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Archaeological Inference and Inductive Confirmation
Author(s): Bruce D. SmithSource: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 79, No. 3 (Sep., 1977), pp. 598-617Published by: Wileyon behalf of the American Anthropological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/675394.
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Archaeological
Inference
and Inductive
Confirmation
BRUCE
D.
SMITH
University
of
Georgia
The
limitations
of
the
hypothetico-deductive
(H-D)
method
of
inductive
confirma-
tion
are
described,
and an alternate
method,
the
hypothetico-analog
(H-A)
method
is described
in
detail.
The
H-A
method
can
be characterized as
a
modified
and
supplemented
form
of
the
simple
H-D
method,
and is
proposed
as
being
more
appropriate for archaeological inference. Aspects of the H-A method that are given
particular
attention
include the
establishment
of
boundary
conditions
for reference
classes,
plausibility
considerations,
multiple
working
hypotheses,
bridging argu-
ments,
and
criteria
for
selecting
alternative
hypotheses. [scientific
method,
archaeological
nference,hypothetico-analogmethod,
inductive
confirmation]
INTRODUCTION
PREHISTORIC
ARCHAEOLOGY
ver the last fifteen
years
has been
suffering through
many
of the
symptoms
of
paradigm
crisis
described
by
Thomas Kuhn.
Such
periods
of
theoretical
retooling
are characterized
not
only by
the
borrowing
of theoretical
and
methodological
models from other fields in the search for a new
paradigm,
but also
by
a
recourse
o
philosophy
(Kuhn
1970:88).
It
is
specifically
to the
philosophy
of
science
that a
growing
numberof
archaeologists
have turned
in
an
attempt
to make
their research and
their results more valid.
Most
archaeologists
would
now
acknowledge
the
value
and
necessity
of
employing
scientific
methodology
in their
reasoning.
There is
still
no
agreement,
however,
as
to
which variation
of
the
scientific
method
should
be
employed
in
archaeological easoning.
There are
a
number
of reasons
for
the
present
state of confusion
concerning
the
integration
of scientific
methodology
into
archaeological
reasoning.
The
most
obvious
of
these reasons
is
that
until
recently
formal
training
n
either the
philosophy
of science or the
different variationsof the scientificmethod wasnot an integralpartof graduateprogramsn
anthropology.
As a
result,
most
archaeologists
have minimal
exposure
to or
understanding
f
scientific
methodology,
even
though they may
use
such
terms as
hypothesis,
confirmation,
etc.,
in
their
working
vocabularies.
It
is not
surprising,
therefore,
that
relatively
few
archaeologists
have felt
confident
enough
of their own
understanding
of
scientific
methodology
to
attempt
to alleviate the state of
ignorance
of
their
colleagues
by providing
insight
into how
any
one
of
the numerous
variations
of
the scientific method
could
be
employed
in
archaeological
reasoning.
It
is
also not
surprising
that of
the
attempts
at
interpretation
of scientific
methodology
that have been made
by
archaeologists,
many
have
tended to confuse
the
issue
further rather than
providing
needed clarification
of
the role
of
scientific
methodology
in
archaeological easoning Morgan1973:259-260).
Lewis Binford is
generally
associatedwith the first attempts at
making
archaeological
reasoning
more
scientific,
although
one
could trace the
beginnings
of
this trend back
through
Taylor
(1948)
to
the
late 1800s.
Binford'sconcern with
explanation
n
archaeology
s
clearly
598
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Smith
]
INFERENCE AND
INDUCTIVE
CONFIRMATION 599
evident
in
many
of
his
articles of the
1960s
(see
the
collected
essays
in Binford
1972),
as is
his selection
of
the
covering
law
(CL)
model of
explanation proposed by
Carl
Hempel:
After
surveying
most
of
the
argumentative
debate
in the
literature
on the
philosophy
of
science,
I
concluded
that
from a
practical-science
oint
of
view,
the
arguments
of Karl
[sic]
Hempel (see particularlyHempel, 1965) were the most useful (Binford 1972:18). In a
number
of
his articles Binford
also
discusses the need
for
implementation
of a
logicodeductive
(1972:70)
or
rigorous
hypotheticodeductive (1972:96)
method of
confirmation
in
archaeology.Finally,
Binfordalso
presents
a number
of
specific examples
of
the
way
in which
such
a
hypothetico-deductive
(H-D)
method of
confirmation could be
applied
to an
archaeological
ituation.
The
most detailed of the
specific
examples
given
by
Binford
is
his discussion
of
smudge pits
and hide
smoking(see
Binford
1972:33-58).
Binford
has
recently
been criticized
by
Sabloff,
Beale,
and
Kurland
or
(1)
advocating
he
CL
model
of
explanation
(1973:108); (2)
organizing
his
arguments
n
terms
of
a
simple hypothetico-
deductive
structure
while
paying
polemical
ip
service o
Hempel's
CL model
(1973:110);
and
(3)
presenting
specific
archaeologicalexamples
that do not conform either to the
CL
model of
explanation
or to the
hypothetico-deductive
method of confirmation
1973:111).
While these criticisms
appear
to be
justified,
and
will be
discussed
n
more detail
later
in this
article,
I
would at
this time like
to
pursue
an
interesting
question
that
may
at first seem
rather
unimportant:
Why
were these
criticismsso
long
(six
years)
in
coming?
The answer
o
this
question
in
large
measure has
to do with the fact
that
Binford was
apparently
not so
much
concerned with
either
stressing
the
importance
of
employing
the CL
model or
explaining
n
detail
the
structure
of the
HD
method as
he
was
with
analyzing
he
structure
of
archaeological reasoning:
However,
it
is
noteworthy
that Lewis
R.
Binford,
the
guiding
light
of
the new
archaeology,
has
strongly supported
a deductive
approach
without
polemically
belaboring
the
role
of the
Hempelian
deductive-nomological
model
(Sabloff,
Beale, and Kurland 1973:108). Binford was primarily interested, then, in presenting a
rigorous ogical
method
of
confirmation
hat
archaeologists
ould
employ
in
their
reasoning.
Labeling
the method
he
outlined
(see
especially
Binford,
1972:47-48)
as
hypothetico-
deductiveand
demonstrating
n detail
its
relationship
o
Hempel's
CL
model were
apparently
of
secondary
concern, judging
from the
very
limited
coverage given
to
these
topics
in
his
articles. This has
interesting
implications,
because while
Binford's
logical
method of
inference,
as well
as another
complementary
method
applied
to
archaeological
ituations
by
Longacre (1970)
and
Hill
(1968),
do
not,
in
fact,
conform to the
hypothetico-deductive
framework,
hey
are still
recognized
by philosophers
as
reasonable,
f
incomplete,
methods
of
scientific
inference
(Morgan
1973:271-272;
M.
Salmon
1976:379).
Philosophers
and other interested
individuals
have
as
a
result
not
focused their criticism
so much at the method of scientific inference
proposed by Binford,
Longacre,
Hill,
and
others.
Rather
they
have directed their
comments toward
the
numerous
more
recent
attempts
to
claim
that this method of inference
must
in
fact be viewed
as
part
of the CL
model of
explanation:
The new
archaeologists
would have their
colleagues
believe that the
new
trends in
theory
and
methodology,
which
they
have
helped
to
develop
in
the
past
decade,
are
inextricably
linked
to
positivist
philosophy
and
the
deductive-nomological
CL)
model of
explanation,
which
they espouse
(Sabloff,
Beale,
and
Kurland
1973:108).
Two
publications
in
particular (Fritz
and
Plog
1970;
Watson, LeBlanc,
and
Redman
1971)
attempted
both to
describe
Hempel's
CL
model
of
explanation
and to
demonstrate he
need
for its
acceptance
and
employment by archaeologists.
The
response
by philosophers
o these
two publicationswas both rapidand devastating.Levin (1973) respondedto the articleby
Fritz
and
Plog,
and
Morgan (1973) replied
in
detail
to the
discussion of the CL
model
presented
in
the book of
Watson,LeBlanc,
and
Redman. While
these detailed criticisms
by
Levin
and
Morgan
have
apparently
done severe
damage
to the
image
of the CL model of
explanation
within
archaeology,they
do not
appear
to
have eliminatedall
support
for the
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600 AMERICAN
ANTHROPOLOGIST
[79, 1977
positivist
philosophy
of Carl
Hempel (see
Watson
1974;
Watson,
LeBlanc,
and Redman
1974).
This
debate within
archaeology
in
the
early
1970s
over
the
relative merits of the
CL
model of
explanation
unfortunately
tended
to
divertattention from
an
article
by
James
Hill
(1972) which presenteda comprehensivedescriptionof the hypothetico-deductivemethod
of
confirmation
as well as
providing
a
discussion
of
how
it
could be
employed
in
archaeological
reasoning.
It
is
important
to
stress
that
Hill's
article,
rather
than
addressing
the
issue
of
explanation
in
archaeology,
was
focused on the
more
important
and
more
pressing
problem
of
successful
articulation of the
H-D
method
of
confirmation to
archaeological
situations.
For
a few
years
after the
appearance
of
Hill's 1972 article it
appeared
that even if
the
issue
of the
identity
of
an
appropriate
model
of
explanation
in
archaeology
remained
unresolved,
archaeologists
could at
least
employ
the
hypothetico-
deductive method
of
confirmation n
their
reasoning.
This situation
changed
abruptly
with
the
publication
of two
short
articles
in
1975 and
1976
by
Merrilee
Salmon,
a
philosopher
with a
research
interest
in
archaeological
confirmation.
Although
rather
brief,
Salmon's
articles
contain a number of
very
important
points,
including
the
following:
(1)
The
hypothetico-deductive
method
is
an
inductiverather han
a
deductivemethod
of
confirmation
1976:
377).
(2) Archaeologists
do not
employ
the H-D
method in
their
reasoning,
even if
they
believe and
state
that
they
do
(1975:464,
1976:378).
(3)
The fact
that
archaeologists
do not
employ
the H-D
method in their
reasoning,
even
if
they
think that
they
do,
is
good,
not
bad. This
is
because
the H-D
method
is
an
oversimplified
and
incomplete
account
of
scientific
reasoning,
and
is
inadequate
for
employment
in
archaeological
nference.
(4)
The
inductive method of
logical
confirmation
employed by
many
archaeologists
s
far more
sophisticated
han
the
H-D
method,
with
which it
is
often
confused.
(5)
The
method of
logical
confirmation
employed by
many archaeologists
s,
in
fact,
roughly
comparable
to a
method of
inductive
inference
described in a
number of
publications
by Wesley
Salmon
(1963, 1967).
Thus
in
1976
many
archaeologists
find
themselves
in
a
situation
that is
puzzling,
surprising,
and
at
the
same
time
encouraging.
Although
they
have
thought
of
themselvesas
employing
an
impressively
deductive method of
logical
confirmation
(H-D),
they
find
that
the H-D
method
is
not
only
inductive rather
than
deductive,
but
further that
they
were
never
actually
employing
the
H-D
method in their
reasoning.
Rather
they
were
employing,
n
an
admittedly
ncomplete way,
a more
sophisticated
method of inductive nference.
Merrilee
Salmon
begins
the
final
paragraph
f
her
1975
article
with
this statement: It
is
my
hope
in
presenting
some
of
these issues and
suggesting
alternative
models,
that
fruitful
discussions
of
confirmation and
explanation
n
archaeology
will
ensue
(1975:464).
She
has
indeed
presented
a
number
of
pertinent
observationsand
suggestions
concerning
archaeologi-
cal
confirmation
that
deserve serious
consideration
by
all
interested
archaeologists.
While t
is
understandablethat
many
archaeologists
are
perhaps
not
concerned
with the
issue of
archaeologicalreasoning,
or
do
not
feel
knowledgeable
enough
on the
subject
to offer an
opinion,
or
perhaps
are not too
excited
about
sticking
their
heads
up
out of the
trench,
I
strongly
agree
with
Sabloff,
Beale,
and
Kurland
1973:118)
that: It
cannot
be
ignored
by
a
thinking member of the profession; the argumentrevolves around the place of scientific
models in
archaeological
research.The
true issues need a
clear and
vigorous
airing
n
print.
In the
present
article,
which
is concerned
specifically
with
confirmation
n
archaeology,
a
number of
logical points
raised
by
M. Salmon will be
pursued.
These
points
are
elaborated
upon
in a short initial
section of
this article. The
following
much
longer
section
will be
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Smith
]
INFERENCE
AND INDUCTIVE
CONFIRMATION
601
concerned
with
the method
of inductive confirmation
presented by
W. C. Salmon
and
suggested
to
archaeologistsby
M. Salmon
as an
alternative
o
the H-D method.
To
facilitate
discussion
of
this
general
method as it
specifically
applies
to
archaeological
nference,
t
will
be referred
o
as the
Hypothetico-Analog
H-A)
method of
inductive
confirmation.
THE
HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE
ETHOD
OF
INDUCTIVE
CONFIRMATION
The
H-D
method of
confirmation will be
briefly
described
prior
to
presenting
a
more
detailed
discussion
of
some
of
its
inherent
limitations.
A
more
comprehensive
reatmentof
the
H-D
method
can
be
found
in
W.
Salmon
(1963:76-88)
and
Copi
(1972:422-468).
The
hypothetico-deductive
method
begins
with the
formulation
of a
hypothesis,
which
can be
defined
as
a
statement that
is
taken as a
premise,
n
order that
its
logical
consequences
can
be
examined and
compared
with facts
that can be
ascertained
by
observation
W.
Salmon
1963:77).
Once
the
hypothesis
has been
formulated,
and
any
necessary
nitial
conditions
are
stated,
the next
step
in
the
H-D
method
involves
deducing ogical consequences
from the
hypothesis.
Such
consequences,
which are
often
termed
test
implications
or
observational
predictions,
when
combined with
the
hypothesis
and
any
stated
initial
conditions,
constitute
a
logical
argument.
This
argument,
consisting
of
a
hypothesis
and
initial
conditions as
premises
and
a
test
implication
as
conclusion
must,
in the
hypothetico-deductive
method,
be
a
deductive rather
than
an
inductive
type
of
argument.
By
definition,
a
deductive
type
of
argument
s one in
which
the
conclusion must
logically
follow from the
premises:
If
all of
the
premises
are
true,
the
conclusion must
be
true
(W.
Salmon
1963:14;
see
also
M. Salmon
1976:377).
Many
of
the
people
who believe the
H-D
method
to be
thoroughly
deductive
n
character
would be correct f
the
method
consisted
only
of
deducing
est
implications
rom
a
hypothesis.
But
the
H-D
method
includes
a
final
step
of
confirmation.
This
involves
comparing he deduced observationalpredictionswith reality to see if in fact they aretrue.
If
the
observational
predictions
are
true,
the
hypothesis
is
confirmedto
some
extent.
In
this
final
step
of
the
hypothetico-deductive
method,
observational
predictions
and
the
hypothesis
once
again
comprise
an
argument,
but the
hypothesis
is
now
the
conclusion
and
the
observational
predictions
are
the
premises.
This
argument
of
confirmation
can be
seen to
be
inductive rather than
deductive
for
the
simple
reason
that
even if
all
of the
premises
(observational
predictions)
of
the
argument
are
demonstratedto
be
true,
the
conclusion
(hypothesis)
might
still be
false: To
argue
that
true
implications
confirm a
hypothesis
is
to
argue
inductively,
for it
is
logically possible
for
the
implications
to
be
true while
the
hypothesis
is false
(M.
Salmon
1976:377;
see
also
W. Salmon
1967:18-20,
108-110).
This
point will be discussed n greaterdetail later in this article.Thus,althoughthe H-Dmethod
employs
deductive
logic
in
one
step,
it
must
be
viewed in
total
as an
inductive
method of
confirmation,
because
it
also
includes
an
inductive
argument.
The
fact that
the
hypothetico-
deductive
method
is
not
a
deductive
form
of
confirmation
may
be
disconcerting
to
any
archaeologists
who
hope
to
prove
once
and for
all the
absolute
truth
of
their
hypotheses.
At
the
same time
it
will,
however,
make it
easier for
many
archaeologists
to
accept
the
otherwise
disturbing
fact
that
they
have
not
been
employing
the
hypothetico-deductive
method
of
confirmation. The
loss
will
not
seem
so
serious
if the
hypothetico-deductive
method
is
only
inductiveafter
all
(assuming
t
is
possible
to
lose
somethingyou
only
thought
you
had).
The
type
of
inference
that
many
archaeologists,
as
well
as
most
of the
members of the
larger scientific community, employ resemblesthe H-D method, but differs from it in a
number
of
important
ways:
It
seems
undeniable that
science
uses
a
type
of
inference at
least
loosely
akin to
the
hypothetico-deductive
method
(W.
Salmon
1967:18).
The
most
obvious,
but not
the
most
important,
difference
between the
H-D
method
and
the
method of
confirmation
employed
in
archaeological
nference
has
to
do with
the
way
in
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602 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
[79,
1977
which observational
predictions
are shown to follow
logically
from
hypotheses.
Rarely
if
ever are
such
arguments
deductive
in
form.
The
truth
of
an
observational
prediction
(conclusion)
is often
argued
to
be
highly probable
f an
archaeological ypothesis
(premise)
is
true,
but
rarely
if ever
could
it be
demonstrated that
such an
observational
prediction
must be true
if
the hypothesis is true. This is in large part due to the inherentnatureof
archaeological
nference.
Hypotheses
formulated
n
archaeological
nference
invariably
have
to
do with various
aspects
of
prehistoric
human behavior
(Hill
1972:101)
and
as
a
result
cannot
be tested
directly. They
can, however,
be
tested
indirectly.
The
observational
predictions
of
such
hypotheses
about
human
behavior
take the
form of
statements
concerning predicted patterning
of
cultural debris
in
archaeological
sites.
It
is
logically
impossible
to
deduce
such
observational
predictions
because
of the
problems
of
disturbance,
poor preservation,
or
poor recovery
of
cultural
debris.
Few
archaeologists
would
argue
hat
if
their
hypothesis
concerningprehistoric
human behavior s
correct,
the
predicted
pattern
of
cultural
debris
must be
observed
during
excavation.But
one
cannot
argue
otherwise
and
still
be
employing
the
hypothetico-deductive
method
of
confirmation. In
discussing
an
archaeologicalhypothesis concerninghumanbehaviorM.Salmonstates:
...
the
point
here
is a
logical
one-that
thereis no deductive
relation of the
sort
required
by
the H-D
method
between
the
hypotheses
and the
implication.
We
can
say,
however,
that
if
the
hypotheses
are true then it
is
highly probable
that
the
implication
is
true....
The
implication
was not
deduced from
the
hypotheses,
but
was inferredwith
high
probability
on
the
basis
of a
correct
inductive
argument
1976:378].
Similarly:
While
they [test implications]
are
presumed
o
be
likely
consequences
of
a
given
hypothesis,
they
do
not
follow
of
necessity
from
it.
They
are
not
deduced from
a
hypothesis
in
the
sense that there is
a
strict
formal
logical
connection
between
the
hypothesis
and
its
test
implication
(Hill
1972:83-84).
This statement
by
Hill
is
especially
interesting
because
throughout
his
paper
he
refers
to the
method
being presented
as
being deductive,
and
more
specifically being
the
hypothetico-deductive
method of
confirmation.
t
is
apparent
hat not
only
is the
H-D
method
incorrectly
characterized
as
being
a
deductive
form of
logical
inference,
but
that the method
Hill
presents
is
not,
in
fact,
the
hypothetico-deductive
method.
Probably
the most
important
point
to be
made
concerning
hese
inconsistencies n
Hill's
paper
is that
they
can
to
a
great
extent be
remedied
by changing
a few
terms,
and
that
they
in
no
way
detract from the
substance
of
his
presentation.
While he
method
presented
is
incorrectly
identified
as
the
H-D
method,
it
is
none the
less a solid
method of
inductive
confirmation.
Having
demonstrated that
archaeologists
are
not in
fact
employing
the H-D
method
because
their
observational
predictions
are not
deduced from
hypotheses,
we
can
now
consider a numberof other, more importantdifferencesbetween the H-Dmethod and the
method of
inductive confirmation
actually
employed
by
many
archaeologists.
These
differences can
most
accurately
be
viewed as
representing
serious
limitations
of
the H-D
method.
The
first
serious
imitation of the H-D
method
has
to
do with
the
relationship
between
an
observational
prediction
and the
variety
of
alternative
hypotheses
that
could
account for
it.
W. Salmon
poses
this
problem
of
unlimited
alternative
hypotheses
in
the
following
way:
Whatare
the
chances that
the
deduced
prediction
would
be
true
if
the
hypothesis
we
are
testing
is false
and
some other
hypothesis
is true? The
same
question
may
be
reformulated:
Are
there
other
hypotheses
which
would be
strongly
confirmed
by
the
same
outcome?
(1963:82).
When
this
question
is
rephrased
n
termsof
archaeological
nference,
it will be
recognized
as
a
familiar
problem
by many archaeologists:
What
are the
chances that a
specific
pattern
of
cultural
debris s the result of the
specific
causative
human
activity
I
have
hypothesized,
or is it the
result of
any
one of a
number
of other
human
activity
patterns?
If
one
were
to
employ
the H-D
method
strictly,
all of the
logically
possible
hypotheses
that
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]
INFERENCE AND
INDUCTIVE
CONFIRMATION
603
could have been
used
to deduce the observational
prediction
would have to be
considered
because
the
H-D
method
provides
no
guidelines
for
reducing
the class
of all
logical possible
hypotheses
to a
smaller
group
of more
likely hypotheses:
The
basic
trouble
with the
hypothetico-deductive
nference
in that
it
always
leaves
us
with an
embarrassinguperabundance f hypotheses. All of thesehypothesesareequally
adequate
to the available data from the
standpoint
of the
pure
hypothetico-deductive
framework.
Each is confirmed
in
precisely
the same manner
by
the same
evi-
dence....
The
hypothetico-deductive
method
is
therefore, hopelessly
inconclusive
for
determining
the
acceptability
of scientific
hypotheses
on
the basis of
empirical
data.
Something
must
be
done to
improve
t
[W.
Salmon
1967:115-116
].
Obviously archaeologists
do,
in
fact,
initially
reduce
the
number
of alternative
hypotheses
they
are
going
to
consider,
and therefore are
filling
this
logical gap
in the H-D
method,
or
it
could be said
that
they
are
extending
or
supplementing
he H-D
method.
The
ways
in
which
archaeologists
narrow
the
range
of
hypotheses
to
be
considered
for
any
observational
prediction
or set
of
observational
predictions
will
be
discussed
n the next section of
this
article.
The
second
shortcoming
or limitation
of the H-D
method is that it does not
provideany
clear set of
universallyapplicable
guidelines
or
procedures
or
choosing
between alternative
hypotheses,
either
in
terms
of
those
hypotheses
considered
as
possible
candidates
for the
same
specific
observational
predictions,
or
in
terms
of
alternative
hypothesis
for
different
sets
of
observational
predictions being
tested at a later
point
in
the confirmation
process.
This
problem
oo
will be
discussed
n the next
section
of
this article.
While
t is clear that those
archaeologists
who
do
employ
scientific
methodology
n
their
reasoning
do not
employ
the
hypothetico-deductive
method,
it is also clear
that
the
method
that
they
do
employ
is
in fact
logically
superior
to the
H-D
method,
and avoids
many
of its
shortcomings.
THE
HYPOTHETICO-ANALOG
ETHOD
OF
INDUCTIVECONFIRMATION
It
should
initially
be
emphasized
that
the
method
of
confirmation
referred to
in
this
article
as the
hypothetico-analog
(H-A)
method is best
characterized
as a
variety
of
supplemented
H-D
method
that
is similar
in
form
to
the
general
method
of
confirmation
presented
by
W. Salmon
(1967,
1973)
and which has
recently
been
briefly
describedas
being
applicable
to
archaeological
ituations
by
M. Salmon
(1976).
While the H-A
method
can be
viewed as an
expansion
and refinement of the
more
general
model
described
by
W. Salmon
in an
attempt
to make it
specifically
applicable
to
archaeological
problems,
this neither
entails the endorsementof the
attempt by
eitherW. Salmon or M. Salmon nor does it ensure
by
association the
logical
correctness
of
the
H-A
model.
It is
possible
that
this
attempt
will
do
as
much
damage
to the
general
method described
by
W. Salmon as other
archaeologists
have
managed
o
do to the work
of Carl
Hempel,
although
t
is to
be
hoped
that
this
will not
be
the
case. The
term
hypothetico-analog
has been
applied
to the
method to be
discussed
simply
to
facilitate
reference to
the
method
and
to
indicate that it
is
inductive n
form,
with
argument
by analogy
playing
an
important
role.
One of
the
most
obvious differences between
the H-D
and the
H-A
method
is that
in
the
latter
method
observational
predictions
do
not have to be
deduced
from
a
hypothesis
and
initial
conditions.
An
observational
prediction
in the H-A
method is
inferred
with
high
probability (M. Salmon 1976:378). Salmon further suggests calling such observational
predictions
or
test
implications
inductive
mplications 1976:
378).
More
importantly,
the H-A
model addresses the
problem
of
unlimited alternative
hypotheses.
The
whole
question
of how it
might
be
logicallypossible
to limit the number
of
possible
hypotheses
to be
considered as
being responsible
for a
specific
single
observational
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604
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
[79,
1977
prediction
or
set
of
observational
predictions
has been an
issue of
much debate within the
philosophy
of
science
for a
number
of
years.
While
some
scientists and
philosophers
would
argue
that
there
is no mechanism
or
thinking
up hypotheses-that
hypothesis
formulation
s
a
psychological
rather han a
logical process-others
think
it
may
be
possible
to
develop
such
methods
(Simon 1973).
It
is
at the
same time
clear, however,
that
scientists, including
archaeologists,
do not consider all
logically possible
hypotheses,
but
initially distinguish
between
those
that are
reasonable
and
those that are
not.
W. Salmon
argues
that
there
is
a
step
in
the
logical sequence
of
confirming
hypotheses
that
comes
after
discovery,
or first
thinking
of
a
hypothesis,
and
prior
to
the
decision of
whether the
hypothesis
should
be
seriously
entertained
and tested:
At
this
stage
we are
trying
to
determine whether the
hypothesis
deserves o be
seriously
entertainedand
tested
or
whether
r
should
be
cast
aside
without further
ceremony
(1967:113).
Salmon describes his
step
as
involving
plausibility
considerations
1967:114).
Such
plausibility
considerationsare: not
only
admissable
nto
the
logic
of
justification;
they
are
an
indispensablepart
of
it
(W.
Salmon
1967:118).
This
step
of
plausibility
consideration
of
alternative
hypotheses
is, then,
not
only
an
essential
part
of the logic of confirmation,but it is also the most crucialstep involved n the H-Amethod
of
archaeological
nference,
and
clearly
necessitates
careful consideration.
Plausibility
Considerations
Perhaps
the first
point
that should
be
made
clear
in
considering
he
process
by
which
scientists
in
general
and
archaeologists
in
particular
assess the relative
plausibility
of
alternative
hypotheses
is that it is
not an area of
logically
solid
ground.
Not
only
are
a
number
of the theoretical issues
concerning
plausibility
considerations
being
actively
debated,
there are also
practical
difficulties
that
must
be dealt
with,
as will be seen
shortly.
In light of these inherent theoretical and practicaldifficulties, it is not surprising hat M.
Salmon does not
attempt any
detailed discussion
of
plausibility
considerations
s
they apply
to
archaeological
inference.
In
discussing
the now well known case
study by
William
Longacre (1963,
1968,
1970) involving
the
proposed
causal
link
between
a
hypothesized
pattern
of
matrilocal residence and
an
inductively
inferred
observational
prediction
of
nonrandom
(aggregated)
distribution
of
ceramic
style
elements,
M.
Salmon
states
the
following:
An
important
feature of
Longacre'sexample
is that his
hypothesis
was a
plausible one,
that
is,
it had
significant
prior probability.
The
priorprobability
of
a
hypothesis may
be
taken as a measureof its
likelihood, independent
of
any testing
of
it
throughchecking
ts
deductive
or
inductive
implications.
Various
kinds
of
background
nformation, ncluding
ethnographic analogies, are used to determine the prior probability of an hypothe-
sis
.
..
Why
weren't
any
other
hypotheses
with
the
same
implications
considered
here?...
The alternative
hypotheses
which
could account for the
observed
phenomena
were
so
initially implausible
hat
they
were not
even
mentioned.
[Longacre
does in
fact
mention
alternative
hypotheses;
see
1970:34]
No other
hypothesis
which fits
the
data
uncovered
by Longacre
has
as
high
prior probability
as his
hypothesis,
so no other
hypothesis
is so
strongly
confirmed
by
the
data
[1976:378-379; emphasis
n
original].
Although
M.
Salmon
goes
on to
say
that
plausibility
considerations re not
always
so
easily
resolved
as
in
the
Longacreexample,
and
provides
an
additional
example
to
make
her
point,
she does
not
provide any
detailed discussion of how
plausibility
considerations
hould
be
carried
out.
The detailed discussion of plausibility considerations that will be presented below is
clearly necessary
for a
number
of
reasons.
The
most obvious reason will
be
recognized by
many,
if not
all, archaeologists,
nd has to do with the
basis
on
which
archaeologists
valuate
propositions
concerning
prehistoric
human behaviorthat are
put
forth
by
other
membersof
the
profession.
It
has
already
been
noted that for
any
specific
observational
prediction
or set
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Smith
]
INFERENCE
AND
INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION
605
of
related observational
predictions
there is an abundanceof
logically possible
alternative
hypotheses.
In terms of
archaeological
nference
this
could
be
rephrased:
There is an
abundance of
logically possible
(not necessarily probable)
human
activity patterns
that
would result
in
archaeologically
dentical
patterns
of
cultural debris.
The
observational
predictions, if subsequently shown to be true, would serve to confirm any one of the
alternative
hypotheses.
The decision
as to which of these
equally
confirmable
alternative
hypotheses
concerning
a causalhuman behavior
pattern
will
actually
be
formally
stated
(and
perhaps confirmed)
is reached
through
plausibility
considerations.
It has
already
been
established
that such
plausibility
considerations
are
an
integral part
of the
confirmation
process.
If
an
archaeologist
simply
states a formal
hypothesis
rather
than
presenting
alternative
hypotheses
and
explicitly
stating
the
procedureby
which
they
were
rejected
as
being
less
plausible,
how
does one
judge
the
relative
plausibility
of the
hypothesis
that
was,
in
fact,
selected
for formal statement
and
testing?
If
the
procedure by
which an
archaeologist
determines
the
prior probability
of a
hypothesis
is not
explicitly
stated,
how
can other
archaeologists
assess
the
reasonableness
r
correctness
of the
determination?
How
could one know if the
archaeologist,
either
by
design
or
through
ignorance,
selected a
hypothesis
for
subsequent testing
that was
not in
fact the most
plausible
choice? The
only
criteria
that
could
be
employed
in
such
a
situation would
be
those
of
competence
and
intellectual
honesty
of
the author. Consider
the
following
statement
by
Lewis
Binford:
...
The
main
point
of
our
argument
s that
independent
means of
testing
propositions
about the
past
must
be
developed.
Such means must
be
considerably
more
rigorous
than
evaluating
an
author's
propositions
by judging
his
professional
competence
or
intellectual
honesty (1972:90).
It
is
clear,
I
think,
that
this
demand for
explicit
objectivity
should be
extended
to
include
plausibility
considerations.
Hypotheses
must not
only
be
subjected
to
testing
once
formally
stated,
but
the
plausibility
considerations hat
resulted
n
the selection
of the hypothesis (or hypotheses) to be tested mustbe explicitly stated. Unless his is done,
archaeological
nference
will
not be
a
logically
complete
method of
inductive
confirmation.
In
describing
he
plausibility
consideration
process
I
outline
the
general
method described
by
W.
Salmon
(1967:113-131),
and
at the same time refer to the
specific
application
of
plausibility
consideration
o
archaeological
ituations
by
several
archaeologists.
think it will
become
clear
as
the
discussion
progresses
hat some
archaeologists
employ
a
method of
plausibility
consideration
hat is
very comparable
o the
abstract
descriptionprovidedby
W.
Salmon.
The
procedure
outlined and
described
in
detail
by
Lewis Binford
in
the article
Smudge
Pits and Hide
Smoking:
The Use of
Analogy
in
Archaeological
Reasoning
1967;
reprinted
1972:33-51;
see
also,
Binford
1972:52-58),
will
in
particular
be
seen
to
be
in
very
close
agreement
with
the
more
general
ogical
model.
Although
Binford
does
not
employ
the
same
terminology
as W.
Salmon,
and
does
not
provide any
discussion of the inherent
theoretical
problems
involved,
he
does,
in
fact,
provide
a
logically
sophisticated
example
of
plausibility
consideration
n
archaeological
nference.
Binford's
method
would
riot,
however,
be the most
appropriate
o
employ
in
all
archaeological
ituations,
and
different
variationsof
plausibility
considerations
n
archaeological
nference
will therefore
also
be
discussed.
Before
going
further with a
discussion
of
plausibility considerations,
a
number
of
points
need to be
reiterated.
First,
plausibility
considerationsare
logically
separate
rom and
prior
to
the actual
testing
of
a
hypothesis:
Plausibilityarguments
mbody
considerations elevant
to
the evaluation of
prior
probabilities.
They
are
logically prior
to
the
confirmatory
data
emerging
from
the
H-D
schema,
and
they
involve
direct
consideration
of
whether the
hypothesis is of a type likely to be successful (W. Salmon 1967:118). Similarly: This
particular
situation demonstrates the
necessity
of
examining
the
validity
of
arguments
presented
before
considering
them
seriously
and
proceeding
o the
testing
of
their
accuracy.
Invalid
arguments
may
be
dismissed;
valid
arguments
must be
tested to
determine their
accuracy Binford
1972:57).
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606
AMERICAN
ANTHROPOLOGIST
[79,
1977
Secondly,
plausibility
considerations
involve
analysis
of
prior
documented
situations
where
either
or
both the observational
prediction(s) (patterns
of cultural
debris)
and
alternative causative
hypotheses
(patterns
of human
behavior) might
have occurred.
In
an
archaeological
context
this
assessment
of the
prior
probability
of
hypothesized
relationships
of human activity to cultural debris usually involves consideration of documented
ethnographic
and
ethnohistoric situations where
the behavior
pattern
and/or
pattern
of
cultural
debris is described.
Archaeologists
are
not, however,
restricted o
a
consideration
of
ethnographic
situations
in
determining
he
prior
probability
of
hypotheses,
as will
be seen
later
in
this article.
The
first
step
in
plausibility
consideration involves
defining
the attribute
class
to be
considered.
This is
a
simple
matter
(W.
Salmon
1967:90-91)
and in an
archaeological
ontext
consists
of
explicitly
defining
the alternativebehavior
patterns
and
the
pattern
of cultural
debris
that are under
consideration
Binford
1972:37-38,
45).
The
second,
and much
more
difficult
step
involves
the
choice
of a
reference
class.
In
an
archaeological
ontext
choosing
a referenceclass would involve
deciding
which
ethnographic
situationsare going to be considered n assessingprior probabilityof alternativehypotheses,
and which
are
not
going
to be considered.
Choosing
a reference class
is
referred
to
as
establishing boundary
conditions
by
Ascher:
In
effect,
the
new
analogy
consists of
boundary
conditions
for
the
choice
of
suitable
analogs
(1961:319),
while M.
Salmon
employs
the term
domain
of
applicability
(1975:461)
to refer to a reference class. W.
Salmon
clearly
expresses
the
problems
confronting
archaeologists
who are
attempting
to
establish
an
appropriate
eference
class:
...
In
order
to
ascertain
the
probability
we
must
have
enough
instances
to be able to
make
an
inductive
generalization.
Thus we
do not want
to
try
to refer
single
cases to
classes
that
are too
narrow,
for
if
we
do we will not have
enough
evidence
upon
which
to
base
our
inference.
At the
same
time,
we
want our reference class
to contain other
relevantcases,not irrelevant nes [1967:91].
In
attempting
to
define
a
suitable
reference
class, archaeologists
are
almost
invariably
confronted with the twin
problems
of
insufficient data
and
possibly
biased data.
This often
forces
archaeologists
to define
a
reference class that is
larger
than
appropriate
n
that
it
contains
irrelevant ases.
There
is, however,
no clear-cut set
of
rules
for
defining
the
boundaries
of
a
reference
class:
The
choice
of a
reference
class
is an
extremely
practical
affair,
in which
we must
balance a number
of
factors such
as
the size
of
the
class,
the amount
of
statisticalevidence
available,
the cost involved
in
getting
more
data,
the
difficulty
in
effecting
a
relevant
subdivision..
.
(W.
Salmon
1967:92).
As a
general
rule
archaeologists
have
tended to
employ the suggested criteria of similarity of environment and similarityof subsistence
adaptation
n
defining
the
boundaries
of a
referenceclass:
In
summary,
hen,
the
canon is:
seek
analogies
in
cultures which
manipulate
similar
environments
n
similar
ways
(Ascher
1961:319).
While
this
is
certainly good
advice,
it
does
not
provide
an
answer
to
the
question:
Should
all
ethnographic
descriptions
of
human
populations
that have
a similar
subsistence
pattern
and are located within
a
similar
environmental
situation as the
prehistoricpopulation
n
question
be
included
n the
reference
class,
or
only
some?
One
possible
way
to
approach
this
problem
s to include all such
similar
ethnographically
documented
populations
within
the reference
class,
and
then
partition
the reference class
into
subgroups
on the
basis of
geographical,
ubsistence, cultural,
or
environmentalcriteria
(see W. Salmon 1967:91-92; M, Salmon 1975:460-461). The way in which the reference
class is
partitioned
would
vary,
of
course,
depending upon
the
type
of
human behavior-
cultural debris
relationship being
considered. Once
partitioning
of the reference class has
been
accomplished,
the
subgroup
hat is most similar o the
prehistoric
human
population
n
question
could
be
surveyed
to
assess
the
prior probability (relative plausibility)
that
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Smith
]
INFERENCE
AND
INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION
607
alternative behavior
patterns
would
have
resulted
in
the
pattern
of
cultural
debris under
consideration.
If consideration
of this
initial
highly
similar
subgroup
did
not
yield
sufficient
data
to
ascertain
he
prior
probability
of
alternative
hypotheses,
then
subgroups
with
a lesser
degree
of
similarity
could
be considered.
The
number
of
subgroups
hat would
be
eventually
considered would depend both upon the qualityof the ethnographicdescriptionsavailable
within each
subgroup,
and the
relative
difficulty
encountered
n
deciding
between
alternative
hypotheses.
If in
the
initial
subgroup
there were
accurate,
detailed
descriptions
of the
cultural debris and
the causal behavior
pattern
was
always
the
same,
it
would
not
appear
o
be
necessary
to consider
any
other
subgroups.
If,
on the other
hand,
data were
lacking,
or
there
was more
than one
hypothesis
with
nonnegligible
priorprobability,
urther
ubgroups
would have
to be considered.
Thus
Longacre
was
able to
restrict
his
plausibility
consideration
to
a small
subgroup,
the
Western
Pueblos
(Longacre
1970:28),
of the total
possible
referenceclass because
of the excellent
quality
of the
ethnographic
nformation,
he
historical-cultural
ontinuity
in the
area,
and
the
apparent
ack of
more than one
hypothesis
with
nonnegligibleprior probability.
Binford,
on the other
hand,
considereda much
larger
percentage of the cases in the total possible reference class, including ethnographic
descriptions
from
the
Great Lakes
region,
the
Plains,
and
the
southeast United
States
(Binford 1972:42-44, 53-55).
Before
turning
to a consideration
of
how
the
relative
prior probability
of
alternative
hypotheses
is
actually
determined,
two
final
points
should
be
made
concerning
reference
classes.
First,
archaeologists
hould
explicitly
define
the
referenceclasses
hey
are
employing
in
plausibility
considerations.
Secondly, archaeologists
should
consider all
of the
available
ethnographic
cases
included
within
those
reference
classes
ratherthan
selecting
only
some
cases for
comparison (requirement
of
total
evidence,
W. Salmon
1967:76).
Thirdly,
there
is
an
increasing
effort
by
archaeologists
o
recognize
and
employ
reference classes other
than
ethnographicones. Geographicreference classes(G. Johnson1972, Pearson1976) as well
as
reference classes
concerning
plant
and
animal
populations
(Asch,
Ford,
and Asch
1972;
Smith
1975)
are
being
successfully
employed
in
determining
the
prior
probability
of
alternative
hypotheses.
Similar
guidelines
to the ones
just put
forth for
ethnographic
reference
classes
also
apply
to such
nonethnographic
eferenceclasses
(Smith
1976a).
Although
W.
Salmon outlines
an
all-inclusive
classification
of considerations
that
can
serve
as a basis
for
plausibility
udgments
1967:125-130),
such
plausibility
considerations
n
archaeological
nference
invariably
take the form
of
argument
by analogy (Binford
1967).
Since
arguments
by
analogy play
such
an
important
role in
plausibility
judgments,
it
is
obviously
important
to
understand
their
general
structure,
and
to know the
criteria
established
for
determining
he
strength
of such
arguments.
Through
uchan
understanding,
archaeologicalarguments by analogy can be improved, and the overall archaeological
reasoning
process
can
be
strengthened.
Argument
by
analogy
is familiar
to most
people
because it
plays
an
important
role
in
most
everyday
reasoning.
It
can
be
briefly
defined
as:
A form of
inference in
which
it
is
reasoned
hat
if
two
or
more
things
agree
with
one another
n
one
or more
respects,
they
will
probably
agree
in
yet
other
respects
(Neilson
1956:94).
In
archaeological plausibility
considerations the
situations
to
be
compared
consist
of the
archaeological
ituation
on
the
one
hand,
and on
the
other hand
all
of
the
ethnographic
ituations
included
n the reference
class.
The
archaeological
observational
predictions
(specific
statements
concerningpatterns
of
cultural
debris)
are the shared attributes
that
will
be
compared
with
reference
class
situations, and the alternative hypotheses (causal patterns of human behavior) are the
unknown but
inferredattribute.
The
archaeologist,
n
attempting
o determine
he
prior probability
of alternative
nferred
behavior
patterns
should
employ
the
seven
nonquantitative
criteria isted
below,
which are
described n
greater
detail in
Copi (1972:358-362;
see also Binford
1972:34-36).
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608
AMERICAN
ANTHROPOLOGIST
[79,
1977
(1)
The
number
of situations
shown
to share
the attributes
n
question.
(2)
The
dissimilarity
of
the situations
shown
to share the attributes.
This is what
M.
Salmon
is
referring
to
when
she
discusses
employing
ethnographic
cases
from
dissimilar
subgroups
of the
reference
class
(1975:461).
(3)
The
number
of shared
attributes.
(4)
The
number
of
inferred
attributes.
(5)
The
significance
of the
shared
attributes.
(6)
The
specificity
of inferred
attributes.
Binford's
argument
concerning
smudge pits
and hide
smoking
(1967),
for
example,
would be a
strongerargument
f it were not
so
specific
as
to the exact
function of
the
pit
(Munson
1969).
(7)
The numberof
points
of
difference
between
situations.
The extent
to which
these
criteria have
to be
employed
will,
of
course,
depend
upon
the
relative
prior
probabilities
of various
alternative
hypotheses
that
emerge
during
plausibility
consideration.
If
only
one of the
hypothesized
causalbehavior
patterns
s even mentioned
n
the reference class
situations,
there
is
obviously
no need to
apply
all of the seven
criteria
listed
above.
The
situation
becomes
more
difficult,
however,
if more than
one
hypothesis
is shown
to
have
nonnegligible
prior
probability.
If
in
such
a
situation
the
competing
hypothesized
human
behavior
patterns
with
nonnegligible
prior
probability
are
similar,
one solution is
to
incorporate
both into
a
single,
less
specific
hypothesis
prior
to
testing:
...
one
may
then
be
forced,
as
I
previously
suggested
(Binford,
1967
p. 8),
to offer
a
more
general
and inclusive
proposition.
In this case the more
general
nclusive
proposition
would
be
that
the
observed
archaeological
eatures
were
smudge
pits
as distinct
from
lighting
fires,
roasting
pits,
etc.
[Binford
1972:57.]
If,
on
the
other
hand,
alternative
hypothesized
causal
behavior
patterns
with
nonnegligible
prior probabilityare not similar,they should be formallystated andsubjectedto testing.It
is
important
to
remember
hat
the function
of
plausibility
considerations s
not
necessarily
to
select
the
single hypothesis
with
the
highest
prior probability
for formal
statement
and
testing,
but rather
to
reject
those
hypotheses
with
low
prior probability.
If more than
one
alternative
hypothesis
is
formally
stated
for
testing,
it
is
important
to
attempt
to
ascertain,
through
consideration
of
the
reference class
situations,
if
there are differences
among
the
patterns
of cultural
debris caused
by
each
human
activity.
If
observed,
such
differences
may
allow
a
selection
of one
of
the
alternative
hypotheses
during esting.
Archaeologists
would,
in
many
cases,
be
pleased
to
be confronted
with
the
problem
of
more
than one
hypothesis
with
nonnegligible
prior probability.
It
is
a
much more common
situation
for an
ethnographic
reference
class
to
yield very
little,
if
any,
information
concerning
human behavior-cultural ebris
relationships.
Archaeologists
are
attempting
to
deal with
this
problem
n
a
number
of
ways.
The
patterning
of
material
remains
in
archaeological
contexts
is
being
observed
and
analyzed
with much
greater
accuracy
and in
much
greater
detail
now
than
formerly.
Improved recovery
techniques
such as
flotation
(Struever1968)
have
greatly
increased
the
amount
and the
variety
of data
being
recovered from
archaeological
contexts,
allowing
longer
and more detailed
observational
prediction
sets
to be
developed
for
archaeological
situations.
There
has
also been a
corresponding
ncrease n
the
accuracy
of the
recording
and
describing
of
the context
of material remains. This
increased
accuracy
in
recovery
and
recording,
combined
with
the
development
of
sophisticated
analytical techniques,
has
resulted in a much greater ability on the part of archaeologists o recognizeand describe
accurately
the
existing patterning
of cultural debris in
archaeological
situations.
This has
allowed
longer
and
more detailed observational
prediction
sets to be
developed.
There
has
also
been
increased
interest in
attempting
to extract more information from the
material
remains hemselves
Semenov
1964;
Wilmsen
1970).
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]
INFERENCE
AND
INDUCTIVE
CONFIRMATION
609
All
of
these efforts have
been directed
toward
providing
more accurate and
more
complete
detailed
descriptions
of
patterned
material
remains
observed
in
archaeological
contexts. This
concern
with
accuracy
and detailed
descriptions
stems
from the
realization
that the
ability
to
identify
and to
differentiate between the
cultural debris
patterns
producedby alternativehypothesized behaviorpatterns dependsto a greatextent upon the
length
and
quality
of sharedattribute
ists for
archaeological
ituations.
Archaeologists
are at the
same
time
working
on
strengthening
the
other
side
of
plausibility
considerations,
the
analog
situations.
Numerous ndividuals
have oriented
their
research
toward
detailed
study
and
analysis
of
the
cause and effect
relationshipsexisting
between
human behavior
and
patterned
material
remains in
a
great
variety
of
specific,
contemporary ethnographic
analog
situations
(Bonnichsen
1973;
Cranstone
1971;
David
1971;
Friedrich
1970;
Gould
1968,
1971;
Heider
1967;
Longacre
and
Ayres
1968;
White
and Thomas
1972).
All of
these efforts
are
oriented toward
providing
more
detailed
and
more
accurate attribute lists
for
specific
human
behavior-cultural
ebris
analog
situations,
as
well
as
critically analyzing
the
numerous
ways
in
which
archaeologists
are
prone
to
misinterpretpatternedmaterialremains.
Cross-cultural
urveys employing published
ethnographic
reports
are
also
being
carried
out
to
determine
what kinds
of
relationships
of
human behavior o
material
remainscan
be
observed
in a
large
number
of
diverse
ethnographicanalog
situations
(Naroll
1962;
Ember
1973).
A
recent article
by
Murdock
and
Provost
(1973),
incidentally, gives
an
excellent
example
of
partitioning
of an
ethnographic
reference
class into
subgroups.
Investigations
of
analog
situations have
not,
however,
been
restricted to the
study
of
present
day
human
populations
or to the
analysis
of
published
ethnographic reports.
Archaeologists
have also been
literally taking
things
into
their own
hands and
carrying
out
imitative
experiments
with material
objects
in a
manner
designed
to
simulate
past
human
activity patterns Ascher1961; Million1975; North 1975; Spears1975).
Once
plausibility
considerations
are
completed,
and the
prior
probability
of
alternative
hypothesized
causal
behavior
patterns
for
a
specific
observational
prediction
or
set
of
observational
predictions
has
been
determined,
the next
step
in the H-A
method
is
to
state
explicitly
those
hypotheses
with
nonnegligible
prior
probability.
Alternative
hypotheses
that
were
considered but
rejected
due
to
low
prior
probability
hould
also
be
listed at
this
point.
Formulation
of
Alternative
Hypotheses
Once
hypotheses
with
high
prior
probability
are
explicitly stated,
the H-A
method
follows,
with
a
few
exceptions,
the format
of the
H-D
method.
At this
point
in the
employment
of the
hypothetico-analogmethod,
it is to be
hoped
that
at
least
one
(and
perhaps more)
hypothesized
causal
human
activity
pattern(s)
has
been
found to
have
high
prior
probability
of
causing
a
specific
set of
observational
predictions,
and
has been
explicitly
stated
prior
to
being
tested.
If
the
archaeologist
is
primarily
interested
n
pursuing
he
strength
or
reliability
of
the
hypothesized
human
behavior-cultural
debris
relationship(s),
subsequent
testing
of the
hypothesis
(hypotheses)
would
involve
either
considering
a
different
set
of
relevant
attributes
within the
original
reference
class,
or
consulting
either
a
previously
unconsidered
subset of the
original
reference
class
or
an
entirely
new
reference
class,
employing
the
original
attribute class
(Binford
1972:46).
If,
on
the other
hand,
the
archaeologist
s
considering
human
behavior-cultural
ebris
relationships within the context of an archaeologicalresearch project, the H-A method
should be
carried
out within a
larger
problem
oriented
framework.
The
familiar
statement
that
archaeology
must be
problem
oriented
simply
means that
any
research
project
should
be
oriented
toward
providing
answers
to a
numberof
explicitly
stated
general
problems
or
research
questions.
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