Nasa FMEA Presentation

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    1NASA Lewis Research Centerr1

    TOOLS OF RELIABILITYANALYSIS -- Introduction and

    FMEAs

    (09)

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    DEDUCTIVE PROCEDURES(Top-Down Analysis)

    INDUCTIVE PROCEDURES(Bottom-Up Analysis)

    Pick Upper LevelFailure in Component

    Flowdowncauses

    Determine Failure Modes of LowerLevel Components.

    Summarize

    upward

    RELIABILITY ANALYSIS PROCEDURES

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    RELIABILITY ANALYSIS PROCEDURES

    INDUCTIVE METHODS DEDUCTIVE METHODS

    HARDWAREFAILURES

    HUMANINTERACTIONERRORS

    HARDWARE ANDHUMAN ERRORS

    RELIABILITY

    ANALYSIS

    FAILURE MODE

    AND EFFECTSANALYSIS (FMEA)

    HUMAN FACTORSANALYSIS

    FAULT TREEANALYSIS (FTA)

    EVENT TREEANALYSIS (ETA)

    PROBABILISTICRISK ASSESSMENT

    CRITICAL ITEMSLIST (CIL)

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    FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTANALYSIS

    (09 cont)

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    DEFINITION

    A methodology to analyze and discover: (1)all potential failure modes of a system, (2) theeffects these failures have on the system and(3) how to correct and or mitigate the failuresor effects on the system. [The correction andmitigation is usually based on a ranking ofthe severity and probability of the failure]

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    Benefits of FMEA

    FMEA is one of the most important tools ofreliability analysis. If undertaken early enoughin the design process by senior levelpersonnel it can have a tremendous impacton removing causes for failures or ofdeveloping systems that can mitigate theeffects of failures.

    It provides detailed insight into the systems

    interrelationships and potentials for failure. FMEA and CIL (Critical Items List) evaluations

    also cross check safety hazard analyses forcompleteness.

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    BACKGROUND

    The failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)is the most widely used analysis procedure inpractice at the initial stages of systemdevelopment.

    The FMEA is usually performed during theconceptual and initial design phases of thesystem in order to assure that all possiblefailure modes have been considered and that

    proper provisions have been made toeliminate all the potential failures.

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    OBJECTIVES: Be able to answer (or perform):

    Explain terminology: FMEA, CIL, REDUNDANCY,COMMON MODE FAILURE, etc.

    What are the benefits of FMEA and when shouldthey be applied in the design program?

    Be able evaluate levels of criticality & redundancy. Be able to perform a components FMEA and a

    system FMEA.

    Know how to apply the results of a FMEA.

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    FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTANALYSIS

    PURPOSE/TYPES/USES. PROCEDURE.

    DATA REQUIREMENTS & TERMS/TYPES.

    WHY AND HOW DO THINGS FAIL?

    PERFORMING A FMEA.

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

    Critical Items List

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    System Engineering: FMEA

    FMEA;FMEA INITIAL

    CONCEPT

    FMEAEVALUATE

    DESIGN & REV;PREVENTIONS

    & DETECTIONS

    CoDR PDR CDR

    CONCEPTDESIGN

    PRELIM.DESIGN

    FINAL DESIGNCOMPONENTS/ASSY, TEST &

    INSPECTION

    PRODUCTIONINSPECTION

    ACCEPTANCE

    TESTS

    FMEA FINAL &MAINT FMEA.

    ACTIONSAGREED TO,IMPLEMENT

    SYS.TEST

    FMEA EVALfor

    ADEQUACY,FAULT

    DIAGNOSIS

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    TYPES

    Functional Hardware

    FMEA with Criticality Analysis(FMECA)/Critical Items List

    Other variations.

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    USES--Short Term

    Identify critical or hazardous conditions. Identify potential failure modes

    Identify need for fault detection.

    Identify effects of the failures.

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    USES--Long term.

    Aids in producing block-diagram reliabilityanalysis

    Aids in producing diagnostic charts for repairpurposes.

    Aids in producing maintenance handbooks. Design of built-in test (BIT), failure detection

    & redundancy.

    For analysis of testability. For retention as formal records of the safety

    and reliability analysis, to be used asevidence in product safety litigation.

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    PROCEDURE Get an overview of the system:

    Determine the function of all componentry.

    Create functional and reliability block diagrams.

    Document all environments and missions of sys.

    ID all potential failure modes of each component.

    Establish failure effect on the next level of the sys.

    Determine failure detection methods.

    Determine if common mode failures exits.

    Determine criticality of the failure, ranking & CIL.

    Develop CIL

    Corrective actions/retention rationale.

    Provide suitable follow-up or corrective actions.

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    PROCEDURE-FLOWCHART

    PERFORM

    FMEA,ID FAILUREMODES

    DESIGN

    GET SYSTEMOVERVIEW

    ESTABLISH

    FAILUREEFFECT

    DETERMINE

    CRITICALITY

    REVISE DESIGN

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    TERMS: FMEA WORKSHEET

    Page ___ of ____Date:__________

    Title:_________________________________

    System:______________________________Analyst:_____________

    Description Function Failure Mode Cause of Failure Effect of FailureCorrective Action

    DetectionCrit./Rank

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    FAILURE TERMS REVIEW:THE PROCESS OF FAILURE

    FAILUREMODE

    FAILURECAUSE

    FAILUREMECHANISM

    FAILURESTRESSES

    OBSERVED

    PROBLEM

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    WHY DO THINGS FAIL?(Failure Mechanisms)

    fatigue/fracture material removal structural overload radiation

    electrical overload ________________

    wear (lube failure) ________________

    wear (contamination) ________________

    wear ________________

    seal failure ________________

    chemical attack ________________

    oxidation ________________

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    HOW DO THINGS FAIL?(Failure Mode)

    In what ways can they fail?

    How probable is this failure?

    Do one or more components interact toproduce a failure?

    Is this a common failure?

    Who is familiar with this particular item?

    PROBLEM--VALVE(P)

    OPTIONAL PROB: CHEM MICRO EXP

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    Review--PURPOSE OF FMEA???

    The purpose is to identify the differentfailures and modes of failure that can occur atthe component, subsystem, and systemlevels and to evaluate the consequences ofthese failures.

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    CONCLUSION--BENEFITS OFFMEA

    Identify critical or hazardous conditions.

    Identify potential failure modes

    Identify need for fault detection.

    Identify effects of the failures. END>MORE

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    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

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    CRITICALITY ANALYSIS

    Assign critically categories based onredundancy, results of failure, safety etc.

    Develop criteria for what failure modes are tobe included in a critical items list (CIL).

    Develop screens to evaluate redundancy. Analyze each critical item for ways to remove

    it, or develop retention rational to supportthe premise that the risk can be retained.

    Cross check critical items with hazardreports.

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    CRITICALITY CATEGORIES (TYP.) 1 Single failure point that could result in loss of vehicle or

    personnel.

    1R Redundant items, where if all failed, the result is loss ofvehicle or personnel.

    1S A single failure point of a system component designedto provide safety or protection capability against a potentialhazardous condition or a single point failure in a safetymonitoring system (e.g. fire suppression system).

    1SR Redundant components, where if all failed, the result isthe same as 1S above.

    1P A single failure point which is protected by a safetydevice, the functioning of which prevents a hazardouscondition from occurring.

    2 Single point failure that could result in loss of criticalmission support capability.

    3 All other.

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    Analyze Critical Items

    Redesign item, add redundant unit, etc.

    Prepare retention rationale for item.

    What current design features minimize theprobability of occurrence.

    What tests can detect failure modes duringacceptance tests, cert. tests, prelaunch and/or on-

    orbit checkout. What inspections can be performed to prevent the

    failure mode from being mfg, into hardware.

    What failure history justifies the CIL retention.

    How does operational use of the unit mitigate thehardwares failure effect.

    How does maintainability prevent the failure mode.

    END

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    IIIII

    1-END VALVE

    2-POPPET 3-SPRING4-GUIDE

    6-HOUSING

    7-O-RING (lg)8-BACK-UP RING

    10-O-RING (small)

    PROBLEM--VALVE

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    RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM of ___________FFF

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    Page ___ of ____Date:__________

    Title:_________________________________System:______________________________Analyst:_____________

    FMEA WORKSHEET

    Description Function Failure Mode Cause of Failure Effect of FailureCorrective Action

    Detection Crit

    FFF