi(idual ri"#ts, e!erging de!ocracies have consistently loo&ed to the U nited

    S tates and its Constitution in fashioning fra!ewor&s that safeguard theindependence of their judiciaries . See $an *irs'#l, B#e Politi'al Fri"ins of Judi'ial %mpowerment t#rou"#onstitutionaliHation! Lessons from ?our onstitutional $e(olutions, 2/ Law R So'. =n uir) ;1, ;2 C2000D Cstatin" t#at of t#e

    [m3an) 'ountries . . . [t#at3 #a(e en"a"ed in fundamental 'onstitutional reform o(er t#e past t#ree de'ades, nearl) all adopted a +ill of ri"#ts and esta+lis#e[d3 some form of a'ti(e 6udi'ial re(iew D0stablishing judicial review by a strongand independent judiciary is a critical step in stabili ing and protecting these new de!ocracies . See #ristop#er M. Larkins, Judi'ial =ndependen'e and emo'ratiHation! 7 B#eoreti'al and on'eptual

    7nal)sis, 7m. J. omp. L. @0/, @0/:0@ C1;;@D Cdes'ri+in" t#e 6udi'ial +ran'# as #a(in" 9a uni uel) important role9 in transitional'ountries, not onl) to 9mediate 'onfli'ts +etween politi'al a'tors +ut also [to3 pre(ent t#e ar+itrar) e&er'ise of "o(ernment powerEsee also aniel . Prefontaine and Joanne Lee, B#e $ule of Law and t#e =ndependen'e of t#e Judi'iar), =nternational entre for

    riminal Law $eform and riminal Justi'e Poli') C1;;4D C9B#ere is in'reasin" a'knowled"ment t#at an independent 6udi'iar) is t#eke) to up#oldin" t#e rule of law in a free so'iet) . . . . Most 'ountries in transition from di'tators#ips andKor statist e'onomiesre'o"niHe t#e need to 'reate a more sta+le s)stem of "o(ernan'e, +ased on t#e rule of law.9D, a(aila+le at

    #ttp!KKwww.i''lr.law.u+'.'aKPu+li'ationsK$eportsK$uleofLaw. pdf Clast (isited Jan. 4, 200 D. 7lt#ou"# t#e pre'ise form of"o(ernment differs amon" 'ountries, they ulti!ately constitute variations within+ not fro!+ the A!erican !odel of constitutionalis! . . .@a specific set of funda!ental rights andliberties has the status of supre!e law+ is entrenched against a!end!ent orrepeal . . . and is enforced by an independent court . . . . Step#en Gard+aum, B#e -ew

    ommonwealt# Model of onstitutionalism, ; 7m. J. omp. L. 0 , 14 C2001D.This pheno!enon beca!e !ostnotable worldwide after 8orld 8ar 66 when certain countries , su'# as German), =tal), andJapan, e!braced independent judiciaries f ollowin" t#eir +itter e&perien'es under totalitarian re"imes. See id.at 1 : 1/E see also >nited States (. B#en, /@ ?. d @ , @; C2d ir. 1;;/D C ala+resi, J., 'on'urrin"D CSin'e World War ==,!anycountries have adopted for!s of judicial review + which O t#ou"# different from ours in man)parti'ulars O un!ista&ably draw their origin and inspiration fro! A!ericanconstitutional theory and practice. See "enerall) Mauro appelletti, B#e Judi'ial Pro'ess in omparati(e

    Perspe'ti(e CF&ford! larendon Press, 1;4;D. D.6t is a trend that continues to this day. 6t bears!ention that the United States has consistently affir!ed and encouraged theestablish!ent of independent judiciaries in e!erging de!ocracies . =n Septem+er 2000,President linton o+ser(ed t#at 9[w3it#out t#e rule of law, ele'tions simpl) offer a '#oi'e of di'tators. . . . A!erica-se perience should be put to use to advance the rule of law + where de!ocracy-sroots are loo&ing for roo! and strength to grow .9 $emarks at Geor"etown >ni(ersit) Law S'#ool, @ Weekl) omp. Pres. o'. 2214 CSeptem+er 2@, 2000D, a(aila+le at #ttp!KK'[email protected]."o(K2000K0;K2000:0;:2@: remarks:+):president:at:"eor"etown:international:law'enter.#tml. The U nited S tates acts on these principles in part

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    through the assistance it provides to developing nations. ?or e&ample, t#e >nited States re uirest#at an) 'ountr) seekin" assistan'e t#rou"# t#e Millenium #allen"e 7''ount, a de(elopment assistan'e pro"ram instituted in2002, must demonstrate, amon" ot#er 'riteria, an 9ad#eren'e to t#e rule of law.9 B#e W#ite *ouse noted t#at t#e rule of law is oneof t#e 9essential 'onditions for su''essful de(elopment9 of t#ese 'ountries. See#ttp!KKwww.w#ite#ouse."o(Kinfo'usKde(elopin"nations Clast (isited Jan. 4, 200 D.12 A few e a!ples illustratethe influence of the United States !odel . "n 2ove!ber '=+ 1>>=+ Albania adopted

    a new constitution + representin" t#e 'ulmination of ei"#t )ears of demo'rati' reform after t#e 'ommunist rule 'ollapsed.6n addition to protecting funda!ental individual rights+ the Albanian Constitutionprovides for an independent judiciary 'onsistin" of a onstitutional ourt wit# final aut#orit) to determine

    t#e 'onstitutional ri"#ts of indi(iduals. 7l+anian onstitution, 7rti'le 12/, =tem 1 and 7rti'le 124E see also arian Pa(li, 97 5rief8 onstitutional *istor)8 of 7l+ania9 a(aila+le at #ttp!KKwww.ipls.or"Kser(i'esKot#ersK'#ist.#tml Clast (isited Janaur) 4, 200 DE Jean:Marie *en'kaerts R Stefaan Ian der Jeu"#t, *uman $i"#ts Prote'tion >nder t#e -ew onstitutions of entral %urope, 20 Lo). L.7.=nt l R omp. L.J. / CMar. 1;;4D. =n Sout# 7fri'a,the new constitutional judiciary plays a si!ilarlyi!portant role+ following generations of an oppressive apartheid regi!e . Sout# 7fri'aadopted a new 'onstitution in 1;;@. onstitution of t#e $epu+li' of Sout# 7fri'a, %&planator) Memorandum. =t esta+lis#es a

    onstitutional ourt w#i'# makes t#e final de'ision w#et#er an 7't of Parliament, a pro(in'ial 7't or 'ondu't of t#e President is'onstitutional. =d. at #apter 4, Se'tion 1@ , =tem C/D, a(aila+le at#ttp!KKwww.polit).or".HaK#tmlK"o(do'sK'onstitutionKsa'onst.#tml r e+ookmarkN1 Clast (isited Januar) 4, 200 DE see also Justi'eB#olakele *. Madala, $ule >nder 7part#eid and t#e ?led"lin" emo'ra') in Post:7part#eid Sout# 7fri'a! B#e $ole of t#e Judi'iar),2@ -. . J. =nt l L. R om. $e". CSummer 2001D. Afghanistan is perhaps the !ost recent e a!ple

    of a country struggling to develop a !ore de!ocratic for! of govern!ent.

    Adoption by the oya 5irga of Afghanistan-s new constitution on 5anuary I+ '44Ihas been hailed as a !ilestone . See #ttp!KKwww.'+snews.'omKstoriesK200 K01K02KworldKmain/;111 @.s#tml CJan

    , 200 D. B#e proposed 'onstitution 'reates a 6udi'iar) t#at, at least on paper, is 9an independent or"an of t#e state,9 wit# a Supremeourt empowered to re(iew t#e 'onstitutionalit) of laws at t#e re uest of t#e Go(ernment andKor t#e ourts. 7f"#an onst. 7rt. 11@,

    121 Cunoffi'ial %n"lis# translationD, a(aila+le at #ttp!KKwww.#aHara.netK6ir"aK7f"#an onstitution:?inal.pdf Clast (isited Januar) 4,200 D. See also $on S)nowitH, 7f"#anistan! onstitutional ommission #airman Presents

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    *uant na!o (ay. ?or e&ample, $ais atim,%alaysia-s ,de facto law !inister , e plicitlyrelied on the detentions at *uant na!o to justify %alaysia-s detention of !orethan F4 suspected 6sla!ic !ilitants for over two years. $ais stated t#at %alyasia-sdetentions were , just li&e the process in *uant na!o +, addin", 9= put t#e e uation wit#Guant namo 6ust to make it "rap#i' to )ou t#at t#is is not simpl) a Mala)sian st)le of doin" t#in"s.9 Sean oon", 9Mala)sia Slams

    riti'ism of Se'urit) Law 7llowin" etention Wit#out Brial,9 7sso'iated Press, Septem+er ;, 200 Ca(aila+le from Westlaw at;K;K0 7PW=$%S 0;! !00D. Similarl), when responding to a United States *overn!ent hu!anrights report that listed rights violations in 2a!ibia , 2a!ibia-s 6nfor!ationPer!anent Secretary %oc&s Shivute cited the *uant na!o (ay detentions+clai!ing that ,the US govern!ent was the worst hu!an rights violator in the

    world., 55 Monitorin", Mar'# 4, 2002, a(aila+le at 2002 WL 1/; 4 0 . -or is t#is distur+in" trend limited to t#ese spe'ifi'e&amples. 7t a re'ent 'onferen'e #eld at t#e arter enter in 7tlanta, President Carter+ specifically citing the*uant na!o (ay detentions + noted that the erosion of civil liberties in the UnitedStates has , given a blan& chec& to nations who are inclined to violate hu!anrights already. 9 ou" Gross, 9 arter! >.S. #uman ri"#ts missteps em+olden forei"n di'tators,9 7sso'iated Press

    -ewswires, -o(em+er 12, 200 Ca(aila+le from Westlaw at 11K12K0 7PW=$%S 00! 0!2@D. 7t t#e same 'onferen'e, Professor Saad=+ra#im of t#e 7meri'an >ni(ersit) in airo Cw#o was 6ailed for se(en )ears after e&posin" fraud in t#e %")ptian ele'tion pro'essDsaid, 9%(er) di'tator in t#e world is usin" w#at t#e >nited States #as done under t#e Patriot 7't . . . to 6ustif) t#eir past (iolations of

    #uman ri"#ts and to de'lare a li'ense to 'ontinue to (iolate #uman ri"#ts.9 =d. Likewise, S#e#u Sani,president of the#aduna+ 2igeriabased Civil Oights Congress+ wrote in the 6nternational LeraldTribune on Septem+er 1/, 200 that ,@t he insistence by the (ush ad!inistration on&eeping Taliban and Al uaeda captives in indefinite detention in *uant na!o(ay , u+a,instead of in jails in the United States 7 and the 8hite Louse-s preferencefor !ilitary tribunals over regular courts 7 helps create a free license for tyrannyin Africa. 6t helps justify 0gypt-s !ove to detain hu!an rights ca!paigners asthreats to national security+ and does the sa!e for si!ilar !easures by thegovern!ents of 6vory Coast+ Ca!eroon and (ur&ina aso ., 7(aila+le at#ttp!KKwww.i#t.'omKi#tsear'#.p#p idN10;;2 RownerNC=*BDRdat eN200 012112 2/;.6n our uni/polar world+the United States obviously sets an i!portant e a!ple on these issues. 7s refle'ted in

    t#e foundational do'uments of t#e >nited -ations and man) ot#er su'# a"reements, the international co!!unityhas consistently affir!ed the value of an independent judiciary to the defense ofuniversally recogni ed hu!an rights . =n t#e 'ru'i+le of a'tual pra'ti'e wit#in nations, !any haveloo&ed to the United States !odel when developing independent judiciaries withthe ability to chec& e ecutive power in the defense of individual rights . Ret othershave justified abuses by reference to the conduct of the United States . ar !oreinfluential than the words of %ontesquieu and %adison are the actions of the

    U nited S tates. This case star&ly presents the question of which !odel this Court willset for the world . F- L>S=F- %uch of the world !odels itself after this country$stwo hundred year old traditions O and still more on its da) to da) implementation and e&pression of t#ose

    traditions. To say that a refusal to e ercise jurisdiction in t#is 'ase will have globali!plications is not !ere rhetoric . Oesting on this Court$s decision is not only thenecessary role this Court has historically played in this country . 7lso at stake are t#e freedomst#at man) in emer"in" demo'ra'ies around t#e "lo+e seek to ensure for t#eir peoples.

    The plan is &ey 7 indefinite detention e!boldens global destruction of rightsprotectionChaffee >+ Advocacy Counsel at Lu!an Oights irst , ismantlin" Guantanamo! ?a'in"t#e #allen"es of ontinued etention and $epatriation! B#e ost of =ndefinitel)

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    an! W#) ontinued 9Prolon"ed9 etention =s -o Solution Bo Guantanamo,#ttp!KKwww.le&isne&is.'omK#ottopi'sKlna'ademi'KB#e Guantanamo detentions #a(e s#own t#at assessments of dan"erousness +ased not on o(erta'ts, as in a 'riminal trial, +ut on asso'iation are unrelia+le and will ine(ita+l) lead to 'ostl)mistakes. B#is is pre'isel) w#) national se'urit) pre(enti(e detention s'#emes #a(e pro(en adismal failure in ot#er 'ountries. B#e potentialgains from su'# s'#emes are simpl) not greatenough to warrant departure fro! hundreds of years of western cri!inal justicetraditions . n1/ B#e militar) leaders re'o"niHe t#e disa"reea+le 'ompan) t#at t#e >.S. keeps

    w#en en"a"in" in indefinite detention wit#out trial. >.S. allies in %urope #a(e implemented no'ompara+le lon" term detention s'#eme in armed 'onfli't or administrati(e pre(enti(edetention outside of t#e deportation 'onte&t. n1@ B#egovern!ents of countries in 0gypt+%alaysia+ i!babwe+ and #enya #a(e authori ed indefinite or successive detentionsche!es in the na!e of fighting threats fro! terrorists or insurgents and all thosesche!es have resulted in violations of funda!ental due process nor!s. n1F 6nresponse to this criticis!+ such govern!ents have cited *uantana!o (aydetention policies to justify repressive sche!es of prolonged @K1>1 detention wit#out trial:s'#emes t#at t#e >.S. 'riti'iHes as aut#oriHed ar+itrar) detention. n146ndefinite detention regi!es ai!ed at preventing security ris&s are &nown to

    foster hu!an rights abuses and to create perverse incentives against bringingcri!inal charges against prisoners . B#at is w#) t#e >.S. #as +een 'onsistentl) 'riti'al of"o(ernments t#at detain indefinitel) wit#out '#ar"e, in'ludin" re"imes t#at in(ol(e su''essi(ere(iew or unrestrained renewa+le time limits.n1; 6f t#e "ba!a administration continues topursue a detention regi!e for for!er *uantana!o detainees that per!itsindefinite detention without charge+ it will i!pact detention policies ofgovern!ents throughout the world and will li&ely e!bolden other govern!ents tocircu!vent the protections guaranteed in cri!inal trials by citing securityconcerns .

    )e!ocratic bac&sliding causes great power war and authoritarianis!*at 11+ Professor at Tel Aviv University , %Her WeiHman Professor of -ational Se'urit) at

    Bel 7(i( >ni(ersit), 7Har 2011, B#e #an"in" #ara'ter of War, in B#e #an"in" #ara'ter of War, ed. *ew Stra'#an and Si+)lle S'#eipers, p. 0: 2Sin'e 1; /, the decline of !ajor great power war has deepened furt#er. -u'lear weapons #a(e 'on'entrated t#eminds of all 'on'erned wonderfull), +ut no less important #a(e +een t#e institutionaliHation of free trade and t#e 'losel) related pro'ess of rapid and sustained e'onomi'"rowt# t#rou"#out t#e 'apitalist world. B#e 'ommunist +lo' did not parti'ipate in t#e s)stem of free trade, +ut at least initiall) it too e&perien'ed su+stantial "rowt#, and,unlike German) and Japan, it was alwa)s sufT'ientl) lar"e and ri'# in natural resour'es to maintain an autark) of sorts. Wit# t#e So(iet 'ollapse and wit# t#e inte"rationof t#e former 'ommunist powers into t#e "lo+al 'apitalist e'onom), t#e prospe't of a ma6or war wit#in t#e de(eloped world seems to #a(e +e'ome (er) remote indeed. B#isis one of t#e main sour'es for t#e feelin" t#at war #as +een transformed! its "eopoliti'al 'entre of "ra(it) #as s#ifted radi'all). B#e moderniHed, e'onomi'all) de(eloped

    parts of t#e world 'onstitute a QHone of pea'e . 8ar now see!s to be conBned to the less/developed partsof the globe+ the world$s ; one of war$+ where countries that have so farfailed toe!brace !oderni ation and its pacifying spin/off effects continue to be engagedin wars amon" t#emsel(es, as well as wit# de(eloped 'ountries.\ W#ile t#e trend is (er) real, one wonders if the neardisappearance of ar!ed conVict within the developed world is li&ely to re!ainas star& as it has been since the collapse of co!!unis! . The post/Cold 8ar

    !o!ent ma) turn out to be a Veeting one.The probability of !ajor wars within thedeveloped world re!ains low O+e'ause of t#e fa'tors alread) mentioned! in'reasin" wealt#, e'onomi' openness and interdependen'e,and nu'lear deterren'e. (ut the deep sense of change pre(ailin" sin'e 1;4; has been based on the far!ore radical notion that the triu!ph of capitalis! alsospelled the irresistibleulti!ate victory of de!ocracy E and t#at in an af uent and demo'rati' world, ma6or 'on i't no lon"er needs to +e feared or seriousl)prepared for. This notion , #owe(er, is fast eroding with the return of capitalist non/de!ocratic great powers that have been absent fro! the international syste!since 1>IE . 7+o(e all, t#ere is t#e formerl) 'ommunist and fast indus