T8 B6 Col Sheryl Atkins Fdr- 3-26-04 MFR 832

8/14/2019 T8 B6 Col Sheryl Atkins Fdr- 3-26-04 MFR 832

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Commission SensitiveMEMORANDUM FORTHE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration Headquarters, (FAA HQ)Type of event: Interview with Colonel Cheryl AtkinsDate: Friday, M arch 26, 2004Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by : Geoffrey BrownTeam Number: 8Location: 10 th Floor, FAA HQ, Washington, D.C.Participants - Non-Commission: Major Matt Duffin, Department of Defense (DoD)Legal CounselParticipants - Comm ission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer, Geoffrey BrownNote: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.Background:

Atkins was a U.S. Air Force Air Traffic Controller (ATC) for approximatelytwenty-four years. She has been a Military Liaison with the FAA since A ugust 31, 2000;immediately prior to that she worked as the Deputy Director for Management Reform inthe Undersecretary of the Air Force's office.On September 11, 2001 (9/11) she was C omm ander of Detachment Two (themilitary liaison office at FAA Headquarters).Atkins explained that each service's liaison reports indep endently to their chain ofcommand. The Air Force liaisons at the FA A Regions al l report to her. Atkins reports tothe Pentagon, and is associated with the offices of Bill Peacock for administrativesupport. Her department offices are in a suite on the fourth floor at FAA Headquarters.Atkins views the Central Altitude Reservation Function (CARF) at FAA HerndonCommand Center as "just another customer', whereas she views the Air Services C ell asboth "customers" and "teammates" because they report to the Associate Director for CivilAviation for the Air Force. M cCullough is the current Associate D irector, and Mr.Plenser, currently Vice President of Air Traffic Management for Boeing, was in theposition on 9/11.

9/11:Atkins was in route to work when the first flight struck the World Trade Center(WTC) [American Airline Flight 11 (AAL 11) at 8:46AM (approx.)]. She was in FAAHeadquarters when the second p lane hit the WT C [United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175)

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Commission Sensitiveat 9:03 (approx.)], and saw the event on a CNN broadcast. Imm ediately they beganpersonnel accounting. Sh e believes originally she heard on the broadcast that a bomb ha dgone off at the Pentagon. Sh e went to the tenth floor with Sabra Caleia shortly afterAmerican Airlines Flight 77 (AAL 77 ) struck the Pentagon [9:37 (approx,)].

Atkins went to the Air Traffic Situation Room w here David Cannoles wasworking on a teleconference. She was the only m ilitary liaison in the room at that time.She was "in a nd out" of this room throughout the morning, but did not hear anyinformation that related to United A irlines Flight 93 (UAL 93). She did not speak withany of the military representatives at the White House, and w as not informed of a threatto Air Force One.She recalls one of the main issues being addressed was "mission essentialaircraft" that needed identifica tion and permission to travel. She worked directly withSteve Nolle, the Air Space Manger at NORAD (North American Aerospace DefenseCom ma nd), to coordinate this. Mission essential aircraft would entail medical evacuation,fire and rescue aircraft. She also spoke with L t. Col. Michael-Ann Cherry at FAAHemdon C ommand Center to exchange information. Atkins performed these duties fromcommercial lines, but did use STU3 phon es occasionally. A tkins believes either on 9/11and or in the days following Tem porary Flight Orders (TFO ) were issued and acoordinating military cell was established at the FAA.She did not participate in the Tactical Net set by Lee Longmire, and did notparticipate in the SVT (Secure Video Teleconference).

Pre-9/11 hijack protocol, military notification, and the response to the attacks:Atkins' exposure to hijack protocols is the guidance given within the FA A Air

Traffic Procedures handbook, wh ich is also used by military ATC s. She does not knowwho the FAA military hijack coordinator was, but she informed Com mission staff thather responsibilities do not overlap with this issue.Atkins explained that he r office is a liaison m ilitary adm inistrative office, and shedoes not see notification to her of the hijack as procedural military notification . She notedthat no one at the FAA told her on 9/11 that she should set in motion notification for amilitary response and/or coordination with the FAA response to the attacks.Commission staff represented to Atkins that there is no indication in the FAAhandbook for special military procedures that her office has a role in the notifica tion to

the military of a hijack, or the request to the military fo r fighter asset support. Sh econfirmed this assessment.She was involved with military administrative coordinating and facilitating on9/11 and not with direct assessment or response to the attacks.

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Commission staff presented the FA A timeline of military notifications, andAtkins commented that she has never been exposed to the docum ent. She did not workwith Darlene Freeman, D an Diggins or David Cannoles to produce that project.Atkins had no role in fighter activity, ROE (Rules of Engagement), DEFCO N(Defensive Condition), or AFIO (Authorization for Intercept Operations) on 9/11.

Major Nix and Commander Victor, liaisons for other military services, came to the tenthfloor on 9/11 after they arrived from Crystal City. They arrived later in the morning sincethey had to walk from Crystal City through the police and military presence tha t wa sresponding to the impact at the Pentagon.SCATANA:

A representative from the A dministrator's office area, either Monte Belger or PeteChallan, and most likely Challan to Atkins' recollection, asked her to receive clarificationfrom General Ralph Eberhart (Command in Chief, or CINC, NORAD) on SCATANAprocedures. She called Eberhart, and asked her about the implementation order. Eberhartreferred her to his O-6, and he informed he r that th e implementation order was for "AirSecurity".Post 9/11 reconstruction:

Atkins commented that she did not take any notes on 9/11, and if she was asked tocomment on her recollection of events as pertained to the tactical level, she could onlyoffer "what I saw in the papers" (media reports). S he did view a number of 9/11presentations, but she has no specific knowledge of these briefings, or of any issues priorto the Comm ission's creation tha t involve a debate regarding FAA notification to themilitary of the hijacking events. Since Commission staff began its interviews, A tkins hasheard that man y of the FAA logs a nd military logs of events during the attacks do notrepresent matching informa tion. David Cannoles did not speak with her on this issue.She was part of the discussions between General Arnold and Jeff Griffith, put forthe most part she provided a ssistance to Arnold by explaining the a dministrative functionof "bringing the air space back up" so he could have a general knowledge of the role ofthe m ilitary officers who w ork with the FAA, and how that re-establishing of the a irspacesystem w as conducted.She participated in lessons learned interviews for Operation Enduring Look. She

was also interviewed by M eiter consultants for their FAA post-9/11 lessons learnedreport. She does no t recall specifics from these interviews.Atkins recalls that the FA A did review imm ediately after 9/11 the tactical detailsand normal process policies (phone numbers, titles, etc.) involved in military notification.On the military side, Atkins comm ented that NORA D was the lead on reviewing thesedetails.

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T8 B6 Col Sheryl Atkins Fdr- 3-26-04 MFR 832