AntoLiderazgo

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Liderazgo para el Desarrollo Sostenible

Curso SelloSeptiembre-Diciembre de 2000

Lecturas del Curso

Datos especificos para presentar el material para los cursos

Periodo en el que se utilizarà:Septiembre- Diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo SostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaria Lopez Franco y Dr. Martin BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicación:Nueva YorkTítulo:State of the WorldEditorial:State of the WorldAutor/editor:Brown R. LesterCapítulo/artículo:Capítulo I The legacy of RioAño (fecha) de publicación:1997Páginas-- De: Al:3-22

The Legacy of RioChristopher Flavin

Five years after the historic U.N. Con-ference on Environment and Develop-ment in Rio de Janeiro, the world isfalling well short of achieving its centralgoal-an environmentally sustainableglobal economy. Since the Earth Sum-mit in 1992, human numbers have grownby roughly 450 million, which exceedsthe combined populations of the UnitedStates and Russia. Annual emissions ofcarbon, which produce carbon dioxide,the leading greenhouse gas, haveclimbed to a new high, altering the verycomposition of the atmosphere and theearth’s heat balance.¹

During these past five years, theearth’s biological riches have also beenrapidly and irreversibly diminished.Huge areas of old-growth forests havebeen degraded or cleared-in temper-ate as well as tropical regions-eliminat-ing thousands of species of plants andanimals. Biologically rich wetlands andcoral reefs are suffering similar fates.Despite a surge in economic growth in

Units of measure throughout this book are metricunless common usage dictates otherwise.

developing countries, an estimated 1.3billion people are so poor that they can-not meet their basic needs for food orshelter.²

In its vast scope and ambitious record,the Earth Summit set a standard for it-self that was almost certain to lead todisappointment. Of course, the failureto reverse in only five years trends thathave been under way for decades is notsurprising. Unfortunately, few govern-ments have even begun the pol icychanges that will be needed to put theworld on an environmentally sustainablepath. Only a half-dozen countries, forexample, have levied environmentaltaxes to discourage the unsustainable useof materials and energy. And many na-tions continue to subsidize clear-cuttingof forests, inefficient energy and wateruse, and mining. (See Chapter 8.)

One of the signal accomplishments ofRio was the official linking of environ-ment and development issues, includingan explicit recognition that poverty it-self is a driving forte behind a largeshare of environmental degradation. Al-though many think of development in

l l

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State of the World 1997

simple economic terms, it can be betterthought of as an increase in the optionsavailable to people-for meeting theirbasic needs for food, shelter, and educa-tion, for example. As biological and cul-tural diversity are diminished, thoseoptions are reduced.

In the years since Rio, millions ofpoor people have fallen even furtherbehind, and governments have been ei-ther unable or unwilling to provide anadequate safety net. In many countries,environmental and social problems areexacerbating ethnic tension, creatingmillions of refugees and sometimes lead-ing to violent conflict. (See Chapter 7.)Yet most governments still pursue eco-nomic growth as an end in itself, ne-glecting the long-term sustainability ofthe course they chart. In many develop-ing countries, rapid growth has led to asharp deterioration in air and waterquality in the nineties, and underminedthe natural resources on which peopledepend.³

Five years is not long enough to judgeRio’s full legacy, but one lesson is clear:Although substantial progress has beenmade on specific environmental prob-lems, the world has so far failed to meetthe broader challenge of integratingenvironmental strategies into economicpolicy. Until finance ministers, and evenprime ministers, take these problems asseriously as environmental officials do,we will continue to undermine the natu-ral resource base and ecosystems onwhich the human economy depends.

If the economy is to be put on a sus-tainable footing in the twenty-fìrst cen-tury, it is unlikely to be the result of atop-down, centralized plan; the answeris more likely to lie in an eclectic mixof international agreements, sensiblegovernment policies, efficient use of pri-vate sesources, and bold initiatives bygrassroots organizations and local gov-ernments. In fact, Rio may have been alast hurrah for those who hope for vast

“Marshall Plans” to solve world problems.National governments have generallyfailed to meet even the minimal finan-cial commitments made in Rio. If thelong-term viability of human society isto be assured, we all have to get involved.

THE ROAD FROM RIO

The broad goals of the Earth Summitwere laid out in Agenda 21, the 40-chap-ter plan of action for achieving sustain-able development that was signed by theleaders gathered in Rio. This landmarkdocument concludes that “an environ-mental policy that focuses mainly on theconservation and protection of resourceswithout consideration of the livelihoodsof those who depend on the resources isunlikely to succeed.”4

The goals included in Agenda 21range from protecting wetlands anddeserts to reducing air and water pollu-tion, improving energy and agricultura1technologies, managing toxic chemicalsand radioactive wastes more effectively,and reducing the incidence of diseaseand malnutrition. By embracing a broadrange of environmental and social aims,Agenda 21 reflects the scope of the chal-lenges the world now faces. But its veryambition has weakened its effectiveness-by straining the limited capacities of gov-ernments and international agencies.5

The most important institution toemerge from the Earth Summit was theUnited Nations Commission on Sustain-able Development (CSD), set up to re-view national implementation of Agenda21 and to provide high-level coordinationamong various U.N. environment anddevelopment programs. At annual minis-terial-level meetings in New York, the CSDhas focused on a range of disparate envi-ronmental goals—from protecting moun-tains and grasslands to phasing lead out

12

The Legacy of Rio

of gasoline and developing environmen-tal indicators. The CSD has been a usefuldiscussion forum and has launched somepromising initiatives, including the Inter-governmental Panel on Forests, which isnow meeting regularly to craft strongerefforts to protect the world’s woodlands.The Commission lacks regulatory powersand a budget of its own, however, so itcan only cajole other U.N. programs andagencies into taking its pronouncementsseriously.6

Under Agenda 21, governments arerequired to prepare national sustainabledevelopment strategies. By 1996, 117governments had formed national com-missions to develop these strategies—most of them made up of a diverse arrayof industry and nongovernmental orga-nization (NGO) representatives as wellas government officials. Unfortunately,most reports prepared so far are broad,rhetorical, self-congratulatory documentsthat describe existing environment anddevelopment programs but do little toredirect them. Too many of the strate-gies treat environmental issues as sepa-r a t e c o n c e r n s t o b e a d d r e s s e d b yenvironment ministries rather than asproblems that are woven into the veryfabric of the world economy.7

Nevertheless, in the five years sincethe Earth Summit, the internationalcommunity has begun to embrace theconcept of sustainable development andto use that notion to shift the prioritiesof existing agencies and programs. Gov-ernments have also adopted a numberof specific agreements, including guide-lines for safety in biotechnology and anagreement to protect fish that straddlethe boundaries of national waters. Inaddition, a new Desertification Conven-tion has been negotiated and signed.The Basel Convention has been strength-ened to ban many exports of hazardouswastes to developing countries, and aprogram of action for the protection ofthe marine environment from land-based

pollution has been adopted. Meanwhile,a treaty to control persistent organicpollutants is being negotiated.8

The speeches of the more than 100world leaders at the Earth Summit weremarked by bold rhetoric about the needto channel billions of dollars toward thenew challenge of environmentally sus-tainable development. The ConferenceSecretariat, led by Canadian industrial-ist Maurice Strong, prepared a reportconcluding that developing countriesalone would need to invest an additional$600 billion annually during the nine-ties to achieve Agenda 21’s goals, andthat $125 billion of this would need tobe in the form of aid from industrialcountries—more than double the totalforeign aid being received by developingcountries in the early nineties.9

The world has so far failed to meetthe challenge of integrating environ-mental strategies into economicpolicy.

Very little new money has been forth-coming since Rio. To the contrary, thelast five years have been marked by ma-jor economic and political changes thatdiverted attention away from the chal-lenge of sustainable development. Theend of the cold war has seen the col-lapse of economies throughout CentralEurope, and has added nations such asRussia and Ukraine to the list of leadingforeign aid recipients—a kind of nega-tive “peace dividend.”

During the nineties, economic andsocial pressures have made “rich” coun-tries feel poor, leading them to cut backon domestic social programs and, insome cases, to slash their foreign aidcommitments. In Agenda 21, these coun-tries reaffirmed earlier promises to raiseannual foreign aid contributions to 0.7

13


percent of their gross national products(GNP). Instead, overall assistance levelshave fallen to their Iowest level since1973 and now average just 0.3 percentof GNP. The steepest falloff was in theUnited States, where offícial develop-ment assistance declined from $11.7 bil-lion in 1992 to $7.3 hillion in 1995; bythen. Japan was providing twice as muchdevelopment assistance as the UnitedStates.10

Similar cutbacks have undermined thebudgets of agencies that many nations hadbeen counting on to promote sustainabledevelopment, including the United Na-tions Environment Programme (UNEP)and the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP), which saw their an-nual budgets stagnate at $106 million and$1.4 billion respectively in 1995. (By wayof comparison, a company must have rev-enues of $8.9 billion just to make theFortune Global 500 list.) Effective U.N.programs such as the International Reg-ister of Potentially Toxic Chemicals andthe Global Environment Monitoring Sys-tem have been starved for funds, as haveprograms to help developing countriescraft new environmenl and developmentstrategies.11

The fastest progress is now occurringon issues that were first identifieddecades ago.

The one major financia1 initiative dedi-cated to the Rio agenda is the Global En-vironment Facility (GEF), a specializedfund managed by the World Bank, UNEP,and UNDP. Started in pilot form in 1991,the GEF was envisioned in Agenda 21 asa means to support developing-countryprojects that mitigate global environmen-tal problems. Since Rio, the GEF has alsobecome the interim funding arm of theclimate and biodiversity conventions.¹²

Following these mandates, the GEFhas provided support for several dozenworthwhile projects, including efforts toset up national parks, protect endan-gered species, and promote solar energy,energy efficiency, and other alternativesto fossil fuels. But it has been hamperedby feuding member governments and bya management structure that is complexeven by the byzantine standards of theUnited Nations. The $315 million ap-proved for GEF funding in 1996 is actu-ally slightly smaller than the $322 millionapproved in 1992.¹³

The World Bank, which loans roughly$20 billion to developing countries eachyear, has a far greater impact on envi-ronmental trends around the world.Since Rio, the Bank has strengthenedits environmental review process and haswithdrawn support from some high-pro-file environmental projects that criticsdenounced as wasteful or destructive,such as the Arun Dam in Nepal. JamesWolfensohn, who become President ofthe 50-year-old Bank in 1995. has pub-licly embraced the challenge of sustain-able development, a commitment thatis backed up by a Vice-President for En-vironmentally Sustainable Develop-men—Ismail Serageldin.14

These symbolic changes have high-lighted a growing gulf between the newenvironmentally concerned senior man-agement and the hundreds of task man-agers and country directors that wieldthe Bank’s real power. These individualsremain focused on narrow financialgoals, and so far the Bank has failed evento develop an adequate environmentalscreening process for their loans, accord-ing to internal assessments. Conse-quently, it continues to lend large sumsfor projects that add to global carbonemissions, destroy natural ecosystems,and undermine the livelihoods of poorpeople, say outside critics, while thebroader vision of a more sustainableeconomy is largely ignored.15

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The failure to fulfill the legacy of Rioduring these past five years can be at-tributed in part to the inevitable timelags that mark any new policy initia-tives—particularly at the internationallevel. In fact, the fastest progress is nowoccurring on those issues that were firstidentified decades ago. In most indus-trial countries, for example, air and wa-ter pollution are now less severe thanthey were during the Stockholm Confer-ence on the Human Environment in1972. And many developing countrieshave begun to implement stringent airpollution laws and to phase lead out ofgasoline. At the global level, efforts toend prodUction of the chemicals thatdeplete the atmosphere’s protectiveozone layer are already well under way,and have led to a 76-percent reductionin the manufacture of’ the most damag-ing ones. (See Chapter 9.) 16

In other areas, the world still seemsto be moving in reverse. Lack of cleanwater, for example, has permitted a re-surgence of‘ infectious disease in manydeveloping nations, while human andanimal immune and reproductive sys-tems are being disrupted by chlorine-based chemicals that have becomeubiquitous in ecosystems. More seriously,three global problems still stand in theway of achieving a sustainable world:hunian-induced climate change, the lossof biodiversity, and expanding humanpopulation and consumption levels. Asrecognized in three separate agree-ments—the 1992 Framework Conven-t ion on Cl imate Change, the 1992Convention on Biological Diversity, andthe 1994 Population Plan of Action—astable atmosphere, a rich biologicalworld, and a steatly human populationare essential to humanity´s future pros-pects. Failure to achieve these goalswould complicate a range of other prob-lems and lead to an almost inevitabledecline in the human condition.”

EI G H T E N V I R O N M E N TAL

HEAVYWEIGHTS

In assessing progress on these three glo-bal issues since the Earth Summit, it isclear that all countries are not createdequal. Global environmental trends aredominated by just a few nations. Thischapter looks at eight countries—fourindustrial and four developing—that to-gether account for 56 percent of theworld’s population, 59 percent of its eco-nomic output, 58 percent of its carbonemissions, and 53 percent of its forests.(See Table l-l.) These eight environ-mental powers include the country withthe largest population—China; the onewith the largest economy and carbonemissions— the U n i t e d S t a t e s ; a n d t h enation that arguably claims the richestarray of biodiversity-Brazil. Togetherwith Germany, Japan, India, Indonesia,and Russia, these countries constitutewhat could be called the E8—eight na-tions that disproportionately shape glo-bal environmental trends.18

Even more than the Croup of Seven(G7)—the industrial nations that havedominated the global economy sinceWorld War II—the E8 will help shape thefuture of the entire world. The politicalsystems of the E8 range from communistto democratic, and their experience withcapitalism varies from five years to twocenturies. But in terms of environmentalimpact, these eight nations are in a leagueof their own. Their post-Rio record pro-vides a revealing picture of the progressbeing made by the world as a whole.

The industrial countries in the E8shape global trends in part because oftheir economic strength, their high lev-els of material consumption and socialtrend-setting, and their dominance oftechnology. The developing countries’influence, in contrast, is determined inpart by their large populations, their

The Legacy of Rio

15

rapid economic development, and theirrich diversity of wildlife. Because theseeight nations use such a large share ofthe world’s resources and produce somuch of its pollution, they have a dis-proportionate responsibility for craftingsolutions to the problems identified inRio.

The ES nations are also major playersat international economic and politicalfora, heavily influencing the policies oftheir neighbors and allies, and so arewell positioned to lead the way to a moresustainable world. The G7 nations cometogether each year to discuss and takeresponsibility for global economic stabil-ity; but the E8 will have a far greaterinfluence on the prospects of future gen-erations. No such collection of countriescan replace the important role playedby global institutions such as the UnitedNations and its various agencies. Yet theE8 nations, if they choose, could becomean important catalyst for action else-where-filling a vacuum that now seems

to suck energy out of the sustainabledevelopment agenda.

During the cold war, the U.S. govern-ment provided leadership on a host ofissues, including the environment. U.S.air and water quality laws were forerun-ners of those passed by other nations,and the United States helped establishUNEP in 1972 and formulate the land-mark Montreal Protocol to protect theozone layer in 1987. But U.S. leadershiphad faded by the time of the Earth Sum-mit, when the government kept otherleaders guessing as to whether PresidentBush would even show up. Since Rio,the United States has failed to ratify theConvention on Biodiversity or the Lawof the Sea, clashed with allies over ac-tion to slow climate change, and slashedfunding for many U.N. environmentalprograms.

Other nations have stepped forwardduring the last five years to fil1 the lead-ership void. Germany, for example, hasadopted some of the world’s tightest

16

The Legacy of Rio

environmental standards as well as in-novative policies to reduce consumerpackaging and harness renewable en-ergy. As a pivotal member of the Euro-pean Union, which is now attempting tospeak with one voice on internationalenvironmental issues, Germany has alsoprovided leadership at treaty negotia-tions-notably the Berlin climate con-ference in 1995, where it stitchedtogether a consensus on a new round ofcommitments. 20

Japan, on whom many hopes hadbeen placed in Rio, has compiled animpressive record of domestic environ-mental progress, including substantialreductions in emissions of’ sulfur andnitrogen oxides. It has so far failed, how-ever, to assert itself as a global environ-mental leader-and in fact is known forits resistance to international limits onwhaling and on imports of tropicaltimber from old-growth forests.21

Russia, meanwhile, beset hy economicand political chaos, has largely lost con-trol of its ecological future. Vast areas ofSiberia are being stripped of their natu-ral riches, and belching smokestacks areonly cleaned up when the factories be-nearh them go out of business. Scoresof dangerous nuclear reactors continueto operate, while Russian industry stillproduces and uses chloro fluorocarbons(CFCs) in violation of internationalozone agreements the government hassigned. “What happened to Russia’sgreen movement?” asked Mark Borozin,editor of Green World, an environmentalnewspaper in Moscow. "People now say,‘Give us bread, shelter and clothing-then we will think about the ecology."22

Although developing countries stilllag behind in implementing and enforc-ing environmental laws, they have comea long way in understanding the seri-ousness of the threats. Prior to Rio, manyThird World leaders believed they couldafford to address only local environmen-tal problems, but now they realize that

17

global c l imate change and loss ofbiodiversity also threaten their develop-ment prospects. Rising seas, for example,could inundate large areas, displacing140 million people in Bangladesh andChina alone. Tropical and subtropicalcountries are also likely to see their ag-ricultural harvests diminished by climatechange, increasing the need for foodimports. In addition, destruction of natu-ral ecosystems may undermine suppliesof fresh water, and limit potential revenuesfrom “bioprospecting” and tourism.23

With such dangers in mind, and prod-ded by the Earth Summit agreements,many developing countries have takensteps to redirect development efforts.Among the E8, Brazil has tried withsome success to slow deforestation of theAmazon, and, thanks in large measureto the efforts of its NGOs, has dramati-cally reduced its fertility rate. India, too,has strengthened its environmental ef-forts, and is an emerging world leaderin renewable energy. At climate nego-tiations in Berlin in 1995, the Indianenvironment minister helped broker thefinal North-South bargain. Yet most de-veloping countries still depend heavilyon extractive industries; in many cases,the owners of those industries have keptthe money flowing to these tradicionalsectors. 21

China, which now has the world’sthird largest economy when measuredin purchasing power parity terms, willbe increasingly pivotal in any efforts toprotect the global environment. As of1993, China already consumed morecoal, grain, and r ed mea t t han t heUnited States did. It is the world’s num-ber two emitter of carbon, and its airpollution is affecting Japan and SouthKorea, as well as China itself. In re-sponse, China has crafted one of themost e laborate , ambi t ious nat ionalAgenda 21 plans. Still, the governmenthas a relatively poor record of enforcingits environmental laws, and it remains


to be seen whether the paper promiseswill be translated into policy changes.25

As this litany suggests, today’s envi-ronmental geopolitics is marked by a“new world disorder” in which strongleadership is lacking and most countrieshave mixed records. Shifting allianceshave marked recent negotiations on cli-mate and biodiversity. It is time for theE8 countries to take more responsibilityfor strengthening existing agreementsand forging new ones. By establishinginformal links between their officials andbridging North-South differences thatoften impede negotiations, the E8 couldcatalyze action. A key challenge will beto focus on the common interests of allcountries rather than on national inter-ests; in the struggle for a sustainableworld, the fates of rich and poor, ofNorth and South, are inextricably linked.

STABILIZING THE CLIMATE

One of the centerpieces of the EarthSummit was the Framework Conventionon Climate Change signed by the worldleaders gathered in Rio. In the five yearssince, the urgency of the climate prob-lem has grown, according to scientists.With the atmospheric concentration ofcarbon dioxide at its highest level in150,000 years-and still increasing-theworld is projected to face a rate of cli-mate change in the next several decadesthat exceeds natural rates by a factor of10. Scientists believe that the rapid cli-mate change ahead is likely to be er-ratic, clisruptive, and unpredictable.Local weather patterns may shift sud-denly. The incidence of floods, droughts,fires, and heat outhreaks will probablyincrease as global temperatures rise.26

Between 1990 and 1995, annual fos-sil-fuel-related emissions of carbon,which produce carbon dioxide, rose by

113 million tons, reaching 6 billion tonsin 1995. (See Figure l-1.) They wouldhave risen an additional 400-500 mil-lion tons if not for the collapse of fossil-fuel-dependent industries in Central andEastern Europe. An estimated 1.6 billiontons of additional carbon are releasedannually from forest clearing, primarilyin tropical regions. Emissions of CFCs,another important greenhouse gas, arefalling sharply as a result of efforts toprotect the ozone layer (see Chapter 9),while emissions of hydrofluorocarbonsand methane-both potent greenhousegases-are still increasing.27

Greenhouse gas emission levels varywidely among nations, as seen in figuresfor the E8. Per capita carbon emissionsfrom fossil fuels range from 5.3 tons inthe United States to 2.4 tons in Japanand 0.3 tons in India. (See Table l-2.)This more-than-twentyfold range inemission rates reflects many differences,including stages of industrial develop-men t and pe r sona l l i f e - s ty l e s andconsumption levels. But even amongcountries at similar stages of economicdevelopment, the situation varies widely:per capita emissions in. China are 75percent higher than they are in Brazil,

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The Legacy of Rio

Table 1-2. Carbon Emissions from Burning of Fossil Fuels, E8 Countries, 1995

Total Share of World

Emissions Carbon Emissions

Emissions

Per Capita

Emissions Growth,

1990—95

United States

Russia

Japan

Germany

China

India

Indonesia

Brazil

E8 Total

(million tons)

1,394

437

302

234

807

229

5662

3,521

(percent)

22.9

7.2

5.0

3.8

13.3

3.8

0.9

1 . 0

57.9

(tons)

5.32.9

2.4

2.9

0.7

0.3

0.3

0.4

0.9

(percent)

6.2

-27.7

8.7

-10.227.5

27.7

38.8

19.8

SOURCES: Chistopher Flavin and Odil Tunali, Climate of Hope: New Strategies for Stabilizing the World´s Atinosphere, Worldwatch paper 130 (Washington, D.C: Worldwatch Institute, June 1996); Oak Ridge National

Laboratory, Trends 1993: A Comprendium of Data on Global Change (Oak, Ridge, Tenn.: 1994); British Petro-

leum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy (London: Group Media & Publicationss, 1995).

for instance, while those. in the United

States are 120 percent higher than in

Japan.28

Under the terms of the climate con-

vention, all countries must prepare a full

inventory of greenhouse gas emissions

as well as a national climate plan. Only

industr ia l countr ies , however , are re-

quired to hold their emissions of green-

house gases at or below the 1990 level

in the year 2000—a conimitment likely

to be missed by roughly half the coun-

tries. Among the E8, Germany and Rus-

sia will almost certainly make the year

2000 target, but the United States and

Japan have fallen badly off track.29

Germany, Europe’s leading producer

of greenhouse gases and the fifth larg-

est producer worldwide, has established

a far tougher emissions target than re-

quired under the convent ion—carbon

emissions in 2005 that are 25 percent

below the 1990 level, a goal that reflects

s t r o n g p u b l i c c o n c e r n a b o u t c l i m a t e

change as well as the fact that some re-

ductious are coming easily as the energy-

intensive industries of’ Germany’s eastern

states close down or switch from coal to

gas. By 1995, German emissions were

already more than 10 percent below the

1990 level, and continuing to fall.³º

The Ge rman c l ima te p l an i nc ludes

incentives for improving the energy effi-

ciency of buildings and a law that allows

generators of “green” power to sell it to

the utilities at a premium price. As a

resul t of th is law, Germany ins ta l led

more wind turbines in 1995 than any

other country. It also has high gasoline

taxes, but in early 1996 backecl down

from a new energy tax initiative after

industry leaders interceded with Chan-

cellor Kohl. However, he used the threat

of the tax to extract a commitment from

major industries to cut carbon emissions

20 percent by 2005. Still, even German

climate policy is plagued by contradic-

t ions , inc luding a $5.3-bi l l ion annual

coal subsidy that is only gradually being

phased out. (See Chapter 8.) The gov-

ernment will need to end such subsidies

and enact other reforms if it is to meet

its own ambitious target.³¹

Russ ia , the th i rd larges t emi t ter of

carbon, has done little to reduce emis-

s ions , hampered as i t i s by economic

problems. Still, Russian carbon emissions

in 1995 were already 28 percent below

19

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the 1990 level due to the col lapse of

many of the country´s energy-intensive

enterprises. As Russia develops a more

efficient economic system. it is unlikely

to ever emit as much carbon as it did at

the peak. But it remains to be seen if the

government will build the policy frame-

work needed to achieve high levels of

energy efficiency and develop carbon-free

energv sources: ³²

Thk situation is not so encouraging

in two other E8 countries. The United

States, the world’s leading producer of

greenhouse gases, launched a Cl imate

Change Act ion Plan in 1993 tha t in-

cludes 50 measures to promote energy

efficiency, commercialize renewable en-

ergy technologies, and encourage tree

planting. Two thirds of’ these are rela-

tively weak voluntary programs that do

not include the kind of f i rm indust ry

commitments found in Germany’s “vol-

untary” programs. By. 1996, U.S. carbon

emissions were already 6 percent above

the 1990 level, anti a projection by the

C.S. Department of Energy indicates that

without new policy initiatives, in 2000

these may exceed 1990 levels by a full

11 percent .³³

The Convention on Climate Changerisks becoming an empty vessel:strong on principle but desperatelyweak in implementation.

Japan, which has a repeutation for en-

ergy eff ic iency and a commitment to

developing new technologies, has had

only limited success with its national cli-

mate program, which includes new en-

ergy standards, a program to promote

solar-powered homes, and other initia-

t ives . Japan’s carbon emiss ions have

surged by more than 8 percent s ince

1990—main1y spurred by increased driv-

ing and heavier reliance on central heat-

ing and a i r -condi t ioning in bui ld ings .

Goverment officials believe that strong

additional measures will be required if

Japan is to have any hope of returning

to the 1990 level by the year 2000.

Japan’s task is made more difflcult, how-

ever, by the fact that its per capita car-

bon emissions are already less than half

the U.S. level.34

Carbon emissions have soared in de-

veloping countries in the first half of the

nineties. Emissions rose 20 percent in

Brazil between 1900 and 1995. 28 per-

cent in China and India, and 39 percent

in Indonesia. Growth in energy demand,

which was restrained by high oil prices

and economic stagnation in the eight-

ies, is now surging. Such growth is hardly

surprising, given that emissions per per-

son in India and Indonesia are only one

tenth the European level, while Brazil’s

are one seventh and China’s one fourth

as high. And in many developing coun-

tries, emissions are growing slower than

the economy because l ight industr ies

and services are developing faster than

heavy manufacturing. In China—which

is already the world’s second largest car-

bon emitter—emissions grew at 5 per-

cent a year in the early mineties, while

economic growth averaged 10 percent. 35

The cl imate convent ion recognizes

d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s n e e d s f o r i m -

proved housing and transportation, and

so only requires them to adopt national

climate plans, not to meet specific emis-

sion targets. So far, no national plans

have been completed, but i t i s hoped

these wi l l help demonstra te a host of

cost-effective means of reducing emis-

sions, including energy efficiency and

solar power projects supported by the

GEF. Grandually, the economic efficacy

of such efforts is being recognized by

developing countries, and over time is

likely to slow their emissions growth.:36

St i l l , the overal l record on c l imate

policy to date is not encourging. Unless

additional policies are implemented, the

20

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The Legacy of Rio

Internat ional Energy Agency projects , biological systems most at risk. Three

global emissions of carbon from fossil

fuels will exceed 1990 levels by 17 per-

fourths of the world’s bird species are

declining, and nearly one fourth of the

cent in 2000 and 49 percent by 2010, 4,600 species of’ mammals are threatened

reaching nearly 9 billion tons annually. with extinction. Scientists are also con-

The Framework Convention on Climate

Change risks becoming an empty vessel:

cerned that rapid climate change in the

coming ciecades could accelerate the al-

strong on principle but despetately weak

in implementation. 37

ready dangerously high rale of species

loss. (See Chapter 5.) 39

Treaty members recognized this short-

coming at the Second Conference of’ the

Parties, which convened in Geneva in

July 1996. The U.S. government abruptly

abandoned i t s ear l ie r opposi t ion , and

supported European calls for a legally

binding protocol to limit emissions. The

declaration issued in Geneva calls for

such a protocol to be adopted a t the

third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto

in December 1997. It is restimony to the

lobbying skills of‘ the fossil fuel indus-

tries that it has taken five years just to

begin these discussions. If‘ the climate

convention is to finally become effective,

these commitments will have to be strong

ones, and will have to be accompanied

by the kind of flexible implementation

schemes and regular review procedures

that allow the Montreal Protocol to he

so effective. (See Chapter 9.)38

For the first time, a single species—

Homo sapiens—has become a vast, de-

structive ecological force. The pressures

can be seen in China, where 1.2 billion

increasingly prosperous people have al-

ready put 15-20 percent of’ the country’s

species in danger of extinction. With 21

percent of the world’s population, China

has only 4 percent of the forested area,

and growing demand for agr icul tura l

land and wood products has placed se-

vere pressure on its remaining forests.‘“’

Humanity has worked since the be-

ginning of’ this century to conserve wild-

l i f e , a n d t h e l a n d a r e a s e t a s i d e f o r

protection has grown dramatically since

mid-century—reaching nearly 1 billion

hectares, equivalent to the entire land

area of the United States. (See Figure

1-2.) Still, the Convention on Biologi-

cal Diversity, openeci for signature in

1992, provided the first comprehensive

C O N S E R V I N G B I O L O G I C A L

W E A L T H

Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson cal-

culates that the rich fabric of lil’e that

makes up the earth’s ecosystems is now

being ripped up at the rate of at least

50,000 species a year. Tropical rain for-

es ts and o ther na tura l ecosys tems are

being extinguished Wholesale by expand-

ing agriculture and Human settlements

anti by water diversions and pollution.

Globally, fi-eshwater lakes and streams,

coastal mangroves and coral reefs, and

temperate ra in fores ts are among the

21

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framework for conserving diversity across

the globe. It recognizes the “intrinsic”

value of biodiversity and seeks to pre-

serve it, while encouraging “sustainable

and equitable use” of those resources.

(See Chapter 6.) By Nonvember 1996, 162

countries had ratified it , although the

United States had not. Developing coun-

tries have strongly supported the treaty’s

asser t ion of the i r sovere ign r ight to

charge other nations that use their bio-

logical resources to manufacture drugs

and other marketable products. The con-

vention suffers, however, from a lack of

targets , t imetables , and enforcement

mechanisms.41

The challenges facing the Convention

on Biological Divers i ty can be seen

clearly in the records of the eight envi-

ronmental heavyweights, which together

possess a sizable portion of the world’s

land area and biodiversity and which face

a range of accelerating pressures on their

natura l ecosys tems. (See Table 1–3. )

Russ ia has the most ex tens ive fores t

area—21 percent of the world to ta l—

but Brazil is estimated to have the world’s

richest store of biodiversity, including an

estimated 22 percent of the earth’s flow-

ering species. China also has a wealth of

biological resources—12 percent of the

flowering plants; India, Indonesia, Rus-

sia, and the United States are not far

behind:‘”

At the first Conference of the Parties

to the Convention on Biological Diversity,

in 1994, Brazil’s Deputy Minister for the

Environment pledged “to conserve this

national patrimony and to promote the

sustainable utilization of its biological re-

sources,” and to “integrate the conserva-

tion and sustainable use of biological

diversity in-to... forestry, fishing, and ag-

riculture,” including the promotion of

ventures such as rubber tapping tha t

sustainably use those resources. Since

hosting the Rio Earth Summit, Brazil’s

government has sought to limit its ear-

lier efforts to encourage road building

and settlement schemes in the tropical

Table 1-3. Protected Areas and Threatened Species, ES Countries, Nineties

Land in Share of

Protected Land Area

Areas, 1994 Protected

Threatened

Plants’

Threatened

Animal?

(million (percent) (number)

hectares)

United States 130 13 1,845 281Russia 71 4 127 59J a p a n 3 7 704 79Germany

C h i n a

9 26 16 1158 6 343 153

India 14 4 1,256 137Indonesia 19 10 281 242Brazil 3 2 4 483 167

E8 Total 336 7 - -

¹Includes all protected areas (IUCN categories l-V). including totally protected areas and partially

protected areas: totally protected areas are maintained in a natural slate and are closed lo extractive uses;

partially pretected areas can be managed for specific uses (such as recreation). and some extractive use is

allowed. ²Data for E8 total not presented due lo overlap of threatened species in different countries.

³Includes mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish; data for E8 total not presented due to overlap of

same threatened species in different countries.

SOCRCE: World Resources Institute, U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Development Programme, and

World Rank. World Resources 1996-97 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

22

��

The Legacy of Rio

forests of the Amazon Basin—which is

arguably the world’s greatest single con-

centration of biodiversity:”

Still, Brazil’s efforts to conserve its rich

biodiversity are marked by a wide gulf

between promises and action—a gap that

is seen in most other biodiversity plans.

Satellite monitoring indicates that the

pace of deforestation in the Amazon ac-

tually increased 34 percent between 1991

and 1994. Responding to such concerns,

the government has cracked down on il-

legal logging and has increased the share

of property that landowners must preserve

as forest from 50 percent to 80 percent.‘.’

Indonesia is arguably the second most

i m p o r t a n t c o u n t r y w h e n i t c o m e s t o

biodiversity, and its wildlife is uniquely

threatened. The official list of endan-

gered species inc ludes 126 bi rds , 63

mammals, and 21 reptiles. Although this

nation has only a little more than 1 per-

c e n t o f t h e e a r t h ’ s l a n d a r e a , i t h a s

roughly 12 percent of the world’s mam-

mals, 16 percent of the reptiles and am-

phibians, and 17 percent of all birds.

A c c o r d i n g t o g o v e r n m e n t e s t i m a t e s ,

Indonesia’s species are being lost at a

rate of one a day, driven by a large and

politically influential logging industry as

well as a human population that is ex-

panding by some 3 million people each

year. Crowded conditions on the island

of Java have led the govermment to en-

courage migrat ion to the biological ly

richer outer islands:”

At the second Conference of the Par-

ties to the Convention on Biological Di-

vers i ty , in Jakar ta in 1995, Indones ia

released a revised biodiversity plan. At

its core is the setting aside of 16 million

hectares (8 percent of Indonesia’s land

area) for protection. Additional areas,

including coastal and marine resources,

are being consitlerecl for inclusion. Lo-

cal communities and NGOs, with their

wealth of biological knowledge and de-

pendence on nature, are to be actively

involved in the biodiversity plan.46

23

The United States, which established

the world’s first national parks a cen-

tury ago and enacted a landmark En-

d a n g e r e d S p e c i e s A c t i n 1 9 7 3 , h a s

recently found its conservation efforts

under assault bye the timber, mining, and

grazing industries. So far, their efforts

to undermine the species act and other

laws have been unsuccessful , but the

budgets of the agencies that administer

t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n w e r e s l a s h e d . T h e

Clinton administration’s attempts to pro-

tect the Everglades wetlands in Florida,

the ancient forests of the Pacific North-

west, and other valuable wild areas may

fare better in the Congress that came to

off ice fol lowing nat ional e lect ions in

November 1996.47

Russia, which stretches across 11 time

zones from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific

Ocean, still has vast areas of intact eco-

systems—mainly boreal forests and sub-

Arctic tundra found in Siberia. Although

these ecosystems are not nearly as rich

in biodiversity as those of tropical coun-

tries, they arc a valuable resource, con-

taining a vast store of carbon that, if

released, would accelerate global warm-

ing. According to British environmental

consultant Norman Myers, Siberia may

now be losing 4 million hectares of for-

est annually—nearly twice the rate of de-

forestation in Brazil’s Amazon. Some

sections of Siberia have fallen victim to

an uncontrolled timber rush as local and

foreign companies races to export logs

that can earn hard currency.“’

Although the political system is tee-

tering, Russian officials and scientists are

valiantly trying to protect the country’s

forests. Russia has many trained ecolo-

gists and foresters, as well as a network

of 89 protected areas called zapovedniksthat were started in 1920, plus 29 na-

t iona l parks . A l toge the r t he se cove r

about 2 percent of Russia’s vast land-

scape—equivalent to the entire territory

of Germany. In response to the Conven-

tion on Biological Diversity, and with


GEF assistance, Russia has developed anew strategy that aims to improve moni-toring of biodiversity, promote eco-tourism, and protect wildlife. In March1995, President Yeltsin signed a federallaw setting up a new category of regionalparks and a new wildlife conservation law.Whether they will be effective in Russia’slawless ‘Wild East” is not yet clear.49

The Earth Summit and the efforts thatflowed from it seem to have gone a longway toward convincing national politicalleaders that the long-term health of theirpeople is inextricably linked to the restof the biological world. And in late 1997,treaty members are planning to submitnational plans for conserving and usingindigenous biological resources sus-tainably. Still, the biodiversity conventionis off to a slow start. lf it is to become aneffective instrument, it will have to de-velop a system of strong, enforceablenational action plans. And in order toconserve biodiversity in the long run,we will need to slow growth in humannumbers and reduce the poverty in theSouth and overconsumption in theNorth that drive people to clear land.

LIMITING HUMAN NUMBERS

AND CONSUMPTION

The world had only 1.6 billion peoplewhen the current century began; by thetime it ends, there will be more than 6billion people on the planet-up 3.5 bil-lion (58 percent) just since 1950. (SeeFigure l-3.) Population growth is a driv-ing force behind many environmentaland social problems. With human num-bers now growing at a near record paceof 88 million annually, slowing popula-tion growth is an urgent priority. Incountries such as Bangladesh and Zaire,where the population is projected to

nearly double in the next two decades,this growth is threatening the social andecological viability of whole nations.50

As much as the Earth Summit, theInternational Conference on Populationand Development in Cairo in Septem-ber 1994 was a watershed. The third ina series of U.N. population conferencesthat began in 1974, Cairo finally ad-dressed the inextricable links amongpopulation growth, social inequity, ma-terial consumption, and environmentaldegradation. In the months leading upto the conference, traditional advocatesof “population control” were challengedby a new coalition of women’s and hu-man rights groups that said improvingthe status and well-being of women andchildren should be the top priority. Theynoted that many women were alienatedby programs that treat them as instru-ments of government family planners.In their view, sustainable developmentis as much a social concept as an envi-ronmental one.51

The plan of action produced in Cairobridged this chasm by emphasizing theurgency of slowing population growth,particularly in poor countries, but alsoconcluding that this goal is best accom-

24

The Legacy of Rio

plished by meeting urgent social needs.Recent studies show that unless theseneeds are met, fertility levels will likelyremain high. The Cairo plan thereforecalls for efforts to empower women, re-duce poverty, and expand the availabil-i ty of educat ion, heal th care , andeconomic opportunity. The plan was avictory for the scores of NGOs thatplayed a major role in shaping the finalagreement. Many family planning pro-grams, whether funded by governments,the United Nations, or private groups,have been overhauled and redirected tofocus on raising the status of women.Already, some 31 countries have stabi-lized their populations. But the worldhas a long way to go if the extraordinarygrowth in human numbers that markedthe twentieth century is to be halted inthe twenty-first.52

The good news is that world popula-tion growth has slowed from a peak of2.1 percent a year in the early sixties to1.5 percent in 1996. Among the devel-oping countries in the E8, India’s aver-age fertility has fallen by 41 percent sincethe sixties, Indonesia’s has declined 46percent, Brazil’s by 55 percent, and

China’s by 68 percent. In Brazil, 66 per-cent of married women use modern con-traceptives, and in China, 83 percent ofwomen do. (See Table l-4.) This com-pares with figures of 75 percent in Ger-many and just 22 percent in Russia. Still,demographic momentum continues topush total numbers up at a near recordpace; slowing that relentless growth re-mains a top concern.53

Indonesia is a leader in slowing popu-lation growth-in part because it hasworked to improve the welfare ofwomen. Its family planning program be-gan in the seventies and from an earlystage focused on village-level health careand education as well as the wide dis-semination of contraceptives. The infantmortality rate fell from 133 infant deathsper 1,000 births in the early sixties to 57in the 1990-94 period. By the early nine-ties, half the married women of repro-ductive age were using contraceptives.Since Cairo, Indonesia has suengthenedthe grassroots and community involve-ment aspects of‘ its population program,expanded the availability of health carein remote rural areas, and vowed to con-tinue lowering fertility rates.54

25


Latin American countries have alsohad some success in slowing populationgrowth, including Brasil, where the an-nual growth rate went from 2.8 percenta year in the sixties to 1.5 percent in thenineties. Brazil’s demographic transitionappears to stem from the pressures ofurbanization, the spread of mass com-munications, and efforts by local govern-ments, community groups, and women’sorganizations to organize health careand family planning. Their work hasbeen supported by generous assistancefrom international organizations such asthe United Nations Population Fund.This allowed a dramatic reduction of fer-tility despite the opposition of the Catho-lic Church and the ahsence of nationalpopulation targets and programs.55

Population growth cannot be ad-equately considered without refer-ence to the resource consumptionlevels of individual nations.

China has experienced one of theworld’s fastest demographic transitions:its fertility rate fell from nearly 6 birthsper woman in the sixties to 1.9 in 1995—slightly below the replacement level of2.0 found in the United States. Remark-ably, this sharp drop has occurred in astill mainly rural population with rela-tively low income levels. China’s aggres-sive efforts to slow population growthwere dr iven by concern about thecountry’s density—roughly a billionpeople squeezed into an area the size ofthe eastern United States.56

This desperation led China to adoptnational population targets and coercivefamily planning programs in whichwomen were not permitted to have morethan two children—and in some casesjust one. Not only were these women

forced to use contraceptives, but oftenabortions were required in the event ofunauthorized pregnancies. Female infan-ticide has also been reported amongfamilies whose only child was a girl. Bothin Cairo and at the 1994 womens‘s con-ference in Beijing, China faced growingpressure to develop a more humane ap-proach. Some governments cut back onfunding for China’s family planning pro-grams over concern about such abuses.In response, China issued a White Pa-per on Family Planning in 1995 thaturges couples to choose “freely and re-sponsibly the number and spacing oftheir children.” Still, China’s populationprogram remains coercive, and few in-ternational family planners consider it amodel. 57

Among industrial countries, popula-tion presents a different kind of prob-lem. The United States, Germany, andJapan already have fertility rates near orbelow the replacement level; in Russia,rising death rates and falling birth rateshave caused the population to declineby severa1 million since 1990. In theUnited States, the population is grow-ing by nearly 1 percent each year, butalmost half the increase is from immi-gration. A more important populationissue for these nations is their supportof family planning programs in develop-ing countries, which exceeds $1 billionannually. Although Western Europe andJapan increased such support after Cairo,U.S. support plummeted from $582 mil-lion in 1995 to $76 million in 1996. Un-less these programs are maintained orstrengthened, the goals of the Cairo con-ference cannot be achieved.58

Moreover, population growth cannotbe adequately considered without refer-ence to the resource consumption levelsof individual nations. Roughly 1.5 bil-lion people in the world’s consumerclass—who drive automobiles, own refrig-erators and televisions, and shop in

26

The Legacy of Rio

malls-consume the bulk of the world’sfossil fuels, metals, wood products, andgrain. A newborn in the United Statesrequires more than twice as much grainand 10 times as much oil as a child bornin Brazil or Indonesia-and produces farmore pollution. In fact, a simple calcu-lation shows that the annual increase inthe U.S. population of 2.6 million peopleputs more pressure on the world’s re-sources than do the 17 million peopleadded in India each year.59

Moreover, the diplomats who assemblein New York will be confronted with theirfailure to meet the financia1 commit-ments made in Rio or to effectivelyimplement the major conventions signedthere. Independent reviews by NGOs andthe press are likely to sharpen the spot-light.

Unless industrial coun tries developless resource-intensive life-styles and less-polluting technologies, it will be impos-sible to develop a sustainable worldeconomy- w h e t h e r the world’s popula-tion ultimately stabilizes at 12, 10, oreven 8 billion people. Detailed studiesundertaken by the Wuppertal Institutein Germany conclude that hy using re-sources more productively, it will be pos-sible in the coming decades to reduceenergy and material consumption levelsin industrial countries by a factor of fourwhile actually improving the standard ofliving. And because industrial countriesare the model that developing countriestend to follow, the decisions they makeabout life-scyles and technologies couldbe decisive for the world as a whole.60

RIO PLUS FIVE...

AND COUNTING

In June 1997, the General Assembly ofthe United Nations will convene on thefifth anniversary of the Earth Summit toreview progress and consider next steps.It may be an awkward gathering: mem-ber nations are far behind in their con-tributions to the United Nations, foreignaid is stagnating, and trade disputes areexacerbating international tensions.

From the perspective of 1997, shouldRio be seen as a nineties Woodstock forenvironmentalists, or perhaps as a suc-cessful media event that did little to meetthe challenges of creating a sustainableworld? Though the pace of change hasbeen frustratingly slow so far, and disap-pointments abound, a purely negativeverdict would be too harsh, and certainlypremature. It is already clear that theEarth Summit set in motion historicalprocesses that will bear fruit for decadesto come.

The expansion in public awarenesstha t f l owed f rom R io - th rough t heworld’s newspapers and over its air-waves -has done much to forge the po-litical basis for action at every level.Dozens of smaller institutions, from lo-cal governments to grassroots develop-ment organizations, have been em-powered by the spirit of Rio. Since 1992,some 1,500 cities in 51 countries havecrafted local Agenda 21s. Many of theseare more substantive than the planscrafted by national governments, as theyare aimed at achieving practica1 goalssuch as improved public transportationand recycling.61

The spirit of Rio has also energizedthe efforts of private citizens to protectthe environment and promote humandevelopment. Some 20,000 individualsfrom outside government participated inthe Earth Summit in 1992, and manyU.N. treaty processes since then havebeen opened to the participation ofNGOs that provide ideas as well as pres-sure for change. Bangladesh has morethan 1,000 NGOs, and India has tens of

27


thousands, thanks to the support of reli-gious organizations and tax incentives.In Brazil, Amazonian Indians and rub-ber tappers have organized to protecttheir forests from would-be ranchers andminers. Although each of these initia-tives may by itself seem inconsequential,together they are making a difference.62

The mid-nineties are also marked bya growing role for private businesses andfinancia1 institutions in world affairs astrade barriers are removed and indus-tries privatized, including electric power,telecommunications, railways, and evenroads. In many cases, the rise of themarket has accelerated the degradationof natural resources—particularly in tim-ber and mining—and increased pollu-tion. But it has also accelerated thetransfer of more environmentally benigntechnologies. China is now the worldleader in manufacturing energy-efficientcompact fluorescent light bulbs, whileIndia has developed the world’s secondlargest market for wind turbines—a mar-ket that barely existed in 1992.63

The surge in economic growth inmuch of the developing world hasreinforced the urgency of putting theworld economy on a sustainable path.

The flow of private capital from in-dustrial to developing countries hassoared from $18 billion in 1987 to $225billion in 1996, according to preliminaryestimates by the Institute of InternationalFinance. This is four times the $55 bil-lion of official bilateral and multilateralcapital that moved from North to Southin 1995—although most of the privateflow is channeled to a half-dozen boom-ing economies. One of the highest pri-orities is redirecting these private funds.Among the tools available are reduced

subsidies to extractive industries, taxeson pollution, and international environ-mental investment criteria, particularlyfor projects that are backed by the WorldBank’s International Finance Corpora-tion or by bilateral export credit banks.Aid agencies will also need to consideran accelerated shift away from road anddam building and toward greater sup-port for education, health care, publictransportation, and other developmentpriorities. 64

Opportunities abound for profitableinvestments in more environmentallybenign products and processes, rangingfrom solar power to ozone-friendly re-frigerators, sustainable forestry projects,integrated pest management systems,and chlorine-free paper mills. Numer-ous green investment funds have beenmobilized in recent years to let individu-als and institutions match their invest-m e n t s w i t h t h e i r s o c i a l c o n c e r n s .Another financing mechanism, pio-neered by Bangladesh’s Grameen Bankand now used by scores of similar insti-tutions, provides financia1 hacking Porhundreds of tiny local enterprises thatsupply goods and services to the urbanand rural poor.65

As consumer demand has grown, manybusinesses have revnmped their manufac-turing processes or developed new envi-ronmentally sustainable products. PaulHawken, a successful California businessexecutive, noted in his 1993 book The Ecol-ogy of Commerce: “We have reaclied an un-settling and portentous turning point inindustrial civilization....Business peoplemust either dedicare themselves to trans-forming commerce to a restorative un-der taking, or march socie ty to theundertaker.”66

In response to such calls, many busi-ness leaders now point out that rapidadvances in electronics, materials sci-ence, and biotechnology offer importantsolutions to environmental problems. AI-

28

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Datos específicos para presentar el material para los cursos

Periodo en el que se utilizará:Septiembre- Diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo SostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaria Lopez Franco y Dr. Martin BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicación:Nueva YorkTitulo:Managing Planet EarthEditorial:Reading from Scientific American MagazineAutor/editor:W. H. Freeman and CompanyCapitulo/articulo:Cap. I Managing Planet EarthAño (fecha) de publicación:1990Páginas De: Al:3-13

��

Managing Planet Earth

Infroducing a book that explores the prospects for sustainable human developmenton a planet with finite resources and a fragile environment.

William C. Clark

Every form of life continually faces the chal-

lenge of reconciling its innate capacity for

growth with the opportunities and con-

straints that arise through its interactions with the

natural environment. The remarkable success of our

own species in meeting that challenge is refleded in

the striking image that grates the cover of this book.

That initial success, however, is only the beginning

of the story.

As we seek to imagine different ways in which

that story might unfold, analogies can be helpful.

The global pattem of light created by today’s civili-

zations is not unlike the pattem of exuberant

growth that develops soon after bacteria are intro-

duced to a nutrient-rich petri dish. In the limited

world of the petri dish, such growth is not sustain-

able. Sooner or later, as the bacterial populations

deplete available resources and submerge in their

Figure 1.1 MANAGING PLANET EARTH will require an-swers to two questions: What kind of planet do we want?What kind of planet can we get? To resolve these questionshuman beings must understand how their activities affectthe global environment and must choose strategies for de-veloping the planet. One local aspect of a possible globalstrategy is symbolized here by a Nepalese woman plantinga tree as part of a reforestation project.

own wastes, their initial blossoming is replaced by

stagnation or collapse.

The analogy breaks down in the fact that bacterial

populations have no control over, and therefore no

responsibility for, their ultimate collision with a fi-

nite environment. In contrast, the same wellsprings

of human inventiveness and energy that are so

transforming the earth have also given us an un-

precedented understanding of how the planet

works, how our present activities threaten its work-

ings and how we can intervene to improve the pros-

pects for its sustainable development. Our ability to

look back on ourselves from outer space symbolizes

the unique perspective we have on our environment

and on where we are headed as a species. With this

knowledge comes a responsibility not borne by the

bacteria: the responsibility to manage the human

use of planet earth.

At the individual level, people have begun to

respond to increased awareness of global environ-

mental change by altering their values, beliefs and

actions. Changes in individual behavior are surely

necessary but are not enough. It is as a global spe-

cies that we are transforming the planet. It is only as

a global species-pooling our knowledge, coordi-

nating our actions and sharing what the planet has

to offer-that we have any prospect for managing

the planet’s transformation along pathways of sus-

��

• WILLIAM C.CLARK

tainable development. Self-conscious, intelligentmanagement of the earth is one of the great chal-

lenges facing humanity as it approaches the 21st

century.

that interactions between people and their environ-

ments should be managed with the goal of sustain-

able development (see Figure 1.1).

Although efforts to manage the interactions be-

tween people and their environments are as

old as human civilization, the management problem

has been transformed today by unprecedented in-

creases in the rate, scale and complexity of those

interactions. What were once local incidents of pol-

lution now involve several nations-witness the

concem for acid deposition in Europe and in North

America. What were once acute episodes of rela-tively reversible damage now affect multiple

generations- witness the debates over chemical-

and radioactive-waste disposal. What were once

straightforward confrontations between ecological

preservation and economic growth now involve

multiple linkages -witness the feedbacks among

energy consumption, agriculture and climaticchange that are thought to enter into the green-

house effect.

The World Commission on Environment and De-

velopment (WCED), chaired by Prime Minister

Brundtland, characterizes sustainable development

as paths of social, economic and political progress

that meet “the needs of the present without com-

promising the ability of future generations to meet

their own needs.” Sustainable development thus

reflects a choice of values for managing planet earth

in which equity matters —equity among peoples

around the world today, equity between parents

and their grandchildren.

We have entered an era characterized by syn-

dromes of global change that stem from the interde-

pendence between human development and the en-

vironment. As we attempt to move from merely

causing these syndromes to managing them con-

sciously, two central questions must be addressed:

What kind of lanet do we want? What kind of

planet can we get?

What kind of planet we want is ultimately a ques-

tion of values. How much species diversity should

be maintained in the world? Should the size or the

growth rate of the human population be curtailed to

protect the global environment? How much climatic

change, is acceptable? How much poverty? Should

the deep ocean be considered an option for hazard-

ous-waste disposal?

Science can illuminate these issues but cannot

resolve them. The choice of answers is ours to make

and our grandchildren’s to live with. Because differ-

ent people live in different circumstances and have

different values, individual choices can be expected

to vary enormously. As pointed out by Gro Harlem

Managing the planet toward sustainable devel-

opment is an undertaking made no less

daunting by its urgency. The basic human dimen-

sions of the task are explored in Chapter 6, “The

Growing Human Population,” by Nathan Keyfitz,

and in Chapter 10, “Strategies for Sustainable Eco-

nomic Development,” by Jim MacNeill. The broad

picture, although familiar, bears recounting. The

planet today is inhabited by somewhat more than

five billion people who each year appropriate 40percent of the organic material fixed by photosyn-

thesis on land, consume the equivalent of two tons

of coal per person and produce an average of 150

kilograms of steel for each man, woman and child

on the earth. The distribution of these people, their

well-being and their impact on the environment

vary significantly among countries.

At one extreme, the richest 15 percent of the

world’s population consumes more than one third

of the planet’s fertilizer and more than half of its

energy. At the other extreme, perhaps one quarter

of the world’s population goes hungry during at

least some seasons of the year. More than a third

live in countries where the mortality for young chil-

dren is greater than one in 10 (see Figure 1.2). The

vast majority exist on per capita incomes below the

official poverty level in the U.S.

As we look to the future, it is encouraging that the

growth rate of the human population is declining

virtually everywhere. Even if the trends responsible

Brundtland in the Epilogue, poor people and rich for the decline continue, however, the next century

people are especially likely to place different values will probably see a doubling of the number of peo-

on economic growth and environmental conserva- ple trying to extract a living from planet earth.

tion. Recently, however, the long-standing debate Nearly all of the increase will take place in today’s

over growth versus environment has matured con- poorer countries. According to the WCED, a fivefold

siderably. A broad consensus has begun to emerge to tenfold increase in world economic activity dur-

33

��

MANAGING PLANET EARTH l

Figure 1.2 CHILD MORTALITY is one measure of a popu- mortality is greater than one in 10. The data, estimated forlation’s well-being. The map shows deaths per 1,000 live 1985 to 1990, are from the U.N.‘s Department of Interna-births for children younger than five years. More than one tional Economic and Social Affairs.third of the world’s people live in countries where the

ing the next 50 years will be required to meet thebasic needs and aspirations of the future popula-tion. The implications of this desperately neededeconomic growth for the already stressed planetaryenvironment are at least problematic and are poten-tially catastrophic.

Efforts to manage the sustainable development ofthe earth must therefore have three specific objec-tives. One is to disseminate the knowledge and themeans necessary to control human populationgrowth. The second is to facilitate sufficiently vigor-ous economic growth and equitable distribution ofits benefits to meet the basic needs of the humanpopulation in this and subsequent generations. Thethird is to structure the growth in ways that keep itsenormous potential for environmental transforma-tion within safe limits -limits that are yet to bedetermined.

I f the goals of sustainable development describethe type of planet people want, the second ques-

tion still remains: What kind of planet can we actu-ally get? When we address this question, the focusshifts from what we value to what we know.

In the end the strategies for sustainable develop-ment must translate into local action if they are tohave any impact at all. As I have noted, however,many of today’s most intractable challenges to sus-tainability involve time scales of decades or cen-turies and global spatial scales. Any significant im-provements in our ability to manage planet earthwill require that we learn how to relate local devel-opment action to a global environmental per-spective.

Fortunately, understanding of global environ-mental change has been revolutionized in recentyears. The revolution has its roots in the 192O’s,with the Russian mineralogist Vladimir I. Ver-nadsky’s seminal writings on the biosphere. It re-ceived important impetus from the InternationalGeophysical Year of 1957 and is now being carriedforward through a lively array of research andmonitoring efforts around the world, capped by anambitious new Intemational Geosphere BiosphereProgram. Although the “global change” revolutionis far from complete, its broad outlines can be sum-marized in Figure 1.3.

The view of environmental change outlined in

34

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• WILLIAM C. CLARK

Figure 1.3 shows a planet dominated through dec-ades and centuries by the interactions of climateand chemical flows of major elements, interactionsthat are woven together by the global hydrologicalcycle and are significantly ‘influenced by the pres-ence of life.

The climate system incorporates atmospheric andoceanic processes that govem the global distributionof wind, rainfall and temperature. Processes centralto human transformation and management ofplanet earth include changes in concentrations ofgreenhouse gases and their impact on temperature;the effect of ocean circulation on the timing anddistribution of climatic changes; and the role of veg-etation in regulating the flux of water between land

and atmosphere (see Chapter 3, “The ChangingClimate,” by Stephen H. Schneider).

A second important component of the planet’senvironment is the global circulation and processingof major chemical elements such as carbon, oxygen,nitrogen, phosphorus and sulfur. These elementsare the principal components of life. In chemicalforms such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrousoxide, they also exert a major influence on climate.Even in the absence of human influences, theearth’s climate and chemistry have undergoneabrupt and tightly linked changes such as thosereflected in the ice-core records shown in Figure 3.3.When added to these natural fluctuations, humanactivities have created disturbances in global chemi-

Figure 1.3 INTERACTIONS between the climate and sition liberate methane (CH4). The combustion of fossilmajor chemical flows dominate global environmental fuels releases large quantities of stored carbon to the atmo-change over tens to hundreds of years. Water is taken out sphere as CO2 which like CH4 tends to warm the planet.of the atmosphere by precipitation and returned by evapo- Emissions such as sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxidesration and transpiration. Human agriculture affects the (NOx) are importad causes of acid rain. Industrial emis-planetary system by altering the flows of nitrates, phos- sions of gases like the chlorofluorocarbons (CFC’s) depletephates and carbon compounds. Respiration and decompo- ozone (O3) and also contribute to climatic change.

35

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cal flows that manifest themselves as smog, acidprecipitation, stratospheric ozone depletion andother problems (see Chapter 2, “The Changing At-mosphere,” by Thomas E. Graedel and Paul J.Crutzen).

The third component of the figure, the hydrologi-cal cycle, includes the processes of evaporation andprecipitation, runoff and circulation. Water is a keyagent of topographic change and an overall regula-tor of global chemistry and climate. As desaibed byJ. W. Maurits la Riviere in Chapter 4, “Threats to theWorld’s Water,” human impacts on the hydrologi-cal cycle that require attention indude pollution ofgroundwater, surface waters and oceans, redistri-bution of water flows on the earth’s surface andpotential sea-leve1 changes induced by globalwarming.

Life, the final component in Figure 1.3, has foundthe environment of planet earth to be replete withpossibilities, resulting in the evolution of anastounding - but rapidly decreasing—degree ofbiological diversity (see Chapter 5, “Threats to Bio-diversity,” by Edward 0. Wilson). It has not beenwidely appreciated until recently that life is also akey player in conditioning and regulating the globalenvironment, through its influence on the chemicaland hydrological cycles. Finally, one form of life—the human species —has grown over the past sev-eral centuries from a position of negligible influenceat the planetary scale to one of great significance asan agent of global change.

A lthough our knowledge of the earth system isquickly expanding, we do not yet know

enough about it to say with any certainty how muchchange the system as a whole can tolerate or whatits capacity may be for sustaining human develop-ment. We ‘do, however, know a good deal aboutinteractions between individual components of theglobal environment and specific human activities.This admittedly incomplete knowledge providessome useful perspectives on questions of planetarymanagement.

Since the beginning of the 18th century, thehuman population has increased by a factor ofeight; average life expectancy has at least doubled.During the same period human economic activityhas become increasingly global, with demands forgoods and services in one part of the planet beingmet with supplis from half a world away. Thevolume of goods exchanged in intemational tradehas increased by a factor of 800 or more and now


represents more than a third of the world’s totaleconomic product.

The three components of this growth and globali-zation of human activity that have had greatest im-pact on the environment are agriculture, energy andmanufacturing, each of which is discussed at lengthin subsequent chapters. Agriculture has been thedominant agent of global land transformation; sincethe middle of the last century, nine million squarekilometers of the earth’s surface have been con-verted into permanent croplands (see Chapter 7,“Strategies for Agriculture,” by Pierre R. Crossonand Norman J. Rosenberg). Energy use has risen bya factor of 80 over the same period, with profoundconsequences for the planet’s chemical flows of car-bon, sulfur and nitrogen (see Chapter 8 “Strategiesfor Energy Use,” by John H. Gibbons, Peter D. Blairand Holly L. Gwin). Finally, the world’s industrialproduction has increased more than 100-fold in 100years, supported by long-term growth rates of morethan 3 percent a year in the utilization of such basicmetals as lead, copper and iron (see Chapter 9,“Strategies for Manufacturing,” by Robert A. Froschand Nicholas E. Gallopoulos).

The transformation of the planetary environmentinduced by this explosion of human activity is par-ticularly evident in changes to the physical land-scape. Since the beginning of the 18th century, theplanet has lost six million square kilometers offorest-an area larger than Europe. Land degrada-tion has increased to a significant but uncertain de-gree (see Figure 1.4). Sediment loads have risenthreefold in major river systems and eightfold insmaller basins that support intense human activity;the resulting flow of carbon to the sea is betweenone and two billion tons a year. During the sameperiod the amount of water humans withdraw fromthe hydrological cycle has increased from perhaps100 to 3,600 cubic kilometers per year -a volumeequivalent to that of Lake Huron.

Many substantial changes in the planet’s otherchemical flows have taken place. In the past 300years agricultural and industrial development hasdoubled the amount of methane in the atmosphereand increased the concentration of carbon dioxideby 25 percent (see Figure 1.5). The global flows ofmajor elements such as sulfur and nitrogen thatresult from human activity are comparable to orgreater than the natural flows of these elements.Among the trace metals, many of which are toxic tolife, Jerome O. Nriagu of the Canadian NationalWater Research Institute and Jozef M. Pacyna of the

36

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• WILLIAM C.CLARK

Figure 1.4 LAND DEGRADATION results from a variety is actually able to support. The data are from the U.N.‘sof human activities. Shown are regions threatened by de- Food and Agriculture Organization and the Scientificsertification, overharvesting of firewood, acid rain and Committee on Problems of the Environment.stress induced by efforts to feed more people than the land

Norwegian Institute for Air Pollution Research haveshown that human emissions of lead, cadmium andzinc exceed the flux from natural sources by factorsof 18, five and three, respectively. For severa1 othermetals, including arsenic, mercury, nickel and vana-dium, the human contribution is now as much astwo times that from natural sources. Finally, of themore than 70,000 chemicals synthesized byhumans, a number—such as the chlorofluorocar-bons and DDT—have been shown to affect theglobal environment significantly, even at very lowconcentrations.

A ssessment of the prospects for sustainable de-velopment of the earth shows that the change

in the rates at which human activities are trans-forming the planet may be as important as the abso-lute magnitudes involved. B. L. Tumer, Robert W.Kates and I have analyzed historical transformationrates for several components of the global environ-mental system.. For each component, we first char-acterized the recency of change—the date by whichhalf of the total human transformation from prehis-toric times to the present had taken place. Next, we

assessed the acceleration of change by comparingthe present rate of transformation with that of ageneration ago. The dominant impression from thisanalysis is the relative recency of most global envi-ronmental change. None of the components we re-viewed had reached 50 percent of its total transfor-mation before the 19th century. Most passed the 50percent leve1 only in the second half of the 20thcentury .

Beyond this general conclusion, four broad pat-terns of transformation emerge. The first pattem,characterized by relatively long-established and stillaccelerating change, includes deforestation and soilerosion. The second, established relatively recentlyand still accelerating, includes the destruction offloral diversity, withdrawal of water from the hy-drological cycle, sediment flows and human mobili-zation of carbon, nitrogen and phosphorus. There islittle reason to believe that human society has yetleamed to manage on a global scale any of theseaccelerating transformations of the environment.

More encouraging are two decelerating trends.Human-induced extinctions of terrestrial verte-brates reached half of their present total by the late

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19th century and are apparently occurring moreslowly today than they were a generation ago. Theremaining group of transformations we examined-releases of sulfur, lead, radioactive fallout, a rep-resentative organic solvent and extinction of marinemammals - also represents primarily phenomenaof the 20th century that are now decelerating.

The crude measure of long-term deceleration pre-sented here gives no assurance that the declingtransformation rates reflect increasing competencein planetary management. (Specific transformationrates could, for example, decline simply becausethere are no more species to exterminate or becausewe tum to cheaper fuels that happen to emit differ-ent pollutants.) Nevertheless, for most of the cases Ihave cited, at least some fraction of the decelerationcan be attributed to deliberate large-scale, long-termefforts at environmental management.

T he global patterns sketched so far provide anecessary but insufficient perspective from

which to reflect on the prospects for improving themanagement of planet earth. Also needed is an ap-preciation of the regional faces of change. To ana-

lyze regional situations in ány detail is beyond thescope of this essay; still, it will be helpful to recallthe extraordinary range of local circumstances thatwill have to be dealt with if the human transforma-tion of the planet is to be steered along paths ofsustainable development.

Any classification of regional perspectives on sus-tainable development will inevitably oversimplifyreality. But one of the most instructive simplifica-tions distinguishes interactions between environ-ment and development that are associated withpoverty from those associated with affluence. An-other distinguishes interactions involving low popu-lation densities from those with high populationdensities. Combining the two simplifications yieldsthe classification shown in Figure 1.6.

Low-income, low-density areas such as Ama-zonia and Malaya-Borneo constitute settlementfrontiers still available for use by people in the lessdeveloped countxies. Until recently, such regionssupported sparse populations, and intrusions fromthe industrialized world were confined to smallplantation and mining sites. The situation haschanged dramatically during the past 20 years as

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• WILLIAM C. CLARK

Figure 1.6 REGIONAL VARIETIES of environmentaltransformation can be visualized by plotting populationdensity versus relative wealth. Regions with low densityand low industrialization include many of the earth’s re-maining settlement frontiers. Low-density areas with rela-tively high investments tend to be the harsh environmentsexploited by corporate developers of fuel and minerals.

humans engaged in large-scale timber clearing andlivestock raising have invaded these regions. Theresulting mix of subsistence and commercial agri-culture plus industrial resource extraction has led toa unique pattem of landscape transformation, thefull implications of which cannot yet be assessed.Reduction of biological diversity and degradation ofbiological productivity nonetheless seem inevitable(see Chapter 5, “Threats to Biodiversity,” by Ed-ward 0. Wilson). The poverty of the landlessfarmers engaged in land clearing and the relativepaucity of indigenous institutions that might guidethe sustainable development of such regions willmake them especially problematic components ofany strategy for planetary management.

In contrast, regions with low population densitybut high investments in sophisticated technologyare illustrated by the classic harsh environments ofthe earth. Such environments include the circumpo-

High-density, low-income regions have long histories ofagricultural development. The greatest responsibility fordesigning sustainable-development strategies lies with thehígh-density, wealthy regions that have imposed a dispro-portionate burden on the planet’s environment. The figureis from work by B. L. Turner, Robert W. Kates and theauthor.

lar arctic areas, deserts, mineral-extraction plat-forms and off-shore “fish factories.” The large-scaletransformation of these regions has become possibleonly within the past several decades as knowledge,prices and technology have converged to inducedevelopment.

Of the environmental changes associated withsuch development -oil spills, river diversions andlandscape transformation-some have receivedwidespread attention. Others, such as atmosphericpollution and cultural dislocation, have receivedless. The knowledge base for management remainspoor. But since a relatively few, wealthy corporateactors seem likely to be involved in most transfor-mations of consequence, the possibilities for institu-tionalizing sustainable-development strategies forsuch regions may be relatively good.

Typical of low-income, high-density regions arethe Gangetic Plain of the Indian subcontinent and

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the Huang-Huai-Hai Plains of China. Here inten-sive agricultural development has been under wayfor centuries and has been joined in the past severaldecades by the rapid rise of industrial developmentin growing urban centers. Landscape degradation isthe central problem as more and more people areemployed on agricultura1 land that is already ex-ploited to capacity (see Figure 1.7). In addition, therapid rise of heavy industry in such areas has led topollution problems comparable to those that Europefaced severa1 decades ago. The critica1 managementchallenge here is to provide employment that gener-ates income and takes pressure off the land withoutaggravating urbanization problems or increasing re-gional competition for “smokestack” industries.

The greatest responsibility and the greatest imme-diate potential for the design of sustainable-devel-opment strategies may be in the high-income, high-density regions of the industrialized world. As isrepeatedly stated in discussions of stratosphericozone depletion and the greenhouse effect, ad-vanced industrialized societies have been responsi-ble for imposing a disproportionate share of globalenvironmental burdens on the planet. Over the pastsevera1 decades, however, places as different asSweden, Japan and the northeastem U.S. have allachieved significant improvement in numerousaspects of their regional environments. Forests haveexpanded, sulfur emissions have declined, locallyextinct species have been successfully reintroduced.Some of these environmental victories are clearlythe unintended by-product of unrelated economicchanges. Others reflect the export of environmen-tally destructive activities to less fortunate parts ofthe world. Increasingly, however, such regions arebenefiting from systematic strategies to mitigate theimpacts of uncontrolled development and are be-ginning to design the kinds of environments inwhich their people want to live.

hat kind of environments can such strategiesattain? What kinds of development can they

sustain? Apart from a basic knowledge of how theglobal environment works and how human devel-opment interacts with it, an understanding is alsorequired of the impact that policy can have on envi-ronmental change.

At the outset, it cannot be overemphasized thatpolicy for managing planet earth must above all elsebe adaptive (see Chapter 11, “Toward a SustainableWorld,” by William D. Ruckelshaus). Our under-standing of the science behind global change is in-

MANACING PLANET EARTH l

complete and will remain so into the foreseeablefuture. Surprises like the stratospheric ozone holewill continue to appear and will demand action wellin advance of scientific certainty. Our understand-ing of the economic and social processes that con-tribute to global environmental change is evenweaker. Conventional forecasts of population andenergy growth could tum out to be conventionalfoolishness. Science can help, but it is our capacityto shape adaptive policies able to cope with sur-prises that will determine our effectiveness as man-agers of planet earth. Building such a capaáty willrequire cultivation of leadership and of institutionalcompetence in at least four areas.

The first requirement is to make the informationon which individuals and institutions base their de-cisions more supportive of sustainable-developmentobjectives. Part of the task, it cannot be said oftenenough, is simply to support the basic scientific re-search and planetary monitoring activities that un-derlie our knowledge of global change. Also essen-tial is to improve the flow of information implicit inexisting systems of prices, regulations and economicincentives.The failure of current economic accountsto track the real environmental costs of human ac-tivities encourages the ineffiáent use of resources.The artificially high prices maintained for many ag-ricultural products have significantly exacerbatedproblems of land degradation and pollution inmany parts of the world. Narrowly targeted govern-ment subsidies have been directly responsible for asignificant fraction of today’s global deforestation.All of these distorted information signals need to beaddressed in designing adaptive poliáes for sustain-able development.

A second requirement for adaptive planetarymanagement is the invention and implementationof technologies for sustainable development. Suchtechnologies will need to be resource-conserving,pollution-preventing or environment-restoring andat the same time economically sustainable. Thechapters on agriculture, energy and manufacturingin this book show that significant technical progresshas already been made toward delivering desiredend-use services at significantly lower environmen-tal costs. Surprisingly often, the economic costs ofthe “conserving technologies” also turn out to belower: cost advantages—not environmental con-cerns—are responsible for halving the ratio of en-ergy consumption to the gross national product inthe U.S. since it peaked in the early 1920’s.

Technologies for the restoration of environments

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degraded by salinization, acidification and mininghave also been developed and are being effectivelyemployed on a regional scale. The policy need is totailor technological innovations to the specific localconditions encountered in various environment-de-velopment conflicts around the world.

A third requirement for adaptive planetary man-agement is the construction of mechanisms at thenational and intemational level to coordínate mana-gerial activities. The need for formal intemationalagreements in this area has been highlighted by theMontreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete theOzone Layer and discussion of a possible interna-tional law of the atmosphere. In fact, a dozen ormore global conventions for protection of the envi-ronment are now in effect.

Beneath this orderly surface, however, a largeand rapidly growing number of nongovemmentalbodies, govemmental agencies and intemational or-ganizations are scrambling to play some part in themanagement of planet earth. Pluralism has much torecommend it. But are we not nearing a point ofdiminishing returns where too many meetings, toomany declarations and too many visiting experts

leave too few people with too few resources and toolittle time to actually do anything? The immediateneed at the intemational leve1 is for a forum inwhich ministerial-level coordination of environ-mental-management activities can be regularly dis-cussed and implemented, much as is already donefor ínternational economic policy. As in the case ofeconomic policy, the existence of such a formal,high-level governamental summit on global issues ofenvironment and development could provide an oc-casion for parallel discussions involving nongovem-mental and private-sector interests.

Finally, building a capacity for adaptive manage-ment of planet earth will require a desire and anability to reflect continually on the values and ob-jectives that guide our efforts. In an importantsense, there has tumed out to be more to the notionof sustainable development than even the wisemembers of the World Commission intended. Indi-viduals, organizations and entire nations have takenthe concept as a point of departure for rethinkingtheir interactions with the global environment.

In the Soviet Union, issues of ecological deteriora-tion became a central point of debate in the first

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Figure 1.8 “PAINTING THE FUTURE” is the title of a southem Sweden is shown as it might look in 2015. At theSwedish study in which environmentalist Lars Emmelin top is the area in a “Solar Sweden” scenario of wind powerand artist Gunnar Brusewitz collaborated to paint the and biomass plantations; at the bottom is one vision of theSwedish landscape as it might appear under various paths “Nuclear Sweden” scenario.of development. In these paintings, the Dyback region of

Congress of People’s Deputies. In Kenya, an inno-vative project sponsored by the African Academy ofSciences has begun to explore and articulate alter-native possibilities for the continent’s developmentin the 21st century. In West Germany, a high-levelconunission representing all political parties and thescientific community evolved a consensual Vorsorge,or prevention, principie to guide the nation’s envi-ronmental policies. In Sweden, a national best-sellerand focal point for political debate emerged whenenvironmental sáentists and artist Gunnar Bruse-

witz collaborated in “painting the future” of Swed-ish landscapes under altemative paths of de-velopment (see Figure 1.8).

The impact that these and similar explorationsbeing conducted around the world will ultimatelyhave in guiding the human transformation of theenvironment is far from clear. But there can be noquestion that, against all expectations, the explora-tions al1 reflect an emerging commitment to get onwith the task of managing planet earth ín a respon-sible manner.

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Periodo en el que se utilizará:Septiembre- Diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo SostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaría Lopez Franco y Dr. Martin BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicación:ConnecticutTítulo:Global warning and biological DiversityEditorial:Yale UniversityAutor/editor:Peters, RobertCapítulo/artículo:Conservation of Biological Diversity in the Face of Climate ChangeAño (fecha) de publicación:1992Páginas De: Al:15-27

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CHAPTER TWO 1. INTRODUCTION

Conservation of Biological We can infer how the biota might respond to

climate change by observing present and past

Diversity in the Face of distributions of plants and animals, which

are largely determined by temperature and

Climate Changemoisture patterns. For example, one race of

the dwarf birch (Betula nana) can grow only

where the temperature never exceeds 22°C

ROBERT L. PETERS (Ford 1982), suggesting that it would disap-

pear from those areas where global warming

causes temperatures to exceed 22°C. Recent

historical observations of changes in range or

species dominance, such as the gradual re-

placement of spruce (Picea rubens) by decid-

uous species during the past 180 years in the

eastern United States, can also suggest future

responses (Hamburg and Cogbill 1988). In-

sight into long-term responses to large clima-

tic changes can be gleaned from studies of

fossil distributions of, particularly, pollen (Da-

vis 1983; see also chapters 5 and 22) and small

mammals (Graham 1986; chapter 6). Such ob-

servations tell us that plants and animals are

very sensitive to climate. Their ranges move

when the climate patterns change-species

die out in areas where they were once found

and colonize new areas where the climate

becomes newly suitable.

We can expect similar responses to pro-

jected global warming during the next 50 to

100 years, including disruption of natural

communities and extinction of populations

and species. Even many species that are today

widespread will experience large range re-

ductions. Eficient dispersers may be able to

shift their ranges to take advantage of newly

suitable habitat, but most species will at best

experience a time lag before extensive colo-

nitation is possible and hence in the short

term will show range diminishment (see

chatter 5 for a discussion of vegetation-

climate disequilibrium). At worst, many spe-

cies will never be able to recover without

Copyright CJ 1992 by Yale University. All rights reserved.

ISBN 0-300-05056-9.

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P E T E R S

human intervention since migration routes

are cut off by development or other habitat

loss caused by humans.

Although this chapter will focus on the ter-

restrial biota, ocean systems may show simi-

lar shifts in species ranges and community

compositions if ocean waters warm or the

patterns of water circulation change. For ex-

ample, recent El Niño events demonstrate

the vulnierability of primary productivity and

species abundances to changes in ocean cur-

rents and local temperatures (Duffy 1983,

Glynn 1984; see also chapters 7 and 17).

II. THE NATURE OF ECOLOGICALLY

SIGNIFICANT CHANCES

Although the exact rate and magnitude of

future climate change is uncertain, given im-

perfect knowledge about the behavior of

clouds, oceans, and biotic feedbacks, there is

widespread consensus among climatologists

that ecologically significant warming will oc- .

cur during the next century. For example, the

National Academy of Sciences has concluded

that both global mean surface warming and

an associated increase in global mean pre-

cipitation are “very probable” (NAS 1987).

It should be emphasized that although

projections can be made about global aver-

ages, regional projections are much less cer-

tain (Schneider 1988). It is known that warm-

ing will not be even over the earth, with

the high latitudes, for example, likely to be

warmer than the low latitudes (Hansen et al.

1988). Regional and local peculiarities of to-

pography and circulation will play a strong

role in determining local climates.

For the purposes of discussion in this

chapter, I will take average global warming to

be 3°C since that figure is a commonly used

benchmark, but it must be recognized that

additional warming well beyond 3°C may be

reached during the next century if the pro-

duction of anthropogenic greenhouse gases

continues. I will also make the conservative

assumption that 3°C warming is not reached

until A.D. 2070. Additional warming or faster

warming would cause additional biological

disruption beyond that laid out here.44

The threats to natural systems are serious

for the following reasons. First, 3°C of warm-

ing would present natural systems with a

warmer world than has been experienced in

the past 100,000 years (Schneider and Londer

1984); 4°C would make the earth its warmest

since the Eocene epoch, 40 million years ago

(Barron 1985; see also chapter 5). This warm-

ing would not only be large compared with

recent natural fluctuations, but it would also

be fast, perhaps fifteen to forty times faster

than past natural changes (chapter 4). Such a

rate of change may exceed the ability of many

species to adapt. Even widespread species

are likely to have drastically curtailed ranges,

at least in the short term. Moreover, human

encroachment and habitat destruction will

make wild populations of many species small

and vulnerable to local climate changes.

Second, ecological stress would not be

caused by temperature rise alone. Changes in

global temperature patterns would trigger

widespread alterations in rainfall patterns

(Hansen et al. 1981, Kellogg and Schware

1981, Manabe et al. 1981) and we know that

for many species precipitation is a more im-

portant determinant of survival than temper-

ature per se. Indeed, except at treeline, rain-

fall is the primary determinant of vegetation

structure, trees occurring only where annual

precipitation exceeds 300 mm (chapter 8).

Because of global warming, some regions

would see dramatic increases in rainfall, and

others would lose their present vegetation

because of drought. For example, the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (1989)

concluded, based on severa1 studies, that a

long-term drying trend is likely in the midlati-

tude, interior continental regions during the

summer. Specifically, W. W. Kellogg and R.

Schware (1981) based on rainfall patterns

during past warming periods, projected that

substantial decreases in rainfall in North

America’s Great Plains are possible-perhaps

as much as 40% by the early decades of the

next century.

Other environmental factors important in

determining vegetation type and health

would change because of global warming:

��

DIVERSITY IN THE FACE OF CLIMATE CHANCE

Soil chemistry would change as, for example.

changes in storm patterns alter leaching and

erosion rates (Kellison and Weir 1987; chap-

ter 24). Increased carbon dioxide concen-

trations may accelerate the growth of some

plants at the expense of others, possibly de-

stabilizing natural ecosystems (NRC 1983,

Strain and Bazzaz 1983; see discussion in

Woodward chapter 8). And rises in sea leve1

may inundate coastal biological communities,

(NRC 1983, Hansen et al. 1981, Hoffman et al.

1983, Titus et al. 1984).

As mentioned, a variety of computer pro-

jections conclude that warning will be

greater at higher latitudes (Hansen et al.

1987). This suggests that although tropical

systems may be more diverse and are cur-rently threatened by habitat destruction, tem-

perate zone and arctic species may ultimately

be in greater jeopardy from climate change,

at least from temperature per se (see chapter

10 for discussion of precipitation effects on

tropical forest). Arctic vegetation would ex-

perience widespread changes (chapters 8

and 18; Edlund 1987). A recent attempt to

map climate-induced changes in world bi-

oti communities projects that high-latitude

communities would be particularly stressed,

and boreal forest, for example, was projected

to decrease by 37% in response to global

warming of 3°C (Emanuel et al. 1985).

A final point, important in understanding

species response to climate change, is that

weather is variable, and extreme events, like

droughts, floods, blizzards, and hot or cold

spells, may have more effect on species dis-

tributions than average climate (e.g., Knopf

and Sedgwick 1987). For example, in north-

westem forests, global warning is expected

to increase tire frequency, leading to rapid

alteration of forest character (chapter 19).

III.THE SHIFT OF SPECIES' RANGES EN

REPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE

We know that when temperature and rainfall

pattems change, species’ ranges change. Not

surprisingly, sgecies tend to track their clima-

tic optima, retracting their ranges where con-

ditions become unsuitable while expanding

them where conditions improve (Peters and

Darling 1985, Ford 1982). Even small tem-

perature changes of less than one degree

within this century have been observed to

cause substantial range changes. For exam-

ple, the white admiral butterfly (Ladoga ca-milla) and the comma butterfly (Polygonia c-al-bum) greatly expanded their ranges in the

British Isles during the past century as the

climate warmed approximately 0.5.C (Ford

1982). The birch (Betula pubescens) responded

rapidly to warming during the first half of this

century by expanding its range north into the

Swedish tundra (Kullman 1983).

On a larger ecological and temporal scale,

entire vegetation types have shified in re-

sponse to past temperature changes no larger

than those that may occur during the next

100 years or less (Baker 1983, Bernabo and

Webb 1977, Butzer 1980, Flohn 1979, Muller

1979, Van Devender and Spaulding 1979).

As the earth warms, species tend to shift to

higher latitudes and altitudes. From a sim-

plified point of view, rising temperatures

have caused species to colonize new habitats

toward the poles, often while their ranges

contracted away from the equator as condi-

tions there became unsuitable.

During severa1 Pleistocene interglacials, the

temperature in North America wás, appar-

ently 2° to 3°C higher than now. Sweet gum

trees (Liquidambar) grew in southern Ontario

(Wright 1971); Osage oranges (Madura) and

pawpaws (Asimina) grew near Toronto, sev-

eral hundred kilometers north of their pres-

ent distributions; manatees swam in New

Jersey; and tapirs and peccaries foraged in

North Carolina (Dorf 1976). During the last of

those interglacials, which ended more than

100,000 years ago, vegetation in northwest-

em Europe, which is now boreal, was pre-

dominantly temperate (Critchfield 1980).

Other significant changes in species ranges

have been caused by altered precipitation ac-

companying past global warming, including

expansion of prairie² in the Ameritan Mid-

west during a global warming episode ap-

proximately 7000 years ago (Bemabo and

Webb 1977).

45

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PETERS

It should not be imagined that because

species tend to shift in the same general

direction, existing biological communities

move in synchrony. Conversely, because spe-

cies shift at different rates in response to cli-

mate change, communities often dissociate

into their component species (fig. 21). Re-

cent studies of fossil packrat (Neotoma spp.)

middens in the southwestern United States

show that during the wetter, moderate cli-

mate of 22,00-12,000 years ago, there was

not a concerted shift of plant communities.

Instead, species responded individually to

climatic change, forming stable but, by pres-

ent-day standards, unusual assemblages of

plants and animals (Van Devender and Spaul-

ding 1979). In eastern North America, too,

postglacial communities were often ephem-

eral associations of species, changing as indi-

vidual ranges changed (Davis 1983, Graham

1986; chapter 6).

A final aspect of species response is that

species may shift. altitudinally as well as lati-

tudinally. When climate warms, species shiftupward. Generally, a short climb in altitude

corresponds to a major shift in latitude: a 3°C

cooling of 500 meters in elevation equals

roughly 250 kilometers in latitude (Mac-

Arthur 1972). Thus, during the middle Holo-

cene, when temperatures in eastern North

America were 2°C warmer than at present,

hemlock (Tsuga canadensis) and white pine

(Pinus strobus) were found 350 meters higher

on mountains than they are today (Davis

1983).

Because mountain peaks are smaller than

bases, species that shift upward in response

to warming typically occupy smaller and

smaller areas, have smaller populations, and

may thus become more vulnerable to genetic

and environmental pressures (chapter 26).

Species originally situated near mountain tops

might have no habitat to move up to and may

be entirely replaced by the relatively thermo-

philous species moving up from below (fig.

22). Examples of past extinctions attributed

to upward shifiting include alpine plants once

living on mountains in Central and South

America, where vegetation zones have

Figure 21. (a) Initial distribution of two species, A

and B. whose ranges largely overlap. (b) In re-

sponse to climate change, latitudinal shifiing oc-curs at species-specific rates and the ranges dis-

associate.

shified upward by 1000-1500 m since the last

glacial maximum (Flenley 1979, Heusser

1974). See chapter 26 for projections of some

local extinction rates for butterflies, birds,

and mammals.

A Magnitude of ProjectedLatitudinal shifts

If the proposed CO2-induced warming oc-

curs, species shifts similar to those in the

Pleistocene epoch would occur, and vegeta-

tion belts would move hundreds of kilome-

ters toward the poles (chapter 22; Frye 1983,

Peters and Darling 1985). A 300-km shift in

46 the temperate zone is a reasonable minimum

��


estimate for a 3°C warming, based on the

positions of vegetation zones during analo-

gous warming periods in the past (Dorf 1976,

Furley et al. 1983).

Additional confirmation that shifts of this

magnitude or greater may occur comes from

attempts to project future range shifts for

some species by looking at their ecological

requirements. For example, the forest indus-

try is concerned about the future of commer-

cially valuable North Ameritan species, like

the loblolly pine (Pinus taeda). This species is

limited on its southern border by moisture

stress on seedlings. Based on its physiological

requirements for temperature and moisture,

W. F. Miller et al. (1987) projected that the

southem range limit of the species would

shift approximately 350 kilometers north-

ward in response to a global warming of 3°C.

Davis and Zabinski (chapter 22) have pro-

jected possible northward range withdrawals

among severa1 North Ameritan tree species,

including sugar maple (Acer saccharum) and

Figure 2.2. (a) hesent altitudinal distribution of

three species, A, B, and C. (b) Species distribution

after a 5OO-meter shift in altitude in response to a

3°C rise in temperature (based on Hopkin’s bio-

climatic law, MacAnhur 1972). Species A becomes

locally extinct. Species B shifts upward and the tota1

area it occupies decreases. Species C becomes frag-

mented and restricted to a smaller area, while spe-

cies D successfully colonizes the lowest habitats.

beech (Fagus grandifolia), from 600 kilometers

to as much as 2000 kilometers in response to

the warming caused by a doubled CO2 con-

centration. Beech would be most responsive,

withdrawing from its present southern ex-

tent along the Gulf Coast and retreating into

Canada.

B. Mechanisms Underlying Range Shifts

The range shifts described above are the sum

of many local processes of extinction and

colonization that occur as climate changes

the suitability of habitats. Those changes in

habitat suitability are determined by both di-

rect climate effects on physiology, including

temperature and precipitation, and indirect

effects secondarily caused by other species,

themselves affected by temperature.

There are numerous examples of climate’s

direct influente on survival and consequently

on distribution. In animals, the direct range-

limiting effects of excessive warmth include

lethality, as in corals (Glynn 1984) and inter-

ference with reproduction, as in the large

blue butterfly Maculinea arion (Ford 1982).

For insects, Daniel Rubenstein (chapter 14)

shows that the way a critica1 trait, such as basic

metabolic rate or fecundity, responds to tem-

perature-whether the response is linear or

dome-shaped-may determine the way in

which a species’ range alters in response to

climate change.

In plants, excessive heat and associated de-

creases in soil moisture may decrease survival

and reproduction (chapter 8). Coniferous

seedlings, for example, are injured by soil

temperatures above 45°C although other

types of plants can tolerate much higher tem-

peratures (Daubenmire 1962). The northernlimits of many plants are determined by mini-

mum temperature isotherms below which

some key physiological process does not oc-

cur. For instance, the gray hair grass. (Cori-

nephorus canescens) is largely unsuccessful at ger-minating seeds below 15°C and is bounded to

the north by the 15°C July mean isotherm

(Marshall 1978). Moisture extremes exceed-

ing physiological tolerances also determine

species’ distributions. Thus, the European

4 7

��

PETERS

range of the beech tree (Fagus syivatica) ends to

the south where rainfall is less than 600 mm

annually (Seddon 1971) and dog’s mercury

(Mercunalis perennis), an herb restricted to well-

drained sites in Britain, cannot survive in soil

where the water table reaches as high as 10

cm below the soil surface (Ford 1982).

The physiological adaptations of most spe-

cies to climate are conservative, and it is un-

likely that most species could evolve signifi-

cantly new tolerances in the time allotted to

them by the coming warming trend. Indeed,

the evolutionary conservatism in thermal tol-

erance of many plant and animal species-

beetles, for example (Coope 1977)-is the

underlying assumption that allows us to infer

past climates from faunal and plant assem-

blages.

Interspecific interactions altered by climate

change will have a major role in determining

new species distributions. Temperature can

influente piedation rates (chapter 14; Rand

1964) parasitism (Aho et al. 1976). and com-

petitive interactions (Beauchamp and Ullyott

1932). C. Richard Tracy (chapter 13) describes

how groups of species, in particular a genus

of darkling beetles (Eleodes), may partition the

thermal habitat by time of day and season.

Climate-induced changes in the ranges of

tree pathogens and parasites may be impor-

tant in determining future tree distributions

(Winget 1988). Soil moisture is a critica1 factor

in mediating competitive interactions among

plants, as is the case where dog’s mercury

(Mercurialis perennis) excludes oxlip (Primula ela-

tior) from dry sites (Ford 1982).

Given the new associations of species that

occur as climate changes, many species will

face “exotic” competitors for the first time.

Local extinctions may occur as climate

change increases the frequency of droughts

and fires, favoring invading species. One spe-

cies that might spread, given such conditions,

is Melaleuco quinquenervia, a bamboolike Austra-

lian eucalypt. This species has already in-

vaded the Florida Everglades, forming dense

monotypic stands where drainage and fre-

quent fires have dried the natural marsh com-

munity (Courtenay 1978, Myers 1983).

The preceding enects, both direct and indi-

rect, may act in synergy, as when drought

makes a tree more vulnerable to attack by

insect pests.

C. Dispersal Rates and Barriers

The ability of species to adapt to changing

conditions will depend heavily on their abil-

ity to track shifting climatic optima by dis-

persing colonists. In the case of warming, a

North American species, for example, would

most likely need to establish colonies to the

north or at higher elevations. Survival of plant

and animal species would therefore depend

either on long-distance dispersa1 ofcolonists,

such as seeds or migrating animals, or on

rapid iterative colonization of nearby habitat

until long-distance shifting results. A plant’s

intrinsic ability to colonize will depend on its

ecological characteristics, including fecun-

dity, viability and growth characteristics of

seeds, nature of the dispersal mechanism,

and ability to tolerate selfing and inbreeding

upon colonization. If a species’ intrinsic colo-

nization ability is low, or if barriers to disper-

sal are present, extinction may result if all of

its present habitat becomes unsuitable.

Many complete or local extinctions have

occurred because species were unable to dis-

perse rapidly enough when climate changed.

For example, a large, diverse group of plant

genera, including water shield (Brasenia),

sweet gum (Liquidambar), tulip tree (Lirioden-

dron), magnolia (Magnolia), moonseed (Men-

ispennum), hemlock (Tsuga), arborvitae (Thuja),and white cedar (Chamaecyparis), had a cir-

cumpolar distribution in the Tertiary period

(Tralau 1973). But during the Pleistocene ice

ages, all went extinct in Europe while sur-

viving in North America. Presumably, the

east-west orientation of such barriers as the

Pyrenees, the Alps. and the Mediterranean,

which blocked southward migration, was

partly responsible for their extinction (Tralau

1973). Other species of plants and animals

thrived in Europe during the cold periods but

could not survive conditions in postglacial

forests. One such previously widespread

dung beetle, Aphodius hoderei, is now extinct

48

��


throughout the world except in the high Ti-

betan plateau where conditions remain cold

enough for its surviva1 (Cox and Moore 1985).

Other species, like the Norwegian mugwort

(Artemisia norvedica) and the springtail Tetra-

canthella arctica, now live primarily in the

boreal zone but also survive in a few cold,

mountaintop refugia in temperate Europe

(Cox and Moore 1985).

Those natural changes were slow com-

pared with predicted changes in the near fu-

ture. The change to warmer conditions at the

end of the last ice age spanned severa1 thou-

sand years yet is considered rapid by geologic

standards (Davis 1983). We can deduce that if

such a slow change was too fast for many

species to adapt, the projected warming-

possibly forty times faster-will have more

severe consequences. For widespread, abun-

dant species, like the loblolly pine (modeled

by Miller et al. 1987), even substantial range

retraction might not threaten extinction; but

rare, localized species, whose entire ranges

might become unsuitable, would be threat-

ened unless dispersal and colonization were

successful. Even for widespread species, ma-

jor loss of important ecotypes and associated

germplasm is likely (chapter 22). .

A key question is whether the dispersa1

capabilities of most species prepare them to

cope with the coming rapid warming. If the

climatic optima of temperate-zone species

do shift hundreds of kilometers toward the

poles within the next 100 years, then those

species would have to colonize new areas

rapidly. To survive, a localized species whose

entire present range becomes unsuitable

might have to shift poleward at severa1 hun-

dred kilometers or more per century. Al-

though some species, such as plants propa-

gated by spores or “dust” seeds, may be able

to match those rates, many species could not

disperse fast enough to compensate for the

expected climatic change without human as-

sistance, particularly given the presente of

dispersal barriers (Perring 1965, Rapoport

1982). Even wind-assisted dispersal may fallshort of the mark for many species. In the

case of the Engelmann spruce (Pitea engelman-

nii), a tree with light, wind-dispersed seeds,

fewer than 5% of seeds travel even 200 m

downwind, leading to an estimated migra-

tion rate of l-20 km per century (Seddon

1971); this reconciles well with rates derived

from fossil evidente for North Ameritan

trees of between 10 km and 45 km per cen-

tury (chapter 22; also Roberts 1989). As de-

scribed in the next section, many migration

routes will likely be blocked by the cities,

roads, and fields replacing natural habitat.

Although many animals may be physically

capable ofgreat mobility, the distribution of

some is limited by the distributions of par-

ticular plants, that is, suitable habitat; their

dispersal rates therefore may be largely deter-

mined by those of co-occurring plants.

Behavior may also restrict dispersa1 even of

animals physically capable of moving great

distances. Dispersal rates below 2.0 km per

year have been measured for severa1 species

of deer (Rapoport 1982), and many tropical

deep-forest birds simply do not cross even

small unforested areas (Diamond 1975). On

the other hand, some highly mobile animals

may shift rapidly, as have some European

birds (Edgell 1984).

Even if animals can disperse efficiently, suit-

able habitat may be reduced under changing

climatic conditions. For example, it has been

suggested that tundra nesting habitat for mi-

gratory shorebirds might be reduced by high-

arctic warming (chapter 15).

IV. SYNERGY OF HABITAT DESTRUCTIONAND CLIMATE CHANGE

We know that even slow, natural climate

change caused species to become extinct.

What is likely to happen given the environ-

mental conditions of the coming century?

Some clear implications for conservation fol-

low from the preceding discussion of disper-

sal rates. Any factor that would decrease the

probability that a species could successfully

colonize new habitat would increase the

probability of extinction. Thus, as previously

described, species are more likely to become

extinct if there are physical barriers to coloni-

49

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PETERS

zation, such as oceans, mountains, and cities.

Further, species are more likely to become

extinct if their remaining populations are

small. Smaller populations mean fewer colo-

nists can be sent out, reducing the probability

of successful colonization.

Species are more likely to become extinct

if they occupy a small geographic range. It is

less likely that some part will remain suitable

when the climate changes than it would be if

the ranges were larger. Also, if a species has

lost much of its range because of some other

factor, like clearing of the richer and moister

soils for agriculture, it is possible that remain-

ing populations will be located in poor hab-

itat and therefore be more susceptible to new

stresses.

For many species, al1 of those conditions

will be met by human destruction of habitat,

which increasingly confines the natural biota

to small patches of original habitat, patches

isolated by vast areas of human-dominated

urban or agricultura1 lands. Habitat destruc-

tion in conjunction with climate change sets

the stage for an even larger wave of extinction

than previously imagined, based on consid-

eration of human encroachment alone.

Small, remnant populations of most species,

surrounded by cities, roads, reservoirs, and

farm land, would have little chance of reach-

ing new habitat if climate change makes the

old unsuitable. Few animals or plants would

be able to cross Los Angeles on the way to

new habitat. Figure 2.3 illustrates the com-bined effects of habitat loss and warming on a

hypothetical reserve (see chapter 23 for dis-

cussion of how direct human effects and cli-

mate change will affect Florida’s endangered

fauna).

V. AMELIORATION AND MITIGATION

Because of the difficulty of predicting re-

gional and local changes, conservationists

and reserve managers must deal with in-

creased uncertainty in making long-range

plans. However, even given imprecise re-

gional projections, informed guesses can be

made at least about the general direction of

Figure 2.3. Climatic warming may cause species

within biological reserves to disappear. Hatching

indicates: (a) species disttibution before either hu-

man habitation or climate change, (b) fragmented

species distribution after human habitation but be-

fore climate change, (c) species distribution after

habitation and climate change. (RL indicates south-

ern limit of species range.)

change, specifically that most areas will tend

to be hotter and that continental interiors in

particular are likely to experience decreased

soil moisture.

How might the threats posed by climatic

change to natural communities be mitigated?

One basic truth is that the less populations

are reduced by development now, the more

resilient they will be in the face of climate

change. Thus, sound conservation now, in

which we try to conserve more than just the

minimum number of individuals of a species

necessary for present survival, would be an

excellent way to start planning for climate

change.

50

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DIVERSITY IN THE FACE OF CLIMATE CHANGE

In terms of responses specifically directed

at the effects of climate change, the most en-

vironmentally conservative response would

be to halt or slow global warming by cutting

back on production of fossil fuels, methane,

and chlorofluorocarbons. Extensive planting

of trees to capture carbon dioxide could help

slow the rise in carbon dioxide concentra-

tions (Sedjo 1989; chapter 3). Nonetheless,

even if the production of al1 greenhouse

gases stopped today, it is likely that their con-

centrations in the air are now high enough to

cause ecologically significant warming any-

way (Rind 1989). Therefore, those concerned

with the conservation of biological diversity

must begin to plan mitigation activities now.

To make intelligent plans for siting and

managing reserves, we need more knowl-

edge. We must refine our ability to predict

future conditions in reserves. We also need to

know more about how temperature, precipi-

tation, CO2 concentrations, and interspecific

interactions determine range limits (e.g., Pic-

ton 1984, Randa11 1982) and, most important,

how they can cause local extinctions.

Reserves that suffer from the stresses of

altered climatic regimes will require carefully

planned and increasingly intensive manage-

ment to minimize species loss. For example,

modifying conditions within reserves may be

necessary to preserve some species; depend-

ing on new moisture pattems, irrigation or

drainage may be needed. Because of changes

in interspecific interactions, competitors and

predators may need to be controlled and in-

vading species weeded out. The goal would

be to maintain suitable conditions for desired

species or species assemblages, much as the

habitat of Kirtland’s warbler is periodically

burned to maintain pine woods (Leopold

1978; see also chapter 21). On the other hand,

if native species die out because of physio-

logical intolerance to climate change, despite

management efforts, then some invading

species might actually be encouraged as eco-

logical replacements for those that have dis-

appeared.

In attempting to understand how climat-

ically stressed communities may respond,

and how they might be managed to prevent

the gradual depauperation of their constitu-

ents, restoration studies or, more properly,

community creation experiments can help.

Communities may be created outside their

normal climatic ranges to mimic the effects of

climate change. One such out-of-place com-

munity is the Leopold Pines, at the University

of Wisconsin Arboretum in Madison, where

there is periodically less rainfall than in the

normal pine range severa1 hundred kilome-

ters to the north (Jordan 1988). Researchers

have found that although the pines them-

selves do fairly well once established at the

Madison site , many of the other species that

would normally occur in a pine forest (espe-

cially the small shrubs and herbs, such as

Trientalis bolaslis, the northem star Rower) have

not flourished, despite severa1 attempts to

introduce them.

If management measures are unsuccessful

and old reserves do not retain necessary ther-

mal or moisture characteristics, individuals of

disappearing species might be transferred

to new reserves . For example , warmth-

intolerant ecotypes or subspecies might be

transplanted to reserves nearer the poles.

Other species may have to be periodically

reintroduced in reserves that experience oc-

casional climate extremes severe enough

to cause extinction, but where the climate

would ordinarily allow the species to survive

with minimal management. Such transplanta-

tions and reintroductions, particularly involv-

ing complexes of species, will be difficult. In

many plants for example, flowering times are

determined by photoperiod, and in such spe-

cies southern strains flower later in the year

than northern ones (McMillan, 1959). A

southern strain transplanted to the north

therefore might wait to flower too late in the

season, when it is too cold for successful re-

production. Despite such dificulties, applic-

able restoration technologies are being devel-

oped for many species (Botkin 1977, Jordan et

al. 1988, Lovejoy 1985).

To the extent that we can still establish re-

serves, pertinent information about changing

climate and subsequent ecological response

51

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PETERS

should be used in deciding how to design

and locate them to minimize the effects of

changing temperature and moisture. One

implication is that more reserves may be

needed. The existence of multiple reserves

for a given species or community type in-

creases the probability that if one reserve be-

comes unsuitable for climatic reasons, the

organisms may still be represented in an-

other reserve.

Reserves should be heterogeneous with

respect to topography and soil types, so that

even given climatic change, remnant popula-

tions may be able to survive in suitable micro-

climates. Species may survive better in re-

serves with wide variations in altitude, since,

from a climatic point ofview, a small altitudi-

nal shift corresponds to a large latitudinal

one. Thus, to compensate for a 2°C rise in

temperature, a species in the northern hemi-

sphere can achieve almost the same result by

increasing its altitude only 500 meters that it

would’by moving 300 km to the north (Mac-

Arthur 1972). Corridors between reserves,

important for other conservation reasons,

would allow some natural migration of spe-

cies to track climate shifting. Corridors along

altitudial gradients are likely to be most

practica1 because they can be relatively short

compared with the longer distances neces-

sary to accommodate latitudinal shifting.

As climatic models become more refined,

reserves may be positioned to minimize the

effects of temperature and moisture changes.

In the northern hemisphere, for example,

where a northward shift in climatic zones is

likely, it makes sense to locate reserves as near

the northern limit of a species’ or commu-

nity’s range as possible, rather than farther

south, where conditions are likely to become

unsuitable more rapidly. Maximizing the size

of reserves will increase long-term persis-

tence of species by increasing the availability

of suitable microclimates, by increasing the

probability of altitudinal variation, and by in-

creasing the latitudinal distance available to

shifting populations. Flexible zoning around

reserves may allow us to move reserves in the

future to track climatic optima, for example,

52

by trading present range land for reserve land.

The success of this strategy, however, would

depend on a highly developed restoration

technology, capable of guaranteeing, in effect,

the portability of species and whole commu-

nities.

VI. PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

What concrete steps should be taken now by

agencies and organizations responsible for

the management of reserves and natural re-

sources? How can they act to preserve species

that may soon be dying out over large por-

tions of their ranges? From the conservation

manager’s point of view, the changes will pre-

sent many difficult practica1 and philosophi-

cal questions. Should the manager strive to

preserve all the species within a reserve, given

that climate change is causing some to disap-

pear? Should management be used to con-

serve examples of community types, given

that, on the time scale of climate change,

communities are temporary assemblages of

species likely to break up as the earth warms?

How should the recent evolution of a “let

nature take its course”‘management philoso-

phy within, for example, the U.S. National

Park Service be reconciled with the increas-

ingly intensive management that will be nec-

essary to conserve many species in a warming

world?

Not only is this problem complex, but

management response will also be difficult

because, although the changes will be rapid

from an ecological point of view, they will be

slow in relation to management’s tradition-

ally short-term planning horizon. Thus, to

ensure rapid response, continuity, and ade-

quate resources, the high-level authorities

within conservation organizations, manage-

ment agencies, and funding bodies must give

this issue high priority. The following are

some areas that conservation management

should emphasize.

A. Begin Monitoring

One of the most important steps is to begin

the collection of baseline data on how spe-

cies and communities respond to climate.

��

DIVERSITY IN THE FACE OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Within a reserve, for example, abundances,

ranges, and reproductive success of impor-

tant species can be measured and analyzed

in terms of ongoing climate measurements.

Baseline information is necessary to identify

the beginning of warming effects, to dis-

tinguish short-term from long-term changes,

to help identify susceptible species and com-

munities, to identify the nature of potential

changes (such as the direction of climate-

driven plant succession), and to provide the

basis for identifying the relations between

changes in climatic variables and resultant

changes in the biota.

Changes might be expected to show up

first at high latitudes, in low-lying marine

coastal environments, and generally at eco-

tones between vegetation types determined

by both temperature and precipitation.

Changeover from one vegetation type to an-

other might first be identified where distur-

bance events create succession. Monitoring

for climate change may be done at different

locations from those used for other sorts of

monitoring. For example, at Merritt Island

National Wildlife Refuge in Florida, transects

for studying the effects of burning on vegeta-

tion are typically laid out in the center of

a plant community, but a climate transect

would more likely be at the interface be-

tween two communities.

Some programs already exist that could be

focused on climate efects. For example, the

National Park Service has ongoing ecological

and species monitoring programs at severalparks, including monitoring and research

into the declines of Fraser fir (Abies fraseri) and

red spruce (Picea rubens) of Great Smoky

Mountains National Park. Similarly, the inte-

grated studies of small watersheds initiated at

severa1 parks as part of the National Acid Pre-

cipitation Assessment Program will provide

useful information for assessing long-term

trends in ecosystem processes associated

with climate change. Coordination of moni-

toring at a variety of sites, along with develop-

ment of remote sensing and geographical in-

formation systems, can yield information on

important trends at the landscape level. Such

efforts can provide the scientific basis for the

flexible regionwide planning that will be

needed to develop effective management re-

sponses.

B. Undertake Ecological Research

Monitoring should be backed up by specific

experiments on species and community re-

sponses to climate variables. One of the com-

mon themes in this book is the lack of good

basic knowledge about how species react to

climate. To take a single example, Walter

Whitford (chapter 9) stresses the paucity

of information about climate effects on soil

biota, yet these biota will play a key role not

only in determining the nature of future soils

but also in the influence of soils on carbon

cycling, which will help determine the green-

house effect itself. From the point of view of

a reserve manager, autecological studies can

demonstrate which species have their ranges

within a park determined by climate. Species

of particular interest, such as endangered

species, could receive special attention as to

the effect of climate on, for example, food

supply. Paleoecological studies and dendro-

chronology within protected areas or other

important sites can shed additional light on

past climate change and biotic response with-

in reserves.

C. Identify Sensitive Communities,Species, and Populations

The results of monitoring, research, and anal-

ysis based on present information should al-

low identification of species or communities

of special concern, including those that are

nationally or globally rare or endangered.

Climate-sensitive species could be targeted

for additional monitoring, research, and the

development of management techniques.

D. Develop Contingency Plans

Long-term plans for endangered species, for

species Iikely to become rare, and for pro-

tected areas should have provisions for cli-

mate change. Even though precise local or

regional climate projections are not available,

contingency plans could be developed, par-

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2 PETERS

ticularly for sensitive biota. For example, con-

tingency plans could be made based on as-

sumptions oflocal average warmings of 2°, 4°,

6°, and 8°C, or on assumptions of various

rainfall increases and decreases. Given that in

many areas increased temperature will add to

water stress, it would be reasonable to make

long-term plans for dealing with lower water

availability. They might include plans for miti-

gating effects on sensitive species or political

or legal maneuvers to ensure that biological

resources receive adequate water in the face

of future competition from other users, such

as agriculture and urban development.

E. Develop Regional Plans forNonreserve HabitatAs the location and abundance ofhabitat and

critica1 resources change with climate, man-

agement of speciflc wildlife species will need

to incorporate populations and-resources ly-

ing outside protected areas. Therefore, na-

ture reserves and other management units

will increasingly be forced to become part-

ners in planning and management that tran-

scend the scale of protected areas. There are

precedents: endangered species are already

managed as outlined in multi-agency, multi-

institution endangered species recovery

plans. The current efforts to provide a basin-

wide conservation plan for the grizzly bear in

the Greater Yellowstone area might provide a

model for such regional planning.

F. Develop Management Techniques

The increased disturbance likely to result

from climate change demands a large in-

crease in resources for the development and

implementation of new management tech-

niques, particularly those of restoration ecol-

ogy. Restoration and transplantation tech-

niques are poorly developed at present and

require extensive investment in research (see

Jordan et al. 1988).

G. Develop Philosophical Approachesto Management

Conservationists need to begin the process of

deciding philosophical questions that will af-

fect management. Given the likelihood of

community breakups, should efforts be ex-

pended on maintaining existing community

types? As conditions become unsuitable for

species existing within reserves today, should

herculean efforts be expended to maintain

them? Should the parks be used as transplan-

tation sites for southern species in need of

new habitat? At what point should efforts to

maintain a particular species within a reserve

be stopped and resources used elsewhere?

How can reserves become integrated com-

ponents of regional, national, and global

strategies for conservation of species? Given

stresses on the natural world, will the role of

parks as refuges increase relative to their re-

creation role? At the moment, it is easier toask these questions than to answer them.

H. Dedicate Additional Reserve Lands

Global warming is a strong argument for the

enlargement or creation of additional parks

and other reserved lands. As mentioned

above, multiple refuges provide additional

chances that some protected habitat will re-

main suitable for a particular species as cli-

mate changes. Moreover, as climate change

reduces adequate habitat and other resources

for species within a reserve, enlargement may

be necessary, as it was when Redwoods Na-

tional Park was expanded during the 1970s to

prevent external logging from threatening the

park’s ecosystems.

VII. SUMMARY

In the geologic past, natural climate changes

have caused large-scale geographic shifts in

species’ ranges, changes in the species com-

position of biological communities, and spe-

cies extinctions. If the widely predicted

greenhouse effect occurs; natural ecosystems

will respond in ways similar to responses in

the past, but the effects will be more severe

because of the rapid rate of the projected

change. Moreover, population reduction and

habitat destruction due to human activities

will prevent many species from colonizing

new habitat when their old becomes unsuit-

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able. The synergy between climate change

and habitat destruction would threaten many

more species than either factor alone.

These effects would be pronounced in tem-

perate and arctic regions, where temperature

increases are projected to be relatively large. It

is unclear how the tropical biota would be

affected by the smaller temperature increases

projected for the lower latitudes, because lit-

tle is known about the physiological toler-

antes of tropical species, but precipitation

changes may cause substantial disruptions.

Throughout the world, geographically re-

stricted species might face extinction, while

widespread species are likely to survive in

some parts of their range. In the northern mid

and high latitudes, new northward habitat

will become suitable even as die-offs occur to

the South. However, it may be difficult for

many species to take advantage of this new

habitat because their dispersal rates are slow

relative to the rate of warming, and therefore

ranges of even many widespréad species are

likely to show a net decrease during the next

century. Range retractions will be proximally

caused by temperature and precipitation

changes, increases in fires, changes in the

ranges and severity of pests and pathogens,

changes in competitive interactions, and ad-

ditional effects of nonclimatic stresses like

acid rain and low-level ozone.

The best solutions to the ecological up-

heaval resulting firom climatic change are not

yet clear. In fact, little attention has been paid

to the problem. What is clear, however, is that

these climatological changes would have tre-

mendous impact on communities and popu-

lations isolated by development and by the

middle of the next century may dwarf any

other consideration in planning for reserve

management. The problem may seem over-

whelming. One thing, however, is worth

keeping in mind: if populations are frag-

mented and small, they are more vulnerable

to the new stresses brought about by climate

change. Thus, one of the best things that can

be done in the short term is to minimize

futher encroachment of development on ex-

isting natural ecosystems. Further, we must

refine climatological predictions and increase

our understanding of how climate affects spe-

cies, both individually and in their interac-

tions with each other. Such studies may allow

us to identify those areas where communities

will be most stressed, as well as alternate areas

where they might best be saved. Meanwhile,

efforts to improve techniques for managing

communities and ecosystems under stress,

and also for restoring them when necessary,

must be carried forward energetically.

REFERENCES

Aho, J. M., J. W. Cibbons, and G. W. Esch. 1976.

Relationship between thermal loading and para-

sitism in the mosquitofish. In Thermal Ecology II.

G. W. Esch and R. W. McFarIane, eds.. pp. 213-

218. Springfield, Va: Technical Infornation Cen-

ter, Energy Research and Development Admin-

istration.

Baker, R. G. 1983. Holocene vegetational history of

the westem United States. In Late Quaternary En-

vironments of the United Status. Vol. 2: The Hofocene,

H. E. Wright, Jr., ed., pp. 109-125. Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press.

Barron, E.. J. 1985. Explanations of the Tertiary

global cooling trend. Palacogeo. P. 50:17.

Beauchamp, R.S.A., and P. Ullyott. 1932. Compet-

itive relationships between certain species of

fresh-water triclads. J. Ecol. 20:200.

Bemabo, J. C., and T. Webb III. 1977. Changing

pattems in the Holocene pollen record of nonh-

eastem North America: A mapped surnmary.

Quatern. Res. 8:64.

Botkin, D. B. 1977. Strategies for the reinuoduction

of species into damaged ecosystems. In Recovery

and Rcstoration of Damaged Ecosystems, J. Caims, Jr.,

K. L Dickson, and E. E. Henicks, eds., pp. 241-

260. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia

Buaer, K. W. 1980. Adaptation to global environ-

mental change. Prof. Geogr. 32(3):269.

Coope, G. R. 1977. Fossil coleopteran assemblages

as sensitive indicators of climatic changes during

the Devensian (Last) cold stage. Philos. Traní. Roy. B

280:313.

Courtenay. W. R., Jr. 1978. The introduction of ex-

otic organisms. In WildIife and America, H. P. Bro-

kaw, ed., pp. 237-252 Washington, D.C.: Council

on Environmental Quality, U.S. Govemment

Printing Office.

Cox B. C., and P. D. Moore. 1985. Biogeography: An

Ecological and Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Black-

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Período en el que se utilizará:Septiembre- Diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo SostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaria Lopez Franco y Dr. Martín BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicación:Nueva YorkTítulo:State of the WorldEditorial:State of the WorldAutor/editor:Tuxill, JhonCapítulo/artículo:Appreciating the benefits of plant biodiversityAño (fecha) de publicación:1999Páginas De: Al:96-114

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6

Appreciating theBenefits of Plant

Biodiversity

John Tuxi l l

At first glance, wild potatoes are not tooimpressive. Most are thin-stemmed,rather weedy-looking plants that under-ground bear disappointingly small tubers.But do not be deceived by initial appear-antes, for these plants are key allies inhumankind’s ongoing struggle to controllate blight, a kind of fungus that thriveson potato plants. It was late blight that, inthe 1840s, colonized and devastated thegenetically uniform potato fields ofIreland, triggering the infamous faminethat claimed more than a million lives.The disease has been controlled this cen-tury largely with fungicides, but in themid-1980s farmers began reporting out-breaks of fungicide-resistant blight. Thesenewly virulent strains have cut globalpotato harvests in the 1990s by 15percent, a $3.25-billion yield loss; insome regions, such as the highlandsof Tanzania, losses to b l ight haveapproached 100 percent. Fortunately, sci-entists at the International Potato Centerin Lima, Peru, have located genetic resis-tance to the new blight strains in the gene

pools of traditional Andean potato culti-vars and their wild relatives, and now seehope for reviving the global potato crop.1

Wild potatoes are but one manifesta-tion of the benefits humans gain frombiological diversity, the richness and com-plexity of life on Earth. Plant biodiversity,in particular, is arguably the single great-est resource that humankind has gar-nered from nature during our long cul-tural development. Presently, scientistshave described more than 250,000 speciesof mosses, ferns, conifers, and floweringplants, and e s t ima te t he re may beupwards of 50,000 plant species yet to bedocumented, primarily in the remote, lit-tle-studied reaches of tropical forests.2

Within just the hundred-odd species ofcultivated plants that supply most of theworld’s food, traditional farmers haveselected and developed hundreds of thou-sands of distinct genetic varieties. Duringthis century, professional plant breedershave used this rich gene pool to create thehigh-yielding crop varieties responsiblefor much of the enormous productivity of

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modern farming. Plant diversity also pro-vides oils, latexes, gums, fibers, dyes,essences, and other products that clean,clothe, and refresh us and that have manyindustrial uses. And whether we are in the20 percent of humankind who open a bot-tle of pills when we are feeling ill, or in the80 percent who consult a local herbalistfor a healing remedy, a large chunk of ourmedicines comes from chemical com-pounds produced by plants.3

Yet the more intensively we use plantdiversity, the more we threaten its long-term future. The scale of human enter-prise on Earth has become so great—weare now nearly 6 billion strong and con-sume about 40 percent of the planet’sannual biological productivity—that we areeroding the very ecological foundations ofplant biodiversity and losing unique genepools, species, and even entire communi-ties of species forever. It is as if humankindis painting a picture of the next milen-nium with a shrinking palette—the worldwill still be colored green, but in increas-ingly uniform and monocultured tones.Of course, our actions have produced ben-efits: society now gows more food thanever before, and those who can purchase ithave a material standard of living unimag-inable to earlier generations. But the unde-niable price that plant diversity and theecological health of our planet are payingfor these achievements casts a shadowover the future of the development paththat countries have pursued this century.To become more than a short-term civi-lization, we must start by maintaining bio-logical diversity.4

INTO THE MASS EXTINCTION

Extinction is a natural part of evolution,but it is normally a rare and obscureevent; the natural or “background” rate ofextinction appears to be about 1-10

Appreciating the Benefits of Plant Biodiversity

species a year. By contrast, scientists esti-mate that extinction rates have accelerat-ed this century to at least 1,000 speciesper year. These numbers indicate we nowlive in a time of mass extinction—a globalevolutionary upheaval in the diversity andcomposition of life on Earth.5

Paleontologists studying Earth’s fossilrecord have identified five previous massextinction episodes during life’s 1.5 bil-lion years of evolution, with the mostrecent being about 65 million yearsago, at the end of the Cretaceous period,when the dinosaurs disappeared. Earliermass extinctions hit marine invertebratesand other animal groups hard, but plantsweathered these episodes with relativelylittle trouble. Indeed, flowering plants,which now account for nearly 90 percento f a l l l a n d p l a n t s p e c i e s , d i d n o tbegin their diversification until theCretaceous—relatively recently, in evolu-tionary terms.6

In the current mass extinction, howev-er, plants are suffering unprecedentedlosses. According to a 1997 global analysisof more than 240,000 plant species coor-dinated by the World ConservationUnion-IUCN, one out of every eightplants surveyed is potentially at risk ofextinction. (See Table 6-l) This tallyincludes species already endangered orclearly vulnerable to extinction, as well asthose that are naturally rare (and thus atr isk f rom ecological d isrupt ion) orextremely poorly known. More than 90percent of these at-risk species areendemic to a single country— that is,found nowhere else in the world.7

The United States, Australia, andSouth Africa have the most plant speciesat risk (see Table 6-2), but their highstanding is partly due to how much better-known their flora is compared with that ofother species-rich countries. We have agood idea of how many plants havebecome endangered as the coastal sagesc rub and pe renn i a l g r a s s l ands o fCalifornia have been converted into sub

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Table 6-1. Threatened Plant Species, 1997

Status Total Share(number) ( percent)

Total Number of Species Surveyed 242,013

Total Number of Threatened Species 33,418 14Vulnerable to Extinction 7,951 3In Immediate Danger of Extinction 6,893 3Naturally Rare 14,505 6Indeterminate Status 4,070 2

Total Number of Extinct Species 380 <1SOURCE: Kerry S. Walter and HarrietJ. Gillett, eds., 1997 IUCN Red of Threatened Plants (Gland, Switzerland:World Consevation Union-IUCN, 1997).

urban homes and cropland, for example.But we simply do not know how manyspecies have dwindled as the cloud forestsof Central America have been replaced bycoffee plots and cattle pastures, or as thelowland rainforests of Indonesia andMalaysia have become oil palm and pulp-wood plantations.

Increasingly, it is not just individualspecies but entire communities andecosystems of plants that face extinction.The inter-Andean laurel and oak forestsof Colombia, the heathlands of westernAustralia, the seasonally dry forest of thePacific island of New Caledonia—all havebeen largely overrun by humankind. Inthe southeast corner of Florida in theUnited States, native plant communities,such as subtropical hardwood hammocksand limestone ridge pinelands, have beenreduced to tiny patches in a sea of subur-ban homes, sugarcane fields, and citrusorchards. These irreplaceable remnantsare all that is left of what southeast Floridaonce was—and they are now held togeth-er only with constant human vigilanceto beat back a siege of exotic plants,such as Brazilian pepper and Australiancasuarina. 8

Biodiversity is also lost when genepools within species evaporate. The clos-est wild ancestor of corn is a lanky, sprawl-ing annual grass called teosinte, native to

Mexico and Guatemala, where it occurs ineight separate populations. BotanistGarrison Wilkes of the University ofMassachusetts regards seven of these populations as rare, vulnerable, or alreadyendangered—primarily due to the aban-donment of traditional agricultura1 prac-tices and to increased livestock grazing inthe field margins and fallow areas favoredby teosinte. Overall, teosinte is not yetthreatened with extinction. But because

Table 6-2. Top 10 Countries with theMost Threatened Plants

Country

Percentage ofCountry’s Total

Total Flora Threatened(number)

United States 4,669 29Australia 2,245 14South Africa 2,215 11.5Turkey 1,876 22Mexico 1,593 6Brazil 1,358 2.5Panama 1,302 13India 1,236 8Spain 985 19.5Peru 906 5SOURCE: Kerry S. Walter and Harriet J. Gillett, eds.,1997 IUCN Red list of Threatened Plants (Gland,Switzerland: World Conservation Union-IUCN,1997).

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the plant hybridizes readily with domesti-cated corn, every loss of a unique teosintepopulation reduces genetic diversity thatmay one day be needed to breed better-adapted corn plants.9

OF F O O D A N D F A R M E R S

Nowhere is the value of biodiversity moreevident than in our food supply. Roughlyone third of all plant species have ediblefruits, tubers, nuts, seeds, leaves, roots, orstems. During the nine tenths of humanhistory when everyone lived as hunter-gatherers, an average culture would havehad knowledge of severa1 hundred edibleplant species that could provide suste-nance. Today, wild foods continue to sup-plement the diet of millions of rural poorworldwide, particularly during seasonalperiods of food scarcity. Tuareg women inNiger, for instance, regularly harvestdesert panic-grass and shama millet whilemigrating with their animal herdsbetween wet and dry-season pastures. Inrural northeast Thailand, wild foods gath-ered from forests and field margins makeup half of al1 food eaten by villagers dur-ing the rainy season. In the City of Iquitosin the Peruvian Amazon, fruits of nearly60 species of wild trees, shrubs, and vinesare sold in the city produce markets.Residents in the surrounding countrysideare estimated to obtain a tenth of theirentire diet from wild-harvested fruits.10

For the last 5-10 millennia, we haveactively cultivated the bulk of our food.Agriculture arose independently in manydifferent regions, as people graduallylived closer together, became less

nomadic, and focused their food produc-tion on plants that were amenable torepeated sowing and harvesting. In the1920s the legendary Russian plant explor-er Nikolai Vavilov identified geographiccenters of crep diversity, including

Mesoamerica, the central Andes, theMediterranean Basin, the Near East, high-land Ethiopia, and eastern China. He alsoinferred correctly that most centers cor-respond to where crops were first domes-ticated. For instance, native Andean farm-ers not only brought seven differentspecies of wild potatoes into cultivation,they also domesticated common beans,lima beans, passion fruit, quinoa andamaranths (both grains), and a host of lit-tle-known tuber and leaf crops such asoca, ulluco, and tarwi—more than 25species of food plants in all.11

Over the millennia, farmers havedeveloped a wealth of distinctive varietieswithin crops by selecting and replantingseeds and cuttings from uniquely favor-able individual plants—perhaps one thatmatured slightly sooner than others, wasunusually resistant to pests, or possessed adistinctive color or taste. Subsistencefarmers have always been acutely attentiveto such varietal diversity because ir helpsthem cope with variability in their envi-ronment, and for most major crops, farm-ers have developed thousands of folk vari-eties, or “landraces.” India alone, forinstance, probably had at least 30,000 ricelandraces earlier this century.12

On-farm crop selection remains vital indeveloping countries, where farmers con-tinue to save 80-90 percent of their ownseed supplies. In industrial nations, bycontrast, the seed supply process hasbecome increasingly centralized duringthis century, as professional plant breed-ers have taken up the job of crep improve-ment and as corporations have assumedresponsibility for supplying seeds. Thepower and promise of scientifically basedplant breeding was confirmed by the1930s, when the first commercial hybridcorn was marketed by the Pioneer Hi-Bred Company. Hybrids are favored byseed supply companies because they tendto be especially high-yielding (the bottomline for commercial farming) andbecause “second-generation” hybrid seeds

Appeciating the Benefits of Plant Biodiversity

59

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do not retain the traits of their parents.This means that farmers must purchasehybrid seed anew from the supplierrather than saving their own stock. Somefarmers have also been legally disenfran-chised from seed-saving; under EuropeanUnion law, it is now illegal for farmers tosave and replant seed from plant varietiesthat have been patented by breeders.¹³

Traditional crop varieties are indis-

pensable for global food security.

Although farmers can now purchaseand plant seeds genetically engineeredwith the latest molecular techniques, theproductivity of our food supply stilldepends on the plant diversity main-tained by wildlands and traditional agri-cultural practices. Wild relatives of cropscontinue be used by breeders as sourcesof disease resistance, vigor, and othertraits that produce billions of dollars inbenefits to global agriculture. Imaginegiving up sugarcane, strawberries, toma-toes, and wine grapes; none of these cropscould be grown commercially without thegenetic contribution of their respectivewild relatives. With the rescue mission oftheir wild kin now under way, we can alsoplace potatoes on this list.14

Traditional crep varieties are equallyindispensable for global food security.Subsistence farmers around the worldcontinue to grow primarily either land-races or locally adapted versions of pro-fessionally bred seed. Such small-scaleagriculture produces 15-20 percent ofthe world’s food supply, is predominantlyperformed by women, and provides thedaily sustenance of roughly 1.4 billionrural poor. Moreover, landraces have con-tributed the genetic infrastructure of theintensively bred crep varieties that feedthe rest of us. More than one third of the

U.S. wheat crop owes its productivity tolandrace genes from Asia and otherregions, a contribution worth at least$500 million annually.15

As we enter the next millennium, agri-cultural biodiversity faces an uncertainfuture. The availability of wild foods andpopulations of many wild relatives ofcrops is declining as wildlands are con-verted to human dominated habitats andas hedgerows, fallow fields, and other sec-ondary habitats decline within traditionalagricultural landscapes. In the UnitedStates, two thirds of all rare and endan-gered plants are close relatives of cultivat-ed species. If these species go extinct, apool of potentially crucial future benefitsfor global agriculture will also vanish.16

There is also grave concern for the oldcrop landraces. By volume, the world’sf a rmers now g row more so rghum,spinach, apples, and other crops than everbefore, but they grow fewer varieties ofeach crop. Crop diversity in industrialnations has undergone a massive turnoverthis century; the proportion of varietiesgrown in the United States before 1904but no longer present in either commer-cial agriculture or any major seed storagefacility ranges from 81 percent for toma-toes to over 90 percent for peas and cab-bages. Figures are less comprehensive fordeveloping countries, but China is esti-mated to have gone from growing 10,000wheat varieties in 1949 to only 1,000 bythe 1970s, while just 20 percent of thecorn varieties cultivated in Mexico in the1930s can still be found there—an alarm-ing decline for the cradle of corn.17

Crop varieties are lost for many reasons.Sometimes an extended drought destroysharvests and farmers must consume theirplantillg seed stocks just to survive. Long-term climate change can also be a prob-lem. In Senegal, two decades of below-nor-mal rainfall created a growing season tooshort for traditional rice varieties to pro-duce good yields. When fast-maturing ricecultivars became available through devel-

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opment aid programs, women farmersrapidly adopted them because of thegreater harvest security they offered.18

In the majority of cases, however, farm-ers voluntarily abandon traditional seedswhen they adopt new varieties, changeagricultural practices, or move out offarming altogether. In industrial coun-tries, crep diversity has declined in con-cert with the steady commercializationand consolidation of agriculture this cen-tury: fewer family farmers, and fewer seedcompanies offering fewer varieties forsale, mean fewer crep varieties planted infields or saved after harvest. The seed sup-ply industry is now dominated by multi-national corporations; increasingly, thesame companies that sell fertilizers andpesticides to farmers now also promoteseeds bred to use those products.19

In most developing countries, diversitylosses were minimal until the 196Os, whenthe famed international agriculturaldevelopment program known as theGreen Revolution introduced new high-yielding varieties of wheat, rice, corn, andother major crops. Developed to boostfood self-sufficiency in famine-pronecountries, the Green Revolution varietieswere widely distributed, often with gov-ernment subsidies to encourage theiradoption, and displaced landraces frommany prime farmland areas.20

In areas where agriculture is highlymechanized and commercialized, cropsnow exhibit what the U.N. Food andAgriculture Organization (FAO) politelycalls an “impressively uniform” geneticbase. A survey of nine major crops in theNetherlands found that the three mostpopular varieties for each crop covered81-99 percent of the respective areasplanted. Such patterns have also emergedon much of the developing world’s primefarmland. One single wheat variety blan-keted 67 percent of Bangladesh’s wheatacreage in 1983 and 30 percent of India’sthe following year.21

The ecological risks we take in adopt-

Appreciating the Benefites Plant Biodiversity

ing such genetic uniformity are enor-mous, and keeping them at bay requiresan extensive infrastructure of agriculturalscientists and extension workers—as wellas all too frequent applications of pesti-cides and other potent agrochemicals. Aparticularly heavy burden falls on profes-sional plant breeders, who are nowengaged in a relay race to develop evermore robust crep varieties before thosealready in monoculture succumb to evolv-ing pests and diseases, or to changingenvironmental conditions.22

Breeders started this race earlier thiscentury with a tremendous geneticendowment at their disposal, courtesy ofnature and generations of subsistencefarmers. Despite major losses, this well-spring is still far from empty—estimatesare that plant breeders have used only asmall fraction of the varietal diversity pre-sent in crop gene banks (facilities thatstore seeds under cold, dry conditionsthat can maintain seed viability fordecades). At the same time, we can neverbe sure that what is already stored willcover al1 our future needs. When grassystunt virus began attacking high-yieldingAsian rices in the 1970s, breeders locatedgenetic resistance to the disease in only asingle collection of one population of awild rice species in Uttar Pradesh, India-and that population has never beenfound again since. Conserving and rein-vigorating biodiversity in agricultura1landscapes remains essential for achiev-ing global food security.23

OF MEDICINES AND

MATERIAL GOODS

In a doctor’s Office in Germany, a mandiagnosed with hypertension is prescribedreserpine, a drug from the Asian snakerootplant. In a small town in India, a womancomplaining of stomach pains visits an

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Ayurvedic healer, and receives a soothingand effective herbal tea as part of her treat-ment. In a California suburb, a headachesufferer unseals a bottle of aspirin, a com-pound originally isolated from Europeanwillow trees and meadow herbs.24

People everywhere rely on plants forstaying healthy and extending the qualityand length of their lives. One quarter ofthe prescription drugs marketed in NorthAmerica and Europe contain active ingre-dients derived from plants. Plant-baseddrugs are part of standard medical proce-dures for treating heart conditions, child-hood leukemia, lymphatic cancer, glauco-ma, and many other serious illnesses.Worldwide, the over-the-counter value ofthese drugs is estimated at more than $40billion annually. Major pharmaceuticalcompanies and institutions such as theU.S. National Cancer Institute implementplant screening programs as a primarymeans of identifying new drugs.25

The World Health Organization esti-mates that 3.5 billion people in developing countries rely on plant-based medi-cine for their primary health care.Ayurvedic and other traditional healers inSouth Asia use at least 1,800 differentplant species in treatments and are regu-larly consulted by some 800 million peo-ple: In China, where medicinal plant usegoes back at least four millennia, healersemploy more than 5,000 plant species. Atleast 89 plant-derived commercial drugsused in industrial countries were original-ly discovered by folk healers, many ofwhom are women. Traditional medicineis particularly important for poor andrural residents, who typically are not wellserved by formal health care systems.Recent evidente suggests that when eco-nomic woes and structural adjustmentprograms restrict governments abilitiesto provide health care, urban and evenmiddle-class residents of developingcountries also turn to more affordable tra-ditional medicinal experts.26

Traditional herbal therapies are grow-

62

ing rapidly in popularity in industrialcountries as well. FAO estimates thatbetween 4,000 and 6,000 species of medi-cinal plants are traded internationally,with China accounting for about 30 per-cent of all such exports. In 1992, thebooming U.S. retail market for herbalmedicines reached nearly $1.5 billion,and the European market is even larger.27

Despite their demonstrable value,medicinal plant are declining in manyareas. Human alteration of forests andother habitats all too often eliminatessites rich in wild medicinal plants. Thiscreates an immediate problem for folkhealers when they can no longer find theplants they need for performing certaincures—a problem commonly lamented byingenous herbalists in eastern Panama,among others. Moreover, strong con-sumer demand and inadequate oversightof harvesting levels and practices meanthat wild-gathered medicinal plants arecommonly overexploited.‘8

In Cameroon, for example, the bark ofthe African cherry is highly esteemed bytraditional healers, but most of the coun-try’s harvest is exported to WesternEurope, where African cherry is a princi-pal treatment for prostate disorders. Inrecent years Cameroon has been the lead-ing supplier of African cherry bark tointernational markets, but clearance ofthe tree’s montane forest habitat, com-bined with the inability of the govern-ment forestry department to manage theharvest, has led to widespread, wantondestruction of cherry stands.29

In addition to the immediate losses,every dismantling of a unique habitat rep-resents a loss of future drugs and medi-cines, particularly in species-rich habitatslike tropical forests. Fewer than 1 percentof all plant species have been screened bychemists to see what bioactive compoundsthey may contain. The nearly 50 drugsalready derived from tropical rainforestplants are estimated to represent only 12percent of the medically useful compounds

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waiting to be discovered in rainforests .30

Most tragically of all, many rural soci-eties are rapidly losing their culturalknowledge about medicinal plants. Incommunities undergoing accelerated west-ernization, fewer young people are inter-ested in learning about traditional healingplants and how to use them. From Samoato Suriname, most herbalists and healersare elderly, and few have apprentices study-ing to take their place. Ironically, as thisdecline has accelerated, there has been aresurgent interest in ethnobotany—thestudy of how people classify, conceptualize,and use plants—and other fields of studyrelated to traditional medicinal plant use.Professional ethnobotanists surveyingmedicinal plants used by different culturesare racing against time to document tradi-tional knowledge before it vanishes with itslast elderly practitioners.31

For the one quarter of humanity wholive at or near subsistence levels, plantdiversity offers more than just food secu-rity and health care—it also provides aroof over their heads, cooks their food,provides eating utensils, and on averagemeets about 90 percent of their materialneeds. Consider palms: temperate zonedwellers may think of palm trees primari-ly as providing an occasional coconut orthe backdrop to an idyllic island vacation,but tropical peoples have a different per-spective. The babassu palm from the east-ern Amazon Basin has more than 35 dif-ferent uses—construction material, oiland fiber source, game attractant, even asan insect repellent. Commercial extrac-tion of babassu products is a part or full-time economic activity for more than 2million rural Brazilians.³²

Indigenous peoples throughout tropi-cal America have been referred to as“palm cultures.” The posts, floors, walls,and beams of their houses are made fromthe wood of palm trunks, while the roofsare thatched with palm leaves. They usebaskets and sacks woven from palm leavesto store household items, including


food—which may itself be palm fruits,palm hearts (the young growing shoot ofthe plant), or wild game hunted withweapons made from palm stems andleaves. At night, family members will like-ly drift off to sleep in hammocks wovenfrom palm fibers. When people die, theymay be buried in a coffin carved from apalm trunk.³³

One quarter of the prescription drugsmarketed in North Amer ica andEurope contain act ive ingredientsderived from plants.

Palms are exceptionally versatile, butthey are only part of the specuum of use-ful plants in biodiverse environments. Innorthwest Ecuador, indigenous culturesthat practice shifting agriculture usemore than 900 plant species to meet theirmaterial, medicinal, and food needs;halfway around the world, Dusun andIban communities in the rainforests ofcentral Borneo use a similar total ofplants in their daily lives. People who aremore integrated into regional and nation-al economies tend to use fewer plants, butstill commonly depend on plant diversityfor household uses and to generate cashincome. In India, at least 5.7 million peo-ple make a living harvesting nontimberforest products, a trade that accounts fornearly half the revenues earned by Indianstate forests.34

Those of us who live in manicured sub-urbs or urban concrete jungles may meetmore of our material needs with metalsand plastics, but plant diversity stillenriches our lives. Artisans who craftmusical instruments or furniture, forinstance, value the unique acoustic quali-ties and appearances of the different trop-ical and temperate hardwoods that theywork with—aspects of biodiversity that

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ultimately benefit anyone who listens toclassical music or purchases handcraftedfurniture. Among the nonfood plantstraded internationally on commercial lev-els are at least 200 species of timber trees,42 plants producing essential oils, 66species yielding latexes or gums, and 13species used as dyes and colorants.35

As with medicinals, the value that plantresources have for handicraft production,industrial use, or household needs hasoften not prevented their local or region-al decline. One of the most valuablenontimber forest products is rattan, aflexible cane obtained from a numberof species of vine-like palms that can growup to 185 meters long. Asian rattanpalms support an international furniture-making industry Worth $3.5-6.5 billionannually. Unfortunately, rattan stocks aredeclining throughout much of tropicalAsia because of the loss of native rain-forest and overharvesting. In the pastfew years, some Asian furniture makershave even begun importing rattan sup-plies from Nigeria and other centralAfrican countries.36

On a global level, declines of wildplants related to industrial crops such ascotton or plantation-grown timber couldone day limit our ability to cultivate thosecommodities by shrinking the gene poolsneeded for breeding new crops. Morelocally, declines of materially usefulspecies mean life gets harder and tougherin the short term. When a tree speciesfavored for firewood is overharvested,women must walk longer to collect theirfamily’s fuel supply, make due with aninferior species that does not burn as well,or spend scarce money purchasing fuelfrom vendors. When a fiber plant collect-ed for sale to handicraft producersbecomes scarce, it is harder for collectorsto earn an income that could help payschool fees for their children. Whether weare rich or poor, biodiversity enhancesthe quality of our lives—and many peoplealready feel its loss.

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B I O- UN I F O R M I T Y R I S I N G

The cumulative effects of human activitieson Earth are evident not just in declinesin particular species, but in the increas-ingly tattered state of entire ecosystemsand landscapes—and when large-scaleecological processes begin to break down,conservation and management becomeall the more complicated. Take the prob-lem of habitat fragmentation, whenundisturbed wildlands are reduced topatchwork, island-like remnants of theirformer selves. Natural islands in oceans orlarge lakes tend to be impoverished inspecies; their smaller area means theyusually do not develop the ecologicalcomplexity and diversity characteristic ofmore extensive mainland areas. More-over, when an island population of aspecies is eradicated, it is harder for adja-cent mainland populations to recolonizeand replace it.37

As a result, when development-large-scale agriculture, settlements, roads-sprawls across landscapes, remaining habi-tat fragments usually behave like theislands they have become: they lose species.In western Ecuador, the Río PalenqueScience Center protects a square-kilometerremnant of the lowland rainforest thatcovered the region a mere three decadesago; now the center is an island amid cattlepasture and oil palm plantations. Twenty-four species of orchids, bromeliads, andother plants at Río Palenque have alreadysuccumbed to the “island effect” and canno longer be found there. One vanishedspecies, an understory shrub, has neverbeen recorded anywhere else and ispresumed extinct.38

Even with these drawbacks, small areasof native habitat can have enormous con-servation value when they are al1 that isleft of a unique plant community or rarehabitat. But waiting to protect them untilonly patches remain carries an unmistak-able tradeoff: smaller holdings require

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more-intensive management than largerones. In smaller reserves, managers oftenmust simulate natural disturbances (suchas prescribed burns to maintain fire-adapted vegetation); provide pollination,seed dispersal, and pest control servicesin place of vanished animals; reintroducedesirable native species when they disap-pear from a site (perhaps due to a seriesof poor breeding seasons); and performother duties the original ecosystem oncedid free of charge. Governments and soci-eties that are unwilling or unable to shoul-der these management costs will soonfind that the biodiversity they intended toprotect with nature reserves has vanishedfrom within them.39

Invasive species that crowd out nativeflora and fauna are one of the biggestheadaches for managing biodiversity indisturbed landscapes. In certain suscepti-ble habitats, such as oceanic islands andsubtropical heathlands, controlling inva-sives may be the single biggest manage-ment challenge. South Africa has one ofthe largest invasive species problems ofany nation, and has a great deal at stake:the fynbos heathlands and montane for-est of the country’s Cape region holdmore plant species—8,600, most of themendemic—in a smaller area than any-where else on Earth. Fortunately, SouthAfricans are increasingiy aware of thethreat that exotics pose, and in 1996 thegovernment initiated a program to fightinvasives with handsaw and hoe. Some40,000 people are employed to cut andclear Australian eucalypts, CentralAmeritan pines, and other unwantedguests in natural areas. It is a measure ofthe scale and severity of the invasive prob-lem that this effort is South Africa’s singlelargest public works program.40

Large-scale ecological alterations alsohave great potential to combine theireffects in unpredictable and damagingways. For instance, much of the world isnow saturated in nitrogen compounds(an essential element required by all

plants for growth and development)because of our overuse of nitrogen-basedsynthetic fertilizers and fossil fuels.Studies of North Ameritan prairies foundthat the plants that responded best toexcess nitrogen tended to be weedy inva-sives, not the diverse native prairie flora.Likewise, plant and animal speciesalready pressed for survival in fragmentedlandscapes may also have to contend withaltered rainfall patterns, temperatureranges, seasonal timing, and other effectsof global climate change.41

Scientists are already detecting whatcould be the first fingerprints of analtered global atmosphere on plantcommunities.

Already, scientists are detecting whatcould be the first fingerprints of analtered global atmosphere on plant com-munities. Data from tropical forestresearch plots worldwide indicate that therate at which rainforest trees die andreplace each other, called the turnoverrate, has increased steadily since the1950s. This suggests that the forests understudy are becoming “younger,” increas-ingly dominated by faster-growing, short-er-lived trees and woody vines—exactlythe kinds of plants expected to thrive in acarbon dioxide-rich world with moreextreme weather events. Without majorreductions in global carbon emissions,forest turnover rates will likely rise fur-ther, and over time could push to extinc-tion many slower-growing tropical hard-wood tree species that cannot compete ina carbon-enriched environment.42

Global trends are shaping a botanicalworld that is most striking in its greateruniformity. The richly textured mix ofnative plant communities that evolved


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over thousands of years is increasinglyfrayed, replaced by extensive areas underintensive cultivation or heavy grazing,lands devoted to settlements or industrialactivities,and secondary habitats—partially disturbed areas dominated byshorter-lived, “weedy,” often non-nativespecies. A 1994 mapping study bythe organization Conservation Inter-national estimated that nearly three quar-ters of our planet’s habitable landsurface (that which is not bare rock, drift-ing sand, or ice) already is either partiallyor heavily disturbed. Moreover, withinhuman-dominated landscapes, relativelydiverse patchworks of small-scale culti-vation, fallow fields, seasonal grazingareas, and managed native vegetationare being replaced by large, uniformfields or by extensive denuded anddegraded areas.43

STORED FOR SAFEKEEPING

The mixtures of species in differentregions are becoming more similar aswell. Lists of endangered plants aredominated by endemic species—thosenative to a relatively restricted area suchas a country or state, an isolatedmountain range, or a specific soil type.When endemic plants vanish, theremaining species pool becomes moreuniform. Finally, the spectrum of distinctpopulations and varieties within plantspecies is shrinking, a problem mostadvanced in our endowment of domesti-cated plants.44

Countries that emerged in a worldfilled with biodiversity now must gain andmaintain prosperity amid increasing bio-uniformity. We are conducting anunprecedented experiment with the secu-rity and stability of our food supply, ourhealth care systems, and the ecologicalinfrastructure upon which both rest. Toobtain the results we desire, we must con-serve and protect the plant biodiversitythat remains with us, and manage our useof natural systems in ways that restore bio-diversity to landscapes worldwide.

Broad recognition of the need to safe-guard plant resources is largely a twenti-eth century phenomenon. The first warn-ings about the global erosion of plantdiversity were voiced in the 1920s by sci-entists such as Harry Harlan of theUnited States and Nikolai Vavilov, whorealized the threat posed by farmers’abandonment of landraces in favor ofnewer varieties that were spreading wide-ly in an increasingly interconnectedworld.45

The dominant approach to conservingplant varieties and species has involvedremoving them from their native habitator agricultural setting and protecting themat specialized institutions such as botanicalgardens, nurseries, and gene banks. Mostoffsite collections of wild species and orna-mental plants are in the custody of theworld’s 1,600 botanical gardens. Com-bined, they tend representatives of tens ofthousands of plant species—nearly 25 per-cent of the world’s flowering plants andferns, by one estimate.46

Most botanical gardens active todaywere established by European colonialpowers to introduce economically impor-tant and ornamental plants throughoutthe far-flung reaches of empires, and topromote the study of potentially usefulplants. Nowadays many botanical gardenshave reoriented their mission towardspecies preservation, particularly in theirresearch and education programs. Sincethe late 1980s, botanical gardens havecoordinated efforts through an interna-tional conservation network, which helpsensure that the rarest plants receive pri-ority for propagation and, ultimately,reintroduction. 47

Gene banks have focused almost exclu-sively on storing seeds of crep varietiesand their immediate wild relatives. (Theprincipal exception is the Royal BotanicGarden’s Millennium Seed Bank in

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Appretinting the Benefits of Plant Biodiversity

England, which holds more than 4,000wild species and is expanding toward acollection of one quarter of the world’sflora.) Gene banks arose from plantbreeders’ need to have readily accessiblestocks of breeding material. Their conser-vation role came to the forefront in the1970s, following large losses linked togenetic uniformity in the southern U.S.corn crep in 1970 and the Soviet winterwheat crep of 1971-72.48

In 1974, governments and the UnitedNations established the InternationalBoard for Plant Genetic Resources (nowknown as the International Plant GeneticResources Institute, or IPGRI), which cob-bled together a global network of genebanks. The network includes universitybreeding programs, government seedstorage units, and the Consultative Groupon International Agricultural Research(CGIAR), a worldwide network of 16 agri-cultural research centers originally estab-lished to bring the Green Revolution todeveloping countries, and funded primar-ily by the World Bank and internationalaid agencies.4g

The number of unique seed samples or“accessions” in gene banks now exceeds 6million. The largest chunk of these, morethan 500,000 accessions, are in the genebanks of CGIAR centers such as the—nternational Rice Research Institute inthe Philippines and the InternationalWheat and Maize Improvement Center(CIMMYT) in Mexico. At least 90 percentof all gene bank accessions are of foodand commodity plants, especially theworld’s most intensively bred and eco-nomically valuable crops. (See Table6-3.) By the late 1980s, IPGRI regarded anumber of these crops, such as wheat andcorn, as essentially completely collected;that is, nearly all of the known landracesand varieties of the crop are already rep-resented in gene banks. Others have ques-tioned this assessment, however, arguingthat the lack of quantitative studies ofcrop gene pools makes it difficult to ascer-

Table 6-3.Gene Bank Collections forSelected Crops

Estimated ShareAccessions of Landraces

Crop in Gene Banks Collected

WheatRiceCornSorghumSoybeansCommon

BeansPotatoesCassavaTomatoesSquashes,

Cucumbers,Gourds

(number) (percent)

850,000 90420,000 90262,000 95168,500 80176,000 70

268,500 5031,000 80-9028,000 3577,500 90

30,000 50Onions, Garlic 25,000 70Sugarcane 27,500 70Cotton 48,500 75

SOURCE: Donald L. Plucknett et al., Gene Banks andthe World´s food (Princeton,NJ: Princeton UniversilyPress, 1987); Brian D. Wright, Crop Genetic ResouscePolicy: Toward A Resarch Agenda, EPTD DiscussionPaper 19 (Washington, DC: International FoodPolicy Research Institute, 1996); U.N. Food andAgriculture Organization, The state of the World´s Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Apiculture (Rome:1996).

tain whether even the best-studied cropshave been adequately sampled.50

There are additional reasons for inter-preting gene bank totals conservatively.The total annual cost of maintaining allaccessions currently in gene banks isabout $300 million, and many facilities,hard-pressed for operating funds, cannotmaintain seeds under optima1 physicalconditions. Seeds that are improperlydried or kept at room temperature ratherthan in cold storage may begin to lose via-bility within a few years. At this point, theymust be “grown out”—germinated, plant-ed, raised to maturity, and then reharvest-ed, which is a time-consuming and labor-intensive activity when repeated for

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thousands of accessions per year. Theseproblems suggest that an unknown frac-tion of accessions is probably of question-

Only 13 percent of gene-banked seedsare in well-run facilities with long-termstorage capability-and even the crownjewels of the system, such as the U.S.National Seed Storage Laboratory, have attimes had problems maintaining seed via-bility rates. For extensively gene-bankedcrops (pr imari ly major grains andlegumes) where large collections areduplicated in different facilities, the oddsof losing the diversity already on depositare reduced. But for sparsely collectedcrops whose accessions are stored at justone or two sites, the possibility of geneticerosion remains disquietingly high.52

Despite such drawbacks, off-site facili-ties remain indispensable for conserva-tion. In some cases, botanical gardens andgene banks have rescued species whosewild populations are now gone. They canalso help return diversity to its properhome through reintroduction programs.Although the uplands of East Africa arenot the center of domestication for com-mon beans, the farmers of the regionadopted them as their own several cen-turies ago, and have developed theworld’s richest mix of local bean varieties.When Rwanda was overwhelmed by civilconflict in 1994, the height of the genoci-dal violence occurred dur ing rheFebruary-to-June growing season, greatlyr educ ing ha rves t s and r a i s i ng t heprospect of widespread famine. Amid therelief contributions that flowed into thecountry once the situation had stabilizedwere stocks of at least 170 bean varietiesthat had been previously collected inRwanda and stored in gene banks world-wide. These supplies helped ensure thatRwandan farmers had stocks of highqual-ity, locally adapted beans for planting inthe subsequent growing season.53

Still, even the most enthusiastic boost-ers of botanical gardens and gene banks

recognize that such facilities, even whenimpeccably maintained, provide only onepiece in the conservation puzzle. Off-sitestorage takes species out of their naturalecological settings. Wild tomato seeds canbe sealed in a glass jar and frozen for safe-keeping, but left out of the cold are theplant’s pollinators, its dispersers, and allthe other organisms and relationshipsthat have shaped the plant’s unique evo-lution. Gene banks and botanical gardensonly save a narrow—albeit valuable—sliceof plant diversity. When stored seeds aregrown out over several generations off-site, in time they can even lose their nativeadaptations and evolve to fit instead theconditions of their captivity.54

KEEPING DIVERSITY IN PLACE

In the end, plant diversity can be securelymaintained only by protecting the nativehabitats and ecosystems where plants haveevolved. Countries have safeguarded wild-lands primarily, through establishingnational parks, forest reserves, and otherformally protected areas. During this cen-tury, governments have steadily increasedprotected area networks, and they nowencompass nearly 12 million square kilo-meters, or about 8 percent of the Earth’sland surface. Many protected areas guardirreplaceable botanical resources, such asMalaysia’s Mount Kinabalu National Park,which safeguards the unique vegetationof southeast Asia’s highest peak. A fewreserves have been established specificallyto protect useful plants, such as the Sierrade Manant lan biosphere reserve inMexico, which encompasses the onlyknown populations of perennial wildcorn. 55

Yet current protected area networksalso have major limitations. Many highlydiverse plant communities, such as tropi-cal deciduous forests, are greatly under-

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able viability.51

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protected. In addition, many protectedareas officially decreed on paper are min-imally implemented by chronically under-f u n d e d a n d u n d e r s t a f f e d n a t u r a lresource agencies. But perhaps the mostfundamental limitation of national parks,wilderness areas, and similarly strict desig-nations arises when they conflict with thecultural and economic importance thatplants hold for local communities.56

A great deal of the natural wealth thatconservationists have sought to protect isactually on lands and under waters longmanaged by local people. Indigenoussocieties worldwide have traditionally pro-tected prominent landscape features likemountains or forests, designating them assacred sites and ceremonial centers. Inparts of West Africa, sacred groves holdsome of the last remaining populations ofimportant medicinal plants. On Samoaand other Pacific islands, communitiesmanage forests to produce wild foods andmedicines, raw materials for canoes andhousehold goods, and other benefits.57

Not surprisingly, actions such as evict-ing long-term residents from newly desig-nated forest reserves, or denying themaccess to previously harvested plantstands, have generated a great deal of illwill toward protected areas worldwide.Fortunately, workable alternatives areemerging in a number of cases wherelong-term residents have been madeequal partners in managing protectedlands. In the Indian state of West Bengal,320,000 hectares of semi-deciduous salforest is managed jointly by villagers andthe state forestry department, with vil-lagers taking primary responsibility forpatrolling nearby forest stands. Sincejoint management began in 1972, the sta-tus of the sal forests has improved, andregenerating stands now provide villagerswith medicines, firewood, and wildgath-ered foodstuffs. Medicinals also featureprominently in a 4,000-hectare rainforestreserve in Belize, which is government-owned but managed by the Belize Associa-

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tion of Traditional Healers.58

Such collaboration between locals andprofessional resource managers is alsocrucial to reversing the overexploitationof valuable wild plants. Very few commer-cially marketed wild species are harvestedsustainably, in ways or at levels that do notdegrade the plant resource. Despite thelack of progress, however, the foundationsof sustainability are becoming increasing-ly clear. Secure and enforceable tenure isessential—either in the form of rights toharvest a plant or tenure over the land itgrows on. Harvesters also need enougheconomic security to be able to afford thetradeoffs involved in not harvesting every-thing at once. Access to fair and openmarkets is important, as is having tech-nology appropriate for the harvestingtask. Information about the ecology andproductivity of a plant can make a big dif-ference. Consumers willing to pay a pre-mium for well-harvested products alsohelp—like those generated through certi-fication programs for “environmentallyfriendly” products.5g

Few wild harvests meet al1 these crite-ria, but a growing number of initiativesare coming close. In Mexico, ancientcone-bearing plants called cycads havebeen heavily exploited for their ornamen-tal value, both for sale domestically andfor horticultural export to the UnitedStates, Japan, and Europe. Most cycadsare wild-harvested by uprooting or cut-ting, but a botanical garden in the state ofVeracruz is working with local villagers toreduce pressures on several overexploitedspecies . In one communi ty , MonteOscuro, residents set aside a communalplot of dry forest to protect a relict popu-lation of cycads in exchange for help withbuilding a community plant nursery.Seeds are collected from the wild plants,then germinated and tended in the nurs-ery by villagers who have received train-ing in basic cycad propagation. Some ofthe young cycads are returned to the for-est to offset any potential downturn in the

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wild population from the seed harvest.The rest are sold and the profits deposit-ed in a community fund.60

Presently the largest hurdle is findinggood markets for the young plants thecommunities are producing; cycads areslowgrowing, and horticultural buyersprefer larger plants. Better monitoringand enforcement of the internationalornamental plant trade would help, forMexican cycad species are listed with theConvention on International Trade inEndangered Species of Wild Fauna andFlora (CITES) of 1973, which provides apowerful legal tool for controlling inter-national trade in threatened plants andanimals. CITES is generally regarded asone of the more effective internationalenvironmental treaties. It prohibits tradein the most highly endangered species(listed in the Treaty’s Appendix I), andkeeps watch on vulnerable species (listedin Appendix II) by requiring that coun-tries issue a limited number of permits forthe species’ export and import betweensignatory countries. Although CITES pro-vides powerful tools for enforcing sustain-able harvests, it is still up to the countriesinvolved to use them.61

I n s o m e r u r a l c o m m u n i t i e s i nZimbabwe, villagers contribute seedsarmually to a community seed stock.

Combining local and internationalstrengths also is crucial for sustaining thegenetic diversity of our food supply. Whatis needed most is agricultural development that strengthens rather than simpli-fies plant diversity to meet the needs andgoals of farmers—especially subsistencefarmers in developing countries who stillmaintain diverse agricultural landscapes.

Meeting this challenge requires under-standing the particular cultural, econom-

ic, and technological reasons why farmersmaintain elements of traditional farming,such as unique crep variety mixtures. Forinstance, native Hopi communities in thesouthwest United States maintain indige-nous corn and l ima bean var ie t iesbecause the germinating seeds are indio-pensable for religious ceremonies. Mendefarmers in Sierra Leone continue to grownative red-hulled African rice for thesame reason. Andean peasant farmers stillgrow pink and purple potatoes, big-seedcorn, quinoa, and other traditional cropsbecause that is what they themselves pre-fer to eat; the commercial varieties theygrow are strictly to sell for cash income.62

One option to help farmers maintaincrep diversity could involve supportingfarmers’ informal networks of seedexchange and procurement, so as toimprove their access to diverse seedsources. In some rural communities inZimbabwe, villagers contribute seedsannually to a community seed stock. Atthe start of the planting season, the seedsare redistributed to all community mem-bers, a step that gives villagers access tothe full range of varietal diversity presentin the immediate vicinity and ensures thatno one goes without seeds for planting.Grassroots organizations in Ethiopia,Peru, Tonga, and many other countrieshave sponsored community seed banks,regional agricultural fairs, seed collectiontours, demonstration gardens, and similarprojects to promote informal seedexchange between farmers, increase theiraccess to crep diversity, and help themreplenish seed stocks after poor harvests.63

Another approach to maintaining vari-etal diversity involves reorienting formalplant breeding toward the local needs offarmers. Typically plant breeders createuniform, widely adaptable “pure-bred”varietal lines, and only toward the end ofthe process are the lines evaluated withfarmers. Participatory plant breedingmethods involve farmers at al1 stages. Inthe most advanced programs, breeders

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and farming communities work togetherover several crep generations to evaluate,select, combine, and improve a widerange of varieties, both those availablelocally and those from other regions. Inthis way, participatory plant breeding canimprove the suite of locally preferredvarieties without resorting to varietal uni-formity; this approach maintains—orpotentially even enhances—the geneticdiversity present in farmers’ fields.64

Participatory plant breeding has beenpioneered primarily by grassroots devel-opment organizations and innovativenational plant breeding programs indeveloping countries; it has not beentaken up by commercial seed producers,perhaps because its benefits tend to bediffuse and not easily appropriated forcommercial gain. The CGIAR centers areexploring participatory approaches, butalso remain heavily involved in standardbreeding programs. For instance, thecorn and wheat center CIMMYT: recentlycollaborated with university breeders andseed companies to develop better-yieldingcorn varieties targeted for highlandMexico—areas where corn landraces con-tinue to be grown by small—scale farmersunder diverse environmental conditions.In doing so, CIMMYT chose to focus onhybrid corn varieties. If well tailored tothe environmental and economic con-straints facing highland Mexican farmers,the new hybrids could boost crep yields-but farmers will be unable to save theirseeds and adapt them further to localconditions. The seed companies involvedwill surely benefit, but past experiencesuggests that local plant biodiversity maypay the price.65

As this last example shows, the mostfundamental changes to be made in pro-tecting crop genetic diversity—and plantbiodiversity in general—involve changingpolicies. Governments are often biasedtoward promoting intensive agriculturedependent on high inputs and genetical-ly uniform crops. Farmers in most south-

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ern African countries, for instance, areonly eligible for government agriculturalcredit programs if they agree to plantmodern improved varieties. Internationaldevelopment aid and structural adjust-ment policies commonly promote nontra-ditional export crops, which can triggerhabitat conversion (erasing wild plantdiversity) and replace indigenous crepmixtures. Until fundamental policychanges are taken to heart by govern-ments, international lenders, and relatedinstitutions, the path to sustaining plantbiodiversity—wild or domesticated—willremain difficult.66

S H A R I N G T H E B E N E F I T S

Governments can begin to chart a newcourse by resolving the most prominentpolicy issue affecting plant diversity today:how to distribute biodiversity’s economicbenefits fairly and equitably. Establishinga system of intellectual property rights toplant resources has proved contentiousbecause of a simple pattern—plant diver-sity (both wild and cultivated) is heldmostly by developing countries, but theeconomic benefits it generates are dispro-portionately captured by industrialnations. For most of this century, plantdiversity has been treated as the “com-mon heritage” of humankind, freely avail-able to anyone who can use it, with pro-prietary ownership only granted viapatent law to individuals who demon-strate trade secrets or uniquely improve acrep variety or other plant.67

Since the early 1980s, however, therehas been widening agreement that indige-nous people and traditional farmersdeserve compensation for their long-standing generation, management, andknowledge of biodiversity. Grassrootsadvocates argue that indigenous peopledeserve “traditional resource rights” tothe plants they cultivate and know how to

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use, rights that would have the same inter-national legal standing as that afforded topatent rights. Recognition of such rightsrequires, at a minimum, negotiating equi-table benefit-sharing agreements at thecommunity leve1 whenever plants orindigenous knowledge about them is col-lected by researchers. An additional way toacknowledge the world’s debt to ruralcommunities who safeguard plant bio-diversity would be to establish an interna-tional fund supporting continued localmanagement of plant resources. Such astep appears the most practica1 means ofcompensation for the large amount ofplant biodiversity that is already in thepublic domain (such as the millions ofseed accessions in gene banks or plantswidely used as herbal medicines), sinceestablishing exactly who deserves compen-sation for commercial innovations fromthese plant resources is a Herculean task.68

To date, formal agreements for sharingthe benefits of plant diversity have beennegotiated most extensively in the searchfor new pharmaceuticals from plants inbiodiversity—rich developing countries.The first such “bioprospecting” agree-ment was announced in 1991 betweenMerck Pharmaceuticals and Costa Rica’snongovernmental National Institute ofBiodiversity (InBio) , in which Merck paidInBio $1.1 million for access to plant andinsect samples, and promised to share anundisclosed percentage of royalties fromany commercial products that resulted.69

There are now at least a dozen bio-prospecting agreements in place world-wide, involving national governments,indigenous communities, conservationgroups, start-up companies, and estab-lished corporate giants. Most legitimateagreements have followed the Merck-InBio model, with a modest up-front pay-ment and a promise to return betweenone quarter of 1 percent and 3 percent(depending on the project) of any futureroyalties to the biodiversity holders.Bioprospecting proponents argue that

with the huge cost ($200-350 million) ofbringing a new drug to market, compa-nies cannot afford to share a higher per-centage of royalties. Critics, however, sus-pect many bilateral bioprospectingagreements are not negotiated on aneven footing; when a biotechnology firmapproached the U.S. government aboutprospecting for unique microbes inhabit-ing the geysers and hot spr ings ofYellowstone National Park, for instance,the Park Service negotiated a royaltyshare of 10 percent. Moreover, not al1 bio-prospecting agreements automaticallyuphold traditional resource rights; manyhave been negotiated on a national ratherthan community level, involving govern-ments who many indigenous people thinkdo not adequately represent — indeed,sometimes act ively undermine— theirinterests. 70

In contrast with bioprospecting, resolv-ing who owns the world’s crep geneticresources is being negotiated multilateral-ly, in factious diplomatic arenas. In 1989FAO adopted a Farmers Rights proposalthat would compensate farmers for theircontribution to biodiversity via an inter-national trust fund to support the conser-vation of plant genetic resources. The1992 Convention on Biological Diversityalso called for incorporating Farmers’Rights, subsequent to further internation-al negotiations. There has been no offi-cial endorsement of this concept, howev-er, from the industrial nations who wouldprovide the compensation, and the fundhas remained unimplemented. Duringthe most recent round of internationalnegotiations, in June 1998, the EuropeanU n i o n a p p e a r e d r e a d y t o s u p p o r tFarmers’ Rights, but Australian, U.S., andCanadian diplomats c o n t i n u e d t ostonewall the issue.71

Meanwhile, the intellectual propertyagenda of industrial countries is beingadvanced by the World Trade Organi-zation (WTO). All countries acceding tothe General Agreement on Tariffs and

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Trades are required to establish a systemfor protecting breeders’ rights throughplant variety patents. They can eitheradopt the system of administering patentsand breeders’ rights followed by industri-al nations under the International Unionfor the Protection of New Varieties ofPlants (UPOV), or instead design theirown unique system. T h e U P O VConvention was established in 1978 andsubstantially revised in 1991; initially itgave farmers the right to save commercialseed for their own use, but the 1991 ver-sion allowed signatory countries to revokethis right. Some countries, includingIndia, are looking at structuring theirown plant patent systems to also acknowl-edge farmers’ rights, but it is unclearwhether the WTO will approve sucharrangements. 72

Despite the footdragging in interna-tional arenas, de facto boundaries areemerging for what will and will not be tol-erated in the expropriation of crep genet-ic resources. In May 1997, two Australianagricultural centers applied for propri-etary breeders’ rights on two varietiesof chickpeas. Their application sparked aninternational uproar because theAustralian breeders had obtained bothvarieties from a CGIAR gene bank, whichhad provided the seeds with the under-standing they were to be used for researchand no t fo r d i r ec t f i nanc i a1 ga in .Moreover, the Australians did little breed-ing to improve the two chickpeas, one ofwhich was a landrace widely grown byIndian farmers, and they even appeared tobe laying the groundwork to market thechickpeas in I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n .Ultimately, the Australian governmentbowed to international pressure andrejected the patent application. TheCGIAR subsequently called for a moratori-um on all claims for proprietary breedingrights involving germplasm held in trust byCGIAR or FAO-sponsored gene banks.73

While blatant gene grabs like that ofthe Australians may now be beyond the


international pale, the current situationremains far from ideal. The lack of a clear,multilateral system of intellectual proper-ty rights for plant genetic resources dis-tracts governments from the task of con-serving these resources for futuregenerations. The right of subsistencefarmers to save and adapt the seeds theyplant—arguably the most importantmechanism for sustaining crep geneticdiversity in fìelds—still has not been rec-ognized by many governments. Withoutclear ground rules established, institu-tions and industries that depend directlyon biodiversity for their well-being havelittle incentive to invest in strategies tohelp sustain plant diversity in the fieldsand wildlands where it originates. Allcountries must redouble their efforts tosurmount the political logjam over plantgenetic resources, for continued delayputs biodiversity at risk, and ultimatelyserves no one’s interest.74

The right of subsistence farmers tosave and adapt the seeds they plantstill has not been recognized by manygovernments.

For all of human history, we havedepended on plants and the rest of biodi-versity for our soul and subsistence. Nowthe roles are reversed, and biodiversity’sfate depends squarely on how we shapeour own future. From reducing over-exploitation of wild plants to establishingtraditional resource rights for hiodiversitystewards, many options are available fordeveloping cultural links that supportplant diversity rather than diminish it.Such steps are not just about meetinginternational treaty obligations or estab-lishing new protected areas, but ratherare part of a larger process of shaping

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state of the world 1999

ecologically literate civil societics that arein balance with the natural world. Tomaintain biodiversity’s benefits, whatmatters most is how well we meet the chal-lenges of living sustainably with our deedsas well as our words.

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Periodo en el que se utilizará:Septiembre- Diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo SostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaria Lopez Franco y Dr. Martín BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicación:San FranciscoTítulo:Natural ServicesEditorial:Academic PressAutor/editor:Robert ConstanzaCapitulo/artículo:Cap. 4 Valuing Ecosystem Services with Efficiency, fairness, and Sustainability as GoalsAño (fecha) de publicación:1992Páginas De: Al:82-98

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chapter 4

VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES WITH EFFICIENCY

FAIRNESS, AND SUSTAINABILITY AS GOALS

Robert Costanza and Carl Folke

Valuation ultimately refers to the contribution of an item to meeting a spe-cific goal. A baseball player is valuable to the extent he contributes to thegoal of the team’s winning. In ecology, a gene is valuable to the extent itcontibutes to the goal of survival of the individuals possessing it and their prog-eny. In conventional economics, a commodity is valuable to the extent itcontributes to the goal of individual welfare as assessed by willingness topay. The point is that one cannot state a value without stating the goal beingserved. Conventional economic value is based on the goal of individual util-ity maximization. But other goals, and thus other values, are’ possible. Forexample, if the goal is sustainability, one should assess value based on thecontribution to achieving that goal—in addition to value based on the goalsof individual utility maximization, social equity, or other goals that may bedeemed important. This broadening is particularly important if the goals arepotentially in conflict.

There are at least three broad goals that have been identified as importantto managing economic systems within the context of the planet’s ecologicallife support system (Daly 1992):

1. assessing and ensuring that the scale of human activities within thebiosphere is ecologically sustainable;

2. distributing resources and property rights fairly, both within the cur-rent generation of humans and between this and future generations,and also between humans and other species; and

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3. efficiently allocating resources as constrained and defined by 1 and 2above, and including both marketed and nonmarketed resources, es-pecialIy ecosystem services.

Several authors have discussed valuation of ecosystem services with re-spect to goal 3 above—allocative efficiency based on individual utility max-imization (e.g., Mitchell and Carson 1989, Costanza et al. 1989, Dixon andHufschmidt 1990, Barde and Pearce 1991, Aylward and Barbier 1992,Pearce 1993; see also chapter 3, this volume). In this chapter we explore theimplications of extending these concepts to include valuation with respect cothe other two goals: (1) ecological sustainability, and (2) distributional fair-ness. The “Kantian” or intrinsic rights approach discussed by Goulder andKennedy (chapter 3) is one approach to goal 2, but it is important to rec-ognize that the three goals are not “either-or” alternatives. While they are insome senses independent “multiple criteria” (Arrow and Raynaud 1986),they must all be satisfied in an integrated fashion to allow human life to con-tinue in a desirable way. Similarly, the valuations that flow from these goalsare not “either-or” alternatives. Rather than a “utilitarian or intrinsic rights”dichotomy, we must integrate the three goals listed above and their conse-quent valuations.

Valuations are also the relative weights we give to the various aspects ofthe individual and social decision problem, and the weights that we give arereflections of the goals and worldviews of the community, society, and cul-ture of which individuals are a part (e.g., Costanza 1991, North 1994,Berkes and Folke 1994). We cannot avoid the valuation issue, because aslong as we are forced to make choices we are doing valuation. But we needto be as comprehensive as possible in our valuations and choices aboutecosystems and sustainability, recognizing the relationship between goalsand values.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first addresses ecosystemvaluation in a broader context, in which ecological sustainability and fairdistribution are high-priority goals in addition to economic efficiency. Thesecond discusses the assumption of fixed tastes and preferences (which un-derlies conventional valuation based on individual utility maximization) andlooks at the implications of gradually relaxing this assumption for the con-cept of “consumer sovereignty” and other approaches to social choice.Thethird section raises the issue of the coevolutionary nature of preference for-mation, and puts individuals in their dynamic, social, environmental, insti-tutional, and cultural context. As Sen (1995, p. 18) has noted: “Many of themore exacting problems of the contemporary world—ranging from famineprevention to environmental preservation—actually call for value firmationthrough public discussion” (our emphasis) .

Basing valuation on current individual preferences and utility maximiza-

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tion alone, as in conventional analysis, does not necessarily lead to ecologi-

cal sustainability or social fairness (Bishop 1993). We advocate a two-tiered

approach for combining public discussion and consensus building on sus-

tainability and equity goals with methods for modifying both prices and in-

dividual preferences to better reflect these community goals (Rawls 1971,

Norton 1995, Costanza et al. 1995). Estimation of ecosystem values based

on sustainability goals requires treating preferences as endogenous and co-

evolving with other ecological, economic, and social variables. Finally, we

briefly discuss the possibilities for using integrated ecological economic

modeling as a tool for valuation of ecosystem services in this broader con-

text

S u s t a i n a b i l i t y a n d F a i r n e s s a s G o a l s

Ideally, a framework for economic analysis should contain information

about the full implications (economic, social, and ecological) of various al-

ternative policy options relative to existing policy. For every policy option,

the various ecological-social-economic linkages should be traced to deter-

mine the various consequences for human welfare associated with that op-

tion, and where possible the various positive and negative impacts should be

quantified and valued (Barbier et al. 1994). Economic analysis is about

making choices among alternative uses of scarce resources, and it is in this

context that valuation becomes relevant.

When a single goal or criterion is involved, the valuation problem is in

principle fairly straightforward. But when multiple goals or criteria are in-

volved, the problem can become much more complicated. A classic exam-

ple of the multiple criterion problem can be found in the story about the

drunkard, the miser, and the health freak (Farquharson 1969, Arrow and

Raynaud 1986). All three sit on a committee that has to decide how to spend

the money of a foundation earmarked for building a student residence.

Three alternatives are determined:

1. no house now (leave the money in the bank to earn interest and build

a better house later)

2. a house now without a bar

3. a house now with a bar

Suppose the rankings of the alternatives by the three committee members

are:

miser—l, 2, 3

health freak— 2,3,1

drunkard—3,2,1

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The winning option depends on the order in which the voting is done andcan be manipulated strategically. For example, if the miser were chairman ofthe committee, he could call a vote first on whecher there should be a bar(option 3) or not, (options 1 and 2). Since both the miser and the healthfreak prefer no bar (1 or 2), no bar would be chosen by a |wo-thirds major-icy. Then he couId call a vote on the remaining two options (now or later),which would yield a two-thirds majoricy for later (option 1) and an overall.ranking of l, 2,.3. But if the health freak were chairman, he could suggest .vocing first on the question of whether to build the house now (options 2 or3) or wait (option 1). The decision to build now would pass by a two-thirdsmajority.Then he could call a vote on the question of the bar, which wouldbe rejected by another two-thirds majority, yielding an overall ranking of 2,3, 1. Likewise, if the drunkard were chairrnan he could propose vocing be-tween the opcion 2 (now wichout a bar) and options 1 and 3 (either buildnow or wait). The second grouping would win by a two-thirds majority,since both the drunkard and the miser prefer either option 1 or 3 to option2. Then a vote between options 1 and 3 would yield a two-thirds majorityfor option 3 (build now with a bar) and an overall ranking of 3, 1, 2. It canbe shown that because of strategic manipulations and other “voting para-doxes” that multi-criteria problems do not have any clear-cut, unambigu-ous, systematic solutions (Arrow and Raynaud 1986) and it is only a dicta-torship of one criterion over the others that could not be manipulatedstrategically (Sacterchwaite 1975).

This result is obtained in an environment of fixed preference orderingsand no discussion among committee members (criteria). Social choice the-ory in general has tended to avoid the issue of the connection between valueformation and the decision-making process. As Arrow (1951, p. 7) put it:“we will also assume in the present study that individual values are taken asdaca and are not capable of being altered by the nature of the decisionprocess itself.” One way out of this dilemma is to relax the assumption offixed preferences and allow the committee members to talk with each other,to convey information, to try to change each other’s minds (preference or-derings), and possibly to come to a consensus on the rankings, as they woulddo in a real committee. For example, the drunkard could argue that recentscientific evidence has shown that two glasses of red wine per day actuallyimproves one’s health, and this might convince the health freak to change hisordering co 2,3,1, or even to 3,2,1, especially if some restrictions were putin so that, for example, the bar could serve only beer and wine.

This value formation through public discussion, as Sen (1995) suggests, isessential to integrate the three goals of sustainability, fairness, and efficiencyand can be seen, in fact, as the essence of democracy. As Buchanan (1954,p.120) put it: “The definition of democracy as government by discussion’

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implies that individual values can and do change in the process of decision-

making.” Limiting our valuations and social decision making to the goal of

economic efficiency based on fixed preferences prevents the needed demo-

-cratic discussion of values and options and leaves us with only the “illusion

of choice” (Schmookler 1993). What are the implications of all this for the

valuation of ecosystem services? .

Fixed Tastes and Preferencesand Consumer Sovereignty

As discussed above, conventional economic valuation is based on a social

decision-making rule sometimes referred to as “consumer sovereignty.” By

consumer sovereignty is meant that consumer choices are paramount, and

that individual consumer preferences, whatever they happen to be and how-

ever they are formed, should determine relative value. This rule embodies

the assumption that tastes and preferences are fixed and that the economic

problem consists of optimally satisfying those preferences. If tastes and pref-

erences are fixed and given, then we do not have to know or care why con-

sumers want what they want; we just have to satisfy their preferences as ef-

ficiently as possible. As long as economic efficiency is the only goal, this

approach works reasonably well. But as soon as we introduce the goals of

social fairness and ecological sustainability, we run into the multi-criterion

decision problem (as discussed above), which has no systematic or “proce-

duraI” solution. One way out of this predicament is to relax the assumption

of fixed tastes and preferences and allow some democratic discussion and

modification of values. In addition, tastes and preferences do, in fact, change

anyway, especially in the longer term (North 1994). They are shaped by the

institutional framework under the influence of education, advertising,

changing cultural assumptions, etc. (North 1990). For both of these reasons

we need other criteria for what is “optimal” in addition to economic effi-

ciency and more decision rules as well as consumer sovereignty.

Questioning consumer sovereignty raises legitimate concerns regarding

the possible manipulation of preferences. If tastes and preferences can

change, then who is going to decide how to change them? There is a real

danger that a “totalitarian” government might be employed to manipulate

Preferences to conform to the desires of a select elite rather than the society

as a whole. Two points need to be kept in mind, however: (1) preferences

are already being manipulated every day; and (2) we can apply open demo-

cratic principles to the task of deciding how to manipulate preferences just

as easily as we can apply hidden or totalitarian principles. So the question

becomes: Do we want preferences to be manipulated outside of democratic

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discussion and control, either by a dictatorial government or by big businessacting through advertising? Or do we want to explore and shape them con-sciously, based on democratic social dialogue and consensus, with the addi-tional goals of long-term sustainability and social fairness in mind? Eitherway, this is an issue that can no longer be avoided and one that we belivecan best be handled using the principle of “democracy as discussion.”

Four Degrees of Consumer Sovereignty

The “consumer sovereignty” principle of social choice is not quite as mono-lithic as we have portrayed it There are actually quite a range of opinionsand interpretations. Costanza et al. (1995) define four versions of the con-sumer sovereignty principle as positions on a continuum of degrees of pref-erence endogeneity. These four degrees are labeled: (1) unchanging prefer-ences, (2) preferences as given, (3) commitment to democracy, and (4)democratic preference change.

“Unchanging preferences” implies that preferentes are both given andfixed. To say that preferences are given is to say that stated and revealedpreferences of individuals will be accepted, at face value, as indicative of theindividual’s actual welfare. To say that preferentes are fixed is to claim thatpreferentes do not change through time. According to this view, preferencesare locked in, at least in the sense that they are impossible to change throughrational considerations (Stigler and Becker 1977).

A majority of economists adopt a somewhat weaker version of consumersovereignty, according to which preferences are assumed to be given andfixed only in the methodological sense. Preferences are aggregated from“snapsho t s” , not considered as dynamic processes. If preferences are givenand fixed for the duration of the analysis, then they are not influenced bychanges in other people’s behavior and can be aggregated. But this repre-sents a conscious tradeoff of reality for mathematical precision and ex-planatory power.

A third degree of consumer sovereignty takes given-ness as a purelymethodological decision, admits that preferences change, but makes no at-tempt to change them in an explicit or systematic manner.This view arguesthat if we set out to change preferences, we have taken a giant step down theroad toward paternalism, expertism, and perhaps even totalitarianism (Ran-dall 1995). Preferences are highly individual, and nobody-not politicians,not philosophers, not social scientists, and certainly not environmental ac-tivists—is justified in telling individuals what cheir preferentes should be, ac-coding to this view.

The fourth degree is labeled “democratic preference change.” If a demo-

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cratis process, including safeguards for individual rights of present people,

is in place, then it makes sense to inject into the debate moral concerns

about the well-being of future generations, even if these arguments require

questioning and criticizing individuals sincerely felt current preferences. As

in the miser/drunk/health freak example above, discussion and criticism of

particular preference orderings may be in the form of rational suasion, of

pointing out to people the consequences of their desires, of showing alter-

native paths to personal satisfaction that have less severe impacts on the fu-

ture of society, and of modifying valuation procedures to reflect more

closely the preference sets that are more likely co lead to ecologically sus-

tainable and socially fair decisions. For short-run problems, it may seem rea-

sonable to assume chat preferences are given, but it is less reasonable for

long-run problems, and in particular not for problems related to ecological

sustainability and social fairness.

There is a huge literature on how preferences change, which we can only

touch on here, with relevant research from psychology and economics, in

particular recent research on preference reversals (Tversky and Kahneman

1986), revealed preferences, constructed preferences (Gregory et al. 1993),

and decision making under uncertainty (Heiner 1983); social psychology

and sociology, in particular research on social traps (Platt 1973, Cross and

Guyer 1980); anthropology, especially research on coevolutionary adapta-

tion of cultures and ecosystems, and ecological anthropology (Harris 1979);

and animal ecology, especially research on animal feeding and foraging pref-

erences.

Coevolving Preferences, Goals, and Values

There are certainly several historical examples of societies that managed to

integrate the three goals of ecological sustainability, social fairness, and al-

locative efficiency. Some of their adaptations still survive (Gadgil et al. 1993,

Norgaard 1994). In these societies a pattern of coevolutionary adaptation

between social systems and natural systems must have been the norm, with

the adaptations in many cases driven by crises, learning, and redesign

(Holling et al. 1995a). Individual preferences acted in a cultural setting that

promoted sustainability of the combined and coevolving social-ecological

system, simply because behaving in a sustainable fashion was a necessity for

survival and we only observe the societies that have survived.

Some of the most sophisticated coevolved institutions are common-prop-

erty arrangements. Examples include Spanish huertas for irrigation, Swiss

grazing commons (Ostrom 1990), and marine resource tenure systems in

Oceania (Johannes 1978). In other areas, such institutions have evolved over

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a short period of time (on the order of one decade) in response to a man-agement crisis. An example is the Turkish Mediterranean coastal fishery inAlanya (Berkes 1992). There are social mechanisms in place that respond toecological feedbacks and direct societies’ adaptation toward sustainability.The coevolutionary character reflects the fact that ecological and social sys-tems can change qualitatively to generate and implement innovations thatare truly creative, in the sense of opportunities for novel cooperation andfeedback management (Holling et al. 1995a).

Of course, such social mechanisms for adaptations cannot be captured ina conventional cost-benefit analysis, which only reflects what an aggregateof current individuals prefer, without discussion. The results of a benefit-cost study are not sufficient to address the question of which policy is bestrelative to all three goals mentioned above, since efficiency in a cost-benefitcontext does not guarantee sustainability or fairness (Bishop 1993, Perrings1994).

Thus, we can distinguish at least three types of value that are relevant tothe problem of valuing ecosystem services. These are laid out in table 4.1,according to their corresponding goal or value basis. Efficiency-based value(E-value) is described in detail in several recent publications (e-g., Mitchelland Carson 1989, Costanza et al. 1989, Dixon and Hufschmidt 1990, Bardeand Pearce 1991, Aylward and Barbier 1992, Pearce 1993; chapter 3, thisvolume). It is based on a model of human behavior sometimes referred to asHomo economies, which suggests that humans act rationally and in their ownself-interest. Value in this context (E-value) is based on current individualpreferences that are fixed or given (level 1, 2, or 3 of consumer sovereignty,as described above). Little discussion or scientific input is required to formthese preferences, and value is simply people’s revealed willigness to payfor the good or service in question.

Fairness-based value (F-value) would require that individuals vote fortheir preferences as a member of the community, not as individuals. Thisspecies (Homo communicus) would engage in much discussion with othermembers of the community and come to consensus on the values that wouldbe fair to all members of the current and future community (including non-human species), incorporating scientific information about possible futureconsequences as necessary. One method to implement this might be Rawis’s(197 1) “veil of ignorance,” by which everyone votes as if they were operat-ing with no knowledge of their own status in current or future society.

Sustainability-based value (S-value) would require an assessment of thecontribution to ecological sustainability of the item in question. The S-valueof ecosystem services is connected to their physical, chemical, and biologi-cal role in the long-term functioning of the global system. Scientific infor-mation about the functioning of the global system is thus critical in assess-ing S-value, and some discussion and consensus building is also necessary.

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Table 4.1. Valuation of ecosystem services based on the threeprimary goals of efficiency, fairness, and sustainability

Level of

Goal or W h oLevel of scientific

Preference Discussion Input. specificValue Basis Votes Bas i s R e q u i r e d R e q u i r e d M e t h o d s

Efficiency Homoeconomius

Currentindividualpreferences

low low willingnessto pay

Homo community high medium veil ofcommunicus preferences ignorance

sustainability Homo Whole system medium high modelingnaturalis preferences with

precaution

If it is accepted that all species, no matter how seemingly uninteresting orlacking in immediate utility, have a role to play in natural ecosystems

(Naeem et al. 1994, Tilman and Downing 1994, Holling et al. 1995b), esti-mates of ecosystem services may be derived from scientific studies of therole of ecosystems and their biota in the overall system, without direct ref-erence to current human preferences. Humans operate as Homo naturalis inthis context, expressing preferences as if they were representatives of thewhole system. Instead of being merely an expression of current individualpreferences, S-value becomes a system characteristic related to the item’sevolutionary contribution to the survival of the linked ecological economic.system. Using this perspective we may be able to better estimate the valuescontributed by, say, maintenance of water and atmospheric quality to long-term human well-being, including protecting the opportunities of choice forfuture generations (Golley 1994, Perrings 1994). One way to get at thesevalues would be to employ systems-simulation models that incorporate themajor linkages in the system at the appropriate time and space scales (Bock-stael et al. 1995). To account for the large uncertainties involved, these mod-els. would have to be used in a precautionary way, looking for the range ofpossible values and erring on the side of caution.

A Two-Tiered Decision Structure

How does one integrate these three goals and their related forms of value ina social-choice structure that preserves democracy? We advocate a two-

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tiered conceptual model (Page 1991, Norton 1994, Costanza et al 1995)that makes value formation and reformation an endogenous element in thesearch for a rational policy for managing human economic activities. Morelike the decision-making process going on in the real world and less likemost models fot evaluating environment policies, this conceptual modelembeds both economic models and ecological models in a larger socialprocess.The firsr step in that process, however, is political, not scientific. Itis necessary for the various elements of a community or society, perhapsthrough representatives of the stakeholder groups, to propose and discussvarious visions that they would set as positive outcomes of a process of eco-nomic development over generations. An important part of this will be theranking of risks and attempts to set some kind of priorities in addressing riskproblems. But comparative risk processes are not as important as public dis-cussions of the positive, long-term aspirations of the stakeholders for theirregion. It may be possible to begin by attempting to agree on some possiblemanagement goals and some projects (to be undertaken in willing localcommunities), to experiment with pilot projects and to evaluate them scien-tifically in pursuit of shared, if tentative, goals. The implementation ofAgenda 21 of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in1992 is one example of such a process, based on a shared vision of a sus-tainable society formulated by the global community.

The model is hierarchical in the sense that economic models representlarge subsystems that are embedded in larger-scale ecological, biogeochem-ical, and hydrological systems (figure 4.1). We model economic behaviorsand activity on a shorter frame of time (severa1 years), while modeling therelationship of the economy to the larger physical systems that form its man-agement context on longer scales of time (decades to centuries). A two-tiersystem of analysis sorts possible environmental problems and risks accord-ing to the likely temporal and spatial scale of their impacts, and applies anappropriate action criterion—such as a cost-benefit criterion or a Safe Min-imum Standard criterion—given the scope and scale of possible risks of apolicy. The model is an action-based model that includes economic modelsand ecological models in a larger system that sets goals, engages in experi-ments and pilot projects in search of those goals, monitors progress towardthose goals scientifically, and then factors scientific results into an ongoingpublic process of revising goals and the policies designed to achieve them(Costanza et al. 1995). It is this learning or “adaptive management” (wal-ters 1986) that submits policies to rigorous re-examination both with regardto progress toward the stated goals, and also with regard to the “appropri-ateness” of current individual preferentes under various models.

In this context, actively seeking to influence preferences is consistent witha democratic society. In order to operationalize real democracy at least a

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Figure 4.1. Human dominated ecosystems are parts of the overall global sys-tem. Ecosystem services are essential for the development and well-being ofhuman society, but only a fraction of this work is covered by market prices orperceived by humans.

two-tiered decision structure, or, better, a multilayered set of institutions(Ostrom 1990, Harma 1997), ought to be used.This is necessary in order toeliminate “preference inconsistencies” between the short term and the longterm and between local and global goals, a phenomenon described in the so-cial psychology literature as a “social trap” (Platt 1973, Cross and Guyer1980). There must first be general, democratic consensus on the broad,long-term goals of society. At this leve1 “individual sovereignty” holds in thesense that the rights and goals of all individuals in society must be taken intoaccount, but in the context of a shared dialogue and discussion aimed atachieving the broadest consensus possible. Once the broad goals are demo-cratically arrived at, they can be used to limit and direct preferences at lowerlevels. For example, once there is general consensus on the goal of sustain-ability, then society is justified in taking action to change local behaviors thatare inconsistent with this goal. It may be justified, for example, to attempt tochange either people’s preferences for driving automobiles or the price ofdoing so (or both) in order to change behavior to be more consistent withlonger-term sustainability goals. In this way we are utilizing the foresightthat we do possess in order to modify short-term cultural evolutionaryforces toward achieving our shared long-term goals.

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Such a process is going on continuously at various levels in society. Fromthe level of the household to international agreements, the institutionalframework (formal and informal norms and rules) constrain and shape thepreferences of individuals. Institutions are defined as the humanly devisedconstraints that structure incentives in human exchange, whether political,

social, or economic, and that shape human interactions and the way societiesevolve through time (North 1990).

Integrated Ecological-Economic Modeling and Assessment

Addressing the goal of ecological sustainability requires a large measure ofscientific assessment and modeling (Faucheux et al. 1996). The process ofintegrated ecological-economic modeling can help to build mutual under-standing, solicit input from a broad range of stakeholder groups, and main-tain a substantive dialogue between members of these groups. In the processof adaptive management, integrated modeling and consensus building areessential components (Gunderson et al. 1995). A recent Scientific Commit-tee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) project on Integrated Eco-logical Economic Assessment (IA for short) developed the following basicframework (Costanza and Tognetti 1996). The framework is seen as a cre-ative and learning process rather than a purely technical tool—within whicha well-rounded decision can be achieved through the consensus of stake-holders. The process consists of twelve steps and assumes feedback loopsfrom later steps to earlier steps:

1. Define the focus of attention. This would likely result from a proposeddevelopment opportunity and/or an ecological concem.

2. Identify stakeholders. These typically would include the govemment,business, landowners, nongovernmental organizations, funding agen-cies, community-based organizations, researchers, etc.

3. Establish techniques to bring stakeholders together (e.g., roundtable). Thisstep presupposes that one or more of the stakeholders has sufficientinterest to draw the remaining stakeholders to a meeting. It may bethat specific stakeholders need to be persuaded that it is in their bestinterest to convene in such a roundtable. Other stakeholders mayneed to convince them of the value of developing a participatory ap-proach.

4. Seek agreement on an acceptable facilitator. Ideally such a personshould be as neutral and unbiased as possible and without a stake inthe outcome of the process. The facilitator should nevertheless be

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commined to the process and be able to balance the differing powersof the stakeholders.

5. Define stakeholder interests. Before the roundrable meeting, stake-holder groupings should be encouraged to meet and discuss their owninterests.

6. Hold roundtable The roundtable should ideally be ronvened jointlyby several stakeholders.The agenda should include opportunities for:

• sharing individual visions

• identifying complementarity and conflicts

• agreeing that a process is necessary to address conflicts

• seeing that integrated assessment is a way forward with the poten-cial to develop consensus and arrive at a “win-win” situation

• establishing a structure for ongoing dialogue including a stake-holder committee to oversee the process and feedback opportuni-ties to the stakeholder groups and to all stakeholders collectively.

7. Undertake a scoping exercise. This process is necessary to identify thekey issues, questions, data/information availability, land-use patterns,proposed developments, existing institutional frameworks, timing andspatial consideration, etc. It provides a means to determine whether aspecific action will have significant effects on expressed values and tolink the model with those values. This scoping exercise is also seen asbuilding trust among the stakeholders, as well as an acceptance of theprocess.The stakeholders build upon knowledge and capacity.

8. Build and run a scoping model. A scoping model provides a relativelyquick process of identifying and building in the key components inorder to:

• generate alternative scenarios

• identify critical information gaps

• understand the sensitivity of the scenarios to uncertainty

• identify and agree on additional work to be undertaken by one ormore methods of detailed modeling.

Stakeholders participate in the development of the scoping model.

9. Commission detailed modeling. Additional information is gathered andthe chosen model(s) are modified, extended, and run.

10. Present models. Also present results of model scenarios and discussfindings among stakeholders.

11. Build consensus recommendations.

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12. Proceed with, and monitor the development of, the preferred scenario.Learn from the results and iterate the LA process as necessary. Per-ceptions change as things actually happen, thus the process must per-mit changing values to influence decisions at each stage. As iterationsoccur, the scenario conception changes, leading to new issues for res-olution among groups.

Severa1 examples of applying this process are discussed in Costanza andRuth (1996). One example Worth noting is in the Patuxent River drainagebasin in Maryland, where integrated ecological-economic modeling andanalysis are being applied in order to improve understanding of regionalsystems, assess potential future impacts of various land-use, development,and agricultura1 policy options, and better assess the value of ecological sys-tems (Bockstael et al. 1995, Reyes et al. 1996). The integrated model willallow stakeholders to evaluate the indirect effects over long-time horizons ofcurrent policy options. These effects are almost always ignored in partialanalyses, although they may be very significant and may reverse many long-held assumptions and policy predictions. It will also allow us to directly ad-dress the functional value of ecosystem services by looking at the long-term,spatial, and dynamic linkages between ecosystems and economic systems(figure 4.2).

While integrated models aimed at realism and precision are large, com-plex, and loaded with uncertainties of various kinds (Costanza et al. 1990,Bockstael et al. 1995), our abilities to understand, communicate, and dealwith these uncertainties are rapidly improving. It is also important to re-member that while increasing the resolution and complexity of models in-creases the amount we can say about a system, it also limits how accuratelywe can say it. Model predictability tends to fall with increasing resolutiondue to compounding uncertainties as described above (Costanza andMaxwell 1994). What we are after are models that optimize their “effective-ness” (Costanza and Sklar 1985) by choosing an intermediate resolutionwhere the product of predictability and resolution (effectiveness) is maxi-mized

It is also necessary to place the modeling process within the larger frame-work of adaptive management (Holling 1978) if it is to be effective. We needto view the implementation of policy prescriptions in a different, moreadaptive way, which acknowledges the uncertainty embedded in our modelsand allows participation by all the various stakeholder groups. “Adaptivemanagement” views regional development policy and management as “ex-periments,” where interventions at several levels are made to achieve under-standing and to identify and test policy options (Holling 1978, Walters 1986,Lee 1993, Gunderson et al. 1995). This means that models, and policies

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based on them, are not taken as the ultimate answers, but rather as guidingan adaptive experimentation process with the regional system. More em-phasis is placed on monitoring and feedback to check and improve themodel,’ rather than using the model to obfuscate and defend a policy that isnot corresponding to reality. Continuing stakeholder involvement is essen-tial in adaptive management.

C o n c l u s i o n s

if economics and other social sciences are to adequately address problemsof sustainability, it will be necessary to develop evolutionary models thatmake preference formation and reformation an endogenous part of theanalysis, and to develop mechanisms to modify short-term cultural evolu-tionary forces in the direction of long-term sustainability and social fairnessgoals. Society has begun to do this with the recent growing consensus thatsustainability is an appropriate long-run, global goal (WCED 1987), but

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4.EFFICIENCY, FAIRNESS, AND SUSTAINABILITY AS GOALS

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Figure 4.2. Integrated ecological economic modeling and valuation framework.

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ROBERT CONSTANZA AND CARL FOLKE

there is still a long way to go in developing explicit, shared visions of a sus-tainable and desirable society (Meadows 1996).

We believe that society can make better choices about ecosystems if thevaluation issue is made as explicit as possible.This means taking advantageof the best information we can muster about ecosystem services and beingaware of the different goals of society and their attendant values. In thispaper we have discussed the goals of ecological sustainability, social fairness,and economic efficiency as a basis for valuation in an integrated way. Meth-ods for valuation relative to the efficiency goal are weil developed. Methodsrelative to the other two goals need much further development. For valua-tion relative to fairness we may need to operate behind a “veil of ignorance”as to our status and position in current and future society (Rawls 1971). Forvaluation relative to sustainability we need to develop truly integrated as-sessments and models of the quality, quantity, and spatial and temporal dy-namics of ecosystem services and the various aspects of their connection tohuman well-being in the long run. In all cases it also means acknowledgingand communicating the huge uncertainties associated with this endeavor,and developing new and better ways to make decisions that achieve ourgoals in the face of these uncertainties.

A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

RonTrosper, Charles Perrings, Gretchen Daily, and Susan Hanna providedhelpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. The Pew CharitableTrusts and the Beijer International Institute for Ecological Economics pro-vided support during the preparation of this manuscript.

R e f e r e n c e s

Arrow, K. J.’ 195 1. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: John Wiley.

Arrow, K. J., and H. Raynaud. 1986. Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision-Mak-ing. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Ayiward, B. A., and E. B. Barbier. 1992. “Valuing environmental functions in devel-oping counuies.” Biodiversity and Consemarion 1:3-50.

Barbier, E.B., J. C. Burgess, and C. Folke. 1994. Paradise Lost? The Ecologicat Eco-nomics of Biodiversity. London: Earthscan.

Barde, J-P., and D. W. Pearce. 1991. Valuing the Environment: Six: Case Studies. Lon-don: Earthscan.

Berkes, F 1992. “Success and Failure in Marine Coastal Fisheries of Turkey.” In

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Making the Commons Work. D. W. Bromley, ed.. pp. 161-182. San Francisco: In-

stitute for Contemporary Studies.

Berkes, F, and C. Folke. 1994. “Investing in Cultural Capital for a Sustainable Use

of Natural Capital.” In Investing in Natural Capital: The Ecological Economics Ap-

proach to Sustainability, A.M. Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R Coscanza,

eds., pp. 128-149. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

Bishop. R.C. 1993. “Economic efficiency, sustainability, and biodiversity.” Ambio.

Bockstael, N., R Costanza, I. Strand, W. Boynton, K. Bell, and L. Wainger.

“Ecological economic modeling and valuation of ecosystems.” Ecological Eco-

nomics 14:143-159.

Buchanan, J. M. 1954. “Social choice, democracy, and free markets.” Journal of Po-

litical Economy 62:114-123.

Costanza, R., ed. 199 1. Ecological Economics: The Science and Management of Sustain-

ability. New York: Columbia University Press.

Costanza, R., S. C. Farber, and J. Maxwell. 1989. “The valuation and management

of wetland ecosystems.” Ecological Economics 1:335-361.

Costanza, R., and T. Maxwell. 1994. “Resolution and predictability: An approach to

the scaling problem.” Landscape Ecology 9:47-57.

Costanza, R., B. Norton, and R.C. Bishop. 1995. “The Evolution of Preferences:

Why ‘Sovereign’ Preferences May Not Lead to Sustainable Policies and What to

Do About It.” Paper presented at the SCASSS (Swedish Collegium for Advanced

Study in the Social Sciences) workshop Economics, Ethics, and the Environment,

Upsalla, Sweden, August 25-27.

Costanza, R., and M. Ruth. 1996. “Dynamic Systems Modeling for Scoping and

Consensus Building.” Paper presented at the inaugural conference of the Euro-

pean Chapter of the International Society for Ecological Economics: Ecology, So-

ciety, Economy, Universitè de Versailles, Paris, France, May 23-25.

Costanza, R., and F.H. Sklar. 1985. “Articulation, accuracy, and effectiveness of

mathematical models: A review of freshwater wetland applications.” Ecological

Modelling 27:45-68.

Costanza, R., F.H. Sklar, and M.L. White. 1990. “Modeling coastal landscape dy-

namics.” BioScience 43:545-555.

Costanza R., and S. Tognetti, eds. 1996. Integrated Adaptive Ecological and Economic

Modeling and Assessment- A Basis for the Design and Evaluation of Sustainable De-

velopment Programs. Draft Synthesis paper, Scientific Committee on Problems of

the Environment (SCOPE), 51 Bld de Montmorency, 750 16 Paris, France.

Cross J.G., and M.J. Guyer. 1980. Social Traps. Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress.

Daly, H. E. 1992. “Allocation, distribution, and scale: Towards an economics that is

efficient, just, and sustainable.” Ecological Economics 6: 185-193.

DeBellevue, E.B., T. Maxwell, R. Costanza, and M. Jacobsen. 1993. “Development

of a Landscape Model for the Patuxent River Watershed.” Discussion Paper No.

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Período en el que se utilizarà:Septiembre- Diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo SostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaría López Franco y Dr. Martín BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicación:Nueva YorkTítulo:State of the WorldEditorial:State of the WorldAutor/editor:Brown R. LesterCapítulo/artículo:Capítulo 1 A new economy for a new centuryAño (fecha) de publicación:1999Páginas -- De: Al:3-21

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1

A New Economy fora New Century

L e s t e r R . B r o w n a n d

C h r i s t o p h e r F l a v i n

In t he 1890s , t he Amer i can P re s sAssociation brought together the coun-try’s “best minds” to explore the shape ofthings to come in the twentieth century.Conditions at the time were in flux.Technological advances had recentlymade it possible to travel from coast tocoast by rail, the first “skyscraper” had justbeen built, and electricity was becomingcommon in some urban neighborhoods.At the same time, the economy hadrecently been hit by a depression, citieswere filling with growing numbers of poorpeople, and supplies of wood and ironore that had always seemed unlimitedwere beginning to run short.1

As they looked forward to the centuryahead, the country’s “futurists” werealmost universally optimistic, predicting

The 1996 United Nations biennial populationprojections are used in this edition since the 1998projections were published too late lo be incorpo-rated. The 1998 projections are modestly lower, butnot enough to alter the analysis. Units of measurethroughout this book are metric unless commonusage dictates otherwise.

that many problems would be solved, andthat advancing technology and materialgrowth would produce a near Utopia.Among the predictions that have held upwell: widespread use of electricity andtelephones, the opening of the entireworld to trade, and the emancipation ofwomen. Among the things they missedwere the birth control pill and theInternet. Other forecasts proved to benaive, including the notion that peoplewould live to be 150 and that air pollutionwould be eliminated. The dark sides ofthe twentieth century-two world wars,the development of chemical and nuclearweapons, the emergence of global threatsto the stability of the natural world, and abillion people struggling just to survive-were predicted by no one.2

Today, at the dawn of the next century,faith in technology and human progress isalmost as prevalent in the writings of lead-ing economic commentators. Their easyoptimism is bolstered by the extraordi-nary achievements of the twentieth centu-ry, including developments such as jet

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aircraft, personal computers, and geneticengineering, that go well beyond any-thing predicted by the most imaginativefuturists of the 1890s. But like their pre-decessors, today’s fututists look aheadfrom a narrow perspective-one thatignores some of the most importanttrends now shaping our world. And intheir fascination with the information agethat is increasingly prominent in the glob-al economy, many observers seem to haveforgotten that our modern civilization,like its forerunners, is totally dependenton its ecological foundations.

Since our emergence as a species,human populations have continually runup against local environmental limits: theinability to find sufficient game, growenough food, or harvest enough woodhas led to sudden collapses in humannumbers and in some cases to the disap-pearance of entire civilizations. Althoughit may seem that advancing technologyand the emergence of an integratedworld economy have ended this age-oldpattern, they may have simply transferredthe problem to the global level.

The challenge facing us at the dawn ofa new century begins with scale. Humannumbers are four times the level of a cen-tury ago, and the world economy is 17times as large. This growth has allowedadvances in living standards that ourancestors could not have imagined, but ithas also undermined natural systems inways they could not llave feared. Oceanicfisheries, for example, are being pushedto their limits and beyond, water tablesare falling on every continent, rangelandsare deteriorating from overgrazing, manyremaining tropical forests are on theverge of being wiped out, and carbondioxide (CO2) concentrations in theatmosphere have reached the highestleve1 in 160,000 years. If these trends con-tinue, they could make the turning of themillennium seem trivial as a historicmoment, for they may be triggering thelargest extinction of life since a meteorite

wiped out the dinosaurs some 65 millionyears ago.3

As we look forward to the twenty-firstcentury, it is clear that satisfying the pro-jected needs of an ever larger world pop-ulation with the economy we now have issimply not possible. The western econom-ic model-the fossil-fuel-based, automo.bile-centered, throwaway economy-thatso dramatically raised living standards forpart of humanity during this century is introuble. Indeed, the global economy can-not expand indefinitely if the ecosystemson which it depends continue to deterio-rate. We are entering a new century, then,with an economy that cannot take uswhere we want to go. The challenge is todesign and build a new one that can sus-tain human progress without destroyingits support systems-and that offers a bet-ter life to all.

The shift to an environmentally sus-tainable economy may be as profound atransition as the Industrial Revolutionthat led lo the current dilemma was. Howsuccessful we will be remains to be seen.Yet we have always stood out from otherspecies in our ability to adapt to new envi-ronmental conditions and challenges.The next test is now under way.

T H E AC C E L E R A T I O N OF

H I S T O R Y

Although the specific turning point thatwill be observed on January 1, 2000, is apurely human creation, flowing from thecalendar introduced by Julius Caesar in45 B.C., the three zeros that will appear onthat day are powerful reminders of thepassage of time-and of how the pace ofchange has accelerated since the last suchturn ing poin t , in the Middle Ages.Today’s rapid changes tend to make usthink of a century, not to mention a mil-lennium as a vast span of time. But the

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sweeping developments in the past centu-ry have all occurred in a period that rep-resents just 1 percent of the time sincehumans first practiced agriculture.4

In a sense, the acceleration of humanhistory began long before the first historybook was ever written. Scientists note thatthe development of technology suddenlysped up some 40,000 years ago, marked bythe proliferation of ever-more sophisticat-ed tools used for hunting, cooking, andother essential tasks. With these tools, ourancestors grew in number to roughly 4million, and spread out from their bases inAfrica and Asia, gradually populating vir-tually the entire Earth-from the humidtropics to arid plains and frozen tundra.5

The second burs t of accelera t ingchange began roughly 10,000 years agowith the development of settled agricul-ture, first in the “Fertile Crescent” nearthe eastern Mediterranean, and soonthereafter in China and Central America.Although the early development of agri-culture appears to have been spurred bygrowing populations and shortages of eas-i ly gathered food, the Agricul tura1Revolution soon transformed society,leading to more sophisticated tools andsocial structures, including the emer-gence of the first towns and cities. Theseadvances increased the human carryingcapacity of the planet: human numbers,which had been stalled at roughly 4 mil-lion for tens of thousands of years,jumped to an estimated 27 million in2000 B.C., then to roughly 100 million atthe start of the Christian Era, and to 350million by the beginning of the currentmillennium.6

World population failed to grow muchin the Middle Ages, as limited food supplies and devastating plagues sweptEurope and China, and societies stagnat-ed. The next acceleration of historybegan with the accumulation of humanknowledge and the emergence of sciencein the middle centuries of the currentmillennium. These led to thc early stages

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of the Industrial Revolution in the eigh-teenth century, as manufacturing grew,cities expanded, and trade increased. By1825, our population reached the 1 bil-lion mark for the first time. Even then,however, changes in communications,transportation, agriculture, and medicinewere so slow as to be scarcely perceptiblewithin a given generation. In the earlynineteenth century, most people lived onfarms, and travel was not much differentthan it had been 1,000 years earlier, limit-ed to the speed of a horse: the trip fromNew York to Boston, for example, took sixdays. That this situation could change,and change profoundly, was to most peo-ple unimaginable.7

One hundred years later, the accelerat-ing pace of change can be seen in virtual-ly every field of human activity. Thetechnological advances of this century,building on the scientific progress of ear-lier ones, can only be described as spec-tacular. Advances in mathematics, physics,and engineering have enabled us toexplore other planets in our solar systemand to visit Earth’s moon. Astronauts rou-tinely orbit the Earth in 90 minutes andcan see it as never before. Prior to thiscentury, economies were largely agricul-tural, and growth was generally limited tothe rate of clearing of new land, sinceland productivity changed little over time.But as the century progressed, the mod-ern industrial age unfolded and the west-ern industrial development model beganto spread. It was growth in the industrialsector that sharply accelerated overa11economic growth dur ing the ear lydecades of this century.8

In many ways, the defining economicdevelopment of this century is the har-nessing of the energy in fossil fuels. In1900, only a few thousand barrels of oilwere used daily. By 1997, that figure hadreached 72 million barrels per day. (SeeChapter 2.) We have also seen a vastincrease in the use of materials, includinggrowth in the use of metals from 20 mil-

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lion tons annually to 1.2 billion tons. (SeeChapter 3.) The use of paper increased sixtimes between 1950 and 1996, reaching281 million tons. (See Chapter 4.)Production of plastics, largely unheard ofin 1900, reached 131 million tons in 1995.The human economy now draws on all 92naturally occurring elements in the peri-odic chart, compared with just 20 in 1900.9

Among the most obvious acceleratingtrends is the increase in human mobility, adevelopment the forecasters in the 1890sdid not anticipate. At the end of the nine-teenth century, early steam-powered trainsand the first motor cars with internal com-bustion engines were limited to speeds ofabout 25 miles per hour—and their highcost kept most people on foot. In 1900,there were only a few thousand automo-biles in use worldwide. Today there are501 million. During the first half of thiscentury we went from the pioneeringflight by the Wright brothers in 1903 atlatty Hawk, North Carolina, to jet aircraftthat could fly faster than sound. Today,jumbo jets routinely carry 400 passengerson transoceanic flights. Their wingspansof 200 feet exceed the 120 feet that Wilburand Orville Wright traveled on their firstflight. On modern aircraft, we travel fasterthan our biological clocks can adjust, leav-ing us jetlagged, our bodies out of syncwith the local day/night cycle.10

Engineers built the fìrst electronic com-puters in 1946; in 1949, Popuar Mechanicsmagazine predicted that “computers inthe facture may have only 1,000 tubes andperhaps weigh only one anda half tons”Today, the average 5-pound laptop com-puter can process data faster than thelargest mainframes available at mid-centu-ry. Tiny silicon chips can now perform 200million calculations a second, up from 50million just four years ago. Computers,software, and related products and ser-vices are fueling economic growth anddoing it with a minimal use of physicalresources. Just as mechanization raisedblue collar and farm labor productivity,

computerization is doing the same forwhite-collar workers. In the United States,an important threshold was crossedrecently when the market capitalization ofMicrosoft passed that of General Motors,signifying the dominance of a new gener-ation of technology.”

One outgrowth of the information ageis what The Economist editor FrancesCairncross describes as “the death of dis-tance.” The number of telephone linesleapt from 89 million in 1960 to 741 mil-lion in 1996, while cellular phone sub-scribers rose from 10 million in 1990 to135 million in 1996. At the end of 1998,the world’s first affordable satellite tele-phones went on the market, bringing theworld’s most remote regions into the ubiq-uitous information web. And the numberof households with televisions went from 4million in 1950 to just under 1 billion asthe century closes, bringing the latestnews and cultural trends to a global com-munity. The explosive growth of theInternet, expanding from 376,000 hostcomputers in 1990 to more than 30 mil-lion in 1998, has far surpassed the growthof heavy industry during its heyday.12

In biology, this century saw the emer-gence of antibiotics and a dramatic reduc-tion in the toll of infectious diseases.Routine immunization of children hashelped make infant and Child deaths a rar-ity in many societies. Led by the UnitedNations, the world has eradicated small-pox, once a scourge for most of humanity.A more recent U.N. initiative has eliminat-ed polio in two thirds of the world, andpromises to do away with this frighteningdisease entirely. Organ transplants arenow routine and the transfer of geneticmaterial from one species to another iscommonplace. At the same time, 29 newdiseases have been identified in the lastquarter of this century. Among them areLyme disease, the Ebo la v i ru s ,Legionnaires’ disease, HIV, and the Hantavirus. HIV, now reaching epidemic pro-portions in Africa, is projected soon to

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eclipse traditional diseases such as malariaand tuberculosis as the leading cause ofdeath from infectious disease.13

Aside from the growth of populationitself, urbanization is the dominant demo-graphic trend of the century now ending.(See Chapter 8.) In 1900, some 16 citieshad a million people or more, and rough-ly 10 percent of humanity lived in cities.Today, 326 cities have at least that manypeople and there are 14 megacities, thosewith 10 million or more residents. If citiescontinue to grow as projected, more thanhalf of us will be living in them by 2010,making the world more urban than ruralfor the first time in history. In effect, wewill have become an urban species, farremoved from our hunter-gatherer ori-gins and more separated from our natur-al underpinnings than ever before.14

Our growing population has requiredever greater quantities of food, and grow-ing incomes have led many societies todiversify and enrich their diets. Theseburgeoning food demands have been metby a continuing proliferation of new tech-nologies, including the development ofmore productive crop varieties, theexpanded use of fertilizer and irrigation,and the mechanization of agriculture.Grain use has increased nearly fivefoldsince the century began, while water usehas quadrupled. (See Chapter 7.) 15

On the darker side, the twentieth cen-tury has also been the most violent inhuman history, thanks in part to techno-logical “advances” such as the airplaneand automatic weapons. Some 26 millionpeople were killed in World War I, and 53million in World War II; combined withother war deaths since the century began,the total surpasses the war casualty figurefrom the beginning of civilization until1900. (See Chapter 9.)16

Another major change that distin-guishes the twentieth century is globaliza-tion-the vast economic and informationwebs that now tie disparate parts of theworld together. By 10,000 years ago, our

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ancestors migrating out of Africa had set-tled not only the vast Eurasian continentbut the Americas, Australia, and otherremote corners of the world as well. Ittook most of the time since then, until theEuropean Age of Exploration in the1500s, for the world’s distant peoples tobe brought into more immediate contactwith one another. And it was not until latein the nineteenth century that the devel-opment of steam-powered ships dramati-cally increased international trade. Amajor depression, two world wars, and thecold war slowed the pace of globalizationduring the early stages of this century, butthis has changed dramatically as the 1990send. World trade has grown from $380billion in 1950 to $5.86 trillion in 1997, a15-fold increase.17

T h e market cap i ta l i za t ion o fMicrosoft recently passed that ofG e n e r a l M o t o r s , s i g n i f y i n g t h edominance of a new generation oftechnology.

With the acceleration of history hascome escalating pressures on the naturalworld-on which we remain ut ter lydependent, even in the information age.New forms of environmental disrup-tion-stratospheric ozone depletion andgreenhouse warming-have begun alter-ing natural ecosystems in the past twodecades, doing particular damage to coralreefs and suspected damage to speciesranging from frogs to trees. In addition,the continuously growing global economyhas collided with many of the Earth’s nat-ural limits. These collisions can be seen insuch trends as the shrinkage of forests,the depletion of aquifers, and the col-lapse of fisheries.

Our ancestors survived, multiplied,

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and advanced by continually adjustingtheir economic patterns and finding newbalances with the natural world. Theaccelerating pace of change in the twenti-eth century has led us to new frontiersand wondrous changes that our ancestorscould not have imagined. But the econo-my that has been created cannot be sus-tained for another century. It is Worthnoting that the Fertile Crescent, wherethe f i rs t humans se t t led and c i t iesemerged, was turned into a virtual desertby ancient farmers and herders, and nowsupports only a small human population.

History will undoubtedly continue toaccelerate, but if our descendants are toprosper, historical trends will have tomove in a new direction early in the twen-ty-first century.

THE GROWTH CENTURY

Growth is a defining feature of the twenti-eth century, and has become the de factoorganizing principle for societies aroundthe world. Although growth rates haverisen and fallen, the total scale of humanactivity has expanded continually, reach-ing levels that would have been unimag-inable in earlier centuries.

This growth story starts with humannumbers. It took all of human history forworld population to reach 1.6 billion in1900; the total did not reach 2 billionuntil 1930. (See Figure l-l.) The thirdbillion was added by 1960, the fourth by1977, and the fifth in just 12 years, by1989. World population will pass 6 billionin 1999. If population growth follows theU.N. mid-level projection, human num-bers will grow by another 4.6 billion in thenext century. There is a key difference,however. During the twentieth century,growth occurred in both industrial anddeveloping countries; during the nextcentury, in contrast, almost all the

increase will take place in the ThirdWorld and mainly in cities. Indeed, thepopulation of the industrial world isexpected to decline slightly.18

The annual rate of population growthclimbed from less than 1 percent in 1900to its historical high of 2.2 percent in1964. From there it has slowly declined,dropping to 1.4 percent in 1997. Despitethis, the number of people added eachyear kept increasing—from 16 million in1900 until a peak of 87 million in 1990.Since then the annual addition has alsodeclined, falling to roughly 80 million in1997, where it is projected to remain overthe next two decades before startingdownward again.19

Population is one area where detailedprojections are not only available, theyare revised biennially by the UnitedNations, giving us some sense of wherethe world is headed. According to the1996 update, population projections forindividual countries vary more than atany time in history. In some 32 countries,human numbers have stabilized, while inothers they are projected to double ortriple. With the exception of Japan, all thecountries in the stable group are inEurope. The number of people in a

Billion7

1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Figure 1-1.World Population, 1900-98

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dozen or so countries, including Russia,Japan, and Germany, is actually projectedto decline somewhat over the next half-century. (See Table l-l.) In another 40countries, which account for nearly 40percent of the global total, fertility hasdropped to at least replacement level-roughly two children per couple. Amongthe countries in this category are Chinaand the United States, the world’s firstand third most populous nations.20

In contrast to this group, some devel-oping countries are projected to tripletheir populations over the next half-cen-tury. For example, Ethiopia’s currentpopulation of 59 million is due to reach213 million in 2050, while Pakistan’s 147million are likely to become 357 million,surpassing the projected population ofthe United States before 2050. Nigeria,

meanwhile, is projected to go from 122million today to 339 million—more peo-ple than in all of Africa in 1950. Thelargest absolute increase is anticipated forIndia, which is likely to add nearly 600million by 2050, eclipsing China as themost populous country. Scores of smallercountries also face potentially overwhelm-ing population growth.²¹

Some developing countries have fol-lowed China, dramatically lowering birthrates and moving toward population sta-bility. But others are showing signs ofdemographic fatigue, a result of the effortto deal with the multiple stresses causedby high fertility. Governments strugglingwith the challenges of educating growingnumbers of children, creating jobs forswelling ranks of young job seekers, anddealing with the environmental effects of

Table 1-1. The 20 Largest Countries Ranked According to Population Size, 1998,With Projections for 2050

Rank1998

Country

1 China 1,255 India 1 ,5332 India 976 China 1,5173 United States 274 Pakistan 3574 Indonesia 207 United States 3485 Brazil 165 Nigeria 339

678910

RussiaPakistanJapanBangladeshNigeria

148 Indonesia 318147 Rrazil 243126 Bangladesh 218124 Ethiopia 213122 Iran 170

11 Mexico 96 The Congo12 Germany 82 Mexico13 Viet Nam 78 Philippines14 Iran 73 Viet Nam15 Philippines 72 Egypt16 Egypt17 Turkey18 Thailand19 France20 Ethiopia

6664626059

RussiaJapanTurkeySouth AfricaTanzania

165154131130115

114110989189

Population(million)

Country2050

Population(million)

SOURCE: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 1996 Revision (New York: 1996).

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population growth are stretched to thelimit. When a major new threat arises-such as AIDS or aquifer depletion-theyoften cannot cope.

Trillion Dollars40

35-

As recent experience with AIDS inAfrica shows, some countries with rapidpopulation growth are simply over-whelmed. While industrial countries haveheld HIV infection rates among theiradult populations under 1 percent, a 1998World Heal th Organizat ion surveyreports that in Zimbabwe a staggering 26percent of the adult population is HIVpositive. In Botswana the figure is 25 per-cent, and in Namibia, Swaziland, andZambia, it is 18-20 percent. Barring a mir-acle, these societies will lose one fifth ormore of their adult populations withinthe next decade from AIDS alone. Thesepotential losses, which could bring popu-lation growth to a halt or even intodecline, are the most demographicallycatastrophic human losses from an infec-tious disease since European smallpoxdecimated Indian populations in the NewWorld in the sixteenth century or sincebubonic plague from Central Asia devas-tated Europe in the fourteenth century.These high AIDS mortality trends inAfrica are more reminiscent of the DarkAges than the bright new millennium somany had hoped for.22

30-

25-

20 -

15-

10-

5-

1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000Figure 1-2. Gross World Product, 1900-97

Although the notion that populationgrowth can continue unaltered in thenext century is now questioned by many,faith in the feasibility—and desirability—of unending economic growth remainsstrong. During this century, the globaleconomy has expanded from an annualoutput of $2.3 trillion in 1900 to $39 tril-lion in 1998, a 17-fold increase. (SeeFigtire l-2.) Income per person, mean-while, climbed from $1,500 to $6,600, arise of just over fourfold, with most of thisrise concentrated in the second half ofthe century23

beginning of agriculture until 1900. Andgrowth of the global economy in 1997alone easily exceeded that during the sev-enteenth century. Growth has becomethe goal of every society, North andSouth. Indeed, it has become a kind ofreligion or ideology that drives societies.From the posh penthouses of Manhattanto the thatched huts of Bangladesh,human beings strive to raise their stan-dard of living by expanding their wealth.Aspir ing pol i t ic ians promise fas tergrowth, and the performance of corpo-rate CEOS is judged by how quickly theirfirms expand.24

Economic growth has allowed billionsof people to live healthier, more produc-tive lives and to enjoy a host of comfortsthat were unimaginable in 1900. It hashelped raise life expectancy, perhaps thesentinel indicator of human well-being,from 35 years in 1900 to 66 years today.Children born in 1999 can expect to livealmost twice as long as their great-grand-parents who were born around the turnof the century.25

The growth in economic output in justthree years-—from 1995 to 1998—exceed-

While one fifth of humanity lives better

ed that during the 10,000 years from thethan the kings of yore, another one fifthstill lives on the very margin of existence,

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struggling just to survive. An estimated841 million people are undernourishedand underweight, and 1.2 billion do nothave access to safe water. The income gapbetween the more affluent and the morepoverty-stricken societies in the world iswidening each year. While growth hasbecome the norm everywhere since mid-century, some countries have been moresuccessful in achieving it than others,leading to unprecedented income dispar-ities among societies.26

As the century comes to a close amidstfinancial crises from Indonesia to Russia,doubts about the basic soundness of theglobal economy have mounted. Theneeds of billions are inadequately met inthe best of times, and as Indonesia’srecent experience shows, even a briefreversa1 of economic growth can leavemillions on the brink of starvation. Morefundamentally, our current economicmodel is overwhelming the Earth’s natur-al systems.27

OVERWHELMING THE EARTH

Easter Island was one of the last places onEarth to be settled by hurnan beings. Firstreached by Polynesians 1,500 years ago,this small island 3,200 kilometers west ofSouth America supported a sophisticatedagricultura1 society by the sixteenth cen-tury. Easter Island has a semiarid climate,but it was ameliorated by a verdant forestthat trapped and held water. Its 7,000 peo-ple raised crops and chickens, caught fish,and lived in small villages. The EasterIslanders’ legacy can be seen in massive 8-meter-high obsidian statues that werehauled across the island using tree trunksas rollers.28

By the time European settlers reachedEaster Island in the seventeenth century,these stone statues, known as ahu, werethe only remnants of a once impressivecivilization-one that had collapsed in just

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a few decades. As reconstructed by archae-ologists, the demise of this society was tríg-gered by the decimation of its limitedresource base. As the Easter Island humanpopulation expanded, more and moreland was cleared for crops, while theremaining trees were harvested for fueland to move the ahu into place. The lackof wood made it impossible to build fish-ing boats or houses, reducing an impor-tant source of protein and forcing thepeople to move into caves. The loss offorests also led to soil erosion, furtherdiminishing food supplies. As pressuresgrew, armed coflicts broke out among vil-lages, slavery became common, and someeven resorted to cannibalism to survive.29

As an isolated territory that could notturn elsewhere for sustenance once itsown resources ran out, Easter Island pre-sents a particularly stark picture of whatcan happen when a human economyexpands in the face of limited resources.With the final closing of the remainingfrontiers and the creation of a fully inter-connected global economy, the humanrace as a whole has reached the kind ofturning point that the Easter Islandersreached in the sixteenth century.

For us, the key limits as we approachthe twenty-first century are fresh water,forests, rangelands, oceanic fisheries, bio-logical diversity, and the global atmos-phere. Will we recognize the world’snatural limits and adjust our economiesaccordingly, or will we proceed to expandour ecological footprint until it is too lateto turn back? Are we headed for a worldin which accelerating change outstripsour management capacity, overwhelmsour political institutions, and leads toextensive breakdown of the ecological sys-tems on which the economy depends?

Although our ancestors have struggledwi th wa te r sho r t ages f rom anc i en tMesopotamia onward, the spreadingscarcity of fresh water may be the mostunderestimated resource issue facing theworld as it enters the new millennium.

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(See also Chapter 7.) This can be seenboth in falling water tables and in riversthat run dry, failing to make it to the sea.As world water use has tripled since mid-century, overpumping has led to fallingwater tables on every continent.30

China and India, the world’s two mostpopulous countries, depend on irrigatedagriculture for half or more of their foodsupply. In China, water tables are fallingalmost everywhere that the land is flat.The northern half of the country is quiteliterally drying out. The water table undermuch of the north China Plain, a regionthat accounts for nearly 40 percent ofChina’s grain harvest, is falling by rough-ly 1.5 meters (5 feet) a year. Projections bythe Sandia National Laboratory in theUnited States show huge water deficitsemerging in some key river basins inChina as the new millennium begins.31

In India, the water situation may bedeteriorating even faster. As India’s popu-lation approaches the 1 billion mark, thecountry faces steep cutbacks in the supplyof irrigation water. David Seckler, head ofthe International Water ManagementInstitute in Colombo, the world’s premierwater research body, observes: “Theextraction of water from aquifers in Indiaexceeds recharge by a factor of 2 or more.Thus almost everywhere in India, fresh-water aquifers are being pulled down byl-3 meters per year.” Seckler goes on tospeculate that as aquifers are depleted,the resulting cutbacks in irrigation couldreduce India’s harvest by 23 percent-ina country where food supply and demandare already precariously balanced andwhere another 600 million people areexpected over the next half-century.32

At present, 70 percent of al1 the waterworldwide that is diverted from rivers orpumped from underground is used forirrigation, 20 percent is used for industry,and 10 percent goes to residences. Theeconomics of water use do not favor farm-ers. A thousand tons of water can be usedin agriculture to produce one ton of

wheat Worth $200, or it can be used toexpand industrial output by $14,000-70times as much. As the demand for waterin each of these three sectors rises and asthe competition for scarce water intensi-fies, agriculture almost always loses.33

As the history of Easter Island suggests,wood has been essential to dozens ofhuman civilizations, and the inability tomanage forests sustainably has under-mined and destroyed severa1 of them.Today, we have a global forest economy inwhich the demands of affluent Japaneseor Europeans are felt thousands of kilo-meters away- in tropical Africa,Southeast Asia, and Canada. (See Chapter4.) Since mid-century, the demand forlumber has doubled, that for fuelwoodhas nearly tripled, while paper use hasgone up nearly six times. In addition,forestlands are being cleared for slash-and-burn farming by expanding popula-tions and for commercial cropproducrion and livestock grazing. As population pressures intensify in the tropicsand subtropics, more and more forestsare being cleared for agriculture.34

A combination of logging and clearingland for farming and ranching has weak-ened forests in many areas to the pointwhere they are vulnerable to fire. Ahealthy rainforest will not burn. But largesegments of the world’s rainforests areno longer healthy. During the late sum-mer and fall of 1997, forests burned outof control in Indonesia. For months,heavy smoke filled the air in the region,causing millions of people to becomeill. Some 1,100 airline flights were can-celed. Earnings from tourism droppedprecipitously. 35

Although the fires in Indonesia cap-tured the news headlines, there was evenmore extensive burning in the Amazon,which received much less attentionbecause it was more remote. And in thespring of 1998, forests began to burn outof control in southern Mexico. The near-by state of Texas had severa1 dangerous

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air alerts as the smoke moved northward.At times, it drifted as far north as Chicago.In early summer 1998, fires also startedburning out of control in Florida. Evenwith personnel and equipment fromsome 23 states brought in to help, effortsto tame the fires failed. One entire coun-ty was evacuated along with parts of sever-al others-and this in a country thatprobably has the most sophisticated fire-fighting equipment in the world.36

No one could have anticipated theextent of the burning around the worldduring this 12-month span. But in retro-spect, there was a human influente ineach of these situations. A combinationof forests weakened by the forces justcited, El Niño-related droughts, and insome cases, as in Florida, record hightemperatures contributed to this whole-sale burning.

Fisheries actually preceded agricultureas a source of food, but ours is the firstg e n e r a t i o n t o r e a c h - a n d p e r h a p sexceed-the sustainable yield of oceanicfisheries. In fact, in just the last half-cen-tury the oceanic fish catch increasednearly five times, doubling seafood avail-ability per person for the world as awhole. Marine biologists doubt, however,that the oceans can sustain a catch muchabove the 95 million tons of the last fewyears. According to the U.N. Food andAgriculture Organization, 11 of theworld’s 15 most important fishing areasand 70 percent of the major fish speciesare either fully or overexploited. The wel-fare of more than 200 million peoplearound the world who depend on fishingfor their income and food security isthreatened. (See Chapter 5.) 37

If the biologists are right, then thedecline in seafood catch per person,which started in 1989, will persist for aslong as population growth continues.Those born shortly before 1950 haveenjoyed a doubling in seafood availabilityper person, whereas those born in recentyears can expect to see a halving of the

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catch per person during their lifetimes.The beginning of the new millenniummarks the turning point in oceanic fish-eries, a shift from abundance to onewhere preferred species become scarce,seafood prices rise, and the conflictsamong countries for access to fisheriesmultiply.

A healthy rainforest will not burn, butlarge segments of the world’s rain-forests are no longer healthy.

Although the yield data are not as pre-cise as those for oceanic fisheries, theworld’s rangelands cover roughly twicethe area of croplands, supplying most ofthe beef and mutton eaten worldwide.Unfortunately, as with fisheries, overgraz-ing is now the rule, not the exception.Sustaining future yields of meat, and insome cases milk as well, and providinglivelihoods for ever-growing pastoralistpopulations will put even more pressureon already deteriorating rangelands. Yetanother of our basic support systems isbeing overwhelmed by continuouslyexpanding human needs.38

Perhaps the best single indicator of theEarth’s health is the declining number ofspecies with which we share the planet.Throughout most of the evolutionary his-tory of life, the number of plant and ani-mal species has gndually increased, givingus the extraordinarily rich diversity of lifetoday. Unfortunately, we are now in theearly stages of the greatest decimation ofplant and animal life in 65 million years.39

Of the 242,000 plant species surveyedby the World Conservation Union-IUCNin 1997, 14 percent or some 33,000 arethreatened with extinction. (See Chapter6.) Some 7,000 are in immediate dangerof extinction and another 8,000 are vul-nerable to extinction. The principal cause

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of plant extinction is habitat destruction,often in the form of land clearing for agri-culture and ranching, for housing con-struction, or for the drainage of wetlandsfor agriculture and construction. Large-scale species migration-propelled bygrowing trade— is compounding thatthreat, as is climate change, which couldeliminate whole ecosystems in thedecades ahead.40

The status of animal species is equallyworrisome. Of the 9,600 bird species thatpopulate the Earth, two thirds are now indecline, while ll percent are threatenedwith extinction. A combination of habitatalteration and destruction, overhunting,and the introduction of exotic species isprimarily responsible. Of the Earth’s4,400 species of mammals, of which weare but one, 11 percent are in danger ofextinction. Another 14 percent are vul-nerable to extinction if recent trends con-tinue. Of the 24,000 species of fish thatoccupy the oceans and freshwater lakesand rivers, one third are now threatenedwith extinction.41

The globalization of recent decades isalso reducing the diversity of life onEarth. Mushrooming trade and travelhave broken down ecological barriersthat existed for millions of years, allowingthousands of species-plants, insects, andother creatures-to invade distant territo-ries, often driving native species to extinc-tion and disrupting essential ecologicalprocesses. Recent “bioinvasions” haveforced the abandonment of more than 1million hectares of cropland in SouthAmerica and devastated the fisheries ofEast Africa’s Lake Victoria.42

The presente of chemicals in the envi-ronment is affecting the prospects forsome animal species as well. In 1962, biol-ogist Rachel Carson warned in Si lentSpring that the continuing use of DDTcould threaten the survival of predatorybirds, such as bald eagles and peregrinefalcons, because of its effect on eggshellformation. More recently, there is grow-

ing concern that a family of syntheticchemicals associated with pesticides andplastics, so-called endocrine disrupters,could be affecting the reproductiveprocess in some species of birds, fish, andamphibians.43

The global atmosphere also faces grow-ing stress. As our fossil-fuel-based globaleconomy has expanded, carbon emissionshave overwhelmed the capacity of naturalsystems to fix carbon dioxide. The resultis a buildup in CO2 from roughly 280parts per million at the beginning ofthe industrial era to 363 parts per millionin 1998, the highest leve1 ever experi-enced. This buildup of CO2 and othergreenhouse gases is responsible for risingtemperatures over the last century,according to leading scientists. The 14warmest years since recordkeeping beganin 1866 have all occurred since 1980. Theglobal temperature in 1998 is projected tobe both the highest ever and the largestannual increase ever recorded. (SeeFigure l-3.) 44

If the world stays on the present fossilfuel path, atmospheric CO2 concentra-tions are projected to reach twice prein-dustrial levels as soon as 2050-and toraise the Earth’s average temperature

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l-3.5 degrees Celsius (2-6 degreesFahrenheit) by 2100. This is expected tobring more extreme climate events,including more destructive storms andflooding, as well as melting ice caps andrising sea levels. A new computer simula-tion by Britain’s Hadley Centre forClimate Change in late 1998 projectedmajor reductions in food production inAfrica and the United States as a result ofclimate change. The Hadley scientists alsoidentify the potential for a “runaway”greenhouse effect after 2050 that couldturn areas such as the Amazon and south-ern Europe into virtual deserts.45

The global climate is an essential foun-dation of natural ecosystems and theentire human economy. If we are enteringa new period of climate instability, theconsequences could be serious indeed,affecting virtually all of Earth’s ecosys-tems, accelerating the pace of extinction,and leaving few areas of economic lifeuntouched.

Even in a high-tech information age,human societies cannot continue to pros-per while the natural world is progressive-ly degraded. Our food crops andmedicines are derived from wild plants,and even genetic engineering is based onrearranging the genes that nature has cre-ated. Moreover, our crops, industries, andcities require healthy ecosystems to storeour water and to maintain a nurturing cli-mate. Like the early residents of EasterIsland, we are vulnerable. But unlikethem, we can see the problem coming.

T HE S HAPE OF A N E WECONOMY

As noted earlier, the western industrialdevelopment model that has evolved overthe last two centuries has raised living stan-dards to undreamed-of levels for one fifthof humanity. It has provided a remarkably

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diverse diet, unprecedented levels ofmaterial consumption, and physicalmobility that our ancestors could not haveimagined. But the fossil-fuel-based, auto-mobile-centered, throwaway economy thatdeveloped in the West is not a viable sys-tem for the world, or even for the Westover the long term, because it is destroy-ing its environmental support systems.

If the western model were to becomethe global model, and if world populationwere to reach 10 billion during the nextcentury, as the United Nations projects,the effect would be startling. If, for exam-ple, the world has one car for every twopeople in 2050, as in the United Statestoday, there would be 5 billion cars. Giventhe congestion, pollution, and the fuel,material, and land requirements of thecurrent global fleet of 501 million cars, aglobal fleet of 5 billion is difficult to imag-ine. If petroleum use per person were toreach the current U.S. level, the worldwould consume 360 million barrels perday, compared with current production of67 million barrels.4c

Or consider a world of 10 billion witheveryone following an American diet, cen-tered on the consumption of fat-rich live-stock products. Ten billion people wouldrequire 9 billion tons of grain, the harvestof more than four planets at Earth’s cur-rent output levels. With massive irrigation-water cutbacks in prospect as aquifers aredepleted and with the dramatic slowdownin the rise in land productivity since 1990,achieving even relatively modest gains isbecoming difficult.46

An economy is environmentally sus-tainable only if it satisfies the principles ofsustainability-principles that are rootedin the science of ecology. In a sustainableeconomy, the fish catch does not exceedthe sustainable yield of fisheries, theamount of water pumped from under-ground aquifers does not exceed aquiferrecharge, soil erosion does not exceedthe natural rate of new soil formation,tree cutting does not exceed tree plant-

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ing, and carbon emissions do not exceedthe capacity of nature to fix atmosphericC O2. A sustainable economy does notdestroy plant and animal species fasterthan new ones evolve.

Once it becomes clear that the existingindustrial development model is notviable over the long term, the questionbecomes, What would an environmentallysustainable economy look like? Becausewe know the fundamental limits the worldnow faces and some of the technologiesthat are available, we can describe thisnew economy in broad outline, if not indetail. Its foundation is a new design prin-ciple-one that shifts from the one-timedepletion of natural resources to one thatis based on renewable energy and thatcontinually reuses and recycles materials.It is a solar-powered, bicycle/rail cen-tered, reuse/recycle economy, one thatuses energy, water, land, and materialsmuch more efficiently and wisely than wedo today.

The challenge in energy is to replacethe fossil fuel economy with an efficientsolar economy (see Chapter 2), definingsolar energy to include all the energysources that derive from the sun directlyor indirectly. Although solar energy in itsvarious forms has been widely considereda fringe source, it is now moving towardcenter stage. Wind power, for example,now supplies 7 percent of electricity inDenmark and 23 percent in Spain’snorthern region of Navarre, includingthe capital, Pamplona. More important,however, is the potential. A survey of U.S.wind resources by the Department ofEnergy concluded that just three states—North Dakota, South Dakota, andTexas— had enough harnessable windenergy to satisfy national electricity needs.China has enough wind potential to easi-ly double its current electricity generatingcapacity. 48

The use of solar cells to supply electric-ity is also spreading rapidly. As of the endof 1998, some 500,000 homes, most of

them in Third World villages not yet con-nected to an electrical grid, were gettingtheir electricity from solar cells.Technologically, the most excitingadvance comes from solar roofing materi-al developed in the past few years. Thesesolar tiles and shingles are made of pho-tovoltaic cells that convert sunlight intoelectricity. They promise not only to cre-ate rooftops that become the powerplants for buildings, but to revolutionizeelectricity generation worldwide.49

Widely disparate growth rates in ener-gy use show that this new climate-stabiliz-ing solar energy economy is beginning totake shape. (See Table l-2.) While theuse of coal during the 1990s has beenexpanding by 1.2 percent a year and thatof oil by 1.4 percent, sales of solar cellshave been climbing 17 percent annuallyand wind-generated electricity hasincreased 26 percent a year. Althoughthe base from which these two newsources are developing is quite small,they are both projected to grow rapidly,

with the potential to become corner-stones of the world energy economy overthe next few decades. Thus far, most ofthe installed wind power, for example,

Table 1-2. Trends in Energy Use, by Source,1990-971

Energy Source

Wind power 25.7Solar photovoltaics 16.8Geothermal power2 3.0Natural gas 2.1Hydroelectric power2 1.6Oil 1.4Coal 1.2Nuclear power 0.6

Average AnnualGrowth Rate

(percent)

¹Energy use measured in installed generatingcapacity for wind, geothermal, hydro, and nuclearpower; million tons of oil equivalent for oil, naturalgas, coal; and megawatts for shipments of solar cells.21990-96 only.SOURCE: See endnote 50.

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is concentrated in Germany, the UnitedStates, Denmark, and India, but as morecountries turn to wind, growth is likelyto accelerate.50

In 1997, British Petroleum announcedthat it was taking the threat of globalwarming seriously and was putting $1billion into solar and other renewableenergy resources. Royal Dutch Shellfollowed shortly thereafter, announcing acommitment of $500 million to renew-able energy resources, with additionalfunds likely to follow. For energy compa-nies interested in growth, it is not likely tobe in petroleum, since due to resourcelimits, oil production is projected to peakin the next 5 to 20 years, and then tobegin declining.51

As the cost of electricity from wind andother solar sources falls, it will becomeeconomical to electrolyze water, produc-ing hydrogen. Hydrogen thus becomes away of both storing and transportingrenewable energy. A device called a fuelcell efficiently turns hydrogen back intoelectricity in automobiles or small powerplants located in homes or office build-ings. Several major oil and gas companies,including Royal Dutch Shell and Gasuniein the Netherlands, have begun to take aninterest in hydrogen, while Daimler-Benz,Ford, General Electric, and Toyota are allinvesting in fuel cells. By the middle ofthe next century, hydrogen producedfrom wind-generated electricity in theplains of Mongolia or solar electricityfrom the deserts of Arizona may be sentby pipeline to distant cities.52

The notion of transport systems cen-tered on bicycles and railroads may seemprimitive at first, but this is because gov-ernments everywhere have assumed thatthe auto-centered transportation systemwas the only one to consider seriously. Theunfolding reality, however, is quite differ-ent. In 1969, the world produced 25 mil-lion bicycles and 23 million cars. Andalthough car production was expectedshortly to overtake that of bicycles, it actu-


ally fell further and further behind. Inrecent years, annual production of bicy-cles has averaged 105 million while that ofautomobiles has averaged 37 million. Incontrast to the United States, where mostbicycles sold are for recreational use, mostof the 105 million bicycles sold each yearworldwide are for basic transportation.53

In 1997, British Petroleumannounced that it was putting $1billion into solar and other renewableenergy resources.

There are many reasons why bicycleshave gained in popularity a century afterthe automobile was invented. One is thatthe number of people who can afford abicycle is far greater than the number whocan afford a car. Not only has this beentrue in recent decades, but it is also likelyto be so for some decades to come. Citiesare turning to them because they requirelittle land, do not pollute, and reduce traf-fic congestion and noise. Even thoughsome cities in Asia, notably in China andIndonesia, are discouraging the use of thebicycle instead of the car, a growing num-ber of cities are favoring bikes.54

People everywhere are discovering theinherent incompatibility between theautomobile and the city as traffic conges-tion, air pollution, and noise diminish thequality of life. Land scarcity, especially inseverely populated countries, will limitthe role of the automobile. In China, agroup of prominent scientists has chal-lenged the central government’s decisionto build an auto-centered transportationsystem, arguing that the country does nothave enough land both to feed its peopleand to build the roads, highways, andparking lots needed for cars. The neweconomy will not exclude the automobile,because in many situations it is indispens-

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able, but it is unlikely to be the center-piece of the transportation system as it isin many nations today.55

Bill Ford, Chairman of the FordMotor Company, has predicted thedemise of the internal combustionengine popularized by his great-grandfather.

.

Replacing a throwaway economy with areduce/reuse/recycle economy is per-haps more easily understood than restruc-turing the transportation system becauseof the progress already made in recycling.Nonetheless, even with substantial recy-cling gains, the flow of garbage into land-fills is still increasing almost everywherein the world. We still have a long way to goin increasing material efficiency. Someargue that it is possible to reduce materi-als use by a factor of four. Indeed, theOrganisation for Economic Co-operationand Development is investigating ways toreduce the use of materials in modernindustrial societies by 90 percent. (SeeChapter 3.) The overall challenge in man-ufacturing is to follow a new design prin-ciple, with services rather than goods asthe focus. Interface, for example-anAtlanta-based firm operating in 26 coun-tries-sells carpeting services to its clients,systematically recycling the worn-out car-pets, leaving nothing for the landfill. Thekey is to gradually reduce the materialthroughput of the economy, reducingenergy use and pollution in the process.56

Companies around the world are nowpursuing a concept known as “eco-effi-ciency,” with the goal of maximizing pro-duction while minimizing or, in somecases, eliminating effluents. WilliamMcDonough and Michael Braungartargue that these principles can underpin

a “new industrial revolution” in which

material and energy flows are minimizedand the water and air leaving a factory arein some cases cleaner than that going in.57

As water scarcity continues to spread,the need to make the global economymore water-efficient will become evenmore apparent. This includes both turn-ing to more water-efficient sources ofenergy and dramatically increasing theefficiency of water use in agriculture.Fortunately, the energy sources that donot destabilize climate, such as solar cellsand wind turbines, do not require largeamounts of water for cooling, in contrastto nuclear energy and coal.

Early signs of the emerging new econ-omy can be seen in recent decisions bycorporations and governments. In addi-tion to the oil companies that are nowinvesting heavily in wind and solarresources, other firms are also moving ina sustainable direction. MacMillanBloedel, for instance, the leading timbercompany in British Columbia, is aban-doning clearcutting, replacing it with theselective cutting of trees.58

Bill Ford, who became Chairman ofthe Ford Motor Company in late 1998,declares himself a “passionate environ-mentalist” and has predicted the demiseof the internal combustion engine popu-larized by his great-grandfather early inthe century. “There is a rising tide of envi-ronmental awareness,” says Ford. “Smartcompanies will get ahead of the wave.Those that don’t will be wiped out.”Thomas Casten, CEO of the fast-growingTrigen Energy Corporation, hasembraced the threat of climate change asone of the greatest business opportunitiesof the twenty-first century. The small,extraordinarily efficient power plants hiscompany provides can triple the energyefficiency of some older, less efficientplants. The issue, he says, is not howmuch it will cost to reduce carbon emis-sions, but who is going to harvest theenormous profits in doing so.59

At the government level, Costa Rica

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plans to generate all its electricity fromrenewable sources by 2010, and theDanish government has banned the con-struction of coal-fired power plants.China has banned timber harvesting inthe upper reaches of the Yangtze andYellow river basins, noting that the waterstorage capacity of intact forests makestrees three times more valuable standingthan cut for lumber. And most exciting ofall, Germany, now governed by a coalitionof Social Democrats and Greens, plans amassive tax restructuring, reducingincome taxes and raising energy taxes.60

These are just a few of the early exam-ples of companies and countries that arebeginning to envisage, and work toward, asustainable future. The century to comewill be the environmental century-either because we use the basic principlesof ecology to design a new economic sys-tem or because we fail to, and find thatcontinuing deterioration of the econo-my’s environmental support systems leadsto economic decline. The issue is notgrowth versus no growth, but what kind ofgrowth and where. Converting the econo-my of the twentieth century into one thatis environmentally sustainable representsthe greatest investment opportunity inhistory, one that dwarfs anything that hasgone before.

R E T H I N K I N G P R O G R E S S

As we approach the twenty-first century,many respected thinkers seem to believethat we are in for a period of inevitableeconomic and technological progress.Even the recent economic crisis that hasspread misery from Indonesia to Russia isseen as a brief pause in an unendingupward climb for Homo sapiens. In a spe-cial double issue on the economy in thetwenty-first century, Business Week ran aheadline proclaiming, “You Ain’t SeenNothing Yet,” forecasting even faster rates

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. .of economic progress in the centuryahead. The magazine’s editors expect theglobal economy to ride a wave of technol-ogy in the decades to come, solving allmanner of social problems, as well asadding to the investment portfolios of itsreaders.61

This view of the future, fueled by headyadvances in technology, is particularlyprevalent in the information industry. Itreflects a new conception of the humanspecies, one in which human societies areseen as free of dependence on the natur-al world. Our information-based economyis thought capable of evolving indepen-dently of the Earth’s ecosystem.

The complacency reflected in this viewoverlooks our continued dependence onthe natural world and the profound vul-nerabilities this represents. It concen-trates on economic indicators whilelargely overlooking the environmentalindicators that measure the Earth’s physi-cal deterioration. This view is dangerousbecause it threatens to discourage therestructuring of the economy needed ifeconomic progress is to continue. If weare to build an environmentally sustain-able economy, we have to go beyond tra-ditional economic indicators of progress.If we put a computer in every home in thenext century but also wipe out half of theworld’s plant and animal species, thatwould hardly be an economic success.And if we again quadruple the size of theglobal economy but many of us are hun-grier than our hunter-gatherer ancestors,we will not be able to declare the twenty-first century a success.

One of the first steps in redefiningprogress is to recognize that our genera-tion is the first whose actions can affectthe habitability of the planet for futuregenerations. We have acquired this capac-ity not by conscious design but as a conse-quence of a global economy that isoutgrowing its environmental support sys-tems. In effect, we have acquired thecapacity to alter the Earth’s natural sys-

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tems but have refused to accept responsi-bility for doing so. We live in a world thathas an obsessive preoccupation with thepresent. Focused on quarterly profit-and-loss statements, we are behaving asthough we had no children. In short, wehave lost our sense of responsibility tofuture generations.

We need a new moral compass toguide us into the twenty-first cen-tury—a compass grounded in theprinciples of meeting human needssustainably.

Parents everywhere are concernedabout their children. In their efforts toensure a better life for them, they investin education and medical care. But unlesswe now assume responsibility for the evo-lution of the global economy, our short-term investments in our children’s futuremay not amount to much; our principallegacy to them would be a world that isdeteriorating ecologically, declining eco-nomically, and disintegrating socially.

Building an environmentally sustain-able global economy depends on a coop-erative global effort. No country actingalone can stabilize its climate. No countryacting alone can protect the diversity oflife on Earth. No country acting alone canprotect oceanic fisheries. These goals canbe achieved only through global coopera-tion that recognizes the interdependenceof countries. Unless the needs of thepoorer nations for food, sanitation, cook-ing fuels, and other basic requirementsare being met, the world’s more affluentnations can hardly expect them to con-tribute to solving long-term global prob-lems such as climate change. Thechallenge is to reverse the last decade’strends of rising international inequalities

and shrinking aid programs.In short, we can no longer separate

efforts to build an environmentally sus-tainable economy from efforts to meetthe needs of the world’s poor. According,to various estimates, some 841 millionpeople in the world are malnourished, 1.2billion lack access to clean water, 1.6 bil-lion are illiterate, and 2 billion do nothave access to electricity.62

Forbes magazine estimates that the 225richest people in the world now have acombined wealth of more than $1 trillion,a figure that approaches the combinedannual incomes of the poorest one half ofhumanity. Indeed, the assets of the threerichest individuals exceed the combinedannual economic output (measured atthe current exchange rate) of the 48poorest countries. It is now becomingobvious that the widening gap betweenrich and poor is untenable in a worldwhere resources are shared. In theabsence of a concerted effort by thewealthy to address the problems of pover-ty and deprivation, building a sustainablefuture may not be possible.63

Efforts to restore a stable relationshipbetween the economy and its environ-mental support systems depends on socialcohesion within societies as well. As at theinternational level, this cohesion is alsoinfluenced by the distribution of wealth.As communications improve, and asseverely deprived people everywherecome to understand better their relativeeconomic position, they are likely to takeaction to achieve a more equitable shareof the economic pie. In October 1998, thedisenfranchised in the economicallydepressed southern part of Nigeria begantaking over oil wells and pumping stationsto protest their government’s failure touse its vast flow of oil wealth to benefitpeople in the region. A villager notedthat even though oil had flowed out ofthe area for 30 years, his village stillhad “no school, no clinic, no power, andlittle hope.“64

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The trends of recent years suggest thatwe need a new moral compass to guide usinto the twenty-first century-a compassthat is grounded in the principles ofmeeting human needs sustainably. Suchan ethic of sustainability would be basedon a concept of respect for future genera-tions. The challenge may be greatest inthe United States, where the per capitause of grain, energy, and materials is thehighest in the world, and where in the1990s half of all adults are overweight,where houses and cars have continued toget larger, and where driving has contin-ued to increase, overwhelming twodecades’ worth of efficiency improve-ments. The world’s ecosystems have large-ly survived 270 million people living likethis in the twentieth century, but they willnot survive 8 billion or more doing so inthe twenty-first century.65

At issue is a change in understandingand values that will support a restructur-ing of the global economy so that eco-nomic progress can continue. Althoughsuch a transformation may seem far-fetched, the end-of-century perspectiveoffers hope. The past 100 years have seenvast changes in ethics and standards. Theconcept of “human rights,” for example,has flowered in the twentieth century.The basic principles of human rights havebeen around for several hundred years,but only in 1948— a mere half— centuryago-did governments adopt a complexbody of national and international lawsthat recognize these rights. Anotherexample of changing attitudes and values,

one that has occurred even faster, is thegrowing understanding of the effects ofcigarette smoking on health. This recog-nition has led to a sea change in publicattitudes and policies toward smokingwithin a few decades.66

It is difficult to overstate the urgency ofreversing the trends of environmentaldeterioration. Archeologists study theremains of civilizations that irreparablyundermined their ecological support sys-tems. These societies found themselves ona population or economic path that wasenvironmentally unsustainable-and werenot able to make the economic adjust-ments to avoid a collapse. Unfortunately,archeological records do not tell uswhether these ancient civilizations did notunderstand the need for change, orwhether they saw the problem but couldnot agree on the steps needed to stave offeconomic decline. Today, the adjustmentswe need to make are clear. The question iswhether we can make them in time.

We know what we need to do. We havea vision of a restructured economy, onethat will sustain economic and socialprogress. In Chapter 10 we describe thepolicies—including the key one of restruc-turing the tax system—that can be used toget us there. The challenge is to mobilizepublic support for that economic transfor-mation. No challenge is greater, or moresatisfying, than building an environmen-tally sustainable global economy, onewhere economic and social progress cancontinue not only in the twenty-first cen-tury but many centuries beyond.

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Datos específicos para presenta r el materia l para los cursos

Período en el que se utilizará:septiembre-diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo SostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaria Lopez Franco y Dr. Martín BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicación:México, DFTítulo:México en Ia globalización. Condiciones y requisitos de un desarrollo sustentable yequitativo.Editorial:Fondo de cultura económicaAutor/editor:Urquidi, VictorCapítulo - artículo:Capitulo 2 La perspectiva de nuevas institucionalizacionesAño (fecha) de publicación:1996Páginas De: Al:67-118

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JACQUELINE

JACQUELINE

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II. LA PERSPECTIVA DE NUEVASINSTITUCIONALIZACIONES

2.1. LA ESFERA POLÍTICA

2. 1 .1. Los regímenes democráticos y su problemática

Una gran parte de las sociedades de los países en desarrollo,

así como las que resultaron de la desintegración de la URSS y

se han confederado en repúblicas supuestamente democráti-

cas, han carecido de las normas culturales que suponen la to-

lerancia, la libre opinión, los derechos de asociación libre, la li-

bre elección de representantes, la autonomía de los poderes

legislativo y judicial, la validez de los derechos humanos, la li-

bertad de los medios informativos y otras que caracterizan a

las sociedades principalmente europeas y de influencia euro-

pea, así como a la norteamericana y a algunas de las surgidas

de la ex comunidad británica de naciones. Estas libertades,

principios y derechos han estado vigentes históricamente -en

algunas naciones desde hace varios siglos- aunque con defi-

ciencias y carencias en muchas ocasiones.

Las potencias se han enfrascado en dos guerras mundiales,

no sólo por intereses, sino también, las victoriosas, por el ideal

de promover la democracia. No ha sido hasta la caída del ré-

gimen comunista soviético cuando se ha abierto una posibili-

dad real, todavía sujeta a altibajos, de extender a una creciente

proporción de la población mundial los principios democráti-

cos. Muchas naciones, por ejemplo en América Latina, han

sostenido principios y normas democráticos en sus Constitu-

ciones, pero con frecuencia no han podido hacerlos cumplir

ni mantener. En Asia y África existen regímenes que van más

allá de lo autoritario-democrático y se manifiestan en tiranías

militares, afectadas a su vez por tribalismo feudal. Quedan

asimismo restos de regímenes comunistas y se extienden ideo-

logías fundamentalistas que no respetan los derechos humanos.

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LA PERSPECTIVA GLOBAL

El de la República Popular de China es el más singular de

los regímenes que no son democráticos. Sigue siendo un sis-

tema de extracción comunista, y ha pasado de los excesos del

maoísmo al mantenimiento más reciente en el poder de una

elite doctrinaria. Es manifiesta la falta de libertad de los me-

dios de comunicación y la violación ostensible de los derechos

humanos. No obstante, el régimen chino ha establecido con

espíritu pragmático reformas parciales en lo económico y co-

mercial y en su actitud hacia la vida exterior.

Cabe subrayar que para China el problema demográfico

-tiene 1 200 millones de habitantes, o sea casi 20% de la po-

blación mundial actual-, a pesar de que se ha impuesto una

política bastante rigurosa de control de la natalidad, es un nu-

barrón inmenso que condiciona su futuro y el de las políticas

económicas y sociales que siga su gobierno. Los avances de

China en lo económico y comercial en el último decenio han

sido notables, pero se cuestiona su capacidad para seguirlos

logrando bajo las políticas actuales, a menos de que surjan

condiciones aún no previstas. China no es el único país que se

enfrenta a un problema demográfico-ambiental y demográfi-

co-social de primera magnitud (Ia India es otro ejemplo, en

algunos aspectos más grave). No es del caso en este estudio

adentrarse en la problemática china, sino hacer notar su

máxima importancia para el futuro global y la probabilidad de

que las consideraciones sobre la relación de China con el des-

arrollo sustentable a nivel global tendrán un peso cada vez

mayor en toda visión del futuro. Y si el desarrollo sustentable

habrá de abarcar, como se ha planteado desde el principio, la

equidad y la democratización, así como una extensa y efectiva

política de protección ambiental dentro y fuera de un territo-

rio nacional, el caso de China no puede soslayarse. Debe tener-

se en cuenta también que el desarrollo económico previsible de

China, aun si no continuara a las elevadas tasas actuales, ejer-

cerá indudable presión, ya visible, sobre sus recursos natura-

les (suelos, bosques y agua) y sobre los que demande de otros

países para atender la necesidad interna de cereales y otros gra-

nos, así como para dotar a su industria moderna de energé-

ticos, especialmente petróleo y sus derivados. El empleo del

carbón como fuente importante de energía industrial y urba-

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na es reconocido ya como altamente contaminante y obligará

a China a sustituirlo a largo plazo.

Ahora bien, sin poner en duda los elevados objetivos de la

democratización ni los avances que se registren en diferentes

partes del mundo, queda por definir la capacidad de los regí-

menes existentes para transformarse, si ésa es la intención

real, en auténticamente democráticos, no sólo en cuanto a pro-

cesos electorales, sino a la aplicación de las normas y princi-

pios a que se hace referencia. Las experiencias de los últimos

años indican que la democratización se producirá probable-

mente más por procesos internos que por presiones externas

internacionales, ya sea que provengan de las Naciones Uni-

das, la Unión Europea u otras organizaciones institucionales

o de los Estados Unidos. La base democrática tendrá que de-

rivar de la cultura de una sociedad -como lo ha sido históri-

camente-, de su acceso a la información, de la defensa de los

derechos humanos, de la autonomía y probidad de las institu-

ciones del poder judicial, de un relativo éxito en el desarrollo

económico y el crecimiento y de la tolerancia y la institucio-

nalización, vía partidos políticos y asociaciones de la sociedad

civil y vía funciones legítimas del Estado. Es previsible que el

horizonte para el logro de estos objetivos en muchas socieda-

des de los países en desarrollo, así como en los que transitan

de los sistemas comunistas a los sistemas abiertos, esté aún

bastante lejano.

La relación de estos procesos con la posibilidad de alcanzar

condiciones de desarrollo sustentable deberá ser bastante evi-

dente. Por ahora se vive en un frágil equilibrio de sistemas de

poder económico y político, de alianzas, de poderío militar la-

tente y aun demostrable como en la guerra del Golfo, en Bos-

nia y en el Medio Oriente, y no se han despejado totalmente

las amenazas de guerra nuclear que sin duda alguna, de cum-

plirse, acabarían con la esperanza del desarrollo sustentable y

con un porvenir seguro para la especie humana. A ello se aña-

de el poderío económico-financiero que refuerza estas posibi-

lidades y que a su vez crea inestabilidades difíciles de dominar

y contribuye a la ingobernabilidad a nivel mundial. El que el

sistema de las Naciones Unidas pueda intervenir con eficacia

para contrarrestar estas tendencias está aún por verse.

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LA PERSPECTIVA GLOBAL,

En los años recientes se ha prestado significativa atenciónal tema de la gobernabilidad y, más concretamente, a la pers-pectiva de la “gobernación” (govemance) a escala mundial. LaComisión sobre la Gobernación Global, resultado de la Inicia-tiva de Estocolmo de 1991 y apoyada con posterioridad, a

principios de 1992, por el secretario general de las NacionesUnidas, define la gobernación global de la siguiente manera:

La gobernación es la suma de las muchas f ormas en que los indi-

viduos y las instituciones, lo mismo públicas que privadas, admi-

nistran sus asuntos. Es un proceso continuo por medio del cual

los intereses en conflicto o diversos pueden acomodarse unos a

otros y pueden tomarse acciones en cooperación. Comprende las

instituciones formales y a los regímenes encargados de hacer cum-

plir los acuerdos, así como los arreglos informales que las perso-

nas y las instituciones hayan acordado o consideren que les con-

venga acordar. . . Al nivel global, la gobernación se ha considerado

referida principalmente a las relaciones intergubernamentales; sin

embargo, debe ahora entenderse que se refiere también a las orga-

nizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG), a los movimientos de ciu-

dadanos, a las empresas transnacionales y al mercado global de

capitales. Con estas modalidades interactúan los medios masivos

globales de comunicación, cuya influencia se ha ampliado de ma-

nera extraordinaria. 1

O sea que la gobernación global tiene que ver con la capa-

cidad para administrar los valores políticos, éticos, econó-

micos y sociales en beneficio de las poblaciones, con la inclu-

sión de los nuevos actores no gubernamentales. La Comisión

afirma que no existe un solo modelo de gobernación global:" ... es un proceso amplio, diná mico y complejo de toma inter-

activa de decisiones que evoluciona de manera constante y

que da respuesta a condiciones cambiantes. . . [AI] reconocer

la naturaleza sistémica de los problemas, deberán promover-

se enfoques sistémicos para tratarlos”. Será un proceso com-

1 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood, TheReport of the Commission..., Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 2-3 (traduc-ción libre no oficial). Véase también Edward C. Luck y Gene M. Lyons, TheUnited Nations: Fifty Years After San Francisco: A Conference Report. The JohnSloan Dickey Center for Intemational Understanding, Occasional Paper.Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1995.

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LA PERSPECTIVA DE NUEVAS INSTITUCIONALIZACIONES

plicado y más democrático -por permitir la participación-

que en épocas pasadas, y deberá ser flexible. Se requerirá tan-

to reformar las instituciones intergubernamentales existentes

como mejorar los medios de colaboración con los grupos pri-

vados y los independientes.2

Un politólogo norteamericano,

Kenneth H. Hoover, ha afirmado, por otra parte, que.

el problema crítico de la gobernación es el de establecer la legiti-midad del ejercicio de la autoridad y del poder coercitivo median-te la obtención del compromiso de los ciudadanos. Sin este com-promiso, el Estado se ve constreñido a elegir entre el uso de lafuerza y la disminución de sus funciones. A largo plazo, el futurodel capitalismo conservador dependerá de que pueda proveer unaforma viable de gobernación en las condiciones políticas del siglo

XXI.3

Sería prematuro considerar la probabilidad de que este pro-

ceso empiece a manifestarse de inmediato, sobre todo en el

área de las Naciones Unidas. No obstante, la participación de

las ONG en los debates y ciertas negociaciones en el sistema

de las Naciones Unidas se ha ampliado ya, y a nivel nacional

ha crecido en grandes proporciones la intervención de las ONG

y otros organismos independientes. Por otra parte, no corres-

ponde formalmente a las Naciones Unidas encargarse de la

gobernación global, aunque pueda ser un elemento central por

ser la única instancia universal, el único foro abierto a todos.

.

2. 1 .2. Las Naciones Unidas y el multilateralismo

No obstante la perspectiva general descrita en el apartado an-

terior, existe una opinión generalizada de que las Naciones

Unidas están en una situación de grave crisis por la falta de

z Commision on Global Governance, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

3 Kenneth H. Hoover, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Western Wash-

ington University, Bellingham, Washington, en “The future of conservative

capitalism”, ponencia presentada en la Conferencia sobre el Conservatismo

en la Región Norteamericana: Tendencias Actuales y Perspectivas, organizada

por el Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte de la Universidad

Nacional Autónoma de México. 2 de febrero de 1996.

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acción en muchos asuntos que corresponden a su mandato y

por la tendencia de los países más importantes, en el pasado

y en la actualidad, a emplear los mecanismos multilaterales

para sus propios fines de protagonismo y dominio, al margen

de sus áreas precisas de competencia y sin brindar apoyo en

su función fundamental. La Carta de las Naciones Unidas fir-

mada en San Francisco en junio de 1945 fue un pacto asumi-

do originalmente por sólo 50 gobiernos al calor del fin de la

segunda Guerra Mundial, pero que ahora debe aplicarse, en

circunstancias distintas, a 185 Estados independientes. Sería

erróneo y hasta peligroso desestimar los resultados benéficos

que a lo largo de 50 años ha tenido el primer intento mundial

de producir cohesión de los Estados en cuanto al manteni-

miento de la paz, la eliminación de conflictos y el mejoramien-

to de las condiciones económicas y sociales de la humanidad.

Igualmente, sería ingenuo pensar que las Naciones Unidas

pudieran constituir una especie de gobierno internacional o

supranacional. Sin embargo, las voces en pro de su reforma

han sido en los últimos años más expresivas e insistentes y se

les ha atendido en muchas esferas.

Se ha considerado una serie de posibles reformas al siste-

ma de las Naciones Unidas, empezando por su Carta consti-

. tutiva. Ningún proyecto de reforma ha contado con verdadero

apoyo y la ONU ha caído en desprestigio, aparte de su relativa

ineficacia en muchas áreas, su excesiva burocratización y su

costo, varios miembros destacados no contribuyen o lo hacen

de manera insuficiente. Es indudable que una de las primeras

reformas debería ser la ampliación del Consejo de Seguridad

y la eliminación del veto de que gozan las cinco potencias

principales, a cambio de mecanismos eficaces de obtención de

consensos regionales e interregionales, para que la Asamblea

General quede como un gran foro de discusión y de orienta-

ciones susceptibles de cumplirse en otras instancias.

Otra reforma que parece necesaria es coordinar las accio-

nes de las Naciones Unidas en las esferas económica y social,

incluida la del medio ambiente, junto con la redefinición de

sus objetivos, en particular en cuanto al mejoramiento de las

condiciones sociales, culturales y económicas en los países de

menores niveles de desarrollo, afectadas por grandes y al pa-

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recer insalvables desigualdades internas, siempre de acuerdo

con los aparentes consensos nacionales. Los mecanismos e

instancias a que se ha recurrido hasta ahora, o que han sido

propuestos en distintos momentos por un solo grupo de paí-

ses, no han logrado resultados.

La consideración multilateral de la problemática global se

impone cada día en mayor medida, frente a concepciones de

poder o de dominio bilateral o de clientelismo que han priva-

do en muchas partes. Pero el multilateralismo no puede mani-

festarse con eficacia si no lleva implícita a su vez la descen-

tralización, sea regional o por grupos de países, en que los

objetivos y los medios se definan con apego a consensos in-

ternos y no a simples voluntades gubernamentales. He allí uno

de los aspectos más difíciles de tratar en los años venideros

en relación con la problemática global. Sin duda que el papel

que deberá desempeñar la sociedad civil, representada por las

organizaciones no gubernamentales de los países miembros y

las internacionales o multilaterales del mismo género que se

hayan creado, habrá de adquirir creciente importancia.

En las conferencias internacionales de las Naciones Unidas

de los últimos 25 años se han oído con más insistencia las vo-

ces de las ONG, así como en los foros paralelos y no menos en

las comisiones preparatorias; entre los muchos tipos de ONG

. no han faltado las de carácter científico-académicas, por ejem-

plo en materia de energía atómica, desarme nuclear, cambio

climático, biodiversidad y otros aspectos del medio ambiente.

Asimismo, se les ha escuchado en asuntos sociales, por ejemplo

el status de la mujer, la política demográfica, la desintegración

familiar, la nutrición y la salud, las minorías étnicas, la edu-

cación y la cultura.

Mas no se da entrada a las ONG en los asuntos económicos y

financieros, excepto por medio de asociaciones profesionales

científicas inscritas en la UNESCO, las que carecen de toda in-

fluencia. El Fondo Monetario Internacional, el Grupo del

Banco Mundial, los bancos regionales, la Organización Mun-

dial de Comercio y otros organismos multilaterales no acep-

tan ni escuchan la opinión profesional en esos terrenos. No

han faltado voces y presiones sobre ese grupo de organismos

internacionales, las que se expresan en conferencias, en los

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medios de comunicación y mediante la actividad editorial y

cuyo carácter varía desde el científico-profesional hasta el de

militancia popular, con pocos resultados hasta ahora. En los

años venideros habrá que crear caminos adecuados para ca-

nalizar las opiniones de las ONG de distinto tipo, a fin de con-

tribuir a la búsqueda de consensos.

2.1.3. La cuestión de la soberanía

A medida que ha avanzado la internacionalización, que en

cierta forma es parte de la globalización en su sentido más

amplio y que se expresa no sólo en el sistema de las Naciones

Unidas, sino en agrupamientos regionales formales como la

Unión Europea, han surgido interrogantes sobre el concepto

de la soberanía de las naciones.4 En realidad, esta discusión

se presentó a partir de la primera Guerra Mundial al estable-

cerse la Sociedad de Naciones. Los Estados hoy miembros de

las Naciones Unidas son soberanos; sin embargo, en los gran-

des consensos que se han logrado a ese nivel para aproximar-

se a la solución de problemas planteados es evidente que, por

decisión de los propios gobiernos signatarios de los tratados,

convenciones, acuerdos e instrumentos similares, se han he-

cho concesiones a la noción de la soberanía absoluta entendi-

da en el sentido tradicional, aunque, desde sus orígenes, siem-

pre se han reconocido condicionantes reales y jurídicas a este

concepto. Es más, sin tales concesiones no se podría haber

creado el sistema de las Naciones Unidas. Por lo demás, una

de las facultades estatales derivadas del concepto de sobera-

nía ha sido la de suscribir tratados internacionales.

En organismos multilaterales como la Unión Europea se ha

aceptado la supranacionalidad en algunos temas económico-

comerciales y financiero-monetarios de primera importancia,

en ciertos asuntos ambientales y aun en determinados asun-

tos sociales. La aceptación por las legislaturas nacionales de

los acuerdos de la Unión Europea son en términos generales

4 Véase, entre otras referencias, King y Schneider. op. cit, pp. 42-43, citada

en el cap. I, sección 1.1.8 del presente informe.

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una cesión parcial, consensada, de la soberanía, y además se

han admitido compromisos de convergencia cuasiobligatorios

derivados del Tratado de Maastricht de 1991. Por añadidura,

se han creado instancias legislativas y regulatorias también su-

pranacionales, y un Consejo de Europa y un Parlamento Euro-

peo con facultades definidas. Es decir, el concepto tradicional

de soberanía jurídico-política y terriorial se ha transformado

no por la dominación abierta de un Estado sobre otro u otros,

sino por acuerdo y consenso democráticos. Se trata de conce-

siones de soberanía condicionadas, en las que los Estados sig-

natarios se reservan determinadas facultades. En el Tratado

de Maastricht se admitió expresamente la subsidiariedad, es

decir, el derecho de los países miembros de aplicar de ma-

nera descentralizada y atendiendo a su propia legislación, y

no por intermedio de un órgano supranacional, determinados

compromisos económico-financieros y sociales adquiridos a

nivel comunitario. En todo caso, es conveniente tener en cuen-

ta que los movimientos europeos de integración han venido

evolucionando de manera gradual hacia un sistema federal

que, al perfeccionarse, podría hacer desaparecer la soberanía

de los Estados miembros. Sin embargo, la terminación de este

proceso se considera aún distante.

Otra vertiente importante, fincada en la realidad, es la del

condicionamiento de soberanía económica a que unos Esta-

dos contemporáneos se ven expuestos ante el poderío de las

empresas transnacionales. Estas empresas son a veces más

poderosas que los gobiernos soberanos, actúan a nivel inter-

nacional y global, imponen sus criterios sobre materias tan

importantes como las políticas de inversión, crédito, comer-

cio, fiscales, monetarias y de acceso a los recursos naturales.

Lo hacen no sólo con los países débiles, por ejemplo en Áfri-

ca, sino con los países en desarrollo cuya trayectoria de inde-

pendencia soberana data de hace cerca de dos siglos, como

en el caso de América Latina. Las empresas transnacionales

y sus conglomerados y alianzas toman decisiones, aun sin

acuerdo con sus propios gobiernos, que afectan la economía,

las situaciones sociales y las bases culturales de muchos paí-

ses. Lo hacen sin consideración de los objetivos de la Carta de

la ONU ni coordinación alguna con los programas y las accio-

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nes del sistema de las Naciones Unidas o de otros organismos

multilaterales. Lo hacen en su empeño por tener acceso a los

recursos que necesitan o desean controlar, muchas veces sin

respeto a las políticas ambientales. Lo hacen en función de

sus propios objetivos de lucro y de poder, así como de confor-

mación de las sociedades en que tienen su sede principal o de

las que son objeto de sus inversiones.

Los ejemplos son tantos que no es necesario darlos; se trata

de una materia abundantemente conocida y documentada. Lo

que se desea establecer es que la perspectiva global en que está

inscrito el objetivo del desarrollo sustentable está condicionada

también por el poderío de las empresas transnacionales, por

encima de la noción tradicional de soberanía pero sin atentar

formalmente contra ésta, definiendo así una situación de so-

beranía relativa que no reconoce fronteras y que, en los hechos

económicos y financieros, provoca sumisión de los países inde-

pendientes con obvia cesión efectiva de su soberanía.

La experiencia europea, sin embargo, muestra hasta qué

punto se puede contrarrestar esta perspectiva mediante una

organización con poderes supranacionales como la Unión

Europea, con medidas de cohesión que respondan a nuevos

mandatos consensados y superiores para el futuro de las po-

blaciones de los propios países miembros de la UE y otros que

se asocien parcialmente a esos objetivos. En la UE, pese a con-

flictos, dudas y resquemores, y aun en ocasiones excesos, no

se ha producido ninguna amenaza a la democracia; antes

bien, los procesos democráticos se han fortalecido. Es más, el

Tratado de Maastricht contiene disposiciones relativas al for-

talecimiento de la identidad cultural de sus países miembros

y a la cooperación cultural. No se debe subestimar la impor-

tancia de la experiencia de la UE, aun cuando tampoco se po-

drán abrigar ilusiones de que pueda ser reproducida en regio-

nes y sociedades de distinta trayectoria cultural y política. El

avance de tratados y convenciones regionales o subregionales

-por ejemplo, mercados comunes y tratados o acuerdos de

libre comercio- podría en ciertas circunstancias ir en la mis-

ma dirección. La diferencia con la UE, sin embargo, es que en

esta última no existen graves asimetrías entre las naciones

miembros, ni en lo económico y sus resultados, ni en lo polí-

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tico y sus expresiones partidarias e institucionales.5 No es que

no haya habido errores y fracasos y muchas dificultades por

vencer, pero ha sido un largo periodo de aprendizaje proposi-

tivo y positivo que ha echado raíces y que tiene fuertes respal-

dos culturales consensados.

En el ámbito del derecho internacional, en el cual la Comi-

sión de Derecho Internacional de las Naciones Unidas ha lle-

vado a cabo una labor extraordinaria, se acepta también que

existe un “derecho internacional soft” constituido por las con-

venciones aceptadas bajo los auspicios de las Naciones Uni-

das y aun por las recomendaciones contenidas en las resolu-

ciones de la Asamblea General, que cada día influyen más en

el ejercicio de la soberanía de los Estados miembros pues en-

trañan compromisos y en algunos casos obligatoriedad.

2.2. ECONOMÍA Y MEDIO AMBIENTE

2.2.1. La cooperación económica

En los años de los “decenios del desarrollo” promovidos en

las Naciones Unidas por los países en vía de desarrollo-en su

momento llamados del Tercer Mundo y, en el caso de un gru-

po determinado de ellos, los Países No Alineados- llegaron a

abrigarse grandes esperanzas de que se fortalecería la coope-

ración económica internacional a favor del progreso. Sin

embargo, sin mucho disimulo, las grandes potencias industria-

les constituyeron un bloque aparte en las instancias del sis-

tema multilateral, opuesto casi de manera sistemática a todas

las propuestas provenientes del grupo que llegó a llamarse De

s Cabe recordar la recomendación del profesor Jan Tinbergen, Premio

Nobel, quien hacía ver que la razón entre los sectores de más altos ingresos ylos de ingresos más bajos, cercana a 3-1 en la Comunidad Económica Euro-pea de los años setenta, podía considerarse “apenas aceptable”, pero que sería“necesaria para la estabilidad política del mundo” y sólo podría alcanzarseentre las regiones y los países “en un periodo de 42 años”. Y añadía: “Por su-puesto, falta saber si los pobres estarían dispuestos a esperar medio siglo...”

(Jan Tinbergen [coord.]. Reestructuración del orden internacional: Informe alClub de Roma, México. Fondo de Cultura Económica. 1977, cap. vt. p. 148).

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los 77. Las potencias industriales han dejado de apoyar la co-

operación económica y financiera internacional en el sentido

en que ésta aparece en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. Desde

las altas tribunas de la Asamblea General y el Consejo Econó-

mico y Social de la ONU el número de consensos no logrados y

de oposición sorda a una serie de propuestas de diversos ór-

ganos subsidiarios para regular el desarrollo económico y su

financiamiento ha sido mayor que el de los casos de acuerdo

y éxito. En la medida en que ha existido cooperación multila-

teral, ésta se ha llevado a cabo en gran parte en los términos y

condiciones de los países desarrollados. Es más, en épocas

recientes se ha transformado en modalidades de cooperación

económica bilateral o en aspectos particulares no integrados

con políticas de desarrollo.

No deberá extrañar a nadie que, no obstante la Carta de

San Francisco, la política de cooperación económica y finan-

ciera haya estado desde el principio marcada, con las justi-

ficaciones que la segunda Guerra Mundial imponía, por los

puntos de vista de las principales potencias económicas. El

Fondo Monetario Internacional y el Banco Internacional de

Reconstrucción y Fomento se crearon en 1944 a instancias

de los Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido, con la participación

adicional pero secundaria de 42 gobiernos más -antes de fir-

marse la Carta de las Naciones Unidas en 1945. Los acuer-

dos fueron ratificados en 1946 y ambos organismos empeza-

ron a funcionar en 1947, todo ello en forma independiente de la

Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. El Fondo Moneta-

rio Internacional y el Banco Mundial firmaron posteriormen-

te convenios con las Naciones Unidas para obtener la categoría

de organismos especializados, aceptándose sus modalidades

propias, entre las que priva la suscripción de participaciones

financieras desiguales que a su vez dan derecho a un número

de votos también desigual, es decir, a un sistema de voto ponde-

rado a favor de las potencias mayores. En un principio sus

funciones tuvieron indudable utilidad y fueron ampliamente

apreciadas. Se concentraron, por una parte, en el terreno de

la estabilización monetaria y la liberación de los controles y

restricciones sobre el movimiento de divisas, y, por otra, en

la reanudación y estímulo de los movimientos de capital a

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largo plazo -primero para las tareas de reconstrucción euro-

pea y, gradualmente, para el desarrollo de la economía de los

países miembros-.

No obstante, a partir del Plan Marshall en 1948, tanto el FMI

como el BM quedaron marginados de las principales activida-

des que habían emprendido en Europa occidental. El Plan

Marshall fue un entendimiento directo entre Europa occiden-

tal y los Estados Unidos destinado a hacer posible la recupera-

ción de la economía europea y, secundariamente, a influir en

la economía internacional en general. En este aspecto, el FMI y

el BM, a partir de 1949, dirigieron su acción y sus programas

en forma creciente a los países no europeos, entre ellos los

países en vía de desarrollo.6

Por lo demás, junto con el FMI y el BM no se creó un instru-

mento concebido desde el inicio como complemento indispen-

sable: un organismo que liberara el comercio internacional del

enjambre de restricciones de los periodos de preguerra y

del sistema de economía de guerra. La creación de una Orga-

nización del Comercio Internacional, promovida dentro de los

mecanismos de negociación de las Naciones Unidas -la Con-

ferencia sobre Comercio y Empleo de La Habana de 1948-,

jamás recibió el apoyo necesario del Congreso norteamerica-

no, y en su lugar quedó un mecanismo transitorio para las

negociaciones arancelarias, el GATT, al que adhirió al principio

solamente una veintena de países.

Las potencias económicas, en un contexto político interna-

cional que afectaba obviamente a las Naciones Unidas, en que

se perfilaban la Guerra Fría y la hostilidad de los países en vía

de desarrollo y los de reciente independencia en Africa y otras

regiones, obstruyeron a partir de los años cincuenta todo pro-

yecto de creación de nuevos organismos financieros multila-

á La Unión Soviética participó en la Conferencia de Bretton Woods en

1944 y aprobó el Acta Final, que contenía los convenios para crear el FMI y el

BM. pero posteriormente se negó a ratificarlos. Checoslovaquia y Polonia, que

habían estado representadas por sus gobiernos en el exilio, fueron obligadas

años después a retirarse de ambos organismos al producirse sobre ellas el

control político de la Unión Soviética. Cuba formó parte inicialmente del

Fondo y el Banco, pero se retiró en 1960. Rusia y los nuevos países democrá-

ticos de Europa oriental han vuelto a integrarse a los organismos de Bretton

Woods.

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terales para el desarrollo, dentro y fuera de las Naciones Uni-

das. Apoyaron en cambio el fortalecimiento de los mecanismos

de cooperación intraeuropea que al fin llevaron a la firma del

Tratado de Roma de 1957, el cual dio base a la Comunidad

Económica Europea.

Con todo, a medida que se ampliaba el número de miem-

bros de las Naciones Unidas, y bajo la presión de los países en

vía de desarrollo y los No Alineados y con el apoyo tácito y a

veces explícito del bloque soviético, se adoptaron en las Nacio-

nes Unidas programas en pro del desarrollo: los decenios del

desarrollo y los grandes programas de asistencia o cooperación

técnica. Además, se establecieron mecanismos de estudio,

consulta y colaboración, como la UNCTAD ( 1963). Previamente

se habían creado las comisiones económicas regionales, entre

ellas la de Europa, la CEPAL, la de Asia y el Pacífico y más tar-

de las de Africa y de Asia occidental. La asistencia técnica,

concepto asumido por las Naciones Unidas a partir del céle-

bre Punto Cuarto del discurso de toma de posesión del presi-

dente Truman en 1948 -y que desembocó años más tarde en

el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD)

y varios fondos semejantes tales como el Fondo para la Infan-

cia (UNICEF), el de Población y el de Medio Ambiente-, fue la

principal vertiente apoyada por las llamadas potencias occi-

dentales en pro del desarrollo por medios multilaterales y en

muchos casos la única que no encubría intereses bilaterales o

que los mantenía matizados. En otra etapa, y atendiendo a

intereses regionales, aceptaron la creación de los bancos mul-

tilaterales regionales, como el BID (1960) y el Banco de Des-

arrollo del Caribe en la región latinoamericana y los corres-

pondientes de Asia y África.

La OCDE estableció, por otra parte, un Comité de Asistencia

al Desarrollo (DAC), que se abocó a la tarea de contabilizar

anualmente los flujos de fondos multilaterales y bilaterales

destinados a la promoción económica de los países en vía de

desarrollo. En fecha reciente se cifraron, en montos ya estables,

sin nuevos aumentos, en alrededor de 56 000 a 60 000 millones

de dólares al año a precios corrientes (flujos, por lo demás, no

exentos de problemas de definición y precisión respecto al con-

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cepto de “cooperación”).7 El DAC tuvo además por objeto veri-

ficar si los países del Primer Mundo estaban o no cumpliendo

el objetivo adoptado en las Naciones Unidas de aportar 0.7%

del PIB a la “asistencia internacional”; sólo muy pocos países,

entre ellos Suecia, Dinamarca y Noruega, han alcanzado

dicha proporción, y el promedio es de 0.3 por ciento.

Con el tiempo, el conjunto de la coordinación de las polí-

ticas económicas internacionales ha quedado en manos de un

grupo reducido de países, el c-7 (los Estados Unidos, Canadá,

la Gran Bretaña, Alemania, Francia, Italia y Japón), al que se

ha invitado a participar a Rusia. Los mismos países dominan

las políticas del FMI y el BM y, teniendo en cuenta además a la

UE, influyeron en el GATT hasta 1994, cuando entró en vigor el

nuevo organismo multilateral, la Organización Mundial de Co-

mercio (OMC). A nivel regional, el peso de los organismos mul-

tilaterales regionales es bastante débil, incluso el de los bancos

regionales. Y aun a nivel bilateral, con algunas excepciones, se

ha vuelto a los arreglos directos, al gusto de los gobiernos de

los países desarrollados que por algún motivo especial se ven

motivados a hacer préstamos, ofrecer asistencia técnica, fir-

mar convenios comerciales, entrar en convenios sobre inver-

siones extranjeras, etc. Muchas veces la cooperación económi-

ca bilateral va ligada a compromisos políticos y, en el orden

militar, conlleva apoyos en armamento. Durante los años del

auge petrolero ( 1973- 1981) el financiamiento internacional a

los países en desarrollo estuvo en manos principalmente de la

banca comercial de Europa occidental, Canadá, Japón y los

Estados Unidos gracias a los depósitos creados en ellos por

los países exportadores de petróleo; el FMI y el BM se quedaron

bastante al margen.

Mientras tanto, como queda comprobado en la documenta-

ción de las Naciones Unidas (los informes del PNUD, la Secre-

taría General y las comisiones regionales y otros), del Banco

Mundial mismo y de innumerables organismos, entre ellos la

OCDE e instituciones internacionales y nacionales, la desigual-

dad entre las condiciones económicas y financieras en que

operan los países en desarrollo, por un lado, y los de nivel ele-7 OECD. Development Assistance Committec, op. cit.. en el cap. I de este

informe.

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vado de industrialización y otros que han alcanzado ya muy

altos niveles de ingreso per capita y de condiciones sociales y

humanas, se ha ampliado y parece insalvable. Es más, no

operan instancias en que se estudie la posibilidad de crear

nuevas institucionalizaciones para remediar esta situación, ni

siquiera de reformar los mecanismos institucionales existen-

tes. Las principales potencias llevan ya años de aconsejar a

los países de menor nivel de ingreso la implantación de polí-

ticas económicas y financieras en que los actores tendrían que

ser las fuerzas del mercado, es decir, los instrumentos en

que las ventajas están a favor de las grandes empresas trans-

nacionales y en su caso nacionales aliadas con ellas, así como

de las instituciones financieras privadas, sin mayor aportación

de los organismos multilaterales del área financiera y econó-

mica. Muchos de los principales aspectos de las políticas de

desarrollo económico y social quedan cada vez más sujetos a

las orientaciones preferidas del Banco Mundial y el FMI. Tam-

poco se admite la intervención del Estado en la economía de

los países en desarrollo, ya dañados en su capacidad de ges-

tión económico-financiera y aun política por el adelgazamien-

to de su función económica y por las obligaciones originadas

en la enorme deuda externa.

No está a la vista en la actualidad una perspectiva clara, o

más bien ninguna, que presagie una activa cooperación eco-

nómica internacional, multilateral o global para los fines de

desarrollo de las tres cuartas partes de la humanidad que cons-

tituyen, con bastantes variantes, el mundo de los países en vía

de desarrollo, muchos de los cuales han sufrido durante largo

periodo una fuerte tendencia al deterioro. La tarea de la coope-

ración internacional la vislumbran los países industrializados

como una que compete más que nada a los propios países en

desarrollo con sus propios medios -lo que no sería una es-

trategia equivocada si no fuera porque tales medios son esca-

sos frente a las necesidades (salvo contadas excepciones)-.

El peso del servicio de la deuda externa contraída entre 1973

y 1983 por los países en desarrollo no ha podido ser aliviado

de manera significativa. Se apela con demasiado optimismo al

apoyo que pudieran significar las inversiones extranjeras di-

rectas y se supone, equivocadamente, que todos los países en

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desarrollo están en iguales condiciones para promover sus ex-

portaciones hacia aquellos con elevados niveles de ingreso

per capita.En estas condiciones, deberá verse con escepticismo la po-

sibilidad de reorientar las políticas nacionales o regionales, o

las de los organismos multilaterales, hacia el desarrollo sus-

tentable con equidad que se postuló en el Informe Brundt-

land y se adoptó como consigna en la Conferencia de Rio de

Janeiro sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo.

2.2.2. El desarrollo sustentable y la energía

A nivel global, el objetivo del desarrollo sustentable ha empe-

zado a tener seguimiento por parte de la Comisión del Desarro-

llo Sustentable (CDS), creada en 1993 por la Asamblea General

de las Naciones Unidas como dependencia del Consejo Eco-

nómico y Social. Sin embargo, lo mas probable es que este ór-

gano, dada su condición subordinada, no alcance a tener más

funciones que la supervisión y tal vez alguna coordinación de

las actividades de los distintos organismos especializados del

sistema de las Naciones Unidas, incluido sobre todo el PNUMA

-por lo menos en el campo de la información-, ya que cada

organismo tiene su propio órgano de gobierno. Se supone

que la CDS tendrá también intervención en la aplicación de las

convenciones sobre cambio climático, los protocolos de Mon-

treal relativos a la capa superior de ozono, la referente a la

biodiversidad y otras. Si se tienen en cuenta los antecedentes

de otras conferencias de las Naciones Unidas como la de Rio de

Janeiro en 1992, la CDS tendría a su cargo la organización de una

nueva Conferencia sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo (esta

vez Sustentable) 10 años después, o sea, en el 2002. En el

ínterin podrá haber un sinnúmero de reuniones de comités

especiales y regionales, comités ad hoc, etc. acerca de una am-

plia gama de asuntos relacionados con el desarrollo sustenta-

ble. Entre ellos tal vez ocupe un lugar importante la cuestión

de la energía de origen fósil, cuyo uso afecta doblemente el des-

arrollo sustentable: por el hecho de que los yacimientos de

petróleo y gas son agotables a determinado plazo y porque la

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contaminación atmosférica derivada de su empleo contribuye

al aumento del efecto de invernadero y en consecuencia al cam-

bio climático.

Sin embargo, el desarrollo sustentable no se instaurará a

nivel global porque las Naciones Unidas se ocupen del asun-

to, sino porque en los gobiernos y las sociedades que repre-

sentan vayan asentándose las actitudes, las políticas y los pro-

gramas que permitan generar los procesos que lleven a ese

objetivo. No basta que unos cuantos países, por ejemplo los es-

candinavos o Japón, asuman ese importante papel, sino que

tendrían que incorporarse todas las naciones, principalmente

aquellas que más contribuyen al deterioro ambiental. Tendrá

primacía el fenómeno causado por las emisiones de carbono

y otros compuestos que derivan del transporte automotor, de la

industria y los servicios, aun de la agricultura, es decir, de toda

actividad humana que emplee combustibles de origen fósil.

En esta perspectiva entrarían en juego no sólo los Estados Uni-

dos y Canadá y algunos países europeos por sus elevadas emi-

siones de carbono por habitante, sino también países como

Indonesia, México o Brasil, cuya emisión de carbono por ha-

bitante es de alrededor de la quinta parte de la que emiten

aquellos. Se incluiría también a China, con emisión per capitaestimada en la octava parte de aquel nivel, pero cuyo número

de habitantes es tan grande que su aportación total de carbo-

no la coloca entre los 15 primeros contaminantes de la atmós-

fera global por ese concepto. China depende esencialmente

del carbón mineral para la generación de energía eléctrica y

como combustible familiar. Por su parte, Brasil, con la des-

trucción de las grandes áreas boscosas de la Amazonia, reduce

rápidamente el potencial de absorción de carbono en el mundo.

No es posible a estas alturas considerar hasta qué punto

puedan, en un plazo de unos 20 a 25 años, conciliarse los in-

tereses de grupos tan disímiles de países. A pesar de la infor-

mación científica ya disponible recopilada y analizada desde

1990 por el Panel Intergubernamental sobre el Cambio Climá-

tico (IPCC), en Rio de Janeiro, en 1992, se redujeron los requi-

sitos cuantificables de emisiones de carbono a que se compro-

meterían los signatarios de la Convención sobre el Cambio

Climático, a fin de que los Estados Unidos, que se oponían a

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las metas que quería proponer la Unión Europea, aceptaran

firma. En marzo de 1995, en Berlín, se dieron nuevos pasos

en reversa, al aplazarse otro tanto las metas ya disminuidas

adoptadas en Rio respecto a los principales países desarrolla-

dos emisores de carbono. Varios países desarrollados hicie-

ron ver que no serían capaces de alcanzar ni siquiera los com-

promisos acordados en Rio de Janeiro, mientras los países en

desarrollo condicionaron los suyos a las acciones que empren-

dieran los primeros. No obstante, en la Segunda Conferencia

Ministerial sobre Cambio Climático, efectuada en Ginebra en

mayo de 1996, se reavivó algún optimismo al refrendarse al-

gunos compromisos anteriores a los de Berlín y establecerse

un calendario de obligado cumplimiento para limitar y re-

ducir las emisiones de carbono en los años 2005,2015 y 2020.

Entraron en escena, además, el Consejo Empresarial para la

Energía Sustentable y las compañías de seguros, interesadas

en reducir riesgos derivados del cambio climático futuro; asi-

mismo, fue mayor la presencia de los Estados insulares y de

las ONG.

De cualquier manera, a este ritmo, los avances son un re-

medo de la leyenda de Sísifo, si bien puede considerarse alen-

tador que sean ya 142 los países que han ratificado la Con-

vención sobre el Cambio Climático, y que se prevean apoyos

para las naciones en desarrollo cuyos compromisos subsisten

pero que disponen de más tiempo para cumplirlos.

Por otra parte, está en pleno vigor el Protocolo de Montreal

para la reducción de la producción y exportación de los CFC, y

éstos se están ya remplazando en muchos de sus múltiples

usos y en varios de los principales países que los utilizan. El

Protocolo prevé financiamiento para los países con problemas

de transición, aun cuando no haya habido compromisos firmes

de China y la India en cuanto a los gases requeridos para la fa-

bricación de refrigeradores, cuyo consumo se estima puede

crecer de manera muy considerable a mediano y largo plazos.

En otros campos del medio ambiente global se han empe-

zado a registrar algunos avances. La Convención sobre Biodi-

versidad ha sido ratificada por 128 países, pero dispone toda-

vía de un secretariado relativamente débil para impulsar su

implementación. La posición de los Estados Unidos, que al

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fin firmaron el documento, continúa siendo ambigua y, en al-

gunos aspectos, opuesta a los intereses de los países en desarro-

llo poseedores de la biodiversidad. Faltan, además, protocolos

que prevean disposiciones sobre el uso de recursos genéticos.

Son previsibles todavía intentos de excesiva politización y di-

ficultades reales para el cumplimiento de los compromisos.

Para 1997 se espera que los países signatarios den a conocer su

estrategia nacional en materia de biodiversidad.

La Convención para Combatir la Desertificación, en lo cual

se venía trabajando largos años, quedó pendiente en la Con-

ferencia de Rio de Janeiro. En junio de 1994 se llegó a un acuer-

do, que fue suscrito por 86 países en octubre del mismo año.

Se cuenta ya con 112 países signatarios, pero con sólo ocho

ratificaciones, y tardará algún tiempo más en entrar en vigor.

Subsisten problemas científico-técnicos sobre el concepto

mismo de “desertificación” y sobre las estrategias y políticas

necesarias para reducirla o contenerla. Dada su importancia

en este asunto, la Convención incluye un anexo sobre África,

donde se espera iniciar algunas actividades aun antes de que

entre en vigor. Muchos de los países desarrollados no han

estado de acuerdo con la necesidad de semejante Convención

ni en proveer financiamiento a los países directamente afecta-

dos. En los círculos académicos y otros se discute aún si la

desertificación es un fenómeno fundamentalmente físico o

esta caracterizado más bien por importantes factores socio-

económicos. Los desiertos no han avanzado, pero sí se han

degradado los suelos en las zonas semidesérticas y las sequías

han sido frecuentes. La Convención se refiere a “degradación

de suelos en zonas áridas, semiáridas y áreas subhúmedas

secas resultante de diversos factores, incluidas las variaciones

climáticas y las actividades humanas”.8

Aun cuando la Convención sobre el Derecho del Mar de

1982 no ha contado con la ratificación de los Estados Unidos,

8 Véase Camilla Toulmin, del Instituto Internacional de Medio Ambiente y

Desarrollo (IIED), Londres. “Combatting desertification by conventional

means”, en Global Environmental Change 1955, vol. 5, núm. 5, pp. 455-457.Años atrás, en 1984, Rolando García había publicado los resultados de unnotable trabajo de investigación titulado Nature is Not to Blame (IFIAS, Toronto)en que puso en evidencia la conjunción de factores socioeconómicos involu-

crados en la desertificación en el Sahel.

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siguen adelante algunos acuerdos, entre ellos uno de impor-

tancia ambiental -firmado en diciembre de 1994-, relativo

a Conservación y Gestión de Pesquerías Transjurisdiccionales

(straddling) y Pesquerías de Altos índices de Migración con el

que se pretende asegurar el aprovechamiento sustentable de

dichos recursos.9

Las propuestas sobre desforestación consideradas en Rio

de Janeiro no han fructificado aún. Por otra parte, no existe

ninguna convención internacional que se ocupe de los dese-

chos industriales y municipales, fuera de las normas que los

países de la Unión Europea han impuesto y las recomen-

daciones de la OCDE, así como el mejoramiento de la cultura

ambiental a nivel municipal en algunos países que generan

grandes volúmenes, por ejemplo Japón, los Estados Unidos y

Canadá, o en algunos municipios ejemplares, como el caso de

Curitiba, Brasil.

El transporte de desechos peligrosos ha sido normado por

la Convención de Basilea y por la OCDE, y existen convenios so-

bre desechos nucleares radiactivos. Los países en desarrollo,

de cualquier modo, distan mucho de haber definido siquiera

políticas ambientales adecuadas en la materia. Faltan concien-

tización y voluntad política, se carece de incentivos y es escasa

la buena administración de los programas y reglamentaciones

ya existentes.

Si se centra la atención en el problema energético -del que

sólo una parte tiene que ver con el consumo de combustibles

de origen fósil y sus consecuencias-, la perspectiva de avan-

ce es aún más compleja y está sujeta a obstáculos y restriccio-

nes. En esta materia el Informe Brundtland lanzó en realidad

un ataque a fondo a la etapa actual de civilización de la es-

pecie humana: el futuro de las nuevas generaciones, es decir,

la condición de desarrollo sustentable, no puede depender del

empleo tan predominante de carbón, petróleo y gas natural.

El transporte, los procesos industriales, el comercio y los ser-

9 Naciones Unidas, Consejo Económico y Social, Comisión de Desarrollo

Sustentable, Cuarto Periodo de Sesiones, 18 de abril a 3 de mayo de 1996,

“Informe del secretario general sobre arreglos institucionales de seguimiento

de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarro-

Ilo” (versión preliminar en inglés).

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vicios, la agricultura moderna, no podrán seguir creciendo a

base de tales recursos de origen fósil que, por una parte, son

agotables, y por otra constituyen el factor más importante de

aumento a largo plazo de la temperatura media de la atmós-

fera, o sea, el llamado efecto de invernadero. Se prevén graves

consecuencias climáticas, redistribución de actividades agro-

pecuarias, inundación de zonas costeras, desplazamiento de

cientos de millones de habitantes y reubicación de estableci-

mientos industriales y de otros sectores. La actividad económi-

ca global depende ya en la actualidad de un suministro de

energía que en 80% está representado por el empleo de com-

bustibles de origen fósil, y mientras los combustibles susti-

tutos no contaminantes o menos contaminantes no se pro-

duzcan en volumen suficiente y alcancen, por vías técnicas y

económicas, una proporción fuertemente creciente del consumo

total de energéticos, las esperanzas de proteger adecuadamen-

te el ambiente global son tenues. De ese 80% del suministro

de energía, 36% proviene del petróleo, 24% del carbón y 20%

del gas natural.10 Según proyecciones del Consejo Mundial de

Energía, la demanda mundial de energéticos, que en 1990 se

calculó en 8 800 millones de toneladas de equivalente de pe-

tróleo, podrá aumentar para el año 2020, según distintos su-

puestos, a un total situado entre un mínimo de ll 300 y un pro-

bable máximo de 17 200 millones.11

La energía basada en el carbón, el petróleo y el gas natural

es indispensable en casi cualquier actividad, sea por razones

tecnológicas, climáticas u otras. El mundo industrializado lle-

va apenas un poco más de un siglo haciendo uso industrial y

municipal de la electricidad. El vehículo automotor, inventa-

do por la misma época en que se obtenían los primeros deri-

vados modernos del petróleo, ha llegado a tener uso genera-

lizado apenas en los últimos 60 años. A partir de la primera

Guerra Mundial, y en definitiva desde la segunda, ningún

ejército puede movilizarse ni ejercer acciones ofensivas o de-

fensivas sin combustibles de origen fósil o electricidad. La

lo Comunicación de Umberto Colombo, miembro del Club de Roma, “On

Nuclear Power”, de julio de 1995; reproducida en Canadian Association for

the Club of Rome, Proceedings, Serie 1, núm. 15, septiembre de 1995, pp. 1-3.11

Citado por Umberto Colombo, loc. cit.

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agricultura moderna mecanizada lleva también apenas unos

70 años consumiendo combustibles líquidos para la tracción

mecánica. Luego, transformar toda esa estructura a nivel glo-

bal, o en grandes regiones del mundo, es una tarea que no

sólo no tiene precedente, sino que transtornaría la economía

de casi todas las naciones, además de los movimientos inter-

nacionales de bienes, personas y capitales.

Son varios los países que, desde los sacudimientos petrole-

ros impuestos por la OPEP en los años setenta, han llevado a

cabo importantes programas de economía en el uso de ener-

géticos, por ejemplo Japón, Suecia, Dinamarca, los Países Ba-

jos, Alemania y otros en Europa. El aumento de su costo

obligó además a buscar medios de sustituir las importaciones

de combustibles. Se creó la Agencia Internacional de Energía

(AIE), formada por un grupo numeroso de países de alto con-

sumo de energéticos, para apoyar programas de economía en

su empleo y reducir la brecha entre la demanda y la oferta,

expresada a los precios de esta última, que controlaban en

parte significativa los países miembros de la OPEP. La AIE ha

sido hasta cierto punto el organismo de defensa de los países

consumidores.

Por otro lado, en los años setenta se dio fuerte impulso a la

capacidad de generación de energía nuclear. Más adelante, a

fines de 1985 y comienzos de 1986, una importante sobre-

oferta de petróleo y sus derivados hizo retroceder en forma

aguda los precios y debilitarse muchos de los mercados de

estos productos. A la vez, los costos crecientes de la energia

nuclear, los problemas tecnológicos de esta industria, la difi-

cultad aún no resuelta de disponer adecuadamente y sin ries-

go de los desechos atómicos, y el temor a los accidentes nu-

cleares provocaron oposición a la expansión de la capacidad

de generación de esta modalidad “limpia” de producción de

energía. Se suspendieron y aun cancelaron nuevos proyectos

y se tomaron medidas para desmantelar las plantas nucleares

más antiguas, como en Suecia. Sólo Japón, Francia y Rusia

han, logrado crear una capacidad sustancial de generación de

energia nuclear para sustituir, en la producción de electrici-

dad, las plantas térmicas que utilizan combustibles líquidos o

carbón. No obstante, se mantienen en operación en la actuali-

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dad más de 420 plantas nucleares, las que satisfacen 6% de la

demanda global de energía y 17% de la de electricidad. Pero

apenas 60 más están en proceso de construcción. A principios

del siglo XXI, con el cierre de muchas plantas que habrán lle-

gado al término de su vida útil, la capacidad mundial de ge-

neración de energía nuclear habrá disminuido.12

Los Estados

Unidos no han podido inaugurar una sola planta nuclear des-

de hace varios años. La situación en Rusia, desde el accidente

de Chernobyl, así como su crisis económica y financiera, ha-

cen poco probable que pueda renovarse a corto plazo su pro-

grama nuclear. La búsqueda de alternativas ha pasado de ser

un sueño científico a un empeño de muchos países por esta-

blecerlas en plazos razonables. No obstante, no son pocas las

voces favorables a una nueva etapa de expansión de la energía

nuclear, sea porque constituye energía “limpia” desde el pun-

to de vista ambiental o porque es necesario abandonar el uso

intensivo de los combustibles de origen fósil, pero a condiciónde que se superen las dificultades técnicas que determinan to-davía sus inconvenientes y riesgos.

13

Algunos países, como Brasil, han experimentado con el em-

pleo de combustibles derivados de la biomasa (alcohol) para

continuar movilizando el creciente número de vehículos de

combustión interna. Los resultados no parecen haber sido muy

claros, ni económicamente ni desde el punto de vista ambien-

tal. Brasil, como otros países, cuenta con reservas potenciales

de fuentes hidráulicas para generar electricidad, y ha estable-

cido dos plantas eléctricas nucleares; pero no tiene a la vista

los sustitutos de los combustibles líquidos, por lo que, igual que

otros países importadores netos de petróleo crudo, ha promo-

vido -a costos crecientes - la exploración y explotación de es te

tipo de hidrocarburos, en su caso en las zonas marítimas.

En los países en que ha registrado importancia el empleo

de leña en las áreas rurales y en no pocas urbanas -en Asia y

África principalmente, aunque también en algunos de América

Latina- , la extensión de los bosques ha declinado. La energía

eólica y la generada por las mareas ha sido utilizada en algunos

países en dimensión limitada, aunque útil. China y la India,12

Datos recopilados por Colombo, loc. cit,13

Por ejemplo, Colombo, loc. cit.

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así como países de Europa oriental, siguen dependiendo del

carbón, en gran proporción de baja calidad, para los usos do-

mésticos y aun para la generación de electricidad.

La energía solar parece ser la gran alternativa relativamen-

te práctica, no sólo para remplazar combustibles en los usos

domésticos, sino para generar electricidad, al menos para

alumbrado público, oficinas y hogares, así como en determi-

nadas aplicaciones en la agricultura, en buena medida para el

bombeo de aguas. Se conocen también ya aplicaciones expe-

rimentales de energía solar al movimiento de vehículos de

transporte. Según la comunidad científica, no es de esperar

que predomine una sola tecnología solar, sino que influirán

las diversidades regionales en las condiciones básicas.

La electricidad podrá generarse quemando biomasa, construyendo

turbinas eólicas y máquinas térmicas solares, o empleando celdas

fotovoltaicas... El combustible de hidrógeno podrá producirse por

medio de celdas electroquímicas o por procesos biológicos, a base

de microorganismos o enzimas, cuya fuerza motriz sea la luz so-

lar. Los combustibles como el etanol y el metanol podrán genenar-

se mediante biomasa o con otras tecnologías solares... La energía

solar existe también en los océanos... por más que sea difusa y di-

fícil de extraer.14

Las tecnologías solares -se afirma- “permitirían a los paí-

ses en vía de desarrollo ahorrarse una generación de infraes-

tructura y avanzar directamente a una fuente de energía que

no contribuya al efecto de invernadero o provoque degrada-

ción del ambiente”.15

En algunos países se emplea ya la ener-

gía eólica y la que puede derivarse de las mareas y de los di-

ferenciales de temperatura de las aguas marítimas.

La posibilidad de generar energía por fusión atómica, que

lleva ya un largo periodo experimental, no deberá descartarse

a largo plazo,16

como tampoco deberá excluirse el hidrógeno

como combustible.

14 William Hoagland. “Solar energy”. en Scientifìc American, vol. 273.

núm. 3, septiembre de 1995. pp. 136-137.15

Ibid., p. 139.16

Harold B. Furth, “Fusion”, en Scientific American, vol. 273, núm. 3, sep-

tiembre de 1995, pp. 140-142.

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En contra de la energía de origen solar existe una larga tra-

dición en los medios tecnológicos y aun en los científicos, ro-

bustecida por los indudablemente gigantescos intereses de la

industria extractora y difusora de los hidrocarburos -los mis-

mos intereses que hasta 1962 influyeron para que el precio

internacional del barril de petróleo crudo fuera de menos de

dos dólares de la época, lo que fortaleció la idea popular de que

el petroleo y los combustibles derivados eran un bien casi gra-

tuito de poca repercusión en el costo de los productos indus-

triales y en los precios de los bienes de consumo-. Además, a

la postre fue la base del cártel creado por los países produc-

tores que en los años setenta al fin vieron su oportunidad po-

lítica de hacer subir el precio del petróleo crudo restringiendo

la oferta, hasta provocar precios spot de 40 dólares o más por

barril. Hoy día la sobreoferta potencial de la producción

petrolera mantiene los precios en un margen de 16 a 20 dóla-

res, según la calidad y los costos de transporte. En términos

reales, sin embargo, los precios de mercado de la actualidad

son inferiores en términos reales a los prevalecientes hace 30

años. Además, los estudios dirigidos a determinar los costos

reales ambientales del petróleo, teniendo en cuenta, entre otros

elementos, la probabilidad de reducción radical de los recur-

sos disponibles de hidrocarburos, los cuales se agotarían qui-

zás en menos de 100 años, demuestran que los precios reales

del petróleo, el gas y el carbón deberían ser mucho mayores

de lo que son.

En estas condiciones, ¿puede preverse un cambio radical en

el empleo de los hidrocarburos? Su producción es casi el único

sustento de divisas de muchos países; generan movimientos

de transporte internacional que a su vez representan ingresos

para fuertes intereses navieros y petroleros; no tienen, en la

mayoría de los países, sucedáneos equivalentes en eficiencia

térmica, y su falta produciría en casi todos los casos el colap-

so de la economía y de la vida urbana.

Si han de ocurrir los cambios necesarios para el uso de

energéticos menos contaminantes y no agotables, en particu-

lar la energía solar, ¿cuáles serán los plazos para que surja

esta gran transformación? Puede pensarse que dichos plazos

se alargarían no sólo por las resistencias, las dificultades tec-

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nológicas para consumir otros energéticos y los intereses in-

volucrados, pero, ¿los acortaría el avance científico-tecnológi-

co en los usos de la energía solar? ¿Habría una etapa interme-

dia o de transición en que el motor eléctrico convirtiera los

actuales vehículos, en otros no contaminantes, primero en cier-

tos usos locales y más adelante a mayor escala, y en la cual la

actual industria automotriz se reorganizara para ensamblar

esos nuevos vehículos, con una transformación paralela de la

industria de autopartes?

Mientras nada de esto suceda y los plazos tiendan más bien

a alargarse que a acortarse, pese a los experimentos y las pre-

siones a favor del vehículo eléctrico -cuyo uso, de paso, lle-

varía a un incremento de la demanda de electricidad, incluida

la de origen térmico-, la contribución de una nueva política

energética a nivel global al mejoramiento ambiental y al des-

arrollo sustentable podría no ser suficiente para contrarrestar

las tendencias ya presentes. El que el empleo masivo de la

energía solar sea un componente importante del futuro recla-

mará asimismo acciones a nivel multilateral. tanto globales

como regionales y subregionales, y en último análisis nacio-

nales, para las que no existe antecedente ni verdadera viabili-

dad a mediano plazo.

Por lo anterior, el desarrollo sustentable, en toda la exten-

sión del concepto, puede no pasar de ser una quimera que sólo

sirva para alimentar marginalmente las ideas sobre el desarro-

llo futuro de la humanidad. Podría sostenerse que la contra-

parte de las tendencias ya presentes pudiera ser una transfor-

mación cultural, ayudada por la pobreza y la incapacidad para

consumir, que lleve a las sociedades y a los gobiernos a limi-

tar los consumos excesivos en los países de elevado nivel de

ingresos, que se traducen en un uso también intenso de los

energéticos. Ello liberaría recursos que podrían utilizarse en

elevar los niveles ya mínimos de consumo para la satisfacción

de necesidades básicas en los países que constituirán en el fu-

turo una creciente mayoría de la población mundial. Se trata

de un propósito expresado frecuentemente por algunos sec-

tores y que con cierta regularidad ha aparecido en la retórica

y las demandas a nivel de las Naciones Unidas, así como en

opiniones provenientes de centros académicos y de ONG. Sin

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embargo, tal transformación cultural no podrá ser impuesta

desde afuera, sino que tendría que surgir de manera endóge-

na, tanto en los países de elevados niveles de consumo como

en los menos favorecidos.

La conclusión que se puede perfilar es que el desarrollo sus-

tentable, dependiente como es, en considerable proporción,

de que se controle y reduzca el empleo de combustibles de

origen fósil por razones ambientales y de agotamiento de los

mismos, será difícilmente un proceso social obvio y viable,

aun en el supuesto de que un número suficiente de sociedades

se encaminen por ese rumbo e influyan en las organizaciones

internacionales para que colaboren efectivamente en la trans-

formación hacia esa meta. Las alternativas reales no son fá-

ciles de prever si se busca no caer en determinismos pesimis-

tas. Además, el desarrollo sustentable no es sólo cuestión de

reducir la dependencia respecto de los energéticos, en parti-

cular los más contaminantes, sino que abarca un amplio es-

pectro de otras acciones nacionales, regionales y globales.

Si el desarrollo sustentable supone crecimiento económico

suficiente para hacer frente al incremento demográfico pero

a la vez un crecimiento equitativo que abarque desarrollo so-

cial, debe admitirse que no ha sido aún escrito el guión para

lograrlo. Se dispone apenas de orientaciones inspiradas más

bien en la tradición del desarrollo que pudieran llevar a la hu-

manidad a una menor desigualdad en la distribución de los

recursos disponibles, entre ellos los energéticos. No se logrará

tal vez sustentabilidad para el planeta, pero quizá pueda evi-

tarse caer en los abismos que ya se avizoran.

2.3. ASPECTOS SOCIALES Y CULTURALES

2.3.1. La población, la pobreza y la marginalidad

Las tendencias demográficas globales son, dentro de ciertos

márgenes, relativamente previsibles. Como ya se ha mencio-

nado, para el año 2015 habrá siete mil y tantos millones de ha-

bitantes y se llegará a un cifra superior a 8 000 millones en el

2025, con probabilidad de alcanzar 12 500 millones como

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máximo el año 2050. Fuera de las controversias entre economis-

tas, demógrafos, sociólogos y activistas de distintos tintes con

los dirigentes religiosos, políticos y otros, se tendrá que hacer

frente a las consecuencias de esa enorme masa humana y a la

de sus migraciones internas e internacionales. Los recursos

humanos, técnicos, administrativos, económicos y sociales re-

sultarán probablemente insuficientes y no del todo eficaces, y

ademas estarán repartidos desigualmente entre las regiones.

A su vez, las políticas de población están sujetas a limitantes

políticas, sociales y culturales, incluso religiosas, que genen-

rán respuestas variadas a la visión relativamente amplia y pro-

gresista que se ha tenido a los niveles de las Naciones Unidas.

Con el número de habitantes que se calcula para dentro de

apenas 30 a 50 años será indispensable, pero no seguro, que

se aborden todos los aspectos de la problemática de la pobla-

ción puestos a debate en la Conferencia de El Cairo de 1994.

A nivel nacional y regional será preciso que se preste la debi-

da atención a los problemas más agudos y profundos, sobre

todo los que requieren por una parte acciones del Estado y

por otra concientización y actitudes positivas por cuenta de

la población. Si bien las variables demográficas se mueven con

cierta lentitud, su impulso acumulado tiende a magnificar cier-

tas consecuencias, como ya se ha expuesto en relación con la

probable sobreoferta futura de fuerza de trabajo joven no su-

ficientemente educada y capacitada para las tareas económi-

cas por venir. El envejecimiento demográfico en los países cuyo

índice de fecundidad sea inferior a la tasa de remplazo, como

varios de Europa y Japón, será otro ejemplo de acumulación

de factores que influirán en las políticas sociales y de empleo

en los países afectados. Los desbalances que conducirán a una

mayor migración internacional requerirán de nuevas orienta-

ciones para regular los flujos migratorios y al mismo tiempo

respetar los derechos humanos y hacer menos inflexibles las

actitudes culturales que en muchos casos están en oposición.

Puede preverse que los temas de población tendrán que

descomponerse y analizarse en sus distintas fases para llevar

la problemática a niveles menos generales de discusión y

comprensión, distintos a los que han predominado desde la

Primera Conferencia Mundial de Población de Bucarest en

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1974. La dinámica demográfica, aun registrando en algunos

aspectos cambios más bien lentos, en otros puede ser rápida,

como en el descenso de la fecundidad en ciertas sociedades o

el aumento imprevisible de la migración en otras. Diferentes

movimientos divergentes de las variables se relacionarán cada

vez más con las interacciones sociales, económicas y políticas

que las afectan, por lo que tendrán que abordarse a esos nive-

les en toda su complejidad. Los instrumentos internacionales

no parecen estar diseñados todavía para este género de enfo-

ques. No obstante, podrían promoverse en una estrategia a

largo plazo.

En sus aspectos sociales, la intensidad demográfica y el

solo número de habitantes que pueblan algunos países y re-

giones del mundo requieren de una atención que esas nacio-

nes no parecen ser capaces de ofrecer adecuadamente, al me-

nos en los contextos de organización del desarrollo que hoy

prevalecen. Los más de 1000 millones de personas en el mun-

do que se encuentran en condición de pobreza o miseria, y

aun indigencia total, tienen con frecuencia escasas o nulas

posibilidades de salir de ella y están condenadas en conse-

cuencia a vivir en estado de subsistencia mínima. Cierto es

. que ésta pudiera subsanarse en alguna medida y aliviarse por

medio de aportaciones directas de alimentos y otros bienes y

materiales de primera necesidad, aun con apoyos internacio-

nales. Pero es difícil que los habitantes aquejados de pobreza

lleguen a constituir una proporción decreciente a futuro sin

una reorientación, a veces radical, de la economía a favor de

los estratos menos favorecidos de la sociedad. Ello entraña

alimentación y nutrición, salud, educación, capacitación y vi-

vienda en cantidad y calidad suficientes, infraestructura urba-

na y acceso a recursos naturales donde corresponda, con los

servicios necesarios para que esos objetivos se logren.

Sin esfuerzo nacional propio, poco podrá hacer la comu-

nidad internacional, salvo acciones de salvamento parcial. Si

aumentase gradualmente la capacidad nacional de ocuparse

de la miseria en formas constructivas, la cooperación interna-

cional podría ser más efectiva, pero deberán evitarse tendencias

del pasado que pretenden imponer a una determinada comu-

nidad las recetas y soluciones de otras y de grupos técnicos

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internacionales sin la debida participación de elementos loca-

les. La pobreza no es una enfermedad, sino el resultado de

procesos de alcance negativo del pasado, agravados en muchos

casos por sobrepoblación relativa; por ello, la reducción y

eliminación de la pobreza -concepto relativo en sí- reque-

rirá actuar sobre sus causas con más ahínco y claridad y no

sólo limitarse a remediar algunos síntomas. Las consecuen-

cias de determinadas formas de explotación agrícola, la falta

de dinamismo en la economía de muchos países y el abuso de

los sectores fuertes con los débiles seguirán siendo factores

negativos mientras las sociedades no sean capaces de crear

alternativas. La comunidad internacional tendrá que asumir

sus responsabilidades, los programas de las Naciones Unidas,

como los de la UNICEF y el PNUD, deberán mantener su vigencia,

y habrán de incrementarse las muchas acciones de organiza-

ciones no gubernamentales y en algunos casos de programas

bilaterales. De lo contrario, las consecuencias podrán ser mu-

cho más graves de lo que han sido hasta ahora.

La marginación de grandes sectores de la población, tanto

en los países desarrollados como en los en vía de desarrollo, es

una característica particular de la vida urbana, como se ha

apuntado ya, pero también surge de la discriminación de las

etnias autóctonas y de las tendencias abusivas de las institu-

ciones que debieran respetar su cultura y a la vez llevarles los

beneficios de las sociedades modernas, especialmente en ma-

teria de salud, tecnologías productivas, medios de comerciali-

zación, educación y capacitación. Marginalidad no es lo mismo

que pobreza, pero se asocia a ésta de manera muy estrecha;

entraña aspectos culturales y políticos no siempre fácilmente

descifrables, pero lo suficientemente ostensibles para que se

puedan también sentar bases a largo plazo para apoyar y me-

jorar a las poblaciones marginadas.

2.3.2. Cooperación en materia de educación,ciencia y tecnología y salud

Aunque estos temas han surgido en su mayoría en el escenario

internacional después de creado el sistema de las Naciones

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Unidas, y pese a que en una etapa inicial se procedió con gran

optimismo y empuje al desarrollo de organismos especializa-

dos como la UNESCO y la OMS, el apoyo a estas tareas ha decaído.

Se requiere por lo tanto una evaluación de las funciones de

tales organismos en el cuadro de las nuevas circunstancias

que se están previendo, independientemente de problemas co-

yunturales de financiamiento o de falta de aportaciones finan-

cieras gubernamentales suficientes. La UNESCO ha tenido una

vocación claramente establecida en pro de la educación bási-

ca, que no se ha alcanzado para todos los grupos de edad me-

nores de 15 años en los países en vía de desarrollo, sobre todo

en África y en algunos que en otras regiones señalan grandes

rezagos. El tema se abordó en 1990 en la Conferencia de Jom-

tien, Tailandia, con la cooperación del Banco Mundial, la

UNICEF y otras organizaciones, y de allí salió una estrategia sóli-

damente concebida pero cuya realización dependerá -como

s i e m p r e - de actitudes y programas nacionales y de apoyos

específicos. Aparte los signos deficientes de los sistemas esco-

lares y las tasas de abandono de la educación tan elevadas,

subsiste la necesidad de formar más y mejores maestros y de

atender la educación y formación de niños y jóvenes que aban-

donan el sistema escolar en distintas etapas. La educación bá-

sica dificilmente se puede financiar con recursos que no sean

del sector público. La tarea es inmensa e impone estrategias y

planes a mediano y largo plazos. Estos procesos se han inicia-

do y son susceptibles de mejorarse; para ello es indispensable

el apoyo de los gobiernos que han dejado de contribuir sufi-

cientemente o del todo a la UNESCO. Este organismo y el Insti-

tuto Internacional de Planeamiento de la Educación adscrito

a él tienen como su más alta prioridad la educación básica.

La educación media y la superior no se prestan en la mis-

ma medida a la acción de la UNESCO para promoverlas y mejo-

rarlas, aun cuando el organismo auspicia la Unión Interna-

cional de Universidades, que sirve como foro a nivel mundial

y presta apoyo a programas de enseñanza media y universita-

rios en todos los continentes por medio de fondos para inves-

tigación y becas de posgrado. Son muchas las organizaciones

regionales dedicadas a estos fines. La Unión Europea sostiene

amplios programas de intercambio y están en vigor decenas

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de programas bilaterales. La UNESCO y las Naciones Unidas crea-

ron en 1973, a instancia de Japón, la Universidad de las Nacio-

nes Unidas (UNU) con el propósito de apoyar investigaciones

en nuevos temas de interés global mediante redes de coopera-

ción e intercambio. El Instituto Internacional de Planeamien-

to de la Educación, además de colaborar en la formación de

docentes e investigadores para la educación básica, tiene en

marcha un programa de investigación y estudios sobre la ense-

ñanza superior. En muchos países las universidades, con sus

fuertes rasgos de independencia académica y autonomía de

gestión, están pasando de una situación en que el financia-

miento lo proveía mayormente el Estado a otra en que las ins-

tituciones mismas se ven en la necesidad de generar fondos

por medio de los servicios que prestan y de allegarse aporta-

ciones del sector privado. En los Estados Unidos, en donde mu-

chas universidades se originaron en dotaciones públicas de

tierras, la tendencia a crear y financiar universidades priva-

das, y aun a fortalecer las públicas con fondos de origen pri-

vado es muy marcada. En otros países que han contado en

época reciente con un conjunto de nuevas universidades pú-

blicas, como el Reino Unido, las asignaciones presupuestarias

se han reducido de manera acusada y cada vez más han teni-

do que obtener financiamientos privados. En cambio, en Fran-

cia, Alemania y España se mantiene la universidad pública, si

bien al lado de una creciente participación de instituciones

. privadas de educación superior. Puede preverse, de cualquier

manera, que las oportunidades de educación universitaria, en

todas sus formas, y de especialización profesional y científica

tendrán que aumentar a mayor velocidad que en el pasado.

Recientemente, la UNESCO ha dado a conocer un nuevo in-

forme sobre el futuro de la educación, redactado por una Co-

misión Internacional sobre la Educación para el Siglo Vein-

tiuno.l7

El propósito de este informe, que tuvo en cuenta todos

los antecedentes valiosos de informes anteriores de la UNESCO

y las aportaciones de los miembros de la Comisión, fue reafir-

mar el valor de la educación como factor fundamental del

17 Learning: The Treasure Within: Report of the Intemational Commission

on Education for the Twenty-First Century, Comisión presidida por Jacques

Delors, UNESCO. París, 1996 (no se dispone aún de la versión en español).

185

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desarrollo de la persona y de la sociedad y como instrumento

indispensable para alcanzar los ideales de paz, libertad y jus-

ticia social. No obstante la gran diversidad de situaciones edu-

cativas que prevalecen, la Comisión encuadró sus ideas en el

contexto de la globalización, distinguiendo temas y orientacio-

nes que puedan tener aplicación nacional y a la vez mundial. 18

La educación del futuro -sostiene el informe- tendrá que

enmarcarse en las tendencias de formación de una economía

mundial o global, pero haciendo posible el desarrollo de los

talentos personales y locales y del potencial creativo. El men-

saje busca originar una amplia renovación del pensamiento so-

bre la educación en todos sus aspectos y a todos los niveles, así

como impulsar la colaboración internacional en la materia.

La cooperación científica es también objeto de apoyos mul-

tilaterales y bilaterales, e interviene en ella gran número de

ONG, academias y otras instituciones generales y especializa-

das con apoyo de organismos como la UNESCO y otros del sis-

tema de las Naciones Unidas. Se han creado también institu-.

clones singulares con aportaciones tanto multilaterales como

regionales y bilaterales, que van desde el Centro Europeo de

Investigaciones sobre Partículas Nucleares (CERN), sito en Gi-

nebra, hasta institutos de investigación médica, agrícola y mu-

chos otros. La UNESCO, otros organismos que intervienen en la

cooperación científica y las comunidades científicas naciona-

les han hecho repetidos llamados a los gobiernos y a la opi-

nión pública acerca de la necesidad de mantener los respaldos

necesarios a la investigación científica, así como de estimu-

larla en los países en desarrollo. Se ha recomendado una más

amplia cooperación y se ha insistido en la vinculación indis-

pensable de la ciencia con el resto de las actividades. Este as-

pecto se acentúa a medida que se cobra mayor conciencia de

los peligros en que se encuentra el equilibrio ecológico y aun

la propia especie humana. 19

En cambio, la cooperación en materia tecnológica tropieza

con dificultades, ya que la mayoría de los adelantos en este

campo se originan en la industria privada, que no comparte

18 Ibid., pp. 13-15.

19 UNESCO, World Science Report 1993 y World Science Report 1996, París.

186

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sino una pequeña proporción de sus descubrimientos y nue-

vas aplicaciones. La Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre

la Aplicación de la Ciencia y la Tecnología al Desarrollo, reu-

nida en Viena en 1979, fue un fracaso porque desembocó en

demandas de los países en vía de desarrollo de que se hicieran,

mediante un gran fondo internacional, fuertes transferencias

de tecnología de los paises desarrollados a los del Tercer Mun-

do. Los gobiernos de los países industrializados rechazaron

estas demandas y propuestas, salvo la creación de un peque-

ño fondo de 35 millones de dólares en manos de las Naciones

Unidas. Se volvió pronto al punto en que habían quedado las

discusiones con anterioridad, sin ningún avance. En las cir-

cunstancias actuales, en que priva la ideología del mercado,

no es probable que prospere el conjunto de demandas en ma-

teria tecnológica que puedan formular los países en desarro-

llo. La política de las grandes potencias tecnológicas va en el

sentido de que la tecnología es propiedad industrial privada,

protegida por los derechos normales de propiedad y por pa-

tentes de larga duración, y que su transferencia deberá efec-

tuarse en consecuencia en forma directa, y según su convenien-

cia, por las empresas que la generan, es decir, principalmente

las transnacionales. Se supone que los paises en desarrollo

tienen o podrán tener en el futuro capacidad para generar las

tecnologías que el mercado demande, pero hasta ahora son

muy pocos los casos de éxito comercial internacional.

En materia tecnológica, un tema que tuvo cierta resonancia

hace 30 años fue el de la “tecnología intermedia”, aplicable a

las condiciones prevalecientes en países de baja capacidad

científico-tecnológica. En general, los movimientos en pro de

estas tecnologías no han prosperado, y en algunas esferas se

considera a éstas como “tecnologías de segunda”, a pesar de

que se pueden citar cientos de proyectos y decenas de países,

en la esfera de aplicación de los programas de las Naciones

Unidas, en que han tenido éxito y eficiencia en el plano micro-

económico. Las tecnologías intermedias, no obstante, debie-

ran tener amplios campos de aplicación para actividades eco-

nómicas en pequeña escala, así como en un gran espectro de

asuntos ambientales y energéticos, con grandes economías

potenciales de capital.

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Por último, la creciente atención al medio ambiente global,

regional y nacional, sobre todo a raíz de la Conferencia de

Rio de Janeiro de 1992, ha dado lugar a que se considere la

necesidad, como parte de los seguimientos a las recomenda-

ciones de esa conferencia, de acelerar la transferencia de tec-

nología con fines ambientales por intermedio de organizacio-

nes tanto multilaterales como bilaterales, especialmente para

hacer frente a las necesidades de los países en vía de desarro-

llo. Es posible que por este medio se logre gradualmente debi-

. litar el cuasimonopolio de la tecnología de que hasta ahora

han gozado unos cuantos países. Será uno de los pocos casos

en que podrían coincidir intereses nacionales de los países des-

arrollados con intereses globales, de orden ambiental, en que

se requiere abrir un nuevo camino a la cooperación entre las

naciones.

En cuanto a salud, la labor cumplida por la Organización

Mundial de la Salud (OMS) revela resultados de fundamental

importancia por lo que hace a la erradicación de algunas en-

fermedades endémicas y la prevención de otras, aun cuando

el panorama de la salud ha estado cambiando por las fallas de

los sistemas de inmunidad, la resistencia biológica a ciertos

medicamentos y, en general, por el influjo de la pobreza y la

desnutrición. Un estudio reciente hace notar que las pertur-

baciones ambientales y sociales desencadenan o recrudecen

tendencias a las infecciones microbianas que de otra manera

estarían debidamente controladas.20

Muchas de estas “nuevas

enfermedades” son resistentes a los antibióticos.

La OMS y sus expresiones regionales son elementos positivos

que necesitarán ser reforzados, y, en su caso, reformados o me-

jorados. Un aumento de la cooperación mundial y regional en

materia de salud no debiera ofrecer mayores dificultades, fue-

ra de las financieras. Es de notar también, la existencia de redes

internacionales de ONG en el campo de la salud. A su vez, la

labor que en pro de la infancia lleva a cabo la UNICEF robustece

las condiciones generales de salud, y es probable, dado el éxi-

to y la relativa eficiencia de este organismo, que se amplíe su

20 Véase, por ejemplo, Anne E. Platt, Infecting Ourselves: How Environ-

ment and Social Disruptions Trigger Disease, Washington, Worldwatch Paper

129, Worldwatch Institute, abril de 1996.

188

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radio de acción. Por otro lado, la contaminación industrial y

en particular los desechos definidos como tóxicos generan en

muchos casos daños a largo plazo a la salud y cuyos efectos in-

mediatos y sobre todo acumulativos no son perceptibles con

facilidad.21

2.3.3. La interdependencia cultural

La civilización moderna se ha formado de un sinfín de cultu-

ras locales que con el tiempo se han interrelacionado, muchas

veces perdiendo su identidad propia y en unas más conserván-

dola o adoptando rasgos de otra u otras. El desarrollo de la

cultura ha estado estrechamente ligado a conceptos religio-

sos, en particular en relación con la deidad o deidades a las

que se acepta o se rinde tributo, o que inspiran al ser humano

en sus desempeños terrenales. No es éste el lugar para ahon-

dar en tales aspectos de la humanidad, fuera de reconocer que

en el presente siglo han predominado culturas religiosas que si

bien parecen diferenciarse en sus ritos y sus instituciones,

mantienen cierta similitud básica como en lo referente al mo-

noteísmo y la prédica de la bondad y la tolerancia hacia los

semejantes. Las principales religiones, entre ellas el cristianis-

mo, el budismo, el judaísmo y el hinduismo, y hasta cierto

punto el Islam, no abrigan sentimientos ni conductas agresi-

vas hacia los semejantes, ni son enemigas de la naturaleza;

antes bien, proclaman y promueven la hermandad, con el res-

peto a las ideas de otros, y aprecian el significado de la natu-

raleza. Por algo se sigue la tradición, aun en muchas subdivi-

siones de las religiones y en sectas, de la adoración del Sol.

No ha sido así en las Iglesias que representan a las religio-

nes más extendidas o en determinadas sectas. Las instituciones

eclesiásticas con frecuencia se han aliado a intereses y han de-

fendido causas destructoras de la especie humana, o se han

refugiado en dogmas que han tratado de imponer. A través de

la historia ha habido guerras religiosas, y aun en el siglo xx se

han registrado varios conflictos entre doctrinas eclesiásticas

21 Véase Cheryl Simon Silver y Dale S. Rothman, Toxics and Health: The

Potencial Long-term Effects of Industrial Activity, World Resources Institute,The 2050 Project, Washington, 1995.

189

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que han inspirado, junto con otros intereses, guerras fratrici-

das, a veces internacionales. En las postrimerías del presente

siglo han surgido con más vehemencia en algunas partes del

mundo las militancias llamadas fundamentalistas, sobre todo

entre los pueblos de fe islámica, aunque existen diversos ma-

tices, como también en las religiones cristiana y judaica.

Si se acepta la relación entre religión y cultura, no cabe duda

que la situación de los próximos años y quizá decenios conti-

nuará siendo conflictiva, no obstante que la idea del ecume-

nismo también haya ganado fuerza en distintas sociedades y

a los altos niveles de las Iglesias de origen cristiano. Ello no

asegura la paz ni la supervivencia, aunque puede contribuir a

aminorar en el globo la persistente tendencia a la violencia

como medio de ganar el poder. Las Naciones Unidas, por cier-

to, no parecen haberse ocupado de la participación de las Igle-

sias en los procesos y objetivos que forman el meollo de la

Carta de las Naciones Unidas. Al margen de la participación

de la Santa Sede como Estado miembro de las Naciones Uni-

das, las Iglesias están representadas mediante asociaciones,

consejos y ONG diversos que en algunos países y regiones ejer-

cen fuerte influencia en las poblaciones y los gobiernos.

Otra vertiente de las culturas se relaciona con la experien-

cia histórica en la formación de las familias y comunidades,

con su extensión, sobre todo en los siglos XIX y xx, a una am-

plia gama de la actividad económica nacional e internacional,

en la que intervienen además expansiones de la trama social

original hasta crear nuevas sociedades. Estas sociedades de

hoy se caracterizan en buena parte del mundo por una inten-

sa intercomunicación, especialmente a partir de la expansión

masiva de los medios electrónicos de comunicación. Gutenberg

ha sido superado con creces por Hertz, Marconi, Gates y sus

seguidores. La comunicación es ya instantánea, no reconoce

límites; las modalidades de cada una de las grandes culturas y

de las culturas nacionales, así como de las diversas identidades,

son conocidas al instante y frecuentemente copiadas o adap-

tadas. La aproximación entre la transfronterización de las cul-

turas y el comercio internacional no puede negarse. Trans-

culturación y globalización económica van ya de la mano.

Lo anterior merece desde luego varias consideraciones y

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reservas. La población mundial se compone no sólo de los mu-

chos mestizajes de las etnias originales que habitan principal-

mente en el continente americano y Europa occidental, en los

que intervienen cruzamientos culturales y religiosos, sino que

además existen etnias asentadas en culturas de fuerte arraigo

y por lo mismo menos sensibles a los avances de las culturas

grecolatinas y sus expresiones cristiano-judaicas. Las cultu-

ras que se han opuesto firmemente a los avances modernos y

posmodernos han permanecido aisladas territorialmente o re-

fugiadas en enclaves; son éstos los casos tan dispares como

los de Japón, China, Corea, algunas naciones del sureste de Asia,

la India y gran número de naciones y tribus del continente

africano. Ocurre por igual con las múltiples comunidades ét-

nicas autóctonas en todas las latitudes, llamadas comúnmen-

te “indigenas” en el continente americano. Éstas, aun cuando

hayan adoptado desde hace siglos la religión, por ejemplo la

cristiana, han conservado rasgos culturales fundamentales que

las diferencian, sea por sus costumbres, sus formas de organi-

zación local, su actitud hacia la naturaleza que los rodea, sus

creencias o, desde luego, su lengua original.

El trauma cultural entre el cristianismo y las culturas étni-

cas autóctonas de América Latina, por ejemplo, está documen-

tado desde el principio mismo de la colonización española,

como también los traumas semejantes en América del Norte y

el Caribe en época posterior. Los antropólogos se han encar-

gado desde el siglo XIX de investigar y documentar procesos

similares en las islas del Pacífico, África y otras partes. La his-

toria moderna sigue siendo un descubrimiento de culturas per-

tenecientes a muy diversas etnias en muchas partes del mun-

do. Es legítimo, en consecuencia, plantear lo que pudiera

significar la globalización en la esfera cultural frente a todas

estas situaciones de enfrentamiento o de diferenciación de cul-

turas que han sobrevivido y que en muchos casos tienen muy

fuerte arraigo, a pesar de que algunas manifestaciones super-

ficiales de las culturas modernas de las sociedades capitalis-

tas, que se propagan por los medios electrónicos, lleguen a

todas esas etnias y sean incorporadas. Para decirlo en pocas

palabras, los blue jeans, las camisetas estampadas con leyen-

das y dibujos, las “botas texanas”, ciertas modalidades de la

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LAPERSPECTIVACLOBAL

comida norteamericana o europea, la televisión y la radio, las

imágenes fotográficas... y mucho más, llegan hoy a todas par-

tes y no se rechazan de por si. Estas modalidades culturales,

es cierto, son promovidas por intereses comerciales y aun po-

líticos, pero de cualquier manera no hay manera de ponerles

barreras, y menos aún cuando efectivamente hay contactos

comerciales, se producen migraciones o, por desgracia, las et-

nias locales sufren violencia de otras o de los “elementos civi-

lizadores” provenientes por la vía militar de otras naciones.

Interesa observar también la fortaleza de algunas culturas

plenamente identificadas, es decir, que tienen clara identi-

dad, como las de Japón y China, frecuentemente expuestas a

embates de Occidente durante los últimos siglos. La japonesa

ha sabido conservar su identidad pero a la vez, de modo prag-

mático, ha adoptado tecnologías y modos de organización

económica que le han permitido dotar a la generalidad de su

población de niveles de ingreso y bienestar que se sitúan entre

los más elevados del mundo. China, integrada de varias cultu-

ras, ha mantenido asimismo sus identidades culturales tradi-

cionales a lo largo de los siglos, y ha absorbido tecnologías,

sistemas de organización social e ideologías de otras culturas.

Ello ha ocurrido en Japón en el terreno de la producción y el

consumo; en China, sólo en determinados sectores o zonas

geográficas. El común de la población china alcanza niveles

materiales apenas un poco más altos que los de superviven-

cia, con seguridad de alimentación y nutrición pero sin las

demás comodidades de las sociedades más evolucionadas. En

China, como se ha expresado en otra parte de este informe, el

solo volumen demográfico se puede identificar como un factor

que ha impedido al país llegar más lejos.

Las culturas de las naciones de Rusia y otros Estados de la

confederación que sustituyó a la Unión Soviética han mante-

nido su identidad aun cuando no hayan logrado, por designios

ideológicos y políticos de sus dirigentes, proveer a la pobla-

ción, con ciertas salvedades, de un nivel medio material de

vida que supere en mucho el que se tenía hace un siglo, excep-

to en seguridad alimentaria básica, vivienda, educación, salud

y tecnología. La militarización y las violencias internas han

afectado, a lo largo de los decenios, las condiciones generales

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LA PERSPECTIVA DE NUEVAS INSlTIUCIONALIZACIONES

de vida y han impedido la libre elección por parte del consu-

midor. La nueva Comunidad de Estados Independientes, ade-

más, comprende minorías étnicas asociadas a la religión islámi-

ca que mantienen rasgos culturales propios, aun cuando no

del todo cerrados a las influencias interculturales. Existe en

esta situación un potencial de conflictos, aun internacionales,

que no se puede prever.

En diversos países del sureste de Asia, en la India y en otros

como los de Asia occidental y el Medio Oriente, la diversidad

no sólo es cultural, sino religiosa, con extremos fundamenta-

listas, con influencias de Occidente, con tecnologías moder-

nas al lado de otras tradicionales, con instituciones modernas

y otras obsoletas, con elevado grado de comunicación con el

exterior... y a la vez con conflictos interétnicos y religiosos.

En ocasiones, las identidades nacionales no están estableci-

das con claridad o, estándolo, aceptan modalidades de culturas

occidentales aun en las normas de consumo, aunque con ex-

cepciones importantes en la alimentación y la indumentaria.

En el continente americano, pese a muchas opiniones hoy

divergentes, los rasgos culturales dominantes de la población,

sus instituciones, sus costumbres y modalidades familiares son

de origen europeo, matizados en muchos casos y sectores por

el mestizaje étnico-cultural. En algunos países latinoamerica-

nos es más pronunciada la influencia cultural de las minorías

étnicas, salvo en la religión, que en lo general es católica. En

el siglo xx., después de un periodo en que las manifestaciones

superficiales de la cultura venían principalmente, sobre todo

entre las elites, de Francia y España, ha habido en este aspec-

to importantes transformaciones. Como en la Europa occiden-

tal misma, las manifestaciones modernas y superficiales se

han incorporado por influencia de los Estados Unidos, en gran

medida a través de los medios de comunicación y de repre-

sentación de imágenes y de la publicidad comercial.

En los países latinoamericanos y del Caribe más cercanos a

los Estados Unidos, el hecho de que el principal origen de las

importaciones y el principal destino de las exportaciones, así

como la fuente más importante de inversión extranjera direc-

ta y de acceso a la tecnología moderna haya sido precisamen-

te ese país, ha determinado inevitablemente que la suya sea la

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cultura extranjera más influyente hoy día. En otros países de

la región ha habido mayor influencia de naciones europeas,

entre ellas la Gran Bretaña, Alemania, Italia, Portugal y la Es-

paña de hoy, en todos los terrenos que constituyen aspectos

importantes de la globalización. En uno, Brasil, no es poca,

además, la influencia de la cultura japonesa, aunque adaptada

a la del medio local. Brasil, por cierto, no deja de tener con las

etnias autóctonas y con las de origen africano conflictos que

llaman la atención del mundo, como también se percibe dis-

criminación. o desprecio de las etnias indígenas al igual que

en otros casos, como por ejemplo en México, algunos países

del área centroamericana, Argentina y Chile. Sin embargo, en

todo el continente prevalece sobre todo la influencia norte-

americana, que se sobrepone en muchos aspectos a la origi-

naria hispano-lusitana y a la surgida, en varias partes impor-

tantes de América Latina, de las etnias y las culturas indígenas

y africanas.

Puede afirmarse que algunos contextos culturales de los paí-

ses latinoamericanos conservan signos importantes y aun fuer-

tes de identidad propia por razones étnicas, históricas y de

aislamiento, por la preeminencia de lenguas y tradiciones pre-

hispánicas o por resistencias a la influencia norteamericana

(como ocurre en Canadá en la provincia de Quebec). Sin em-

bargo, los sistemas educativos están marcados más bien por

las tradiciones europeas y norteamericana, así como los sis-

temas de salud y seguridad social, los de organización econó-

mica, comercial y financiera y hasta los de gobierno. Es,

pues, natural que las aproximaciones, los intercambios y las

influencias e invasiones culturales recíprocas entre los países

latinoamericanos y los Estados Unidos. hayan aumentado y lo

sigan haciendo (sin desmerecer ni eliminar lo semejante con

algunos países europeos). Hasta las lenguas española y portu-

guesa han sufrido transformaciones en su vocabulario y en

las expresiones vernáculas, cotidianas y populares, y sobre.

todo en las técnicas, por influencia, sobre todo, del inglés de

los Estados Unidos --como por lo demás ocurre con varias len-

guas europeas y aun con la japonesa y de hecho con la de

cualquier cultura que recurra a la tecnología y el comercio

modernos- . Los anglicismos están a la orden del día, a veces

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sin necesidad pues existen vocablos y expresiones equivalen-tes y correctos en español y portugués; pero con frecuencia seemplean expresiones traducidas literalmente del inglés, asícomo vocablos homófonos engañosos a los que se da el senti-do norteamericano, no el de la lengua española o portuguesa.En América Latina, al menos en lo superficial y material, seaceptan rasgos de otras culturas y lenguas; no obstante, debeinsistirse en que, en lo general, se conservan identidades cul-turales, aunque en algunos casos no tan firmes como muchoslo desearían.

Finalmente, en Europa occidental, sujeta con mayor inten-sidad a las influencias norteamericanas en los últimos 50años, es interesante observar que las identidades culturales semantienen en sus distintas formas, no obstante aberracionesen el lenguaje, en algunas modalidades de la alimentación yel vestido, en las formas de la comunicación en el mundo em-presarial y gubernamental, en los espectáculos, las artes y losdeportes. Europa es una gran región plena de comunidadesque conservan sus rasgos culturales, hasta sus dialectos y len-guas, en forma paralela a los rasgos más generales de las cul-turas modernas. Todavía más, empieza a perfilarse la nociónde que se es “europeo”, con todo lo que eso entraña desdela creación de la Comunidad Económica Europea y ahora laUnión Europea en cuanto a instituciones supranacionales,convergencias económicas y sociales, intercambios y apertu-ras en la educación, movimiento de personas, etc. El ser “eu-ropeo” no afecta la identidad nacional, ni mucho menos lalocal y municipal. El que en América Latina alguien se sienta“latinoamericano” fuera de los funcionarios de algunos orga-nismos de alcance regional o de la esfera de las artes y la litera-tura, es todavía bastante dudoso; se parte, entre los latinoame-ricanos, de un mutuo desconocimiento de enorme magnitud.Sólo en América Central tiende a prevalecer, por razoneshistóricas y de proximidad geográfica, un sentimiento bastan-te claro de lo “centroamericano”, así como en el Caribe la ideade ser “caribeño”.

En la globalización los temas culturales no se estudian aúna fondo, tal vez con excepción de los esfuerzos y programasque tienen su origen en la UNESCO y a los cuales se ha prestado

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mayor atención en los años recientes. En América Latina ymuchas otras regiones existen pocos estudios, y en algunoscasos prevalecen ideas y métodos excesivamente formales yhasta enfoques muy estrechos de las épocas previas a la glo-balización que no permiten prever en todos sus alcances lastendencias y perspectivas. A pesar de ello, el signo de los tiem-pos futuros es la interdependencia cultural.

Lo anterior ha quedado definido en forma nítida en un re-ciente informe de la Comisión Mundial de Cultura y Desarro-llo,22 constituida en la UNESCO en 1991 a instancia de los paísesnórdicos y presidida por el ex secretario general de las Nacio-nes Unidas, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. El informe de esta Comi-sión, que estuvo integrada por personalidades de 14 países ycontó con la colaboración de consultores y del personal pro-fesional de la UNESCO, examina en forma muy amplia los as-pectos y modalidades de la cultura que hoy adquieren espe-cial importancia a la luz de las tendencias globalizadoras dela economía, las comunicaciones y la tecnologia. Su puntode partida es que toda cultura debiera respetar aquellas otras“cuyos valores sean tolerantes de las demás y se adhieran auna ética global”. La libertad cultural, al proteger diversosmodos de vida, “estimula la experimentación, la diversidad, laimaginación y la creatividad”, pues “el fin último del desarro-llo es el bienestar universal físico, mental y social de todo serhumano”.23

La Comisión va más allá de las definiciones tradicionales y,concibe la cultura como un conjunto de factores y elementosderivados de la historia y del presente, de influencias sociales,ambientales, económicas y políticas que conforman la vida yactividades del ser humano y la vida colectiva. Por ello, ningu-na cultura puede ser estática ni aislarse, sino que interactúacon otras y evoluciona, ya hoy en día muy ligada al conceptodel pluralismo y la democracia. La “identificación étnica es unarespuesta normal y sana a las presiones de la globalización”.24

22 Comisión Mundial de Cultura y Desarrollo. Our Creative Diversity:

Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, París, UNESCO,1995 (se cuenta por el momento solo con la versión en inglés).23

Ibid., pp. 16 y 17.24

Ibid., p. 17.

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La cultura, entendida con esta amplitud, viene a ser, en pala-bras del presidente de la Comisión, “una variable central queexplica las distintas modalidades del cambio y es un determi-nante esencial, aun la esencia misma, del desarrollo sustenta-ble, puesto que las actitudes y los estilos de vida gobiernan lasformas en que administramos todos nuestros recursos norenovables”.25

La Comisión se plantea la necesidad de establecer políticasculturales. En forma congruente con las definiciones anterio-res, se establece que la globalización de los procesos cultura-les no la dirige en realidad ningún país determinado, pues noson los gobiernos los que pueden determinar la política cul-tural. Nada mejor que citar un par de párrafos del informe:

Cuando la cultura se entiende como la base del desarrollo es pre-ciso ampliar de manera considerable la noción misma de la polí-tica cultural. Toda política de desarrollo deberá ser profundamen-te sensible a la cultura por sí misma e inspirarse en ésta.

... el definir y aplicar dicha política significa encontrar factoresde cohesión que mantengan integradas a las sociedades multiétni-cas, haciendo mejor uso de las realidades y oportunidades del plu-ralismo. Entraña la promoción de la creatividad en la política y enla gobernación, en la tecnología, la industria y la actividad empre-sarial, en la educación y el desarrollo social y comunitario, así co-mo en las artes. Requiere que los medios se empleen para abrir lasoportunidades de comunicación a todos, reduciendo la distanciaentre los que tienen acceso a la información y los que carecen deél. Significa adoptar una perspectiva de género que visualice laspreocupaciones, las necesidades y los intereses de la mujer y pro-cure una más justa distribución del poder entre los hombres y lasmujeres. Representa dar a los niños y los jóvenes un mejor lugarcomo portadores de una nueva cultura mundial que está en proce-so de generarse. Supone una diversificación cabal de la noción dela herencia cultural en el cambio social. En relación con el am-biente natural, lleva en sí el alcanzar una mejor comprensión delas dimensiones profundamente culturales de la gestión ambientaly la creación de instituciones que permitan llevar a la practicadicha comprensión. Por último, . . . hace ver la necesidad de nuevasinvestigaciones que presten atención a la integración hasta hoy

25 Ibid., prólogo del presidente, p. 10.

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desatendida de la cultura, el desarrollo y las formas de la organi-zación politíca.26

Quedan, por lo tanto, planteados los términos en que, antela globalización, deberán considerarse la interdependenciacultural y la identidad cultural propia.

2.3.4. Los medios de comunicación

En relación con la perspectiva cultural es evidente también lainfluencia de los medios de comunicación, que han alcanzadoun alto grado de penetración mediante el uso intensivo de laelectrónica y los satélites y que muestran marcadas tenden-cias a una cada vez mayor interacción. Al lado de los aspectospositivos debe señalarse que no pueden pasarse por alto losexcesos y los abusos, las especulaciones y la proclividad aofrecer opiniones sesgadas o “editorializadas” y a manipulara la opinión pública con las imágenes. Como se afirmó conanterioridad, la repercusión instantánea de la información pue-de incrementar la incertidumbre natural de las perspectivaspolíticas, económicas, financieras y sociales, y en muchos ca-sos puede desorientar y exacerbar interpretaciones y visioneserróneas de la realidad, con efectos acumulativos en la propiaincertidumbre. Será sin duda un tema difícil, espinoso, inser-tado en el marco de la convivencia internacional del futuro.

2.4. NOTA SOBRE EL LARGO PLAZO

En muchas sociedades y en muchos medios de información,así como en esferas institucionales y políticas, tiende todavíaa menospreciarse la visión de largo plazo. Cierto es que, conpocas excepciones, y sobre todo en épocas de crisis y transi-ción, suelen privar las consideraciones inmediatas y de cortoplazo o que no van más allá de horizontes relativamente cerca-

nos. En los últimos 30 años -dejando fuera las utopías queregularmente surgen en el firmamento social y político- ha

26 Ibid., cap. 9. p. 232 (traducción del inglés).

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habido advertencias claras sobre situaciones futuras, a plazosmás o menos extendidos, que pueden afectar a la humanidad.En vista del deterioro ambiental en todos los rincones del pla-neta, se han advertido las posibles consecuencias para la saludde la especie humana. Se ha señalado la pérdida de biodiver-sidad y el efecto de los continuos embates contra la naturale-za, aun en las áreas menos pobladas. Se han puesto sobre eltapete consideraciones sobre el agotamiento, o aun el graveencarecimiento real, de determinados recursos naturales. LaComisión Brundtland tomó como centro de su preocupaciónel problema planteado por el empleo de energéticos de origenfósil, cuyos efectos contaminantes son graves y cuyas conse-cuencias son todavía imprevisibles en virtud del resultado delas emisiones de carbono sobre la temperatura media atmos-férica, con repercusiones en cambios climáticos globales y re-gionales. Algunas soluciones alternativas que en su momentoparecían racionales -por ejemplo, la noción de que la ener-gía nuclear, por ser “limpia”, evitaría los efectos contaminan-tes de los combustibles de origen fósil- han quedado desacre-ditadas por diversas razones.

Sin embargo, en otros terrenos se advierte todavía muchoescepticismo respecto a las advertencias. Por ejemplo, comoya se ha dicho, prevalece en muchas partes la idea de que elincremento demográfico -que para el año 2050 supondrá unapoblación global de no menos de 7 800 millones de habitantespero que podría ser de 12 500 millones, distribuida desde luegoen forma mucho más concentrada precisamente en las regio-nes de menos desarrollo y menor nivel de vida- no presentarámayor problema, ni siquiera en cuanto a la sola alimentación.Existen ya señales de dificultad para sostener el suministroalimentario de la población en muchas partes del mundo de-bido a la erosión continua de los suelos, la insuficiencia delabastecimiento de agua y la pérdida de la calidad de ésta, lacontaminación por empleo de agroquímicos, la disminucióncontinua del área cultivable, la depredación de los bancospesqueros y muchas manifestaciones más de la actividad “irra-cional” con respecto a la naturaleza y al medio ambiente engeneral, resultante de la actual conformación socioeconómicade la humanidad.

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LA PERSPECIIVA GLOBAL

No se trata de caer en catastrofismos, pero sí de construir“escenarios” realistas en cuanto al futuro a largo plazo, en todasu complejidad y no obstante que se carece todavía de mu-chos elementos de previsión. No puede suponerse que todaslas sociedades están dotadas de igual capacidad para hacerfrente a sus problemas por venir. Tampoco, que la cooperacióninternacional va a solventar las carencias y resolver dichosproblemas. En los últimos años se ha generado gran númerode grupos de estudio del futuro, en todos los continentes, queabordan con distintas metodologías las visiones y perspecti-vas a largo plazo, tanto a nivel global y regional como en elcontexto nacional. En el camino, se producen muchas sorpre-sas y se contradicen muchos pronósticos. También se confíaen que los adelantos tecnológicos continúen aportando solu-ciones. Sin embargo, se han producido situaciones en muchoscasos críticas que constituyen grandes desafíos a los que no seha podido aún hacer frente. Las acciones para prevenir elcambio climático han tenido poco éxito, y tropiezan inclusocon opiniones escépticas, cuando no interesadas. El Protocolode Montreal para reducir y suspender la producción de losCFC ha tenido respuesta positiva hasta cierto punto, pero asabiendas de que el cloro continuará haciendo estragos en lacapa de ozono durante varios decenios, si no un siglo más,con efectos incalculables. La pérdida de biodiversidad y ladesforestación siguen su marcha, aun sin conocerse sino unadécima parte del total de las especies de la fauna y la flora. Latransición hacia los energéticos a base de biomasa, la energíaeólica y la solar es sumamente lenta y tropieza con gran es-cepticismo. El transporte público en ciudades y carreterasdista mucho de prever el ocaso del automóvil de combustióninterna. Las mismas ciudades siguen creciendo, con todos suscostos reales para la población asentada en ellas, sin que sepiense que puedan existir límites y que se requerirán sistemasalternativos de asentamiento.

En fin, el largo plazo, para muchos, a horizontes de dos omas generaciones, ya está presente o debería estarlo, pero nose ha incorporado de manera sistemática a las acciones de losgobiernos ni de la sociedad civil, ni forma parte de la gober-nación local, nacional, regional o global (en el sentido men-

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cionado en el capítulo II, apartado 2.1.2), pero jamás serátarde para empezar.

Las anteriores consideraciones no se hacen por su posiblevalor teórico, sino porque pueden servir de marco a lo que sepiense o elucubre acerca del porvenir, también a largo plazo,de la nación mexicana, de sus habitantes, sus recursos, susasentamientos humanos, su sistema social e institucional, su forma de hacer frente a las necesidades básicas ya percibidasy a las alternativas viables para ofrecer a la población, cuyo nú-mero sigue aumentando a tasa relativamente elevada, mejo-res medios de vida sobre base permanente. Entran en juegoasimismo las relaciones de México con el resto del mundo enel contexto de la globalización, principalmente económica yfinanciera, que para el país se relaciona en medida significati-va con la integración del área de América del Norte. Ni Méxicopuede vivir ya aislado del mundo externo, encerrado en unapretendida endogeneidad, ni el resto del mundo, y en particu-lar los países vecinos del norte, el sur y el Caribe, lo mismoque de otras latitudes lejanas, pueden ya prescindir de la con-sideración de la problemática mexicana del futuro.

Éstas son algunas de las razones por las que el presente es-tudio se ha emprendido con la doble mira de considerar lasperspectivas globales y de situar en ellas, hasta donde sean per-tinentes, las perspectivas nacionales, que en la Segunda Partese examinan de manera todavía segmentada a fin de inducirnuevas ideas, nuevas visiones, nuevas posibilidades. La Prime-ra Parte, que aquí concluye, también se considera como sus-ceptible de nuevas consideraciones y enfoques a mediano ylargo plazos. Se ofrece como un conjunto que, apoyado en elconocimiento de las tendencias y de la literatura sobre posi-bles escenarios futuros que pueden contener cierto grado deprobabilidad, puedan servir de marco mínimo de referencia.Se espera, además, que la perspectiva global que aquí se pre-senta incite a otros a estudiarla y relacionarla con los hori-tontes que se abren a la nación mexicana para el futuro.

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Lugar de Ia publicación:Nueva YorkTitulo:State of the WorldEditorial:State of the WorldAutor/editor:Brown R. LesterCapítulo/artículo:Capitulo 7 Feeding nine billionAño (fecha) de publicación:1999Páginas -- De: Al:115-132

JACQUELINE

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7Feeding Nine Billion

Lester R. Brown

When this century began, each Americanfarmer produced enough food to feedseven other people in the United Statesand abroad. Today, a U.S. farmer feeds 96people. Staggering gains in agriculturalproductivity in the United States and else-where have underpinned the emergenceof the modern world as we know it. Just asthe discovery of agriculture itself set thestage for the emergence of early civiliza-tion, these gains in agricultural productiv-ity have facilitated the emergence of ourmodern global civilization.¹

This has been a revolutionary centuryfor world agriculture. Draft animals havelargely been replaced by tractors; tradi-tional varieties of corn, wheat, and ricehave given way to high-yielding varieties;and world irrigated area has multipliedsixfold since 1900. The use of chemicalfertilizers— virtually unheard of in 1900—now accounts for an estimated 40 percentof world grain producion.²

We are grateful to the Winslow Foundation for itssupport of our research on the world food prospect.

Technological advances have tripledthe productivity of world cropland duringthis century. They have helped expandthe world grain harvest from less than 400million tons in 1900 to nearly 1.9 billiontons in 1998. Indeed, farmers haveexpanded grain production five times asmuch since 1900 as during the preceding10,000 years since agriculture began.³

A CENTURY OF GROWTHThe advances in agriculture that haveunderpinned the near quintupling of thegrain harvest during the twentieth centu-ry have come from essentially five tech-nologies, four of which were availablebefore 1900. Irrigation, one of the keycontributors, goes back several thousandyears, but the other advances are histori-cally much more recent. In 1847 Justusvon Leibig, a German agriculturalchemist, demonstrated that all the nutri-

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ents that plants take from the soil couldbe replaced in mineral form. This secondadvance set the stage for the worldwideuse of chemical fertilizer to boost landproductivity by ensuring that nutrientshortages did not restrict yields.4

In the 1860s, Gregor Mendel, anAustrian monk breeding garden peas dis-covered the basic principles of genetics.This third advance laid the groundworkfor the spectacular gains in plant breed-ing of this century. And fourth, theJapanese succeeded in dwarfing cereals inthe 1880s, which eventually led to thehighly productive short-strawed wheatsand rices that are widely used throughoutthe world today.5

The health effects of being overfedand underfed are the same—increased susceptibility to illness,reduced life expectancy, and reducedproductivity.

The fifth major technology that hascontributed to major advances in grainproduction is the development of hybridcorn, a breakthrough that came in 1917 atthe University of Connecticut AgriculturalExperiment Station. This highly produc-tive hybrid grown throughout the worldtoday helped make corn one of the bigthree cereals, along with wheat and rice.While wheat and rice are consumed large-ly by humans, most of the world’s cornharvest is fed to livestock and poultry.6

Another source of agricultural growthin this century is the exchange of cropsbetween the Old World and the New thatwas set in motion by ChristopherColumbus. Wheat and other small grainswere introduced into the New World bythe early European settlers. Corn, whichwas domesticated by the New World farm-ers, is now grown on every continent. The


potato, first domesticated by the Incans inthe Andes, is today a food staple in nearlyall temperate-zone countries. The soy-bean, which has surpassed the wheat cropin value in the United States, was intro-duced from China. Meanwhile in China,the production of corn has expanded to120 million tons per year, only slightly lessthan its 135-million-ton rice harvest.7

With livestock and poultry, the flow waspretty much one way, since the only resi-dent of the farmyard that was domesticat-ed in the New World is the turkey. Allother livestock and poultry-cattle,sheep, goats, pigs, horses, chickens, andducks-came from the Old World. Thisexchange of crops and livestock thatbegan five centuries ago contributes bothto the productivity of world agricultureand to the diversity of modern diets.8

This impressive century of growthunfortunately has not translated into ade-quate food supplies for all the Earth’sinhabitants. An estimated 841 millionpeople remain hungry and undernour-ished, a number that approaches the pop-ulation of the entire world when ThomasMalthus warned about the race betweenfood and people some 200 years ago.Unless the world can move quickly to sta-bilize population, the ranks of the hungryand undernourished could increase asthe new millennium unfolds.9

Historically, we have depended onthree basic systems for our food supply:oceanic fisheries, rangelands, and crop-lands. With oceanic fisheries and range-lands, two essentially natural systems, theworld appears to have “hit the wall.” Afterincreasing nearly fivefold since mid-cen-tury, the oceanic fish catch appears to beat or near its sustainable yield limit.Overfishing is now the rule, not theexception. The same can be said aboutthe world’s rangelands: after tripling from1950 to 1990, the production of beef andmutton has increased little in recent yearsas overgrazing has lowered rangelandproductivity in large areas of the world.10

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Continued population growth is thedominant source of mounting pressureon these natural systems. Some countries,such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Pakistan,are projected to nearly triple their popu-lations by 2050. Nigeria is expected tohave 339 million people in 2050— morethan there were in all of Africa in 1950.Ethiopia, controlling a large share of theheadwaters of the Nile, which is in effectthe food lifeline for the Sudan and Egypt,is projected to increase its populationfrom 62 million at present to 213 millionin the year 2050. India, a country withnearly a billion people and water tablesfalling almost everywhere, is due to addanother 600 million by 2050. And China,even with its efforts to slow populationgrowth, is still slated to add some 300 mil-lion people, more than currently live inthe United States, before its populationstabilizes in 2040.11

OVERFED AND UNDERFED

We live today in a nutritionally dividedworld, one where some people eat toomuch and others too little. Both areforms of malnutrition. Ironically, thosewho are overfed and overweight andthose who are underfed and underweightface similar health problems. And thehealth effects are the same— increasedsusceptibility to illness, reduced lifeexpectancy, and reduced productivity.

Worldwide, the number of overweightpeople could total 600 million. In theUnited States, the world’s largest industrialcountry, 97 million adults now fall into thiscategory, representing 55 percent of those20 years of age or older. Other countrieswith a particularly large share of over-weight people include Russia, at 57 per-cent, and the United Kingdom, at 51percent; other European societies are notfar behind. There are also substantial num-

Feeding Nine Billion

bers of overweight people within somedeveloping countries. In Brazil, for exam-ple, more than 30 percent of the popula-tion is overweight. For China and India, incontrast, the figures are 8 and 7 percent,and for Ethiopia, a meager 2 percent.12

Unfortunately, the share of the popula-tion that is overweight in industrial soci-eties has increased in recent decades aslifestyles have become more sedentary. Insimplest terms, obesity occurs when foodenergy intake exceeds energy use. It canresult from too much food, too little exer-cise, or both. In the United States, theshare of those overweight is highestamong minority groups— those with lowincomes and limited education, whosediets are often high in fat and sugar.13

U.S. government researchers reportthat being overweight raises the risk ofmortality from high blood pressure, coro-nary heart disease, stroke, diabetes, andvarious forms of cancer. In the UnitedStates, obesity is the second leading causeof preventable deaths after smoking. Dr.Robert Eckel, speaking for the AmericanHeart Association, says that “obesity isbecoming a dangerous epidemic.“4

At the other end of the scale are thosewho get too little to eat. The U.N. Foodand Agriculture Organization, usingnational nutritional surveys, estimates that841 million people living in developingcountries suffer from basic protein-energymalnutrition— they do not get enoughprotein, enough calories, or enough ofboth. Infants and children lack the foodthey need to develop their full physicaland mental potential. Most of the adultsand children in this group do not have theenergy to maintain normal levels of physi-cal activity.15

As the world has become more eco-nomically integrated, the face of faminehas changed. Whereas famine was oncegeographically defined by poor harvests,today it is also economically defined by lowproductivity and incomes. It is foundamong those who are on the land but can-

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not produce enough food or who are inthe cities and cannot buy enough. Famineconcentrated among the poor is less visi-ble than the more traditional geographi-cally focused version, but it is no less real.Malnutrition weakens the body’s immunesystem to the point where common child-hood ailments such as measles and diar-rhea are often fatal. Each day 19,000children die as a result of malnutritionand related illnesses.16

The world’s hungry children are con-centrated in two areas: the Indian sub-continent, where three fifths of allchildren suffer from malnutrition, andsub-Saharan Africa, where the equivalentfigure is 30 percent. Malnutrition amonginfants and children is of particular con-cern because anything that stunts theirphysical development may also stunt theirmental development. Malnutrition notonly exacts a high social cost, as measuredin human suffering, it also depreciates acountry’s human capital, its most valuableresource. 17

Many developing countries have social-ly damaging levels of malnutrition, asmeasured by the share of children underage five that are underweight. (See Table7-l.) Among major countries, Bangla-desh and India are at the top of the list.Other populous countries with a largepercentage of underweight children areViet Nam, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Pakistan,and Nigeria.

Over the last half-century, the share ofthe world that is malnourished hasdeclined substantially. More than any-thing else, this has been due to risingfood production per person. Using grainproduction per person as the indicator,the world has made substantial progressin raising food consumption since 1950.There has been, however, a loss ofmomentum since 1984. World grain con-sumption per person, which averaged 247kilograms in 1950, had climbed to 342kilograms by 1984, a gain of 38 percent.(See Figure 7-l.) During the 14 years


Table 7-l. Share of Children Under FiveYears of Age Who Are Underweight in

Selected Countries

Country Share of Underweight(percent)

Bangladesh 66India 64Viet Nam 56Ethiopia 48Indonesia 40Pakistan 40Nigeria 36Philippines 33Tanzania 29Thailand 26China 21Zimbabwe 11Egypt 10Brazil 7

SOURCE: World Health Organization, Global Databaseon Child Growth, Geneva, 1997, based on nationalsurveys taken between 1987 and 1995.

since then it has declined to 319 kilograms, a drop of 7 percent. Althoughthere are obvious limitations to usingaverage grain supply as a measure, it isnonetheless much easier in a low-incomesociety to eliminate malnutrition whengrain production per person is rising thanwhen it is falling. Since more people areinvolved in grain production than in anyother economic activity in developingcountries, a rise in grain output per per-son means gains in both productivity andconsumption.18

This rising global tide of grain produc-tion from 1950 to 1984 lifted food con-sumption for many to a nutritionallyadequate level, but the extent of the risevaried widely by country and region of theworld. The trends in the two populationgiants— China and India— that togethercontain 35 percent of humanity contrastsharply. Although India has made impres-sive progress in raising grain production,the growth in output has been largely off-set by that of population, leaving nearlytwo thirds of its children malnourished.

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1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Figure 7-1. World Grain Production PerPerson, 1950-98

AS a result, the annual grain harvest perperson is still slightly less than 200 kilo-grams per person, providing the averageIndian with little more than a starch-dom-inated subsistence diet. At 200 kilograms,or roughly one pound per day, nearly allgrain must be consumed directly just tosatisfy basic food energy needs, leaving lit-tle to convert into animal protein.19

In China, by contrast, the impressiveprogress in boosting agricultural outputafter the economic reforms of 1978, com-bined with a dramatic slowing of popula-tion growth, raised grain production perperson from roughly 200 to nearly 300kilograms. This increase, accompanied byrecord gains in income, let China bothraise the amount of grain consumeddirectly and convert substantial quantitiesof grain into pork, poultry, and eggs, thuseliminating much of the protein-caloriemalnutrition of two decades ago. Whilethe share of underweight children in Indiaremains at 64 percent, that in China haddropped to 21 percent by the late 1980s,when the last nutritional surveys weretaken in these two countries. Given thedoubling of incomes in China during the1990s, continuing impressive gains in agri-culture, and the latest life expectancy esti-


mate of 71 years, the portion of childrenmalnourished has likely dropped muchfurther. Many of those still malnourishedin China live in the interior of the country,often in semiarid regions where rainfall isso low that modern agricultural technolo-gies can make only a modest contributionto raising food output.20

Grain consumption per person varieswidely by country (see Table 7-2), provid-ing a rough indicator of nutritional ade-quacy. The annual consumption figure,including grain consumed indirectly inthe form of livestock products, rangesfrom just under 200 kilograms to morethan 900 kilograms. Ironically, the health-iest people in the world are not those atthe top of this ladder, but rather those inthe middle. Life expectancy in Italy, forexample, where on average people get 400kilograms of grain per year, is higher thanin the United States, which uses twice asmuch grain and has much higher healthcare expenditures per person. The healthof those who live too high on the foodchain often suffers from excessive con-sumption of fat-rich livestock products.21

The continued existence of hungertoday is largely the result of low productiv-ity, which manifests itself in low incomesand poverty. For the world as a whole,incomes have risen dramatically over thelast century, climbing from $1,300 perperson in 1900 to more than $6,000 perperson in 1998 (in 1997 dollars). This ris-ing economic tide has lifted most ofhumanity out of poverty and hunger, butunfortunately it has been uneven, leavingmany still suffering from poverty and from

hunger and malnutrition.² ²The World Bank estimates that 1.3 bil-

lion people live in absolute poverty, withincomes of $1 a day or less. Most of thesepeople live in rural areas. Many try to gaina livelihood from plots of land that havebeen divided and subdivided as popula-tion has increased. Others have too littleland to make a living because landowner-ship is concentrated in the hands of a

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Table 7-2. Annual Per Capita Grain Use and Consumption of Livestock Products inSelected Countries, 1998

CountryConsumption

Grain Use1 Beef Pork Poultry Mutton Milk2

(kilograms) (kilograms) (number)

United States 900 44 31 47 1 264 284Italy 400 25 35 19 2 215 215China 300 5 35 10 2 6 289India 200 1 - 1 1 75 30

1Rounded to nearest 100 kilograms. 2Total consumption, including that used to produce cheese, yogurt,and ice cream.SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Production, Supply, and Distribution, electronic database, Washington,DC, updated October 1998.

small segment of the population. Stillanother group consists of rural landless—those who have no land of their own butwho work on that of others, often on aseasonal basis. For other individuals, soilerosion and other forms of land degrada-tion are undermining rural livelihoods.Perhaps the fastest growing segment ofthe absolute poor are those who live inthe squatter settlements that ring so manyThird World cities.23

Consumers the world over have bene-fited from declining real grain prices overthe last half-century, but there is now apossibility that this trend could bereversed as aquifer depletion spreads,shrinking irrigation water supplies. This isparticularly important in major countriessuch as China and India, which rely onirrigated land for half or more of theirfood and where groundwater depletionwill inevitably lead to irrigation cutbacks.There are also scores of smaller countriesfaced with aquifer depletion, many ofthem in North Africa and the MiddleEast, where most of the food comes fromirrigated land.

Fortunately for those on the lowerrungs of the global economic ladder, thedeclining real price of grain created anideal environment for easing hunger andmalnutrition. If this twentieth-centurytrend of falling grain prices is reversed as

we enter the new millennium, as nowseems likely, it could impoverish morepeople in a shorter period of time thanany event in history.

If a strategy to eliminate hunger is tosucceed, it must simultaneously focus onaccelerating the shift to smaller families inorder to stabilize population sooner ratherthan later, raise investment in the ruralareas where poverty is concentrated, anddesign economic policies to distributewealth more equitably. Any strategy thatdoes not focus on the social investmentneeds in education and health and in newinvestments that create productive employ-ment is not likely to accomplish its goal.

LA N D: A FINITE RESOURCE

The option of expanding world grainproduction by cultivating more land hasvirtually disappeared. The world’s grainharvested area increased from 587 millionhectares in 1950 to the historical high of732 million hectares in 1981, a gain of 25percent. Since then, however, the grainarea has shrunk to 690 million hectares, a6-percent drop, as it was converted to non-farm uses, abandoned because of soil era-sion, or shifted to other crops such as

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soybeans. During the next half-centurythe grain harvested area is not expectedto change much, with gains and lossesessentially offsetting each other.24

Gains in the grain harvested area inthe last 50 years have come from clearingnew land for agriculture and fromexpanding irrigation, which both allowedarid land to be brought under cultivationand also facilitated an increase in multi-ple cropping. In the Indian Punjab, forexample, irrigation and earlier-maturingvarieties have made the double croppingof winter wheat and rice commonplace.Similarly, large areas of central Chinagrow winter wheat and corn as a summercrop. These gains have partly offset landlosses from the conversion to nonfarmuses and from soil erosion and otherforms of degradation.

In the next 50 years, some furthergains in cultivated area are likely. If grainprices rise in Brazil, for instance, parts ofthe cerrado— a semiarid region in theeast central part of the country— will like-ly be brought under the plow. In Africa,there are opportunities for expanding thecultivated area in the Congo River basin,particularly on its outer fringes. And inAsia, the outer islands of Indonesia offersome opportunities for increasing cultiva-tion, although as in Brazil, the additionalland is typically marginal in nature. Theinherent fertility of nearly all this land islow, requiring special efforts to maintainproductivity.

Heavy cropland losses during the nexthalf-century are expected in countriessuch as India, where the construction ofhousing alone will claim a substantial areaof cropland. Other countries are losingcropland because of degradation.Kazakhstan, for example, abandonednearly half its grainland between 1980and 1998 as a result of soil erosion andother forms of land degradation, letting itrevert to rangeland. Other countries inCentral Asia, North Africa, and theAndean countries of Latin America are

also losing cropland to degradation.25

Between 1950 and 1998, the grain har-vested area per person worldwide shrankfrom 0.23 hectares to 0.12 hectares. (SeeFigure 7-2.) For most countries this wasnot a problem because unprecedentedrises in land productivity more than offsetthe shrinkage. Given the marked loss ofmomentum in raising land productivitysince 1990, however, there is reason todoubt whether future increases can offsetthe projected shrinkage in cropland perperson to 0.07 hectares by 2050.26

A look at this situation for individualcountries is both illuminating and worry-ing. Assume, for purposes of projection,that India’s cropland area will not changeby 2050; the addition of 600 million peo-ple there and the land they need for hous-ing and to meet other nonfood needs,plus land required for industrialization,will almost certainly reduce cropland areaper person below 0.07 hectares. (SeeTable 7-3.) India— which has alreadytripled its wheat yields and doubled itsrice yields— will find it difficult to sustainthe rises in land productivity needed tooffset the continuing shrinkage in percapita grain area.27

China is in a somewhat better position

Hectares0.25

0.20

0.15

0.10

0.05

1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050

Figure 7-2. Grain Area Per Person, 1950-98,With Projections to 2050

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Table 7-3. Grain Harvested Area Per Personin Selected Countries in 1950, With

Projections for 2000 and 2050¹

Country 1950 2000 2050(hectares)

United States 0.41 0.23 0.19Brazil 0.34 0.11 0.08India 0.28 0.10 0.07Bangladesh 0.29 0.10 0.06China 0.16 0.07 0.06Iran 0.61 0.13 0.06Nigeria 0.52 0.13 0.05Indonesia 0.18 0.07 0.04Ethiopia 0.39 0.11 0.03Pakistan 0.31 0.08 0.03- - - - - - -

11998 grain area used for all years.SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Producction,Supply, and Distribution, electronic database,Washington, DC, updated October 1998; UnitedNations, World Population Prospects: The 1996 Revision(New York: 1996).

because its projected population growthis much lower than that of India. Its grain-land per person is expected to shrinkfrom 0.07 to 0.06 hectares. The questionfor China is not so much whether its landand other agricultural resources willenable it to feed 1.5 billion people, butwhether it can feed 1.5 billion affluentpeople who are consuming large quanti-ties of livestock products.

The countries likely to be in the mosttrouble over the next half-century arethose in the second tier in terms of size—nations that are projected to surpass the300 million mark before 2050 (Pakistan,Nigeria, and Indonesia), plus Ethiopia,which will cross the 200 million threshold.Pakistan— with 357 million people in2050, more than live in the United Statesand Canada combined today— will see itsgrain harvested area shrink to 0.03hectares per person, or less than onetenth of an acre. Every seven Pakistaniswill have just one fifth of a hectare or halfan acre on which to produce their entirefood supply— less than a typical suburbanbuilding lot in the United States. Nigeria,

whose current population of 115 millionis projected to expand to 339 million, willsee its grainland per person shrink to 0.05hectares.28

Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Iran are alsofacing shrinkages of their grain harvestedarea per person to dangerously smallareas. Egypt, too, will be facing adifficult situation. As its population climbsto 114 million, its grainiand per person willshrink from 0.04 hectares to 0.02 hectares.Since it is already importing nearly half itsgrain, its dependence on grain fromabroad seems certain to climb.29

Aside from the loss of grainland tononfarm uses and to soil erosion andother forms of degradation, a substantialarea of grainland is being lost to oilseeds,importantly the soybean. As incomes haverisen in lower-income countries, thedemand for vegetable oil for cooking hasescalated. This, combined with the rapid-ly rising demand for soybean meal amongthe more affluent as a protein supple-ment for livestock and poultry feeds, hasincreased the demand for soybeans near-ly ninefold since 1950. Because soybeansare a legume and therefore not as respon-sive as grains are to applications of nitro-gen fertilizer, their yield per hectare hasrisen much more slowly. To satisfy thisenormous growth in the global appetitefor soybeans, the area planted in this crophas jumped from 14 million hectares in1990 to 69 million hectares in 1997, withmuch of the growth coming at theexpense of grain. (See Figure 7-3.)30

In the last 50 years, world agriculturehas been dominated by surplus capacity.As a result, farmers in the United Stateswere paid to idle part of their croplandunder commodity supply-managementprograms until 1995, when the programswere dismantled. A much smaller areaidled in Europe beginning in the early1990s has now been largely returned toproduction. One of the legacies of thislong-standing surplus production capaci-ty is that land is often thought of as a sur-

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Million Hectares

Figure 7-3. World Soybean Harvested Area,1950-98

plus commodity. Given this prevailingpsychology, the world may have difficultycoming to grips with the prospect of aworldwide scarcity of cropland, and of theneed to protect this resource from con-version to nonfarm uses.31

The effects of the acute croplandscarcity emerging in some countriescould affect many other areas of humanactivity. For example, it could fundamen-tally alter transportation policy, favoringthe development of more land-efficientbicycle-rail transport systems at theexpense of the automobile. It could affectthe conversion of cropland to recreation-al uses, such as golf, one of the more land-intensive sports. Indeed, Viet Nam hasalready banned the construction of moregolf courses because of land scarcity.

WATER: EMERGING CONSTRAINTO N G R O WTH

The first farmers were concerned aboutthe amount of grain produced relative tothe amount that they sowed. For them,seed was the scarce resource. Later it was


the availability of fertile land to till thatconstrained growth in output. As landbecame scarce, farmers began to calculateyield in terms of the grain produced perunit of land cultivated, and grain yieldstoday are routinely reported in tons perhectare or bushels per acre. As we moveinto the new millennium, with waterscarcity emerging as the dominant con-straint on efforts to expand food produc-tion, we may see another shift in the focusof yield calculations— namely to theamount of water required per ton of grainproduced.

From the beginning of irrigated agri-culture several thousand years ago in theMiddle East until 1900, the world’s irri-gated area expanded to an estimated 48million hectares. Then growth in irriga-tion began to accelerate, nearly doublingby 1950 to 94 million hectares. But the biggrowth has come during the last half ofthis century as the irrigated areaincreased to some 260 million hectares,nearly tripling the mid-century level. Now40 percent of world food productioncomes from irrigated land. The growth inirrigation has permitted the expansion ofagriculture into arid regions, increasedmultiple cropping in monsoonal climatesby facilitating cropping during the dryseason, and allowed a substantial expan-sion in fertilizer use.32

The remarkable growth in irrigatedagriculture since mid-century divides intotwo distinct eras— from 1950 to 1978,when irrigation was expanding faster thanpopulation, and since 1978, when itsgrowth has fallen behind that of popula-tion. The irrigated area per personreached a historic high in 1978 of 0.047hectares. (See Figure 7-4.) It then beganto decline slowly, falling to 0.044 hectaresin 1997, a drop of 6 percent.33

Irrigated agriculture is concentrated inAsia, which has some of the world’s greatrivers— the Indus, the Ganges, theYangtze, the Yellow, and the Brahma-putra. Originating at high elevations and

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Hectares

Figure 7-4. World Irrigated Area Per Person,1900-98, With Projections to 2050

traveling long distances, they provide anabundance of opportunities for dams andthe diversion of water into networks ofgravity-fed canals and ditches. Two thirdsof the world’s irrigated area is in Asia.Roughly 70 percent of the grain harvest inChina comes from irrigated land, whilethe equivalent figure in India is 50 percentand in the United States, 15 percent.34

As the 1990s have unfolded, evidenceof water scarcity is mounting. Water tablesare falling on every continent— in thesouthern Great Plains of the UnitedStates, the southwestern United States,much of North Africa and the MiddleEast, most of India, and almost every-where in China that the land is flat. A sur-vey covering 1991 to 1996, for instance,indicates that the water table under thenorth China plain is dropping an averageof 1.5 meters, or roughly 5 feet, a year.Since this area accounts for nearly 40 per-cent of China’s grain harvest, this is a mat-ter of some concern to the leaders inBeijing. 35

A similar situation exists in India.David Seckler and his colleagues at theInternational Irrigation ManagementInstitute in Sri Lanka estimate that under-ground water withdrawals in India are at

least double the rate of aquifer recharge.They report that water tables are falling atl-3 meters (3-10 feet) per year almosteverywhere in India. Seckler describesIndia as being on a free ride, expandingits agriculture by depleting undergroundwater reserves. At some point, he says, this“house of cards” will collapse. When itdoes, India’s grain harvest could fall by asmuch as 25 percent. In a country wherethe supply and demand for food is alreadyprecariously balanced, and where 18 mil-lion people are added each year, this isnot a happy prospect.36

Many major rivers run dry before theyreach the sea. Some have disappearedentirely. In the southwestern UnitedStates, the Colorado River rarely everreaches the Gulf of California. In CentralAsia, the Amu Darya, one of the two riversfeeding the Aral Sea, is drained dry byUzbek and Turkmen cotton farmers longbefore it gets to the sea. As a result, theAral Sea is shrinking and may eventuallydisappear, known to future generationsonly from old maps.37

The Yellow River, the cradle of Chinesecivilization, ran dry for the first time inChina’s 3,000-year history in 1972, failingto reach the sea for some 15 days. Overthe next dozen years, it ran dry intermit-tently, but since 1985 has run dry for partof each year. In 1997, it failed to reach thesea for seven months out of the year.Originating on the Tibetan Plateau, theYellow River flows through eightprovinces en route to the sea. The last ofthese, Shandong Province, whichaccounts for a fifth of China’s corn har-vest and a seventh of its wheat harvest,gets half of its irrigation water from theYellow River. The remaining half comesfrom irrigation wells.38

With hundreds of major projectsplanned in upstream provinces to with-draw water for industrial and urban use,for power projects, and for irrigation, theYellow River could one day become aninland river, never reaching the sea.

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Official policy stresses the need to devel-op the economically depressed interiorprovinces, and Beijing is letting theseprojects continue even though it maymean the eventual sacrifice of irrigatedagriculture in the lower reaches of theYellow River basin.

Little water from the Nile makes it tothe Mediterranean, and the Ganges bare-ly makes it to the Bay of Bengal in the dryseason. With the collective population ofEthiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt— thethree dominant countries in the NileRiver basin— projected to grow from 157million today to 388 million over the nexthalf-century, competition for the Nilewaters is certain to intensify. The samecan be said about the Ganges, wherethere is keen rivalry between India andBangladesh for water.39

Historically, land scarcity traditionallyshaped grain trade patterns. Now waterscarcity is beginning to shape them aswell. North Africa and the Middle East, aregion where every country faces watershortages, has become the world’s fastestgrowing grain import market during the1990s. To import a ton of wheat is toimport 1,000 tons of water. In effect, forcountries facing water shortages, the mostefficient way to import water is to importgrain. In 1997, the water required to pro-duce the grain and other farm productsimported into North Africa and theMiddle East was roughly equal to theannual flow of the Nile River.40

Worldwide, roughly 70 percent of allwater diverted from, rivers or pumpedfrom underground is used for irrigation,while 20 percent goes to industry, and 10percent to residential uses. As countriespush up against the limits of their watersupplies, the contest between these threeend-use sectors intensifies. A thousandtons of water can be used in agriculture toproduce a ton of wheat worth $200, or itcan be used in industry to expand outputby $14,000— 70 times as much. Similarly,if the goal is to produce jobs, using scarce


water in industry is far more productivethan using it for irrigation. Because theeconomics of water use do not favor agri-culture, this sector almost always loses.41

In an effort to assess the water prospectin China more precisely, Dennis Engi atSandia National Laboratory has modeledthe supply/demand balances of all theriver basins in the country, projectingthem into the future. His figures showhuge water deficits developing in some keyriver basins. The combination of aquiferdepletion and diversion of irrigation waterto nonfarm uses indicates that irrigatedagriculture may be phased out in some ofthe more water-short regions of China. By2010, for example, irrigated agriculturecould virtually disappear in China’s Hairiver basin as growing urban and industri-al water demand in Beijing, Tianjin, andother cities in the basin absorbs the waternow used in agriculture.42

Perhaps more than anything else,growing water shortages may hamstringfuture efforts to expand food production.Water used for irrigation raises land pro-ductivity both directly and indirectly, byraising the potential for using fertilizer.And in arid regions it determines theamount of land that can be cultivated.The bottom line is that if we are facing afuture of water scarcity, we are also facinga future of food scarcity.

R A IS I N G L A N D P R O D UC T IV I T Y

When the last half of this century began,the average world grain yield per hectarewas just over one ton— l.06 tons, to beprecise. By 1998, it had climbed to 2.73tons per hectare. Grain yields vary widelyamong countries. But in a world wherefarmers everywhere are drawing on thesame backlog of agricultural technology,the variations that were once explainedlargely by uneven levels of economic

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development are today explained largelyby differences in natural conditions, suchas temperature, rainfall, day length, solarintensity, and inherent soil fertility.43

Take wheat, for example. Three devel-oping countries— Egypt, Mexico, andChina— are in the top five listed in Table7-4 in wheat yield per hectare. And twoindustrial countries— Canada andAustralia— are in the bottom five. This isbecause Egypt, Mexico, and China irri-gate most of their wheat, while in Canadaand Australia the wheat is rainfed andgrown in areas of low rainfall.

The threefold yield difference betweenthe United Kingdom and the UnitedStates is also largely a difference in rain-fall. Soil moisture conditions are simplymuch more favorable in the UnitedKingdom. The two countries at the top ofthe list — the United Kingdom andFrance— are blessed with fertile soils,good rainfall, and, because of theirnortherly latitude, long days during thesummer growing season.

Table 7-4. Wheat Yield Per Hectare in KeyProducing Countries, 1997¹

Country Tons

United Kingdom 7.7France 7.2Egypt 5.7Mexico 4.1China 3.8Poland 3.4United States 2.7Ukraine 2.6India 2.6Argentina 2.4Canada 2.3Pakistan 2.1Australia 2.0Russia 1.4K a z a k h s t a n 0.7

1Yield shown for 1997 is the average of 1996-98.SOURCE : U.S. Department of Agriculture, Production,Supply, and Distribution, electronic database,Washington, DC, updated October 1998.

By contrast, Kazakhstan— at the bot-tom of the list— relies on some of themost marginal cropland in the world. Itwas the site of the Soviet Virgin LandsProject in the 1950s, a project that pushedcultivation into a semiarid grasslandregion that could neither produce highyields nor sustain cultivation over the longterm. Much of the land plowed in the1950s is so vulnerable to wind erosion thatit is being given over to grazing sheep.Although Kazakhstan has since 1980abandoned almost half its grainland (themore marginal land), the average yield onthe land that remains in cultivation, themore productive land, is only 0.7 tons perhectare.44

Solar intensity is another explanationof differences in yields. For example, riceyields even in an agriculturally advancedcountry like Japan are scarcely 5 tons perhectare, even though all the rice there isirrigated. The principal constraint onyields in Japan, and indeed in much ofthe rest of Asia, is solar intensity. Becauserice is grown during the summer mon-soon season, there is extensive cloudcover during the growing season. Thishelps explain why rice yields in Californiaare 30 percent higher than those inJapan. It is not that California’s farmersare more skilled at growing rice; they justhave the advantage of intense sunlightthroughout the entire growing season. 45

The three keys to the rises in land pro-ductivity since mid-century are plantbreeding, the spread of irrigation, andgrowth in the use of fertilizers. The prin-cipal contribution of plant breeders hasbeen to increase the share of photosyn-thate, the product of photosynthesis, thatgoes into seed production. Originallydomesticated wheats converted roughly20 percent of photosynthate into seed,with the remainder used to sustain leaves,stem, and roots. With the more produc-tive modern wheat varieties now convert-ing more than 50 percent ofphotosynthate into seed, there is not

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much remaining potential for increase,since scientists estimate that the absoluteupper limit is 62 percent. Anythingbeyond that would begin to deprive therest of the plant of the energy needed tofunction, thus reducing yields. Whethereven 60 percent can be reached in prac-tice remains to be seen.46

A lack of understanding of the physiol-ogy of increasing crop yields has led someobservers to conclude that biotechnologycould yield another generation of high-yielding varieties— ones that could againdouble or triple yields of existing vari-eties. Unfortunately, traditional plantbreeders have done most of the thingsthat are physiologically possible to raisethe yield potential of the principal cropssuch as wheat, corn, and rice. The maincontribution of genetic engineering toagriculture in the future is likely to be inthe breeding of disease- and insect-resis-tant varieties. This will contribute to addi-tional production only if these biologicalpest controls are more effective than thechemical controls now used.47

Another area in which biotechnologymight be able to contribute to greaterproduction is in breeding crop varietiesthat are more drought-resistant or salt-tol-erant. In each of these, however, theremay be some physiological constraints onhow far genetic engineers can go. This iscertainly true with increasing the waterefficiency of crops, since water use is tiedso directly to the basic physiologicalprocesses of plants, such as photosynthe-sis, nutrient uptake, and plant tempera-ture regulation.

Some of the natural constraints onland productivity can be alleviated. Forexample, soil moisture can be increasedby irrigation. Soil fertility can beincreased by fertilization. Indeed, oneconstraint, the availability of nutrients,has been eliminated in much of the worldby fertilizer use. Between 1950 and 1998,world fertilizer use increased from 14 mil-lion tons to roughly 130 million tons, an

increase of more than ninefold. But inmany agriculturally advanced countriesfertilizer use is leveling off as the responseto additional applications diminishes. Insome countries— including the UnitedStates, Japan, and most of those inWestern Europe— fertilizer use hasplateaued, and it may soon do so inChina. In a country like the United States,where fertilizer use has not increasedsince 1980, applying more fertilizer haslittle or no effect on yields.48

California’s rice farmers have theadvantage of intense sunlightthroughout the entire growing season.

In assessing the future prospect forraising land productivity, it is useful tocontrast conditions at the middle of thiscentury with those as we prepare to beginthe next half century. In 1950, farmerswere gaining access tb new high-yieldingvarieties, including hybrid corn, followedshortly thereafter by widely adapted dwarfwheats and rices. Since then, as noted,world irrigated area nearly tripled andfertilizer use increased ninefold. Theshare of photosynthate going to seed wasraised to more than half in the most pro-ductive varieties. New varieties and rapid-ly expanding irrigation and fertilizer useenabled many countries to double ortriple their yields of wheat, corn, and rice.

In looking ahead at the next 50 years,there is little potential for further increas-ing the share of photosynthate going toseed. World irrigated area is not expectedto grow very much, if at all, since it seemscertain to shrink in some countries. AndworId fertilizer use will continue to grow,albeit much more slowly, with the remain-ing growth concentrated in the Indiansubcontinent, Africa, and Latin America.The net effect of these conditions is that


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the rise in land productivity that hasslowed so dramatically in the 1990s willprobably slow further as the next centurygets under way. Already some countrieshave experienced a plateauing or nearplateauing of the rise in yields, such aswith wheat in the United States and ricein Japan. Some developing countries,such as Mexico with wheat and SouthKorea with rice, are also seeing their yieldrises taper off.49

An analysis of the trend in world grainyield from 1950 through 1998 shows thishalf-century span dividing into two dis-tinct eras. Between 1950 and 1990,the yield per hectare climbed by 2.1 per-cent a year, but during the 1990s it hasincreased by only 1.1 percent a year. (SeeTable 7-5.)

History will likely see the four-decadespan from 1950 to 1990 as the golden agein raising world cropland productivity.But the slowdown since then does notcome as a surprise, given the inability ofscientists to develop a second generationof high-yielding grain varieties that willagain double or triple yields. With theshare of photosynthate going to seedalready quite high and approaching thephysiological limit in some situations, rais-ing yields becomes ever more difficult.The key question the world must now faceis, Will the deceleration in the rise ingrainland productivity that has beenunder way since 1990 continue, falling

Table 7-5. World Grain Yield Gains, 1950-90and 1990-97

Yield1 Annual Increase(tons per hectare) (percent)

1950 1.061990 2.48 2.11997 2.70 1.1

¹ Yields for 1990 and 1997 are thre-year averagesSOURCE : U.S. Department of Agriculture, Production,Supply, and Distribution, electronic database,Washington, DC, updated October 1998.

further and further behind populationgrowth as we move into the next century?

C H AN G I N G C O U RS E

As we prepare for the new millennium,there is a rising tide of concern about thelong-term food prospect. This can be seenin the frustration of plant breeders whoare running into physiological constraintsas they attempt to develop the new high-er-yielding varieties needed to restorerapid growth in the world food supply.And it can be seen in the apprehensive-ness of political leaders in countrieswhere the food supply depends heavily onirrigation but the aquifers are beingdepleted.

This mounting concern is also evidentin the intelligence community inWashington, where the National Intelli-gence Council (NIC), the umbrella overall U.S. intelligence agencies, has commis-sioned a major interdisciplinary assess-ment of China’s food prospect by aprominent group of scientists. Thisresearch effort was triggered by the real-ization that if China were to turn to theworld market for massive quantities ofgrain, it could drive world grain prices upto a level that would create unprecedent-ed political instability in Third Worldcities. The NIC study— the most compre-hensive interdisciplinary assessment everundertaken of China’s food prospect-concluded in its “most likely” scenario thatby 2025 China would need to import 175million tons of grain. This quantity, whichapproaches current world grain exports of200 million tons, could overwhelm thecapacity of exporting countries.50

Two major food issues face the world asit enters the twenty-first century. One ishow to feed adequately those who sufferfrom chronic hunger and malnutrition,people who do not get enough proteinand energy to develop their full physical

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and mental potential. The second is howto maintain the price stability needed inworld grain markets if economic progressis not to be disrupted.51

The worst mistake political leaders canmake entering the new millennium is tounderestimate the dimensions of the foodchallenge. To begin with, oceanic fish-eries and rangelands— the two leadingsources of growth in the animal proteinsupply over the last half-century-haveboth apparently reached their limits. Thismeans that all future growth in the worldfood supply must come from croplands,but irrigation water supplies may notexpand much further and the response toadditional fertilizer is diminishing inmany countries. The backlog of unusedtechnology to raise land productivity isshrinking. This does not mean that foodproduction cannot be increased. It can beand it will. But it is becoming much moredifficult to sustain the rapid growth need-ed to keep up with increased demand.

Given these challenging new dimen-sions of the food prospect, governmentsfacing continuing population growthneed to calculate their future populationcarrying capacity by projecting the landavailable for crops, the amount of waterthat will be available for irrigation overthe long term, and the likely yield ofcrops, based on what the most agricultur-ally advanced countries with similar grow-ing conditions have achieved. This willprovide the basis for a public dialogue onpopulation policy. Once projections offuture food supplies are completed, soci-eties can consider what combination ofpopulation size and consumption levelsthey want, recognizing that there aretradeoffs between the two.

Supply-side initiatives are still impor-tant in achieving an acceptable balancebetween food and people. But victory inthe battle to eradicate hunger and mal-nutrition may now depend heavily ondemand-side initiatives. The world stillneeds to invest more in agricultural


research, in agricultural infrastructure,and in providing credit to small farmers,especially women in agriculture. But inaddition, there is now a need for substan-tial demand-side initiatives in slowingpopulation growth and using grain andwater more efficiently.

Once projections of future foodsupplies are completed, societies canconsider what population size andconsumption levels they want.

The most recent U.N. population pro-jections show the world adding 3.3 billionpeople during the first half of the nextcentury. All these people will be added inthe developing world, with a dispropor-tionate share being added in countriesthat are already densely populated. Areview of the U.N. projections shows someof the biggest increases slated for theIndian subcontinent and sub-SaharanAfrica— the two regions where most of theworld’s hungry people are concentrated.As noted earlier, India is projected toadd nearly 600 million people to itscurrent population during the next half-century. Pakistan, meanwhile, will gofrom 148 million to 357 million by2050. In Africa, Nigeria will go from 122million at present to 339 million, whileEthiopia will more than triple itspopulation, going from 62 million to213 million.52

Given the limits to the carrying capaci-ty of each country’s land and waterresources, every national governmentneeds a carefully articulated and ade-quately supported population policy, onethat takes into account the country’s car-rying capacity at whatever consumptionlevel citizens decide on. As Harvard biol-ogist Edward O. Wilson observes in his

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landmark book The Diversity of Life, “Everynation has an economic policy and a for-eign policy. The time has come to speakmore openly of a population policy.. . . what, in the judgment of its informedcitizenry, is the optimal population?“53

Making sure that couples everywherehave access to family planning is one keystep in achieving an acceptable balancebetween food and people. The Inter-national Conference on Population andDevelopment held in Cairo in 1994 con-cluded that providing quality reproductivehealth care services to all those in need indeveloping countries would cost about $17billion in the year 2000. By 2015, thiswould climb to $22 billion. The agreementwas for donor countries to provide onethird of the funds, with developing coun-tries providing the remaining two thirds.Unfortunately, industrial countries— mostimportantly, the United States— havereneged on this commitment.54

Restructuring the world water econo-my holds the key to eliminatinghunger.

Educating young females is a key toaccelerating this shift to smaller families.In every society for which data are avail-able, the more education women have,the fewer children they have. Closelyrelated to the need for education ofyoung females is the need to provideequal opportunities for women in allphases of national life.55

Another demand-side initiative tolighten pressure on world food supplies isfor those who are consuming health-dam-aging quantities of fat-rich livestock prod-ucts to move down the food chain. Asnoted earlier, the healthiest people in theworld are not those whose diets are domi-nated by livestock products but those who

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consume livestock products in modera-tion, thus satisfying needs for protein in away that does not damage their health. Insocieties with a high incidence of obesity,such as the United States, a government-sponsored nutritional education programto encourage the obese to eat less meatand other foods rich in fats could improvehealth, increase life expectancy, andreduce health care costs.

A closely related demand-side initiativethat can help alleviate long-term pres-sures on land and water resources is toaccelerate the shift to more-efficientmeans of converting grain into animalprotein. Now that there is little prospectof increasing the animal protein yield ofoceanic fisheries and rangelands, nearlyall future gains must come from feeding,whether it be fish in ponds or cattle infeedlots. At this point, relative conversionefficiencies come into play. For cattlein feedlots, an additional kilogram oflive weight requires roughly 7 kilogramsof grain. For pork, it is close to 4 kilo-grams of grain per kilogram of liveweight. For poultry, it is just over 2,and for the leading species used for fishfarming, such as carp, catfish, and tilapia,it is less than 2.56

Water scarcity is becoming a more cen-tral constraint than land scarcity onefforts to expand food production. Thereis a lot of land, including deserts, thatcould be made to bloom if water wereavailable for irrigation, but the potentialfor developing new water resources is solimited that future gains in irrigation nowdepend more on increasing the efficiencyof water use than on increasing supply.This means both using more water-effi-cient irrigation technologies and shiftingto more water-efficient food staples. Insome countries, for example, this maymean eating more wheat and sorghumand less rice. And since water efficiency ineffect equals grain efficiency, respondingto water scarcity also argues for encourag-ing the production of poultry and fish

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over beef and pork— trends that arealready in evidence. If poultry and fishproduction are twice as grain-efficient aspork production, they are also twice aswater-efficient, since grain equals water.

Thus, restructuring the world watereconomy holds the key to eliminatinghunger. One of the most frequently pro-posed remedies for water scarcity is waterpricing— charging users enough for waterto ensure that it is used efficiently.Although there is wide agreement amongwater analysts of the need to shift to thissystem, few governments have adoptedeffective water pricing policies. Waterpricing would enhance the use of irriga-tion practices such as sprinklers, whichcan substantially boost efficiency over thetraditional flood or furrow irrigation nowwidely used, especially in Asia. Drip irri-gation, a technology pioneered in Israel,is not economical for use on grain, but onhigh-value fruit and vegetable crops it cancut water use by up to 70 percent.57

The risk for countries that are likely tobecome heavily dependent on grainimports for their food supply is perhapsgreater than most realize simply becausethe collective import needs of potentiallygrain-deficit countries promises to over-whelm the capacity of exporters. A littlenoticed change that affects the prospectsfor eradicating hunger is the leveling offsince 1980 of grain exports among theprincipal exporting countries, whichaccount for 85 percent of world exports.(See Figure 7-5.) After climbing from 60million tons in 1950 to 200 million tons in1980, there has been little gain since then.U.S. grain production during the last 18years has increased roughly 1 percentannually, the same or slightly less than thegrowth in domestic demand. Unable toraise land productivity faster than thegrowth in demand, the exportable surplushas not increased. The United States,which supplies roughly half of the world’s200 million tons of grain exports, is pro-jected to add 74 million people to its pop

Million Tons

Figure 7-5. Grain Exports from Argentina,Australia, Canada, European Union, and the

United States, 1960-97

ulation over the next 50 years, so it willtake some effort to expand productionfast enough merely to satisfy its growingdomestic needs— much less the escalatingneeds of the rest of the world.58

Two of the other five major exporters—Canada and Australia — are severelyrestricted in their efforts to expand pro-duction by the lack of soil moisture. Littlegrowth can be expected from them. Forthe European Union, where yields arealready at record levels, the potential forfurther gains appears to be limited. Theonly one of the major exporters thatmight be able to expand grain exportssubstantially is Argentina. Its currentexports, running around 20 million tons ayear, could conceivably double. Still, thiswould be a rather minor increase, in aworld where the need for imported graincould easily jump from 200 million to 400million tons in the decades ahead. Oneregion not now contributing in a majorway is Eastern Europe. Countries such asPoland, the Ukraine, Hungary, andRomania can expand their grain exports,at least modestly, if they adopt the eco-nomic policies needed to realize their full

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JACQUELINE

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agricultural potential.59

Adequately feeding the projectedincreases in population poses one of themost difficult challenges that modern civ-ilization faces. With little prospect ofachieving an acceptable balance betweenfood and people by supply-side initiativesalone, the time has come to focus on the

demand side of the food equation as well.This means finding ways to accelerate theshift to smaller families, particularly inthose countries where many are alreadyhungry and malnourished, and it meansmoving down the food chain for thosewho are consuming unhealthily largeamounts of livestock products.

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Período en el que se utilizará:Septiembre- Diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo SostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaría Lopez Franco y Dr. Martín BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicaciôn:Nueva YorkTítulo:State of the WorldEditorial:State of the WorldAutor/editor:Flavin, ChristopherCapítulo/artículo:Capitulo 2 Reinventing the energy systemAño (fecha) de publicación:1999Páginas De: Al:22-40

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Reinventing theEnergy System

Christopher Flavin and Seth Dunn

When the American Press Associationgathered the country’s “best minds” onthe eve of the 1893 Chicago World’s Fairand asked them to peer a century into thefuture, the nation’s streets were filled withhorse-drawn carriages and illuminated atnight by gas lights that were still consid-ered a high-tech novelty. And coal-whose share of commercial energy usehad risen from 9 percent in 1850 to morethan 60 percent in 1890-was expected toremain dominant for a long time tocome.1

The commentators who turned theircrystal balls toward the nation’s energysystem foresaw some major changes-butmissed others. They anticipated, forexample, that “Electrical power will beuniversal....Steam and all other sorts ofpower will be displaced.” But while somewrote of trains traveling 100 miles an hourand moving sidewalks, none predicted theascent of oil, the proliferation of the auto-mobile, or the spread of suburbs andshopping malls made possible by cars.Their predictions also missed the many

ways in which inexpensive energy wouldaffect lives and livelihoods through theadvent of air-conditioning, television, andcontinent- bridging jet aircraft. Nor didthey foresee that oil and other fossil fuelswould one clay be used on such a scale asto raise sea levels, disrupt ecosystems, orincrease the intensity of heat waves,droughts, and floods.²

To most of today’s energy futurists, thecurrent system might seem even moresolid and immutable than the nineteenth-century system appeared 100 years ago.The internal combustion engine hasdominated personal transportation inindustrial countries for more than eightdecades, and electricity is now so takenfor granted that any interruption in itssupply is considered an emergency. Todaythe price of energy is nearly as low-interms of consumer purchasing power-asit has ever been, and finding new energysources that are more convenient, reli-able, and affordable than fossil fuels isbeyond the imagination of many experts.Former Eastern Bloc countries seek eco-

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Reinventing the Energy System

nomic salvation in oil booms, while Chinaand other developing nations are rushingto join the oil era-pouring hundreds ofbillions of dollars into the construction ofcoal mines, oil refineries, power plants,automobile factories, and roads.3

Fossil fuels-coal, oil, and naturalgas-that are dug or pumped from theground, then burned in engines or fur-naces, provide 90 percent or more of theenergy in most industrial countries and75 percent of energy worldwide. (SeeTable 2-l.) They are led by petroleum,the most convenient and ubiquitousamong them-an energy source that hasshaped the twentieth century, and thatnow seems irreplaceable. But as theChicago World’s Fair writings remind us,energy forecasts can overlook what laterseems obvious. A close examination oftechnological, economic, social, and envi-ronmental trends suggests that. we mayalready be in the early stages of a majorglobal energy transition--one that is like-ly to accelerate early in the next century.4

To understand energy in world historyis to expect the unexpected. And as welive in a particularly dynamic period, theleast likely scenario may be that the ener-gy picture 100 years from now will closelyresemble that of today. Although thefuture remains, as always, far from crystalclear, the broad outlines of a new energy

system may now be emerging, thanks inpart to a series of revolutionary new tech-nologies and approaches. These develop-ments suggest that our future energyeconomy may be highly efficient anddecentralized, using a range of. sophisti-cated electronics. The primary energyresources for this system may be the mostabundant ones on Earth: the sun, thewind, and other “renewable” sources ofenergy. And the main fuel for this twenty-first-century economy could be hydrogen,the lightest and most abundant elementin the universe.5

This transition would in some sense bea return to our roots. Homo sapiens hasrelied for most of its existence on a virtu-ally limitless flow of renewable energyresources—muscles, plants, sun, wind,and water—to meet its basic needs forshelter, heat, cooking, lighting, andmovement, The relatively recent transi-tion to coal that began in Europe in theseventeenth century marked a major shiftto dependence on a finite stock of fos-silized fuels whose remaining energy isnow equivalent to less than 11 days of sun-shine. From a millennial perspective,today’s hydrocarbon-based civilization isbut a brief interlude in human history.6

The next century may be as profound-ly shaped by the move away from fossilfuels as this century was marked by the

Energy Source

CoalOilNatural gasNuclearRenewables 1

1900 1997Total Share Total Share

(mllion tons of oil (percent)equivalent) equivalent)

501 55 2,122 2218 2 2,940 309 1 2, 173 230 0 579 6

383 42 1,833 19

Total 911 100 9,647 100‘Includes biomass, hydro, wind, geothermal, and solar energy.

See endnote 4.

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move toward them. Although it may takeseveral decades for another system to fullydevelop, the underlying markets couldshift abruptly in the next few years, dryingup sales of conventional power plants andcars in a matter of years and affecting theshare prices of scores of companies. Theeconomic health-and political power-of nations could be sharply boosted ordiminished. And our industries, homes,and cities could be transformed in wayswe can only begin to anticipate.

Through the ages, the evolution ofhuman societies has both influenced andbeen influenced by changes in patterns ofenergy use. But the timing of this nexttransition will be especially crucial.Today’s energy system completely bypass-es roughly 2 billion people who lack mod-ern fuels or electricity, and underservesanother 2 billion who cannot afford mostenergy amenities, such as refrigeration orhot water. Moreover, by relying on ther a p i d d e p l e t i o n o f n o n r e n e w a b l eresources and releasing billions of tons ofcombustion gases into the atmosphere,we have built the economy on trends thatcannot’possibly be sustained for anothercentury. The efforts made today to lay thefoundations for a new energy system willaffect the lives of billions of people in thetwenty-first century and beyond.’

PRIME MOVERS

Energy transitions do not occur in a vacu-um. Past shifts have been propelled bytechnological change and a range ofsocial, economic, and environmentalforces. Understanding these develop-ments is essential for mapping out thepath that humanity may follow in the next100 years. The emergence of an oil-basedeconomy at the beginning of this century,for example, was influenced by rapid sci-entific advances, the growing needs of an

industrial economy, mounting urbanenvironmental problems in the form ofsmoke and manure, and the aspirations ofmillions for higher living standards andgreater mobility.8

Resource limits are one force thatcould help push the world away from fos-sil fuels in the coming decades. Oil is themain energy source today, accounting for30 percent of commercial use; natural gashas emerged as an environmentally pre-ferred alternative for many uses, and hasa 23-percent share; coal has maintained akey role in power generation, and holds a22-percent share of total energy use.Natural gas and coal are both available insufficient amounts to last until the end ofthe twenty-first century or beyond-butoil is not. Just as seventeenth-centuryBritain ran out of cheap wood, today weface the danger of running out of inex-pensive petroleum.9

Although oil markets have been rela-tively stable for more than a decade, andreal prices approached historical lows in1998, es t imates of the under ly ingresource base have increased very little.Most of the calm in the oil markets of the1990s has been due to slower demandgrowth, not an increase in supply. Despiteprodigious exploration efforts, known oilresources have expanded only marginallyin the last quarter-century, though somenations have raised their official reservefigures in order to obtain larger OPECproduction quotas. Approximately 80 per-cent of the oil produced today comesfrom fields discovered before 1973, mostof which are in decline. Total world pro-duction has increased less than 10 per-cent in two decades.10

In a recent analysis of data on world oilresources, geologists Colin Campbell andJean Laherrere estimate that roughly 1trillion barrels of oil remain to be extract-ed. Since 800 billion barrels have alreadybeen used up, this suggests that the origi-nal exploitable resource base is nearlyhalf gone. As extraction of a nonrenew-

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able resource tends to follow a bell-shaped curve, these figures can be extrap-olated to project that world productionwill peak by 2010, and then begin todecline. (See Figure 2-l.) Applying themore optimistic resource estimates ofother oil experts would push back thisproduction pinnacle by just a decade.”

A peak in world oil production early inthe new century would reverberatethrough the energy system. The problemis not just the large amount of oil cur-rently used-67 million barrels daily-butthe intent of many developing countries,most lacking much oil of their own, toincrease their use of automobiles andtrucks. Meeting the growing needs ofChina, India, and the rest of the develop-ing world in the way industrial countries’demands are met today would require atripling of world oil production, evenassuming no increases in industrial-coun-try use. Yet production capacity in 2020 isunlikely to be much above current lev-els-and may well be declining.12

Long before we completely run out offossil fuels, however, the environmentaland health burdens of using them mayforce us toward a cleaner energy system.Fossil fuel burning is the main source of

Billion Barrels

1500-2500

air pollution and a leading cause of waterand land degradation. Combustion ofcoal and oil produces carbon monoxideand tiny particulates that have been impli-cated in lung cancer and other respirato-ry problems; nitrogen and sulfur oxidescreate urban smog, and bring acid rainthat has damaged forests extensively. Oilspills, refinery operations, and coal min-ing release toxic materials that impairwater quality. Increasingly, oil explorationdisrupts fragile ecosystems and coal min-ing removes entire mountains. Althoughmodern pollution controls haveimproved air quality in most industrialcountries in recent decades, the deadlyexperiences of London and Pittsburghare now being repeated in Mexico City,Sao Paulo, New Delhi, Bangkok, andmany other cities in the developing world.Each year, coal burning is estimated to kill178,000 people prematurely in Chinaalone.13

Beyond these localized problems, it isthe cumulative, global environmentaleffects that now are calling the fossil fueleconomy into question. More than 200years have passed since we began burningthe sequestered sunlight of fossilizedplants that took millions of years to accu-mulate, but only recently has it becomeevident that the carbon those fuels pro-duce is disrupting the Earth’s radiationbalance, causing the planet to warm.Fossil fuel combustion has increasedatmospheric concentrations of the heat-trapping gas carbon dioxide (CO,) by 30percent since preindustrial times. (SeeFigure 2-2.) CO, levels are now at theirhighest point in 160,000 years, and globaltemperatures at their highest since theMiddle Ages. Experts believe humanactivities could be ending the period ofrelative climatic stability that has enduredover the last 10,000 years, and that per-mitted the rise of agricultural and indus-trial society. 14

In recent years scientists have exten-sively documented trends-receding glac-

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iers, rising sea levels, dying coral reefs,spreading infectious cliseases, migratingplants and animals-that are consistentwith the projected effects of a warmerworld. The extraordinary heat of 1998-on pace to hit a new record-was relatedto, but extended well beyond, an unusu-ally strong El Niño phenomenon. Thiscontributed to a range of extreme weath-er events, including droughts and rarefires in tropical and subtropical forestsfrom Indonesia to Mexico; historic floodsin China and Bangladesh;. severe stormsand epidemics in Africa and North,Central, and South America; and deadlyheat waves in the United States, southernEurope, and India. The climate system isnonlinear and has in the past switchedabruptly-even in the space of a fewdecades-to another equilibrium aftercrossing a temperature threshold. Suchshifts haye the potential to greatly disruptboth the natural world and human soci-ety. Indeed, previous changes have coin-cided with the collapse of several ancientcivilizations. 15

Stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concen-trations at safe levels will require a 60-80percent cut in carbon emissions fromcurrent levels, according to the best esti-

mates of scientists. The Kyoto Protocol tothe U.N. Framework Convention onClimate Change, agreed to in December1997, is intended to be a small step on thislong journey-which would eventuallyend the fossil-fuel-based economy as weknow it todayl.16

Energy transitions are also shaped bythe changing needs of societies. Historiansargue that coal won out over wood andother renewable resources during theeighteenth and nineteenth centuries inpart due to the requirements of the shiftfrom a rural, agrarian society to an urban,industrial one. Abundant and concentrat-ed forms of energy were required for thenew industries and booming cities of theperiod. In this view, coal did not bringabout the transition but adapted to it morequickly. Ironically, the success of water-mills and windmills in promoting earlyindustrialization led to expanding energydemands that could only be met by thecoal-fired steam engine.17

Today’s fast-growth economic sectorsare not the production of food or auto-mobiles, but software, telecommunica-tions, and a broad array of services-fromfinance and news to education and enter-tainment. The Information Revolutionwill, like the Industrial Revolution, haveits own energy needs-and will place apremium on reliability. Computer systemsfreeze up if power is cut off for a fractionof a second; heavy industries, such aschemical and steel production, nowdepend on semiconductor chips to oper-ate. Yet the mechanical machines andnetworks of above-ground wires andpipelines that power current energysystems are vulnerable. Today’s systemsare also centralized, while much of theservice economy can be conducted fromfar-flung locations that are connectedthrough the Internet, and may requiremore localized, autonomous energy supplies than power grids or gas lines canprovide. As with the water wheel, so withoil: the growing demands of the new

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economy might not be met by the energysystem that helped launch it.18

In the twenty-first century, the require-ments of the developing world-where 80percent or more of the new energy invest-ment is expected to take place-are likelyto be the leading driver of energy mar-kets. Eighteenth-century Great Britainshifted to coal, and the twentieth-centuryUnited States to oil, in part to meet thedemands of growing populations; similarchanges might be expected as more than5 billion people seek more convenienttransportation, refrigeration, air-condi-tioning, and other amenities in the yearsahead. Technologies that can meet thedemands of developing nations at mini-mal cost may therefore assume prominentroles in the overall transition.19

SYS T E M I C C H A N G E

The closing decades of the nineteenthcentury were a fertile period in the histo-ry of technology, as inventors appliednovel scientific advances to a range of newdevices. The incandescent light bulb, elec-tric dynamo, and internal combustionengine were invented in the late 1800s buthad relatively little effect on industry ordaily life as the century ended. As theycame into widespread use in later decades,however, it became clear in retrospect thatthe technological foundation for the tran-sition was largely in place by 1900.20

Today a new energy system is gestatingin the late-twentieth-century fields ofelectronics, synthetic materials, biotech-nology, and software. The silicon semi-conductor chip, promising increasedprocessing power and miniaturization ofelectronic devices, allows energy use to bematched more closely to need. Wider useof these chips offers efficiency gains inappliances, buildings, industry, and trans-port, making it possible to control pre-

cisely nearly all energy-using devices.Electronic controls also enable a range ofsmall-scale, modular technologies to chal-lenge the large-scale energy devices of thetwentieth century.21

Breakthroughs in chemistry and mate-rials science are also playing key roles inenergy, providing sophisticated, light-weight materials that operate without thewear and tear of moving parts. Modernwind turbines use the same carbon-fibersynthetic materials found in bullet-proofvests, “gore-tex” synthetic membranes linethe latest fuel cells, and new “super-insu-lation” that reduces the energy needs ofbuildings relies on the same aluminumfoil vacuum process that keeps coffeefresh. The latest electrochemical windowcoatings can be adjusted to reflect orabsorb heat and light in response toweather conditions and the time of day.²²

A particularly fertile area of advance isin lighting, where the search is on for suc-cessors to Thomas Edison’s incandescentbulb. Improvements in small-scale elec-tronic ballasts have given rise to the com-pact fluorescent lamp (CFL), whichrequires one quarter the electricity ofincandescent bulbs and lasts 10 times aslong. Manufacturers are now working oneven more advanced models with tiny bal-lasts that work with any light socket, andthat cost half as much as today’s models.Yet the new light-emitting diode (LED), asolid-state semiconductor device thatemits a very bright light when charged, istwice as efficient as CFLs and lasts 10times as long. Today’s LEDs produce redand yellow light, which limits their marketto applications such as traffic signals andautomobile taillights, but. scientistsbelieve that white-light versions will soonbecome practical.²³

Late-twentieth-century technology hasalso revived an ancient source of energy:the wind. The first windmills for grindinggrain appeared in Persia just over 1,000years ago, and eventually spread to China,throughout the Mediterranean, and to

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northern Europe, where the Dutch devel-oped the massive machines for which thecountry is stil l known. Wind poweremerged as a serious option for generat-ing electricity when Danish engineersbegan to apply advanced engineering andmaterials in the 1970s. The latest versions,which are also manufactured by compa-nies based in Germany, India, Spain, andthe United States, have variable-pitchfiberglass blades that are as long as 40meters, electronic variable speed drives,and sophisticated microprocessor con-trols. Wind power is now economicallycompetitive with fossil fuel generatedelectricity, and the market, valued atroughly $2 billion in 1998, is growingmore than 25 percent annually. (SeeFigure 2-3. )24

Use of the sun as an energy source isalso being renewed by modern technolo-gy. The solar photovoltaic cell, a semicon-ductor device tha t turns the sun’sradiation directly into electric current, iswidely used in off-grid applications as apower source for satellites and remotecommunications systems, as well as in con-sumer electronic devices such as pocketcalculators and watches. Improvements incell efficiency and materials have lowered

Wind

costs by 80 percent in the past twodecades, and the cells are now being builtinto shingles, tiles, and window glass-allowing buildings to generate their ownelectricity. Markets are booming. (SeeFigure 2-4) The cost of solar cells willneed to fall by another 50-75 percent inorder to be fully competitive with coal-fired electricity, but automated manufac-turing, larger factories, and more- efficientcells promise further cost reductions inthe near future. Semiconductor researchis also nurturing the development of aclose cousin of the solar cell, the “ther-mophotovoltaic” cell, which can produceelectricity from industrial waste heat.25

The technology that could most trans-form the energy system, the fuel cell, wasfirst discovered in 1829, five decadesbefore the internal combustion engine.The fuel cell attracted considerable inter-est at the turn of the century but requiredefficiency improvements before its firstmodern application in the U.S. space pro-gram in the 1960s. Fuel cells use an elec-trochemical process that combineshydrogen and oxygen, producing waterand electricity. Avoiding the inherentinefficiency of combustion, today’s topfuel cells are roughly twice as efficient as

2-4.

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conventional engines, have no movingparts, require little maintenance, arenearly silent, and emit only water vapor.Unlike today’s power plants, they arenearly as economical on a small scale ason a large one. Indeed, they could turnthe very notion of a power plant intosomething more closely resembling ahome appliance.26

Although, the first fuel cells now runon natural gas-which can be separatedinto hydrogen and carbon dioxide-in the long term they may be fueled bypure hydrogen that is separated fromwater by using electricity, a process knownas electrolysis. Researchers are also testingvarious catalysts that, when placed inwater that is illuminated by sunlight,may one day produce inexpensive hydro-gen. Chemists have recently developeda solar-powered “water splitter” thatnearly doubles the efficiency of convert-ing solar energy to hydrogen. Some scien-tists note that finding a cheap andefficient way to electrolyze water couldmake hydrogen as dominant an energycarrier in the twenty-first century as oilwas in the twentieth.27

Many energy analysts argue that it willtake a long time for such devices tobecome competitive with fossil fuels. Butdwelling on the current cost gap ignores aprinciple that Henry Ford discovered ear-lier this century. Mass production allowedFord to cut the cost of a Model T by 65percent between 1909 and 1923. As withthe Model T, the costs of the new, modu-lar energy devices are expected to fall dra-matically as their markets expand.28

Historically, energy innovations havefirst emerged in specialized “niches”where they were, for a variety of reasons,preferred, to the conventional fuel.Petroleum’s initial market was as areplacement for whale oil used in lightingkerosene lamps; what now seems a mar-ginal use of oil was a powerful force in thelate nineteenth century, sufficient toattract millions of dollars of investment.

Today’s emerging energy technologiesare exploiting similarly small but growingniches that are spurring investment andlarger-scale manufacturing. Shipments ofsolar cells doubled between 1994 and1997 as a result of burgeoning niche mar-kets such as powering highway signals andwater pumps, as well as a half-millionhomes not connected to a grid, wheresolar power is the most economicalsource of electricity. Fuel cells are firstappearing in buses, hospitals, militarybases, and wastewater treatment plants,and are being developed for cellularphones, laptop computers, and cabinlamps. One day, they could be found inmost buildings and automobiles.29

As these examples suggest, downsizingand decentralization may become majorfeatures of the twenty-first century energyeconomy. While the twentieth century hasseen a trend toward larger facilities andgreater distances between energy sourceand use, the new technologies would placean affordable, reliable, and accessiblepower supply near where it is needed. Thiswould retrace the computer industry’spath from mainframe to desktop comput-ers in the past two decades-and resurrectThomas Edison’s vision of decentralized,small-scale power generation. In contrastto today’s monoculture of power genera-tion, a distributed energy system wouldcombine a range of new devices: small tur-bines in factories, fuel cells in basements,rooftop solar panels, wind turbines scat-tered across pastures, and power plantsthat can be carried in a briefcase 30

The information age-itself downsizedand decentralized-could help ensurethe reliability of a distributed power sys-tem through instantaneous telecommuni-cations and sophisticated electroniccontrols that coordinate millions of indi-vidual generators, much as the Internetworks today. Computer and telecommuni-cation companies are developing “intelli-gent” power systems that send signals overphone lines, television cables, and electric

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lines. Micro-generators and even homeapp l i ances can be p rog rammed torespond to electronically relayed priceinformation, providing power to the gridand storing it-in the form of hydrogen,or the kinetic energy of a flywheel-asdemand fluctuates. This fine-tuning ofthe balance between electricity supplyand demand would increase the efficien-cy of the new system-reducing pollutionand saving energy and money.31

The key to a reliable, diversifiedenergy system will be the use ofhydrogen as a major energy carrierand storage medium.

Buildings were energy self-sufficientfor much of history, but in the last centu-ry they have become dependent onincreasingly distant sources of supply. Adistributed energy system would allowbuildings to once again meet most oftheir own energy needs with rooftop solarsystems; fuel cells, and flywheels-evenbecoming net energy generators that sellexcess power back to the grid. Basementfuel cells could provide electricity andheat during the day, while automobilesand electric bicycles might be replenishedwith household-generated hydrogen orelectricity at night. “Zero net energy”buildings can be tightly designed to relyon passive solar energy and on the bodyheat of occupants. Buildings themselvesmay be made of mass-produced compo-nents and modules that can be shipped toa site and then assembled.32

The automobile, too, is likely to bereshaped. Oil’s automotive successors--bethey batteries or turbines, flywheels or fuelcells-will likewise motivate engineers tomake the rest of the vehicle as lightweightas possible, as demonstrated with the bulky

lead-acid battery and sleek exterior of thefirst modern commercial electric car,designed by General Motors (GM). Thefirst commercially available “hybrid-elec-tric” vehicle, Toyota’s Prius, uses engineand battery in tandem and is twice as fuel-efficient as the average U.S. car. (Morethan 7,700 sold in the first eight months,leading the company to double produc-tion during its first year; Toyota plans tomarket the vehicle in North America andEurope by 2000.) In a combination ofthese two ideas, the first hybrid-electricfuel cell taxi has appeared on the streets ofLondon. Trucks, locomotives, and otherheavy vehicles may al a soon shift-andadjust-to the new technologies.33

Running a modular energy system onrenewable resources will require adaptingthe system to their intermittent nature. Atemporary measure might be to buildbackup generators using efficient gas tur-bines, fuel cells, or pumped water storage;new technologies such as compressed air,plastic batteries, flywheels, and otherenergy storage devices also have parts toplay. But the key to a reliable, diversifiedenergy system based on renewable sourceswill be the use of hydrogen as a majorenergy carrier and storage medium.34

Developing a system for storing andtransporting hydrogen will be a majorundertaking. In the long run, materialsthat can store large amounts of hydrogen,such as metal hydrides or carbon nan-otubes, are being developed for use inelectric vehicles and other applications.And deriving hydrogen from natural gasfor the initial generation of fuel cellswould allow the early stages of a hydrogeneconomy to be based on the extensivenatural gas pipelines and other equipment already in place. Small-scale reform-ing units that convert natural gas intohydrogen could be placed in homes,office buildings, and service stations. Thecarbon dioxide released from this conver-sion would be far less than from internalcombustion engines, and could be turned

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into plastics or sequestered in under-ground or undersea reservoirs.35

The use of natural gas as a “bridge” tohydrogen might allow for a relativelyseamless transition to a renewable-energy-based system. Hydrogen could be mixedwith natural gas and carried in the samepipelines, then later transported throughrebuilt pipelines and compressors that aredesigned to carry pure hydrogen. Largeamounts of hydrogen might be producedin remote wind farms or solar stations,and then stored underground; homeown-ers could produce hydrogen from rooftopsolar cells and store it in the basement.Liquid hydrogen could find a niche in airtransport-replacing the kerosene thatfigured prominently in the rise of oil andthat still fuels most commercial jets.36

Systemic change can begin slowly, butgather momentum quickly. The transitionfrom gas to electric lighting proceededquietly at first: in 1910, only 10 percent ofU.S. houses had electricity. At the turn ofthe twentieth century, the gasoline-pow-ered car was still competing with thehorsedrawn carr iage and the s teamengine- and electric battery-powered car,while oil accounted for just 2.4 percent ofU.S. energy use. Within a generation,however, the internal combustion enginehad displaced the others; oil had sur-passed coal by 192 1; and by 1930, 80 per-cent of the country’s houses had beenelectrified. The pace and direction of anenergy transition, then, are determinednot just by technological developments,but also by how industries, governments,and societies respond to them.57

AN INDUSTRY TRANSFORMED

The oil industry that formed in the roughhills of western Pennsylvania in the 1860swas fiercely competitive, prone to wildprice fluctuations, and full of entrepre-

neurs who found niches supplying equipment, drilling wells, and running railroads,pipelines, and refineries. But the entrepre-neurial phase of the industry lasted lessthan two decades. A young man by thename of John D. Rockefeller entered theoil refining business and began buying uphis competitors-first going after otherrefiners, and then moving into the drillingand transportation business. Using tacticsranging from persuasion to coercion-some of which would be illegal today-Rockefeller built Standard Oil into avirtual empire that dominated the oil busi-ness, from the well to the retail markets,along the eastern U.S. seaboard. “It wasforced upon us,” Rockefeller explainedlater. ‘The oil business was in chaos anddaily growing worse.” Rockefeller tamedthe competition, increased the scale andefficiency of the refining process, and cre-ated one of the world’s first multinationalcorporations.38

Standard Oil’s monopoly eventuallybecame so egregious tha t i t led tothe government-mandated breakup ofRockefeller’s empire, but it had alreadycreated a new industrial model that hasbeen followed by the energy industry eversince. Although no longer a monopoly,the oil industry is dominated by a dozenlarge corporat ions , four of which-Amoco, Chevron, Exxon, and Mobil-are“Baby Standards,” offspring of thebreakup. After World War II, large oil dis-coveries were made in increasinglyremote, inhospitable locations such as thedeserts of the Middle East and Alaska’sNorth Slope, all of which favored largemultinational corporations equipped tomount decade-long, multibillion-dollardevelopment projects. Then in the 1960sand 1970s, the nations that are home tothe largest of those reserves-countriessuch as Mexico and Venezuela as well asthe Persian Gulf kingdoms-threw outthe multinationals and formed their ownstate oil monopolies.39

The trend to bigness in the energy

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business moved quickly beyond oil.Prior to 1910, scores of small companiesbuilt an array of handmade cars, butthe diversity ended in the next decadewith Henry Ford’s pioneering assemblylines, which lowered the cost of produc-tion and spurred a host of others toimitate. Soon auto companies were gob-bling each other up, a trend seen mostclearly in today’s General Motors, whichwas assembled from a hall-dozen early-century automakers. 10

The energy business is once moreopening up to a new generation ofentrepreneurs selling revolutionarynew devices.

The electric power business was alsoquickly consolidated, with giant firms con-trolling everything from the power plantto the electric meter. To this day, most U.S.companies are regulated by state govern-ments as legal monopolies. In many othercountries, national and state governmentstook over their electric utility systems,viewing them as strategic industries thatare too important to be left to the vagariesof the marketplace. These huge, centrallyplanned entities seemed to reflect the eco-nomic visions of Lenin rather than AdamSmith, yet for decades these utilities suc-ceeded in building large, reliable powersystems while cutting prices:41

Like. the energy sources and technolo-gies to which they are tied, these econom-ic structures have remained largely intactfor much of the twentieth century. Theyhave justified their gargantuan size as ameans to the end of exploiting economiesof scale. According to Rockefeller’s logic,high-volume, low-cost production requiredlarge, sure markets, which led to verticalintegration-and limited competition.42

The energy system that is now emerg-

ing follows a different economic logic,one closer to the precepts of the informa-tion age. Under this economic paradigm,new machines and methods are onceagain being invented, while companiesare restructured. Numerous mainstreamenergy companies, including BritishPetroleum (BP, in solar energy), Enron(solar energy and wind power), andGeneral Electric (fuel cells and micro tur-bines), are investing in these technolo-gies. It remains to be seen whether thesenew devices will eventually be controlledby a dominant group of companies, orwhether a more open, competitive eco-nomic model will prevail.45

Decades of public ownership in theenergy sector have already been sweptaside in many countries in the 1990s, fos-tering a period of unprecedented compe-tition, innovation, and divers i ty inenergy-related industries. Echoing thechaotic early days of the oil industry, theenergy business is once more opening upto a new generation of entrepreneurs sell-ing revolutionary new devices, such asfuel cells, and services, such as the effi-cient use of combined heat and power, orcogeneration. (See Table 2-2.) Nationaloil companies are being “privatized”; fuelprices are being decontrolled: and theelectric power industry, which has formost of the century been a government-owned or regulated monopoly nearlyeverywhere, is being radically restruc-tured in dozens of countries.44

“Independent power producers,” anew breed of largely unregulated powersuppliers, are increasingly dominating thebusiness in countries such as the UnitedKingdom and the United States, but theyare also being welcomed by governmentsin developing countries where many elec-tric utilities are bankrupt and unable tokeep up with demand growth. There arenow more than 300 independent powercompanies, and they are growing particu-larly rapidly in Asia and Latin America.Firms once limited to regions or countries

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Table 2-2. Energy “Microsofts”

Company (Country) Technology Start-up Date Capitalization(rnillion dollars)

Ballard (Canada) Fuel cells 1979 2,360Vestas (Denmark) Wind turbines 1987 204Trigen Energy (United States) Cogeneration 1986 182Energy Conversion Solar PV cells 1960 74

Devices (United States) Electric batteriesSolectria (United States) Electric vehicles 1989 n.a.

SOURCE: Discussions with company representatives. and annual reports at their respective Web sites.

are building power plants al1 over theworld, with natural gas turbines the tech-nology of choice. A more competitivepower industry is also likely to diversify itsgeneration base quickly, developing newdecentralized generators that are locatedin customers’ buildings. The businessesbest positioned to compete in this marketmay turn out to be firms that already sellair-conditioning and energy control ser-vices to commercial building owners.Some energy service companies now signcontracts to provide customers with a fullrange of heat, refrigeration, and power-in part by upgrading Windows, lighting,air-conditioning, and other systems.45

Changing market conditions have alsospawned a new breed of “virtual utilities”that meet customers’ energy needs with-out owning any of the assets involved.Such companies are essentially intermedi-aries-firms that bring together a rangeof assets to meet needs, free of having toprotect an array of earlier investments.Energy consultant Karl Rábago, whohelped pioneer the concept, describesthe virtual utility as “nimble and fleet offoot, less encumbered with physical assets,exploiting its intelligence and capabili-ties, embracing change and deliveringoutstanding customer satisfaction.“46

A variant of the virtual utility, the“green power” supplier, has emerged inthe last few years. These companies-tak-ing advantage of the opening of retail

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electricity markets and many consumers’disdain for electricity generated from coa1or nuclear power-offer customers theoption of purchasing power generatedfrom wind, geothermal, or biomass ener-gy. While some of the half-dozen compa-nies that have entered the market inCalifornia are subsidiaries of utilities, oth-ers are new firms that own no actualpower plants-and whose employees areoften thousands of miles from the market.Instead, they are energy brokers, linkingwindfarm owners with electricity cus-tomers willing to pay a little more eachmonth to help keep the air clean. Thoughthe green power market is growing slowlyat first, surveys suggest strong consumerinterest in the concept-and businesseslike Toyota have already signed up.47

Ever since the nineteenth century,energy trends llave been dictated in partby a complicated dance between indus-tries and governments, with the formerseeking economic gain and convenienceand the latter focusing on strategic, social,and environmental concerns that themarket is prone to neglect. The U.S. gov-ernment accelerated the rise of coa1 bysubsidizing rail barons during the nine-teenth century, for instance, and helpedusher in the oil age with contracts to theautomobile industry and massive invest-ments in an interstate highway systemafter World War II48

Although it is popular in some quarters

JACQUELINE

JACQUELINE

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today to think that energy is rapidlybecoming the pure province of the pri-vate sector, this seems unlikely. Much ofthe energy industry is still government-owned or regulated in many countries,and a host of unresolved social and envi-ronmental issues will require a guiding-though relatively light-governmentalhand. As governments retreat from directownership of power companies, they willbe in a better position to encouragegreater re l iance on c leaner energysources’ by using both regulations andfinancial incentives. Just as financial regu-lators are required to have a functioningstock market, so is a degree of regulationessential if we are to have a sustainableenergy market. Governments are respon-sible, for example, for setting the rules forgrid interconnection of generators,supervising price-setting on monopolypower lines, and requiring adequate dis-closure of the sources and emissions asso-ciated with power that is being sold.49

Another energy-related industry inwhich growing competition is being influ-enced by government policies is the auto-mobile business. Decisions by the stategovernment in California in 1992 to man-date zero-emission vehicles and by theU.S. government in 1993 to form a coali-tion with the Big Three automakers topursue a new generation of technologieshave spurred faster innovation in theindustry than at any time since the ModelT was introduced. Today, the dozen com-panies that dominate the global car busi-ness are being challenged by a host ofventure-capital-fueled start-ups that aredesigning cars powered by batteries, fly-wheels, turbines, and fuel cells. Largeauto companies have responded withmultibilliondollar efforts to develop thenew technologies themselves-and havealso begun to form strategic coalitionswith some of the high-tech start-ups. Oneexample is the $870-million fuel cell part-nership forged between Ballard, a smallCanadian company, and the German auto

giant Daimler-Benz in 1997. Ballard willsupply the new fuel cells, while Daimlerwill build them into new drive trains, andthen assemble and market the cars.50

The energy industry of the next centu-ry is still in its formative years, and it is notyet clear what kinds of companies will bebest able to provide the new technologiesand services. Similar to the shift from themainframe to the personal computer inthe early 198Os, the move to a decentral-ized energy system may make the marketdominance of big players like Exxon andGM a thing of the past, as smaller, moreversatile players attract more business-just as IBM’s control of the computerindustry was loosened by Apple andMicrosoft. One thing seems likely, howev-er: those hoping to survive the upheavalmay need to be, as was said of Rockefellerhimself, “always ready to embracechange.”51

G R E A T P O W E R S , G E O P O L I T I C A L

P R I Z E S

In his Pulitzer-Prize winning book ThePrize, historian Daniel Yergin notes animportant turning point in the ascen-dance of pet roleum: Lord WinstonChurchill’s decision in 1911, after years ofresistance, to switch Britain’s war fleetfrom coa1 to oil. Many experts thoughtthe move r isky and expensive , butChurchill felt it strategically necessary, asit would provide the speed and powerneeded to defeat the German navy on thehigh seas. Within a few years, coal-fueledvessels had become a rarity, as freightersand passenger ships joined the stampedeto petroleum.52

Energy and geopolitics have becomeclosely intertwined during the past 200years. The British Empire was buttressedby an Industrial Revolution, which was inturn powered by the heavy use of coal.

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T h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , c a l l e d t h eAmerican century by some historians, hasalso been dubbed the century of oil, withits industry and progeny-mass-producedautomobiles, spreading suburbs, andubiquitous plastics-al1 “made in theUSA.” Access to petroleum has underlainmany of the twentieth century’s interna-tional conflicts-including the Japaneseattack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and thePersian Gulf war in 1991-and becomevirtually synonymous with the power bal-ances among western economies, theMiddle East, and the developing world.53

Governments have taken a strategicinterest in the energy industry during thepast century for a variety of reasons:advancing national security, reducing oilimport reliance, and promoting techno-logical innovation as a means to economicdevelopment. In the next century, the cli-mate change battle may assume the kindof strategic importance that wars-bothhot and cold-have had during this one.In a cal1 to arms in the journal Nature inOctober 1998, leading scientists arguedthat global climate change could soonbecome the environmental equivalent ofthe cold war. They pointed out that twen-tieth-century wartime and pos twarresearch and development have producedsuch advances as commercial aviation,radar, computer chips, lasers, and theInternet. The large-scale deployment ofcarbon-free energy technologies over thenext 50 years, they conclude, may requirean international effort conducted with theurgency of the Apollo space program.54

Unlike the effort in the 1960s to put aman on the moon, the shift to a newenergy system could be led by both publicand private sectors. Indeed, there may bea privatesector parallel to Churchill inthe unexpected decis ion of Br i t i shPetroleum Chairman John Browne toannounce, as climate negotiations gath-ered momentum shortly before the his-toric Kyoto conference in 1997, that hiscompany now took climate change seri-

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ously and would step up its investments insolar energy. Like Churchill, Browne wasat first ridiculed by colleagues. But themonths following the Kyoto agreementwitnessed a string of industry announce-ments of new partnerships, investments,and breakthroughs in new energy tech-nologies. John Smith , Chairman ofGeneral Motors, surprised observers atthe 1998 Detroit Auto Show when he pro-claimed that “no car company will be ableto thrive in the twenty-fìrst century if itrelies solely on internal-combustionengines.“ 55

In October 1998, leading scientists

argued that global c l imate change

c o u l d s o o n b e c o m e t h e e n v i r o n -

mental equivalent of the cold war.

National governments are themselvesbeginning to formulate energy-relatedresponses to the climate challenge, manyof them eschewing highly prescriptive“command-and-control” regulation infavor of marker incentives. Governmentsin Europe are setting standards for con-necting small-scale power generators tothe local electric system, and determiningthe appropriate price-based on econom-ic as well as environmental costs-to bepaid for the power. Other governments,including those in China and the UnitedKingdom, are improving the efficiency ofenergy markets by getting rid of tens ofbillions of dollars of subsidies to fossilfuels, while Denmark and Sweden are tax-ing carbon emissions as a way to “inter-nalize” environmental costs, encouragingprivate energy users to make decisionsbased on the ful1 costs of their actions.56

The end of the hydrocarbon centurycould redraw a set of international faultlines that have sharply defined the pastfew decades. Oil is unevenly distributed,

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yielding disproportionate power to thosewith access to these concentrated stocks-particularly the United States, Russia, andthe Middle East. But as petroleum is seenless as a “prize” and more as a dangerousdependence, western economies maybecome less reliant on Middle Eastern oil,and less focused on political developments in the region. The possibility thatthe world economy could be thrown intoanother crisis-today more than half theworld’s oil is traded internationally-might also be diminished.57

A solar-hydrogen economy would bebased on resources that are more abun-dant and more evenly distributed. Somecountries are better endowed than others:Mexico, India, and South Africa are par-ticularly well positioned to deploy solarenergy, while Canada, China, and Russiahave especially large wind resources. Butalthough some countries could exportrenewably generated electricity or hydro-gen, few are likely to depend mainlyon imports. The international energy bal-ance might be more like the world foodeconomy today where some countries arenet exporters and others importers, butthe majority produce most of their ownfood. In other words, energy wouldbecome a more “normal” commodity,one not constantly on the verge of inter-national crisis.58

Since renewable energy resources arerelatively evenly spread, Ieadership in thenew industries is less likely to go to coun-tries with the most resources than to thosewith the know-how, skilled labor force,openness to innovation, efficient finan-cial structures, and strategic foresight toposition themselves for the new era.Today, it is the world’s three leading tech-nological powers-Germany, Japan, andthe United States-that are ahead in thedevelopment of many of the key devices.But nations need not be large or powerfulto find a strategic niche, as demonstratedby Denmark’s preeminence in windpower today. More than half the global

wind power market is now supplied byDanish firms or licensees-an achieve-ment made possible by a two-decade-longstrategic partnership between govern-ment and industry.59

The conditions for an energy transi-tion are particularly ripe in developingcountries, most of which are far betterendowed with renewable energy sourcesthan with fossil fuels. Most of these coun-tries have embryonic energy systems andmassively underserved populations, andtherefore represent a potentially far larg-er market for innovative technologies.Developing nations are in position tobypass or “leapfrog” the twentieth-centu-ry systems that are quickly becoming out-dated-and several of them, includingCosta Rica, the Dominican Republic, andSouth Africa, have already plunged aheadwith some of the new technologies. Giventheir large populations and surging ener-gy demands, China and India are espe-cially well positioned to become leadingcenters of the next energy system. Thiscould mean a reversa1 in the flow of ini-tiative and innovation between East andWest-and could perhaps precipitate abroader shift in the world’s economic and

political center of gravity back to where itwas a millennium ago: Asia. In the NewWorld, Brazil, with its vast supplies ofrenewable resources, could also become amajor player.60

The relatively diffuse nature of renew-able energy sources, and the need toaccelerate their use worldwide, mighthelp diminish international conflict andstimulate cooperation. The evolution ofthe energy system may be determined lessby OPEC cartels and struggles over oilleases than by the ongoing internationalnegotiations to protect the climate, as“de-carbonizing” the world economybecomes a greater “geopolitical impera-tive,” yielding its own prizes. One smallcountry that has already made such astrategic move is Iceland. In 1997 thesmall nation’s Prime Minister announced

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a plan to convert Iceland to a “hydrogeneconomy” within 15 to 20 years; the gov-ernment is working with Daimler-Benzand Ballard Power Systems to shift its fish-ing fleet to hydrogen, and its motor vehi-cle fleet to methanol and hydrogen.Icelandic officials are also exploring theprospects for exporting hydrogen toother countries.61

ENERGY AND SOCIETY

In medieval Europe, feudal lords derivedmost of their wealth and privilege fromtheir control over land, forests, and watercourses. Peasant farmers were unable togrind their own grain, and so had nochoice but to sell it unmilled to their land-lords at a low price. But the lords did notown the wind, and when windmills wereintroduced in Europe in the twelfth cen-tury, a struggle ensued over whether thefarmers would be able to build their ownwindmills and use this previouslyuntapped and “free” energy source.62

The peasant farmers eventually wonthis test of wills, and their struggle is a

reminder that energy has long been close-ly tied to questions of power, wealth, andequity. The energy system that has devel-oped in industria1 nations over the pastcentury has led to a new generation ofsocietal disparities as well as serious envi-ronmental problems. The question todayis whether societies can use a new genera-tion of revolutionary technologies andpractices to overturn the existing order,just as windmills undermined the powerof the aristocracy in the Middle Ages.63

One legacy of the fossil fuel economy isan unprecedented concentration of eco-nomic wealth. Four offshoots ofRockefeller’s Standard Oil are among theworld’s 50 largest companies. And mea-sured by 1997 revenues, the two giantautomakers-General Motors and Ford-are the world’s largest corporations, withToyota among the top 10. (See Table2-3.) GM’s 1997 revenues of $178 billionexceeded the combined nationaleconomies of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, andPeru. In terms of sheer size, multination-al suppliers of electrical equipment-ABB, General Electric, Mitsubishi,Siemens-are among the world’s largest.In personal terms, five of the world’s

Table 2-3. World’s 12 Largest Corporations, 1997

Company 1997 Revenues(hillion dollars)

Industry

General Motors 178 AutomobileFord Motor Company 154 AutomobileMitsui & Co., Ltcl. 143 TradingMitsubishi Corporation 129 Trading (including automobile)Roya1 Dutch/Shell Group 128 EnergyItochu Corporation 127 TradingExxon Corporation 122 EnergyWal-Mart Stores, Inc. 119 General MerchandiseMarubeni Corporation 111 TradingSumitomo Corporation 102 TradingToyota Motor Corporation 95 AutomobileGeneral Electric Company 91 Electric power

1Energy, automobile, and electric power companies are indicated by italics.SOURCE: Fortune Magazine, “Thc Global 500 List” <http://www.pathfinder.com/fortune/global500/index.html>, viewed 26 August 1998.

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wealthiest individuals are sheiks, sultans,or princes who have profited from thetwentieth-century oil boom.64

Today’s energy regime has also heavilyconcentrated political clout. Oil, coal,automobile, and electric utility trade asso-ciations are among the world’s most heav-ily funded and influential lobbies.Through groups like the Global ClimateCoalition, multinationals can-in nearanonymity-finance misleading advertis-ing campaigns, defend outdated subsi-dies, and fight international treaties. Liketheir lordly predecessors, German electricutilities campaign to repeal the govern-ment policy that has enabled wind tur-bines to spread across the country.65

Meeting the needs of the 2 billionpeople who do not have modern fuelsor electricity might become a newsocial imperative.

But such “fronts” are slowly losinginfluence. Some prominent oil compa-nies have broken off from their fossilfuel brethren who oppose the climatetreaty, while others have joined progres-sive business groups that lobby forchange. And in Bonn, German environ-mentalists organized a large protest in1997 that succeeded in staving off opposi-tion to government supports for renew-able energy. Meanwhile, those with apossible stake in a new energy system-energy efficiency, renewable energy,and insurance companies-are beginningto mobilize and fight for changes ingovernment policy.66

Over time, shifting to a decentralizedenergy system may help distribute rev-enues more equitably and devolve deci-sionmaking to the regional or local level.Danish wind power promotion is basedon a decentralized, community-based

model in which the machines are built bylocal companies, f inanced by localbankers, and owned and installed by localfarmers. Unlike traditional large energyprojects carried out by corporationsbased halfway around the world, theDanish approach has raised incomes andcreated jobs within communities. Withthe current financial system biasedtoward large-scale, centralized projects,special efforts are required if communi-ties are to obtain the financing needed toput a new system in place.67

In addition to concentrating wealthand power, today’s fossil-fuel-based systemhas engendered large imbalances in ener-gy use and social well-being. Its benefitshave not been extended to roughly 2 bil-lion of the world’s poor-a third of global population-who still rely on biomassfor cooking and lack access to electricity.Today, the richest fifth of humanity con-sumes 58 percent of the world’s energy,while the poorest fifth uses less than 4percent. The United States, with 5 per-cent of the world’s population, uses near-ly one quarter of global energy supplies;on a per capita basis, it consumes twice asmuch energy as Japan and 12 times asmuch as China.68

A more decentralized, renewable-resource-based energy system may have abetter chance of spreading energy servicesmore broadly. In fact, meeting the needsof the 2 billion people who do not havemodern fuels or electricity and of another2 billion who are badly underserved mightbecome a new social imperative-akin tothe push to electrify rural areas of theUnited States in the 1930s. Providingclean, advanced energy services wouldstimulate development in the poorerregions of the world, provide rural employ-ment, and lessen the burden of daily woodgathering that now falls on hundreds ofmillions of women and children. TheWorld Bank, which has devoted tens of bil-lions of dollars to electrifying cities usingcentral power plants over the past several

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decades, has recently undertaken a rangeof initiatives, intended to provide decen-tralized, renewable power supplies to hun-dreds of millions of rural people.69

Even with a shift to more energy-effi-cient technologies that rely on renewableresources, societies will have to confrontbasic consumption patterns in order tomake the energy economy sustainable. Inthe United States, the energy efficiencygains of the past quarter-century havebeen overwhelmed by escalating con-sumer demand for energy services. U.S.per capita energy use neared its previous1973 peak in the late 1990s, with gasolineuse per person already at record levels.Increased driving, sports utility vehicles,larger homes, and “killer kitchens” with allthe latest energy-hungry appliances havecreated an insatiable appetite for fuel.70

The mass consumer culture of twenti-eth-century North America-and to aslightly lesser extent, Europe and Japan-has been predicated on a “highenergysociety” that has viewed inexpensive,abundant energy as something of a con-stitutional right. But Americans’ energy-intensive lifestyles, and the U.S.-led globalenergy consumption trend of the pastcentury-a 10-fold increase, with a qua-drupling since 1950-cannot possibly bea sustainable model for a population ofmore than 9 billion in the twenty-first cen-tury. (See Figure 2-5.) 71

It will be far easier to meet the energyneeds of the world in coming years if suf-ficiency replaces profligacy as the ethic ofthe next energy paradigm. This willrequire a breakthrough not so much inscience or technology as in values andlifestyles. Modest changes, such as owningsmaller cars and homes, or driving lessand cycling more, would still leave us withlifestyles that are luxurious by historicalstandards but that are far more compati-ble with an energy system that can be sus-tained. Several studies show that societiesthat focus less on absolute consumptionand more on improving human welfare

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can meet development goals with muchlower energy requirements. Russia, forexample, has higher per capita energy usebut far lower living standards than Japan,whose economic success of the 1970s and1980s was greatly assisted by its "delink-ing” of energy use and development.72

The energetic challenge facing human-ity is not unlike that confronting Russiansa decade ago: creating a decentralized,demand-oriented system when a centrallyplanned, consumption-oriented economyhas been the industrial norm for threegenerations. Like the Soviet system, thefossil-fuel-based model is losing authorityas people become more aware of its nega-tive social and environmental effects andthe constrained choices that it offers. Andlike the reform movements that sweptCentral Europe in 1989, the new energysystem must be built from the bottom up,by the actions of millions, through democ-ratization of the energy decisionmakingprocess. Only through the efforts of adiverse cast of characters — activistsprotesting air pollution, consumers seek-ing lower energy bills, villagers demand-ing power, and industry captains pursuingprofits— are societies likely to build a sustainable energy system.73

Figure 2-5. World Energy Consumption,1900-97

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Designing a new energy system suitablefor the twenty-first century may helpreestablish the positive but too oftenneglected connections between energy,human well-being, and the environment.Rather than treat energy as a commodityto be consumed without regard for itsconsequences, we might instead recover amuch older notion of energy as some-thing to be valued, saved, and used tomeet our needs in ways that respect therealities of the natural world— therebyavoiding the kind of ecological catastro-phe that has befallen civilizations thatoverdrew their environmental endow-ments. The sooner we can bring the fleet-ing hydrocarbon era to a close andaccomplish the historic shift to a civiliza-tion based on the efficient use of renew-able energy and hydrogen, the sooner wecan stop drawing down the natural inher-itance of future generations and begininvesting in a livable planet.74

Utopian dreams, borne of societalmores, are hallmarks of energy futurism.In turn-of-the-century America, oil wasdescribed as “black gold,” and automo-biles were depicted as a cure for urbanwoes. At the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair-itself a Utopian exposition-electricity

had already become a symbol of the com-ing century, a marvel to be spreadthroughout the country as a near-reli-gious crusade. Together with lightweightmetals and high-speed trains, it was one ofthe three most-cited technological mar-vels in the 160 Utopian novels that blan-keted the United States between 1888 and1900. In the most famous of these,Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward, themain character travels to an America inthe year 2000 where “electricity... takesthe place of all fires and lighting."75

The pursuit of energy Utopia couldsoon be revived, as a host of innovationsonce again provide glimpses of a betterfuture. But these wonders represent morethan technological solutions. They alsosymbolize a broader vision— formed byold values and new choices— of creatingan energy system that brings billions ofpeople into the light, treats energy as ameans to a social end, and heeds therequirements of the natural systems thatmake life on Earth possible. Such a visionmight yet inspire us to make the nextenergy transition before it is too late—much as the quest for "black gold” droveour predecessors to accomplish the lastgreat transformation.

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Período en el que se utilizará:Septiembre- Diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo SostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaria Lopez Franco y Dr. Martin BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicación:Nueva YorkTitulo:State of the WorldEditorial:State of the WorldAutor/editor:Tuxill, JhonCapítulo/artículo:Capítulo 3 Losing Strands in the web of lifeAño (fecha) de publicación:1997Páginas -- De: A:41-58

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3

Losing Strands in theWeb of Life

J o h n T u x i l l

C h r i s B r i g h t

Ask three doctors with different medicalbackgrounds about the health of a patientand you will probably get three differentopinions-diagnoses that agree in gener-al but differ considerably in emphasis anddetail. Ask three environmental scientistsabout the health of the planet and youmay hear something similar. Some envi-ronmental assessments will track changesin biogeochemical cycles-rates of soilerosion, freshwater depletion, or fluctua-tions in the composition of Earth’s atmos-phere. Others might measure the harvestand regrowth of key biological resources,such as forests, fisheries, and grasslands.But arguably the single most direct mea-sure of the planet’s health is the status ofits biological diversity-usually expressedas the vast complex of species that makeup the living world. Measuring biodiversi-ty is an extremely complicated and subtletask, but four basic questions usually dom-inate the inquiry: How many species arethere? What are they? Where are they?And what is happening to them?

The biodiversity around us today is the

result of more than 3 billion years of evo-lution. Species declines and extinctionshave always been a natural part of thatprocess, but there is something dis-turbingly different about the currentextinction patterns. Examinations of thefossil record of marine invertebrates sug-gest that the natural or “background” rateof extinctions-the rate that has prevailedover millions of years of evolutionarytime—claims something on the order ofone to three species per year. In stark con-trast, most estimates of the current situa-tion are that at least 1,000 species are losta year—an extinction rate 1,000 times thebackground rate even with the most con-servative assumptions. Like the dinosaurs65 million years ago, humanity now findsitself in the midst of a mass extinction: aglobal evolutionary convulsion with fewparallels in the entire history of life. Butunlike the dinosaurs, we are not simplythe contemporaries of a mass extinc-tion—we are the reason for it.¹

The loss of species touches everyone,for no matter where or how we live, bio-

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diversity is the basis for our existence.Earth’s endowment of species provideshumanity with food, fiber, and manyother products and “natural services” forwhich there simply is no substitute.Biodiversity underpins our health caresystems; some 25 percent of drugs pre-scribed in the United States includechemical compounds derived from wildorganisms, and billions of people world-wide rely on plant- and animal-based tra-ditional medicine for their primaryhealth care. Biodiversity provides a wealthof genes essential for maintaining thevigor of our crops and livestock. It pro-vides pollination services, mostly in theform of insects, without which we couldnot feed ourselves. Frogs, fish, and birdsprovide natural pest control; mussels andother aquatic organisms cleanse ourwater supplies; plants and microorgan-isms create our soils.2

Vertebrates can serve as ecologicalbellwethers for the multitude oforganisms that remain undescribedand unknown.

But these natural goods and services—essential though they are—constitute aminor part of the picture. Most of what weare losing is still a mystery to us. As thenoted Harvard University biologistEdward O. Wilson puts it, we live on anunexplored planet. We have barely begunto decipher the intricate ecological mech-anisms that keep natural communitiesrunning smoothly. We do not know—even to a rough order of magnitude—how many species there are on Earth. Todate, scientists have catalogued about 1.8million species of animals, plants, fungi,bacteria, and other organisms; most esti-mates of the number yet to be formallydescribed range from 4 million to 40 mil-

lion. (The single most species-rich groupof organisms appears to be insects; bee-tles, in particular, currently account for25 percent of all described species.):³

This situation presents some seriousproblems for exploring the dimensions ofthe current mass extinction-and thepossible responses to it. If we do not evenknow how many species there are, howcan we be sure about the true scale of cur-rent species losses? If we do not under-stand most species’ ecological relation-ships, how can we tell what their disap-pearance might mean for our planet’slife-support systems? One way t oapproach these hurdles is to focus on thegroups of organisms we already know themost about-birds, mamals, reptiles,amphibians, and fish. These are the verte-brate animals, distinguished from inverie-brates by an interna1 skeleton and a spinalcolumn— a type of anatomy that permits.among other things, complex neuraldevelopment and high metabolic rates.

Vertebrates combined total about50,000 species. and can be found in virtu-ally all environments on Earth, from thefrozen expanses of Antarctica to scorch-ing deserts and deep ocean abysses. Byvirtue of the attention they receive fromresearchers, vertebrates can serve as eco-logical bellwethers for the multitude ofsmall, obscure organisms that remainundescribed and unknown. Since verte-brates tend to be relatively large and tooccupy the top rungs in food chains, habi-tats healthy enough to maintain a fullcomplement of native vertebrates willhave a good chance of retaining the inver-tebrates, plants, fungi, and other small ormore obscure organisms found there.Conversely, ecological degradation canoften be read most clearly in native verte-brate population trends.4

Perhaps the most celebrated exampleof this “bellwether effect” was the intenseresearch effort set off by the publicationof Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962,which described the danger that

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Losing Strands in the Web of Life

organochlorine pesticides pose to wildvertebrates, particularly birds. The studyof wildlife toxicology is now routine: ecol-ogists often monitor vertebrate popula-tions as a way of checking on the generalhealth of an ecosystem. In the NorthAmeritan Great Lakes, for example,researchers gauge water quality partly byexamining the health of the fish. Somevertebrate declines may signa1 troublethat we cannot clearly see in any otherway, as with the mysterious amphibiandeclines discussed later in this chapter.5

Even though vertebrates are a relative-ly small fraction of total biodiversity, track-ing their status is a huge task. The institu-tion leading this effort is the WorldConservation Union (known as IUCN,from its original name), an internationalenvironmental coalition that since the1960s has published the Red Data Book, alisting of al1 animal species known to bethreatened with extinction around theworld. The Red Data Book is compiledthrough extensive consultation with sci-entists who have in-depth field knowledgeof the animals concerned. When com-bined with various other ways of diagnos-ing the planet’s environmental illnesses,the Red Data Rook findings on vertebt-atesoffer a critical insight into the biodiversitycrisis-and on what we must do to halt it.

BIRDS: THE CLEAREST OF ALL

INDICATORS

The latest news is not good. Estimatesare that at least two out of every threebird species are in decline worldwide,although only about ll percent of al1birds are already officially threatenedwith extinction. (See Table 3-l.) Fourpercent-403 species-are “endangered”or “critically endangered.” These includespecies like the crested ibis, a wading birdthat has been eliminated from its formerrange in Japan, the Korean peninsula,and Russia, and is now down to one smallpopulation in the remote Qinling moun-tains of China. Another 7 percent of allbirds are in slightly better condition interms of numbers or range size, but stillremain highly vulnerable to extinction.7

With their prominent voices, vivid colors, The red-cockaded woodpecker is oneand unparalleled mobility, birds have won vulnerable species that scientists hope isa great deal of attention from scientists on the road to recovery. This bird isand laypeople alike. As a result, we know found only in mature pine forests—espe-more about the ecology, distribution, and cially longleaf pine—in the southeasternabundance of the nearly 10,000 species of United States, a habitat leveled by loggingbirds than we do about any other class of and agricultural clearing over the past twoorganisms on Earth. Not surprisingly, birds centuries. The woodpecker’s recoverywere the first animals that IUCN compre- depends on the success of efforts tohensively surveyed, in 1992, followed by restore longleaf pine habitat throughout

Table 3-l. Conservation Status of Birds, 1996

Status Total Share(number) (percent)

Not CurrentlyThreatened

7,633 80

Nearing Threatened 875 9Status

Threatened-Vulnerable toExtinction

704 7

Threatened-In 403 4Immediate Dangerof Extinction

SOURCE: Jonathan Baillie and Brian Groombridge,eds., 1996 IUCX Red List of Threakned Animals(Gland, Switzerland: World Conservation Union,1996).

full reassessments in 1994 and 1996.6

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ihis area by prescrihed burning, replicat-ing the once common low-intensity forestfires that the pines and the woodpeckersare exquisitely adapted to.8

Membership in this pool of threatenedspecies is not spread evenly among differ-ent taxonomic orders or groups of birds.The most threatened major groupsinclude rails and cranes (both specializedwading birds), parrots, terrestrial gamebirds. (pheasants, partridges, grouse, andguans) , and pelagic seabirds (albatrosses,petrels, and shearwaters). About onequarter of the species in each of thesegroups is currently threatened. Only 9percent of songbirds are threatened, butthey still contribute the single largestgroup of threatened species (542)because they are far and away the mostspecies-rich bird order.9

The leading culprits in the decline ofbirds are a familiar set of interrelated fac-tors all linked to human activity: habitatalteration, overhunting, exotic speciesinvasions, and chemical pollution of theenvironment. Habitat loss is by far theleading factor—at least three quarters ofall threatened bird species are in troublebecause of the transformation and frag-mentation of forests, wetlands, grasslands,and other unique habitats by humanactivities, including intensive agriculture,heavy livestock grazing, commercialforestry, and suburban sprawl. In somecases, habitat alteration is intensive andlarge-scale, as when an internationallyfunded development project convertslarge areas of native forest to plantationcrops, or a large dam drowns a uniqueriver basin. In other instances, habitat iseroded gradually over time, as when anative grassland is fragmented into small-er and smaller patches by farming com-munities expanding under a growing

Whatever the pattern, any giveninstance of habitat loss usually resultsfrom complex interactions between dif-ferent institutions, organizations, and

social groups. For instance, the conver-sion of tropical forest in Darién provincein Panama is linked to the actions andaims of commercial logging companies,small landowners (both long-time resi-dents and recent immigrants), largelandowners, government representatives,international consumers, internationaldevelopment agencies, and even conser-vationists. (For other examples of forestloss, see Chapter 2.)¹¹

The birds hit hardest by habitat loss areecological specialists with small ranges.Such species tend to reside full-time inspecific, often very local habitat types,and are most abundant in the tropicaland subtropical regions of Latin America,sub-Saharan Afirica, and Asia. More than70 percent of South America’s rare andthreatened birds do not inhabit lowlandevergreen rainforests or the commonlycited hotspot of environmental concern,the Amazon Basin. Instead, they hail fromobscure but gravely disturbed habitatssuch as the cloud-shrouded montaneforests and high-altitude wetlands of thenorthern and central Andes, deciduousand semiarid Pacific woodlands fromwestern Colombia to northern Chile, andthe fast-disappearing grasslands and river-ine forests of southern and eastern Brazil.The long list of imperiled birds native tothese little-noticed habitats signals thatwhat is being lost in South America is notjust rainforests but a far more diverse andintricate ecological mosaic, vanishingbefore most people have even becomeaware of its existence.¹²

High concentrations of gravely endan-gered birds are also found on oceanicislands worldwide. Birds endemic to insu-lar habitats—that is, found nowhereelse—account for almost one third of allthreatened species and an astounding 84percent of all historically known extinc-tions. These unfortunate numbers reflectthe fact that island birds tend naturally tohave smaller ranges and numbers, mak-ing them more susceptible to habitat dis-

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JACQUELINE

population .

JACQUELINE

10

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Losing Strands in the Web of life

turbance. And since island birds are oftenconcentrated in just a handful of popula-tions, if one such group is wiped out by atemporary catastrophe such as a drought,the birds often have few populationsources from which they can recolonizethe formerly occupied habitat. Equallyimportant is that many island birds haveevolved in isolation for thousands or evenmillions of years. Such species are partic-ularly vulnerable to human hunting, aswell as predation and competition fromnonnative, invasive species. (Invasives arehighly adaptable animals and plants thatspread outside their native ecologicalranges—usually with intentional or inad-vertent human help—and thrive inhuman-disturbed habitats.)¹³

It is likely that island birds have had ele-vated extinction rates for at least the pasttwo millennia. Archeologists have usedbird remains from Pacific islands to docu-ment a wave of extinctions as Melanesianhuman populations—and attendant rats,dogs, and other domestic animals—expanded across the western and centralPacific, colonizing new island chains.Disturbance of island ecosystems also wassevere during the European colonial era,and advanced again in our modern age ofjet travel and global ecollomic trade. As aresult, island birds continue to dwindle.14

Among countries with more than 200native bird species, the highest threat-ened share—15 percent—is found in twoisland archipelagos, New Zealand and thePhilippines. The tiny island nation ofMauritius in the Indian Ocean has record-ed 21 bird extinctions since the arrival ofhumans in the 1600s. Mauritian speciesgone forever include several species offlightless herons and the famed dodo, anaberrant flightless pigeon nearly the sizeof a turkey.15

No island birds have been more deci-mated than those of Hawaii, however.Virtually all of Hawaii’s original 90-oddbird species were found nowhere else inthe world. Barely one third of these

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species remain alive today, the rest havingvanished under Polynesian and modern-day impacts, and two thirds of these con-tinue to be threatened with extinction.The degree of ecological disruption inHawaii is so great that all lowlandHawaiian songbirds are now nonnativespecies introduced by humans.16

While island species and those specificto certain habitats dominate the ranks ofthe world’s most endangered birds, anequally disturbing trend is populationdeclines in more widespread species, par-ticularly those that migrate seasonallybetween breeding and wintering grounds.In the Americas, more than two thirds ofthe migratory bird species that breed inNorth America but winter in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean declined inabundance between 1980 and 1991.Some—including yellow-billed cuckoos,Tennessee warblers, and Cassin’s king-birds—declined by more than 4 percent ayear. Two decades of bird surveys in GreatBritain and central Europe have alsorevealed strong declines in long-distancemigrants that winter in sub-SaharanAfrica.17

All lowland Hawaiian songbirds arenow nonnative species introduced byhumans.

Long-term population declines inmigratory birds are tied to a host of con-tributing hazards. Habitat loss squeezesspecies on both breetling and winteringgrounds, as well as at key stoppingpoints- such as rich tidal estuaries forshorebirds-along their migratory routes.In North America, the loss of almost halfof all wetlands has been a major factorbehind a 30-percent drop in the popula-tions of the continent’s 10 most abundantduck species. Further south, from Mexico

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to Colombia, many migratory songbirdswinter in coffee plantations, where coffeebushes have traditionally been grownunder a shady canopy of native foresttrees. Unfortunately, this habitat is disap-pearing as plantations intensify andreplant with higher yielding, sun-tolerantcoffee varieties that do not require shade.The result is that neotropical migrantsmust search even harder to find suitablewintering territory.18

Excessive hunting also remains a haz-ard for many migratory species. In a num-ber of Mediterranean nations, there is anenduring tradition of pursuing al1 birdsindiscriminately regardless of size or sta-tus. Local species are hunted intensivelyfor food, and migrants that breed innorthern Europe must brave an annualfusillade of guns and snares as they flySouth to Africa. In Italy alone, as many as50 million songbirds are harvested everyyear as bite-sized delicacies.19

Exposure to chemical pollution isanother problem that many birds face.The greatest risk of pesticide and pollu-tion exposure occurs in developing coun-tries, where many chemicals hanned fromuse in industrial nations continue to beapplied or discharged indiscriminately. Inlate 1995 and early 1996, about 5 percentof the world’s population of Swainson’shawks—some 20,000 birds—died in unin-tentional mass poisonings on their winter-ing grounds in Argentina’s pampas. Localfarmers were applying heavy doses of aninternationally manufactured organo-phosphate pesticide called monocro-tophos to control grasshopper outbreakson their crops. The hawks, which breed inwestern North America, were exposed tothe chemical when they fed on thegrasshoppers, one of their main winterfood sources. Argentina has since bannedthe use of monocrotophos on grasshop-pers and alfalfa, and no large hawk killswere found during the 1996-97 winteringseason, but it is unclear how long it willtake the Swainson’s hawk population to

recover from these large losses.20

Whether reduced by the conversion ofkey habitats such as wetlands, by overex-ploitation in the form of hunters’ guns, orby chemical contamination of water andfood supplies, the decline of migratorybirds is sobering because it is a loss notjust of individual species but of an entireecological phenomenon. Present-daymigrants must negotiate their way acrossthousands of kilometers of tattered andfrayed ecological landscapes. The fact thatmany birds continue to make this journey,despite the threats and obstacles, is causefor hope and inspiration. Yet as long asbird diversity and numbers continue tospiral downward, there can be no rest inthe effort to protect and restore breedinggrounds, wintering areas, and key refuel-ing sites that all birds—migratory and res-ident—simply cannot live without.

MAMMALS: A DARKER PICTURE

When the conservation status of birds wasfirst comprehensively assessed by IUCN,the degree of endangerment-about llpercent—was taken as the best availableestimate of endangerment for all verte-brates, invertebrates, and other life onEarth. Then in 1996, IUCN comprehen-sively reviewed the status of all mammalspecies for the first time, allowing for afull comparison with birds. Unfortunately,the news was not good—about 25 percentof all mammal species are treading a paththat, if followed unchecked, is likely toend in their disappearance from Earth.(See Table 3-2.) This suggests that mam-mals are substantially more threatenedthan birds, and raises a larger questionabout which of these groups better repre-sents the leve1 of endangerment faced byother organisms.²¹

Out of almost 4,400 mammal species,about 11 percent are already "endan-

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Table 3-2. Conservation Status ofMammals, 1996



2,661 61

Nearing ThreatenedStatus

598 14


612 14

Threatened-In 484Immediate Dangerof Extinction

11

SOURCE: Jonathan Baillie and Brian Groombridge,eds., 1996 IUCN Red List of Threatened Animals(Gland, Switzerland: World Conservation Union,1996).

ge r ed” o r “c r i t i c a l l y endange red . ”Another 14 percent remain vulnerable toextinction, including the Siberian muskdeer, whose populations in Russia havefallen 70 percent during this decade dueto increased hunting to Peed the boomingtrade in musk, used in perfumes and tra-ditional Asian medicine. An additional 14percent of mammal species also comevery close to qualifying as threatenedunder the criteria used by IUCN to assessspecies' status. These “near-threatened”species tend to have larger populationsizes or be relatively widespread, butnonetheless face pressures that have themon the fast track to threatened status inthe not-too-distant future. One near-threatened species is the African redcolobus monkey. Its huge range stretchesfrom Senegal to Kenya, but the redcolobus faces hunting pressure and habi-tat loss everywhere it occurs, and is declin-ing in numbers.²²

Among major mammalian groups, pri-mates (lemurs, monkeys, and apes) occu-py the most unfortunate position, withnearly half of all primate species threat-

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ened with extinction. Also under severepressure are hoofed mammals (deer, ante-lope, horses, rhinos, camels, and pigs),with 37 percent threatened; insectivores(shrews, hedgehogs, and moles), with 36percent; and marsupials (opossums, walla-bies, and wombats) and cetaceans (whalesand porpoises), at 33 percent each. Inslightly better shape are bats and carni-vores (dogs, cats, weasels, bears, raccoons,hyenas, and mongooses), at 26 percentapiece. Rodents are the least threatenedmammalian group, at 17 percent, but alsothe most diverse. As with songbirds,rodents still contribute the most threat-ened species—300—of any group.23

The biggest culprit in the loss of mam-malian diversity in the late twentieth cen-tury is the same as that for birds-habitatloss and degradation. As humankind con-verts forests, grasslands, riverways, wet-lands, and deserts for intensive agricul-ture, tree plantations, industrial develop-ment, and transportation networks, werelegate many mammals to precariousexistences in fragmented, remnant habi-tat patches that are but ecological shad-ows of their former selves.

Habitat loss is a principal factor in thedecline of at least three quarters of allmammal species, and is the only signifi-cant factor for many small rodents andinsectivores that are not directly persecut-ed. The major reason primates are sothreatened is their affinity for tropicalforests, a habitat under siege around theglobe. In regions where forest degrada-tion and conversion have been mostintense, such as South and East Asia,Madagascar, and the Atlantic forest of east-ern Brazil, on average 70 percent of theendemic primate species face extinction.24

The loss of habitat also afflicts marinemammals, though it usually proceeds asgradual, cumulative declines in habitatquality rather than wholesale conversionof ecosystems (as when a forest is replacedby a housing development). Marine mam-mals, particularly Those that inhabit

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densely populated coastal areas, now haveto contend with polluted water and food,physical hazards from fishing gear, heavycompetition from humans for the fishstocks on which they feed, and hazardous,noisy boat traffic. Along the coastline ofWestern Europe, bottlenose dolphins andharbor porpoises— the only two cetaceansthat regularly use near-shore Europeanwaters— seem to be steadily declining.Seal populations in the Baltic Sea carryvery high chemical pollutant loads intheir tissues that appear to decrease theirreproductive success.25

In addition to habitat loss, at least onein fine threatened mammals faces directoverexploitation-excessive hunting formeat, hides, tusks, and medicinal prod-ucts, and persecution as predators of andcompetitors with fish and livestock.Overexploitation tends to affect largermammals disproportionately over smallerones, and when strong market demandexists for a mammal’s meat, hide, horns,tusks, or bones, species can decline oncatastrophic scales.

One in every four mammals is indanger of extinction.

While the drastic population crashes ofgreat whales, elephants, and rhinos arewell known, the long shadow of overex-ploitation actually reaches much further.For instance, only the most remote orbest-protected forests throughout LatinAmerica have avoided significant loss oftapirs, white-lipped peccaries, jaguars,wooly and spider monkeys, and otherlarge mammals that face heavy huntingpressure from rural residents. Much ofthis hunting is for home subsistence—wild game meat is an important source ofprotein in the diets of rural residents, par-ticularly for indigenous people. One esti-mate pegs the annual mammal take in the

Amazon Basin at more than 14 millionindividuals.27

Yet the real problem occurs when hunt-ing is done to supply markets rather thanjust for home consumption. In centralAfrican forests, there is now intensive,indiscriminate hunting of wildlife for theregional trade in wild game or bushmeat.In parts of Cameroon, the DemocraticRepublic of Congo (formerly Zaire), andother countries, the sale of bushmeat totraders supplying urban areas is the mainincome-generating activity available torural residents. Rural and urban bushmeatconsumption in Gabon has been estimat-ed at 3,600 tons annually. The bushmeattrade is closely linked in many areas withlogging operations, which is the mainactivity opening up roads in previously iso-lated areas, thereby giving hunters accessto new, game-rich territory.28

Throughout South and East Asia, amajor factor fueling excessive wildlifeexploitation is the demand for animalparts in traditional medicine. Tigers-thelargest of all cats-once ranged fromTurkey to Bali and the Russian Far East,and have been the subject of organizedconservdtion projects for more than twodecades. At first these projects appearedto be having some success— until the mid-1980s brought a burgeoning demand inEast Asia for tiger parts as aphrodisiacsand medicinal products. With the bodyparts of a single tiger potentially worth asmuch as $5 million, illegal hunting sky-rocketed, particularly in the tiger’s strong-hold-India. Wild tigers now total barely3,000-5,000 individuals, many in small,isolated populations that are doomedwithout more intensive protection.29

The loss of a region’s top predators ordominant herbivores is particularly dam-aging because it can trigger a cascade ofdisruptions in the ecological relationshipsamong species that maintain an ecosys-tem’s diversity and function. Large mam-mals tend to exert inordinate influencewithin their ecological communities by

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consuming and dispersing seeds, creatingunique microhabitats, and regulatingpopulations of prey species. In Côted´Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, and Uganda,certain trees—including valuable timberspecies—have shown reduced regenera-tion after the crash of elephant popula-tions, which the trees depend on for seeddispersal. Similarly, decades of excessivewhaling reduced the number of whalesthat die natural deaths in the openoceans. This may have adversely affectedunique deep-sea communities of wormsand other invertebrates that decomposethe remains of dead whales after theyhave sunk to the ocean floor.30

Mammals in most regions have beenless susceptible than birds to invasivespecies, but there is one big exception—the unique marsupial and rodent fauna ofAustralia, long isolated from other conti-nents. The introduction of nonnative rab-bits, foxes, cats, rats, and other animalshas combined with changing land use pat-terns during the past two centuries to giveAustralia the world’s worst modernrecord of mammalian extinction. Nine-teen mammal species have gone extinctsince European settlement in the eigh-teenth century, and at least one quarter ofthe remaining native mammalian faunaremains threatened. Most declines andextinctions have occurred among small tomedium-sized ground-dwelling mammals,such as bandicoots and mice, from interi-or Australian drylands. These habitatshave been drastically altered by invasivespecies (particularly rabbits) in conjunc-tion with extensive livestock grazing, landclearance for wheat cultivation, andaltered fire patterns fillowing the declineof traditional aboriginal burning of brushand grasslands.31

Taken together, the problems bedevil-ing mammals in today’s world—habitatloss, overhunting, invasive species—arenot al1 that more intensive than thosefaced by birds. So how can we account forthe fact that one in every four mammals is

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in danger of extinction, compared withonly one in every 10 birds? The answer, itseems, may be found in how well mam-mals and birds cope with the pressuresplaced on them by humankind. Sincebirds tend to be more mobile and wide-ranging, they may be able to find foodand shelter more easily in the fragmentedand disjointed landscapes produced byhuman disturbance. Birds are also smalleron average than mammals, so theyrequire smaller ranges and fewerresources for survival—advantages whenhabitat and food supply become restrict-ed. But while few other organisms havethe resource demands of most mammals,few likewise are as mobile as birds, mak-ing it difficult to predict which group is abetter guide for assessing the leve1 ofendangerment of other organisms.

REPTILES AND AMPHIBIANS:

THE HIDDEN FAUNA

Like their furred and feathered verte-brate kin, reptiles and amphibians(known collectively to scientists as her-petofauna) do not possess huge numbersof species—about 6,300 documented forreptiles and 4,000 for amphibians. Bothgroups share with the world’s many inver-tebrates the fate of being less well knownand relatively little studied. As a result,only a fìfth of all reptile species and bare-ly one eighth of all amphibian specieshave been formally assessed by scientistsfor their conservation status. Among reptiles, the status of turtles, crocodilians,and tuataras (an ancient lineage of twolizard-like species living on scatteredislands off New Zealand) has been com-prehensively surveyed. But most snakesand lizards remain unassessed, as do thetwo main ordcrs of amphibians, frogs andsalamanders.32

The herpetofauna that have been sur-

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veyed, however, reveal a leve1 of endan-germent closely in line with hat of mam-mals. (See Tables 3-3 and 3-4.) Twentypercent of surveyed reptiles currentlyrank as endangered or vulnerable, while25 percent of surveyed amphibians are sodesignated. The country with the highestnumber of documented threatened her-petofauna is Australia, at 62 species, fol-lowed closely by the United States with 52species. These are not the most species-rich countries for these creatures—Brazil,for instance, leads in amphibians andMexico has the most reptiles—but aresimply the countries where herpetofaunahave been most thoroughly surveyed andmonitored. 33

Among reptiles, species are decliningfor reasons similar to those affecting birdsand mammals. Habitat loss is again theleading factor, contributing to the declineof 68 percent of all threatened reptilespecies. In island regions, habitat degra-dation has combinecl with exotic speciesto fuel the decline of many unique rep-tiles. In Ecuador’s famed Galápagos arch-ipelago, the largest native herbivores arereptiles—long-isolated giant tortoises andland and marine iguanas found nowhereelse in the world. Introduced goats arewinning out over the native reptiles, how-ever, and these interlopers have alreadyeliminated unique populations of tortois-es on 3 of 14 islands within the Galápagoschain. At least two other tortoise popula-tions are in imminent danger.34

In addition, a surprising 31 percent ofthreatened reptiles are affected directlyby hunting and capture by humans. Thisfigure may be somewhat inflated since thereptile groups most thoroughly assessed—turtles and crocodilians—are alsoamong those most pursued by humans.Nevertheless, the high percentage is aclear indication of the heavy exploitationsuffered by these species.35

The plight of sea turtles has been stud-ied and publicized since at least the196Os, and al1 seven species are judged by

Table 3-3. Conservation Status ofReptiles Surveyed, 1996

Status Total’ Share(number) (percent)


945 74


79 6


153 12

Threatened-In 100 8Immediate Dangerof Extinction

Numbers reflect only the species surveyed forconservation status, not the total number of speciesknown in each group.SOURCE: Jonathan Baillie and Rrian Groombridge,eds.. 1996 IUCN Red list of Threatened Animals(Gland, Switzerland: World Conservation Union,1996).

IUCN as endangered, with many popula-tions continuing to dwindle. Althoughthere has been progress on protecting seaturtles at some of their best known nest-ing grounds, illegal poaching of turtlesfor meat and eggs remains a widespreadproblem. Where beaches are lit at nightwith artificial lights, as at tourist resorts,hatchling turtles become disoriented andcrawl toward the land rather than the sea.Moreover, sea turtles continue to sufferinadvertent but significant mortality fromnets set for fish and shrimp. In one surveyof a surface driftnet some two kilometersin length set for sharks off the coast ofPanama, observers counted one sea turtleaccidentally entangled for every 150meters of fishing net.36

Although less well known than theirseagoing relatives, tortoise and river turtlespecies also are exploited intensively incertain regions, to the point where manypopu la t i ons a r e g r ea t l y dep l e t ed .Tortoises and river turtles throughout

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Table 3-4. Conservation Status ofAmphibians Surveyed, 1996

Status Total¹ Share(numher) (percent)


348 70

Nearing ThreatenedStats

25 5


75 15

Threatened-InImmediate Dangerof Extinction

49 10

Numbers reflect only the species surveyed forconservation status, not the total number of speciesknown in each group.SOURCE: Jonathan Baillie and Brian Groombridge,eds., 1996 ILCN Red List of Threatened Animals(Gland, Switzerland: World Conservation Union,1996).

Southeast Asia have long been an impor-tant source of meat and eggs for local res-idents. There is now also a burgeoninginternational trade in these species toChina, where they are used in traditionalmedicine. According to a recent report byTRAFFIC, a group that monitors theinternational wildlife trade, the annualEast Asian trade in tortoises and river tur-tles involves some 300,000 kilograms oflive animals, with a value of at least $1 mil-lion. At least five turtle species involved inthis trade are now candidates for the moststringent listing available under theConvention on International Trade inEndangered Species of Wild Flora andFauna (CITES), which attempts to regu-late international wildlife trade.37

Certain species of crocodilians still suf-fer from overhunting (such as blackcaimans in the Amazon Basin) and frompollution (such as the Indian gharial andthe Chinese alligator), but this is one ofthe few taxonomic groups of animals

whose overall fate has actually improvedover the past two decades. Since 1971,seven alligator and crocodile species havebeen taken off IUCN’s Red Data list,including Africa’s Nile crocodile andAustralia’s huge estuarine crocodile. Inpart, these recoveries are due to the devel-opment of crocodile ranching operations,which harvest the animals for their meatand hides; when combined with effectivewildlife protection efforts, this can takehunting pressure off wild populations. InZimbabwe, crocodile ranches have beenso successful that domestic crocodilesnow outnumber the country’s 50,000 wildcrocs by three to one, In 1991, crocodilefarming worldwide generated more than$1.7 million in international trade.38

For amphibians, direct exploitation isless of a problem. With the exception oflarger frogs favored for their tasty legs,few amphibians face any substantial hunt-ing pressure. Habitat loss remains a seri-ous problem, however, affecting some 58percent of threatened amphibians. Muchof this is due to the drainage, conversion,and contamination of wetland habitats. Inaddition, the spread of road networks andvehicular traffic leads to increasedamphibian mortality that can decimatelocal populations.

In recent years, however, amphibianshave captured worldwide attention due tothe rapid and unexplained decline—and,in some cases, even extinction—of frogspecies in relatively pristine, intact ecosys-tems where habitat loss is not a factor.These mysterious decreases have beenparticularly well documented amongfrogs in little disturbed mountain habitatsin Central America and the westernUnited States, as well as in 14 species ofrainforest-dwelling frogs in easternAustralia:40

Researchers have advanced variousexplanations for these declines, includingdisease epidemics caused by invasivepathogens; increases in ultraviolet radia-tion, which inhibit egg development;

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Strate of the World 1998

introduced predarors, particularly gamefish like bass and trout; acid rain andother industrial pollutants, and unusualclimatic fluctuations, such as extendeddrought. Most likely it is not a single fac-tor but rather synergistic combinationsthat best explain the declines. Forinstance, the presente of industrial pollu-tants may stress and weaken frogs, andmake them more susceptible to infectiousdiseases. It may be that frogs, with theirhighly permeable skins and with lifecyclesdependent on both aquatic and terrestri-al habitats, are signaling—more clearlythan any other group of organisms-thegradual but global decline of our planet’servironmental health:41

FISH: THE DARKEST PICTURE

OF ALL

The world’s fish offer the best measure ofthe state of biological diversity in aquaticecosystems. Fish occur in nearly all per-manent water environments, from theperpetually dark ocean abyss to isolatedalpine lakes and alkaline desert springs.Fish are also unique in being far and awaythe most diverse vertebrate group-near-ly 24,000 fish specie have heen formallydescribed by scientists, about equal to allother vertebrates combined.42

As with reptiles and amphibians, lessthan 10 percent of fish species have beenformally assessed for their conservationstatus, with marine fish (some 14,000species) being particularly understudied.Yet even this partial assessment bringsdisturbing news, for the numbers suggestthat one third of all fish species arealready threatened with extinction. (SeeTable 3-5.) Moreover, the proportionof critically endangered species (7 per-cent) among fish is double that of othervertebrates.43

The causes of fish endangerment—

Table 3-5. Conservatìon Status ofFish Surveyed, 1996





Threa tenedImmediate Dangerof Extinction

1.323 61

101 5

443 21

291 13

¹Number reflect only the species surveved forconservation status not the total number of speciesknown in e ach groupSOURCE jonathan Baillie and Brian Groombridge ,eds., 1996 IUCN Red list of Threatened Animals(Gland Switzerland World Conservation Union,1996).

habitat alteration. exotic species, anddirect explotation—are no differentfrom those affecting other species, butthey appear to be more pervasive inaquatic ecosystems. Freshwater hotspotsof fish endangerment tend to be largerivers heavily disturbed by human activity(such as the Missouri, Columbia, andYangtze rivers), and unique habitats thathold endemic fish faunas, such as tropicalpeat swamps, semiarid stream systems,and isolated large lakes. Saltwaterhotspots include estuaries, heavily dis-turbed coral reefs, and other shallow,near-shore habitats.44

Although degradation of terrestrialhabitats such as forests may be more obvi-ous and get the most attention, freshwateraquatic habitats receive an even heavierblow from humanity. More than 40,000large dams and hundreds of thousands ofsmaller barriers plug up the world’srivers—altering water temperatures, sedi-ment loads, seasonal flow patterns, and

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Lsing Strands in the Web of life

other river characteristics to which nativefish are adapted. Levees disconnect riversfrom their floodplains, eliminating back-waters and wetlands that are importantfish spawning grounds. The effects ofriver engineering works also surface indistant lakes and estuaries, whose ecolo-gies decline when river inflows arealtered. Agricultural and industrial pollu-tion of waterways further reduces habitatfor fish and other aquatic life.Agricultura1 runoff in the MississippiRiver basin is now so extensive that whenthe river enters the Gulf of Mexico, theoverferLilized brew of nutrients it carriessparks huge algal blooms, which depletethe water of oxygen and create a “deadzone” of some 17,600 square kilometers-nearly the size of New Jersey.45

As a result of all these problems, atleast 60 percent of threatened freshwaterfish species are in decline because of habi-tat alteration. This includes 26 species ofdarters—small, often brightly colored fìshthat frequented the now heavily dammedrivers of the southern United States—and59 threatened species of fìsh in Indiarecently identified by a nationwide surveyby the Zoological Survey of India.Alteration of aquatic habitats has beenparticularly catastrophic for native fish insemiarid and arid regions, where humancompetition for water resources is high:46

In the heavily altered Colorado Riversystem of southwestern North America,29 of‘ 50 native fìsh species are eitherextinct or endangered. This includes thetotoaba, a marine fish that used to breedin the Colorado River delta in northwestMexico. In most years now, the river runsdry well before it reaches the ocean.Elsewhere in semiarid areas of Mexico,river and spring systems have lost an aver-age of 68 percent of their native andendemic fish species because of fallingwater cables and altered river hydrologies,both due to the water needs of a growinghuman population:47

lntroductions of nonnative, often

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predatory fish can unravel diverse nativefish assemblages in just a few years, pre-cipitating a cascade of local extinctions.Some 34 percent of threatened fresh-water fish face pressure from introducedspecies, but none llave been more devas-tated than the nalive cichlids of EastAfrica’s Lake Victoria, the world’s secondlargest freshwater lake. The cichlid com-munity was extraorclinarily diverse, withmore than 300 specialized species, 99 per-cent of which occurred only in this lake.Unfortunately the community began tocollapse during the 1980s following a pop-ulation explosion of the Nile perch, anonnative predatory fish introduced toboost the lake fisheries. It did its job alltoo well, feeding indiscriminately on themuch smaller cichlitis and destroyingnative food webs. As many as 60 percentof the Lake Victoria cichlids may now beextinct, with only a museum specimenand a scientific name to mark their tenureon the planet.48

Many fish species also face a highdegree of exploitation from commercialfisheries, particularly marine fish andspecies like salmon that migrate betweensalt and fresh water. About 68 percent ofall threatened marine species suffer fromoverexploitation. (See also Chapter 4.)The days when experts thought it impos-sible to deplete marine fish populationsare long gone, and scientists now realizethat overexplotation is a serious extinc-tion threat for many ecologically sensitivespecies. 49

Take seahorses, for example, which arecaptured for use in aquariums, as curios,and in traditional Chinese medicine. Theglobal seahorse trade is very lucrative—top-quality dried seahorses have sold forup lo $1,200 per kilogram in Hong Kong.Current worldwide seahorse harvests maytop 20 million animals annually, and inChina alone, demand is rising at almost10 percent a year. Seahorses are unlikelyto support such intensive harvesting forlong because of their low reproductive

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rates, complex social behavior (they aremonogamous, with males rearing theyoung), accessible habitat (shallow,inshore waters) , and low mobility. Already,some 36 seahorse species are threatenedby this growing, unregulated harvest.50

Sharks are a second group of marinefish headed for trouble. Being top oceanpredators, sharks tend to be sparsely dis-tributed, and grow and reproduce quiteslowly. They are valued for their skin,meat, cartilage (reputed to have anti-can-cer properties), liver oil, and especiallyfins, which are one of the highest-valuedseafood commodities due to their popu-larity in East Asian cuisine. Reportedworldwide shark catches have beenincreasing steadily since the 1940s, andtopped 730,000 tons by 1994. Unreportedand incidental shark catches likely pushthat figure much higher, and most har-vested shark species are probably alreadydeclining. 51

Other fish have supported commercialfisheries for centuries, but now appearunable to continue doing so in the face ofadditional threats from habitat alterationand pollution. Sturgeon, one of the mostancient fish lineages, occur in Europe,northern Asia, and North America, andhave long been harvested for their eggs,famous as the world’s premier caviar.Russia and Central Asia are home to 14sturgeon species—tops in the world—andproduce 90 percent of the world’s caviar,mostly from the Black and Caspian Searegions. The sturgeon fishery was relative-ly well regulated during the Soviet era,but massive water projects and wide-spread water pollution led to sturgeonpopulation crashes, so that all 14 speciesare now highly endangered. To com-pound the problem, sturgeon poachingis now rampant due to minimal enforce-ment of f i shing regula t ions in thepost-Soviet central Asian nations. Un-controlled exploitation of the few stocksthat remain may be the final nail in thecoffin for these magnificent fish.52

With the collapse of native fish faunasin many river basins and lake systems, andwith growing awareness that many marinefish are in decline, the evidente suggeststhat biological diversity is faring no betterunderwater than on land. As noted, oneout of every three fish species now looksto be on the path to extinction. If this per-centage holds up as the conservation sta-tus of more fish species is reviewed, it por-tends a grim future for other aquatic lifeon Earth.

HALTING THE DECLINES

Together, the various vertebrate groupsprovide an unmistakable view of the typesof injuries being inflicted upon theEarth’s biological systems. Habitat alter-ation is the single biggest problem formost vertebrates. While we are accus-tomed to thinking about forests beingconverted to suburbs or savannas beingploughed into cropland, the extremefreshwater fish declines indicate thatfreshwater ecosystems may be the mostpervasively a l t e r e d h a b i t a t o f a l l .Overexploitation threatens fewer speciesdirectly, but it is a major pressure onmany of the larger animals, particularlymarine vertebrates. And given the impor-tant ecological roles typical of large ani-mals, it is reasonable to assume thatexcessive hunting and fishing are now asignificant ingredient in the disruption ofmany ecosystems. The spread of invasiveexotic species is a third major problem,pa r t i cu l a r ly i n i s l and ecosys t ems .Pollution and chemical contaminationhave been responsible for some spectacu-lar vertebrate die-offs, but do not yetappear to affect as many species as theseother problems do.

If the trends evident in vertebrateshold for other organisms, then extinctionwould appear to be a near-term possibility

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for about a quarter of the world’s entirecomplement of species. And this couldwell be an underestimate, since beyondthe IUCN numbers looms the specter ofglobal climate change. (See Chapter 7.) Ifthe current scientific consensus on therate and scale of climate change provesaccurate, then over the next century nat-u r a l communi t i e s w i l l f a ce a s e t o funprecedented pressures. A warmer cli-mate will probably mean changes in sea-sonal timing, rainfall patterns, ocean cur-rents , and var ious o ther par t s of theEarth’s life-support systems. In the evolu-tionary past, the ecological effects ofabrupt climate shifts were somewhat cush-ioned by the possibility of movement.One part of a plant’s or animal’s rangemight dry out, for example, and becomeuninhabitable, but another area mightgrow more moist and become availablefor colonization. Today, with more andmore species confined only to fragment-ed remnants of their former range, thiskind of compensatory migration is lessand less Iikely.53

In the face of current and expecteddeclines, the world’s governmen ts haveclear moral and practical reasons to act.One course of action should involve pur-suit of the processes begun at the 1992Earth Summit in Rio, which resulted inthe Convention on Biological Diversity(CBD), now signed by 169 countries. Thisand other environmental treaties provideimportant forums for coordinating inter-national responses to biodiversity issues.And to some degree, they can function asa sort of international mechanism for self-policing. 54

In the struggle to preserve biodiversity,international agreements have probablymade their biggest contribution in reduc-ing the overexploitation of species, partic-ularly those that are traded globally. Buteven here the record is mixed. CITES, forins tance, was the mechanism throughwhich countries agreed in 1989 to baninternational trade in African elephant

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ivory, which for two decades had fueledheavy poaching that reduced elephantnumbers from several million to 500,000at most. Immediately following the ban,African elephant poaching appeared todrop substant ia l ly in many areas . Butinternational demand for ivory, particu-larly in East Asia, has remained strongsince then, while a number of elephantrange countries, such as the DemocraticRepublic of Congo (formerly Zaire), havee x p e r i e n c e d p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y a n ddec l i ne s i n gove rnmen t an t i poach ingefforts. As a result, poaching intensity hascrept gradually back upward, and illegalelephant kills are again being reportedregularly. 55

International agreements have proba-bly made their b iggest contr ibut ionin reducing the overexploi tat ion ofspecies.

Obviously, treaties are only as effectiveas the will and competence of signatorycountries permit. The CBD requires allparticipant countries to prepare nationalstrategies for conserving their biodiversi-ty; because of its comprehensiveness, itrepresents the most thorough test to dateof the international community’s will toface up to the biodiversity crisis. But theprimary cause of tha t cr is is—habi ta tloss—is likely to escape the CBD in largemeasure, as it has most other treaties.Habitat loss is an issue that must be solvedmainly on a national and local level.

T h e m a i n a p p r o a c h t h a t c o u n t r i e shave taken to safeguard habitat has beento establish systems of national parks,wildlife refuges, forest reserves, marinesanctuaries, and other formally protectedareas. Nations have steadily increased thenumber and extent of the i r protectedareas dur ing th is century . At present ,

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about 1 billion hectares of the Earth’s sur-face is officially designated as protected,an area nearly equal in size to Canada....

Protected lands safeguard some of theEarth’s greatest natural treasures, andhave made a big difference for some “con-servation-dependent” vertebrates thatwould otherwise almost certainly be slid-ing into extinction. These include about40 species of the famed “megafauna” ofEast and Southern Africa, such as giraffes,hyenas, wildebeest, and impala. The pop-ulations of these animals are presently outof danger, in large part because of anextensive reserve system in their homecountries. Yet despite these notable suc-cesses, current networks of protectedareas are nowhere near capable of savingmost biodiversity.57

In most of the world, conservingthreatened species is as much a cul-tural as a biological endeavor.

One reason for this failing is that pro-tected areas do not always target sites ofhigh biological diversity. Icy mountainpeaks, for instance, are obvious and easyplaces for national parks due to theirspectacular scenery and lack of develop-ment pressure, but they are usually nothotspots of species diversity. Although theworld added more protected areas-1,431 new reserves, totalling 224 millionhectares—between 1990 and 1995 thanduring any previous five-year period, mostof the increase was due to a few huge des-ignations in lightly populated desert andhigh mountain areas, such as the emptyquarter of Saudi Arabia and the QiangTang plateau in western China. Despitethese impressive numbers, many highlydiverse ecosystems-from tropical dry for-est to temperate river basins-continue toreceive little formal protection.58

To help ensure that future reserve des-ignations do the most to preserve biodi-versity, conservation organizations such asthe World Wide Fund for Nature and theWorld Conservation Union have begunmapping “ecoregions“—geographic areasdefined by the unique biodiversity theycontain—as a priority for deciding whereto locate future protected areas.Ecoregions have recently been mappedon a continent-wide scale for NorthAmerica, Latin America, and theCaribbean. Conservationists are also map-ping the distribution of ecological com-munities against existing protected areanetworks in what is called a “gap analysis,”looking for communities not representedin existing reserves.59

Another shortcoming of the reservesystem is a lack of implementation. Manyparks exist on paper but are completelyunprotected on the ground. These“paper parks” are most common in devel-oping countries. which hold the bulk ofthe world’s biodiversity yet have the leastin the way of money or expertise to devoteto managing protected areas. As a result,many oflicially designated reserves aresubject to agricultural development. min-ing extensive poaching, and other formsof degradation.

Such scant commitment to protectedareas also makes it easy to decommissionthem with a stroke of a pen—an all-too-frequent consequence of the rush towardsome short-term bonanza in naturalresource exploitation, even at the risk ofappalling and permanent loss. In India,for example, politicians reduced the sizeof the Melghat Tiger Reserve by one thirdin 1992 to accommodate timber harvest-ing and dam construction, while morethan 40 percent of the Narayan SarovarSanctuary was turned over by the GujaratState Assemblv in 1995 to mining compa-nies eager to harvest the coal, bauxite,and limestone deposits found there.Narayan Sarovar was home to a richassembly of wildlife, including wolves,

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Losing Strands in the Web of life

desert cats, and the largest known popu-lation of the Indian gazelle.60

The “paper park” syndrome has deeproots; it cannot be cutred simply byincreased funding for protected areasmanagement. It reflects the lack of awider social commitment to protect bio-diversity and wildlands. Without such acommitment—or a viable plan for gener-ating it-more funcling alone is unlikelyto improve matters significantly. The tac-tics for building that commitment willvary from one society to another, but vir-tually everywhere the effort will requiretwo basic strategies. Environmental edu-cation programs must be built into schoolcurricula (preferably beginning at anearly age) to help people understand thecomplexity and intrinsic value of naturalcommunities. And practical, culturallysensitive development initiatives are need-ed that can help local people make a liv-ing from nature without permanentlydamaging it. Well-planned ecotourismprojects can play such a role, for example,as can“biodiversity prospecting”—thesearch for species that might yield newchemicals, drug precursors, genes, orother beneficial products.61

The biggest opportunities from thisdual strategy can perhaps be seen wherebiological diversity meets social diversity.A great deal of the natural wealth thatconservationists seek t o protect is actuallyon land and under waters long managedby local people. Long-established commu-nities throughout Asia and Africa, as wellas the indigenous cultures of theAmericas, have traditionally protectedmany forests, mountains, and rivers assacred sites and ceremonial centers. Insome areas of Sierra Leone, for example,the best remaining native forest patchesare found within sacred groves main-tained by local villages. Such peoplesoften have a great fund of pragmaticknowledge too: they know how the localweather works; they know which organ-isms produce powerful chemicals; they

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know what grows where.62

Environmental education in suchplaces must work both ways: conserva-tionists can often learn a great deal aboutbiodiversity from those who have livedwithin it for generations. Cutting suchpeople out of the loop is not a good idea:some of the higgest mistakes in naturalareas conservation have involved theforcible removal of long-term residentsfrom newly designated parks. Relocatingsuch individuals or denying them accessto traditional plant and animal resourceshas generated a great deal of ill willtoward protected areas worldwide. Insome cases, local people have reacted bypurposefully neglecting plants and ani-mals that they had previously managedwisely for generations. Even in caseswhere communities have expressed a will-ingness to move out of a protected areavoluntarily—say, to obtain better school-ing for their children or improved med-ical care—governments have often notkept their promises, to provide land andhousing equal to wath the relocated resi-dents left behind.

In most of the world, therefore, con-serving threatened species is as much acultural as a biological endeavor. The var-ious approaches developed—integratedconservation and development projects,for example, or “biosphere reserves” thatuse zoning schemes to integrate settle-ments and wildlands-are al1 complexundertakings. Their success will require along-term commitment from conserva-tionists and local residents, as well asnational and international institutions.63

Yet even under the most optimistic sce-narios, a large chunk of biodiversity willprobably never receive official protectionwithin reserves. lnstead, its fate rests withhow well we can create sustainableapproaches to forestry, agriculture, live-stock husbandry, river management, andother land uses. Developing suchapproaches will require a deeper under-standing of how species, communities,

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and ecosystems interact. and how humancommunities traditionally and currentlyinfluente biodiversity-rich regions. It willalso entail fundamental government poli-cy reform in many areas—for instance, ineliminating subsidies for cattle ranchingthat clears forests (as Brazil did in the late1980s and strengthening land andmarine tenure laws to recognize theclaims of traditional communities withstrong ties to land and resources.64

While increased funding for projects togenerate sustainable natural resource useis certainly needed, this is more likely tomake a difference when coupled withreductions in existing subsidies to activi-ties that damage biodiversity. During itsfirst three years of implementation, forexample, the CBD provided $335 millionin new funding for conservation throughthe Global Environment Facility. Yet dur-ing that same time period, global subsi-dies to such exploitative activities as over-fishing, road building, and excessive fossilfuel burning totalled an appalling $1.8trillion-5,373 times as much.6S

In today’s increasingly crowded andinterconnected world, the most impor-tant steps we can all take to conserve bio-

diversity may be the least direct ones. Thefate of birds, mammals, frogs, fish, and allthe rest of biodiversity depends not somuch on what happens in parks but whathappens where we live, work, and obtainthe wherewithal for our daily lives. Togive biodiversity and wildlands breathingspace, we must find ways to reduce thesize of our own imprint on the planet.That means stabilizing and ultimatelyreducing the human population. It meansfar greater efficiency in our materials andenergy use. It means intelligently plannedcommunities. And it means educationalstandards that build an awareness ofour responsibility in managing 3.2 billionyears—worth of biological wealth.Ultimately, it means replacing ourconsumer culture with a less materialistand far more environmentally literate wayof life.66

Humans, after all, are not dinosaurs.We can change. Even in the midst of thismass extinction, we still largely controlour destiny, but only if we act now. Thefate of untold numbers of speciesdepends on it. And so does the fate of out-children, in ways we can barely begin toconceive.

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Lugar de Ia publicación:Nueva YorkTítulo:State of the WorldEditorial:State of the WorldAutor/editor:French, HillaryCapítulo/artículo:Capítulo 9 Learning from the Ozone experienceAño (fecha) de publicación:1997Páginas -- De: Al:20-41

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9

Learning from theOzone Experience

Hilary F. French

On 16 September 1987, negotiators meet-ing in Montreal finalized a landmark ininternational enviromental diplomacy:the Montreal Protocol on Substances ThatDeplete the Ozone Layer. The treaty man-dated far-reaching restrictions in the useof certain chemicals thai damage theozone layer-the thin, vital veil in thestratosphere 10-50 kilometers above theearth’s surface that protects the earth andits inhabitants from harmful ultroviolet(UV) radiation. Scientists projected thatwithout cooperative international action,the ozone layer would be seriously de-pleted for decades to come. The result-ing intense radiation could have graveconsequences for human and ecologicalhealth-including millions of additionalskin cancer cases wordwide, sharply di-minished agricultural yields, and exten-sive damage to aquatic life.¹

The successful conclusion of the ne-gotiations in Montreal was widely hailedat the time as a historic event, as theprotocol was the most ambitious attemptever to combat environmental degrada-tion on a global scale. Governmentsfrom poor counties as well as rich, from

the East as well as the West, were in-volved in the talks. The protocol theyagreed on promised to have far-reach-ing effects for- the multibillion-dollarglobal industry that produced the of-fentling chemicals, as well as for- themany businesses and individuals whoproduced or used products dependenton them. It was signed on the spot by24 nations and the European Commu-nity, and has since been ratified by morethan 150 countries.²

In the 10 years since that meeting inMontreal, the accord has set in motionmyriad actions by national governments,international organizations, scientists,private enterprises, and individual con-sumers. The results are clear: by 1905,global production of the most significantozone-depleting substance (ODS)-thechlorine-containing chlorofluorocarbons(CFCs) -was down 76 percent from itspeak in 1988. (See Figure 9-1.) Theworld passed an important milestone atthe beginning of 1996, when industrialcountries had to stop producing and im-porting CFCs for domestic use, with theexception of a few “essential uses.”³

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But there is a substantial lag betweenthe time when emissions begin to de-cline and the point at which the ozonelayer begins to recover, as it takes yearsfor CFCs and other ozone-depletingcompounds to reach the stratosphere,and some last for centuries once there.Current estimates suggest that if all coun-tries comply with the Montreal Proto-col, the ozone shield will gradually beginto heal around the end of this decade,with a ful1 recovery expected by about2045. The world is thus currently, suffer-ing through the period in which theozone layer will likely he most severelydamaged. Some of the largest “ozoneholes” on record have been experiencedabove the Antarctic over the last fewyears as a result, and ozone losses overmid- to high latitudes in both the north-ern and southern hemispheres have in-creased rapidly-as have levels of UVradiation over populated and agricultur-ally abundant corners of the earth suchas Canada, Chile, the United Kingdom,and Russia.4

Yet it is clear that the Montreal Proto-col ushered in a new era of environmen-tal diplomacy. Five years af ter thenegotiations ended, more than 100

heads of state or government convenedin Rio de Janeiro for the U.N. Confer-ence on Environment and Development,where they signed treaties on climatechange and the loss of biological diver-sity as well as an ambitious action planfor sustainable development. (See Chap-ter 1.) Diplomats also finalized a treatyon desertification in 1994 and have ini-tiated discussions on other pressing en-vironmental problems, including thecontrol of persistent organic pollutants.5

The tenth anniversary of the MontrealProtocol provides an opportunity to re-flect on the lessons of the ozone experi-ence for these various other efforts atinternational environmental coopera-tion. On the one hand, the steep de-cline in CFC production since 1988offers the first clear example that coun-tries can work together to head offshared threats. Yet today’s record levelsof exposure to UV radiation are also asobering reminder that although actioneventually was taken, it came too late toavoid serious consequences for humanand ecological health.6

Although in some ways the ozonestory is an inspiration, in other respectsit is a cautionary tale. There is much tobe learned from both the successes andthe stumbling blocks.

THE SCIENCE AND POLICY

CONNECTION

Since its beginning, the ozone experi-ence ha s been cha rac t e r i z ed by apathbreaking partnership between sci-entists and international policymakers.In Montreal, Mostafa Tolba, then Execu-tive Director of the United Nations En-vironment Programme (UNEP) and akey force in the negotiations, told theassembled delegates that “with this

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Learing from the Ozone Experience

agreement the worlds of science andpublic affairs have taken a step closertogether...a union which must guide theaffairs of the world into the next cen-tury.” As Tolba predicted, the collabo-ration that was pioneered with the ozoneissue has proved to be a warm-up forother challenges such as climate changeand biodiversity loss, where this partner-ship is equally critica1 but increasinglycontroversial. 7

When CFCs were invented in the latetwenties, they were viewed as wonderchemicals -nontoxic , nonf lammable ,noncorrosive, and stable. These proper-ties helped make them popular for useas propellants in aerosol cans, as foam-blowing agents, as solvents, and as cool-a n t s f o r refr igerators a n d airconditioners. World production doubledroughly every five years through 1970 asa result. Another growth spurt came inthe early eighties, as new applicationswere discovered, including use as a sol-vent to clean circuir boards and com-puter chips in California’s boomingSilicon Valley.8

The seeds of the Montreal Protocolwere sown in 1974, when chemists MarioMolina and Sherwootl Rowland at theUniversity of California at Irvine pub-lished a landmark article in Nature thathypothesisized that the stability of CFCs,while an asset for industrial applications,might prove deadly for the ozone layer,as it meant that CFCs from ground-basedsources might be reaching the strato-sphere intact. There, solar radiationcould be breaking them apart to freereactive chlorine atoms, thus catalyzingchain reactions that would destroy ozoneon a massive scale. Subsequent yearsproved Molina and Rowland right. In1995, they received the Nobel Prize inChemistry (along with Paul Crutzen ofGermany’s Max Planck Institute) fortheir work. (In 1970, Crutzen had laidthe groundwork for Molina and Rowlandby demonstrating that gases from human

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activities-namely nitrogen oxides-playa role in destroying ozone.)9

Public and media reaction in the sev-enties sparked the fírst wave of policyresponses to the threat of ozone deple-tion. By the end of the decade, publicpressure led to bans on the use of CFCsfor aerosol sprays in Canada, Norway,Sweden, and the United States. Mean-while, at a UNEP-sponsored meeting inMarch 1977, 33 national governmentsand the European Community set inmotion a world Plan of Action on theOzone Layer, which called for interna-tional cooperation on research into thecauses and effects of ozone depletion.The gathering also led to the creation ofa Coordinating Committee on the OzoneLayer to evaluate the science, which in-cluded experts from both the industrialand the developing worlds who repre-sented government agencies, the scientificcommunity, industry, and nongovernmen-tal organizations (NGOs). This markedthe launch of a unique partnership amongthese groups that has been a hallmark ofthe ozone esperience ever since.10

It is clear that the Montreal Protocolushered in a new era of environmen-tal diplomacy.

Yet the scientific process was initiallyslow to yield clear answers. Indeed, mod-els in the early eighties suggested thatCFCs would cause less severe ozonedepletion than Molina and Rowland Hadinitially hypothesized. Not surprisingly,perhaps, international negotiations to-ward an ozone: treaty during this periodproduced little in the way of concreteresults. Delegates settled in March 1985for the Vienna Convention for the Pro-tection of the Ozone Layer-a frameworkdocument that contained no commit-ments to control CFCs but that formal-

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ized the scientific cooperation and data-reporting provisions already called forunder the 1977 World Plan of Action.11

Fortunately, the scientific collaborationinitiated years earlier began to bear fruit.Robert Watson, then a U.S. National Aero-nautics and Space Administration (NASA)scientist, recalls that in the late seventiesnumerous different agencies were prepar-ing scientific assessments of ozone deple-tion. “what most people pointed out werethe differences between the assessments,”Watson told the New Scientist. “The differ-ences were more exploited than thesimilarities....There was a drastic needfor an international consensus so therecould be no excuse about what the sci-ence did or did not say.” He travelledthe world tirelessly to bring scientiststogether to produce that consensus, andhelped ensure that it was then translatedinto language policymakers could un-derstand. (In a move that hodes wellfor the ongoing global warming talks,Watson was elected in September 1996to chair the Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (IPCC) .) 12

Protocol signatories were breakingnew ground by deciding to moveahead with international controls onCFCs in the absence of conclusiveproof of environmental damage.

Two months after the Vienna agee-ment was reached, a scientific bombshellprovided a much-needed jolt to proto-col negotiations just then getting underway. In May 1985, members of the Brit-ish Antarctica Survey published findingsthat indicated a 40-percent loss of strato-spheric ozone over Antarctica betweenSeptember and October 1984. Subse-quent satellite data confirmed the pres-ence of this ozone “hole”-and found it

to cover an area as large as the conti-nental United States.13

The fíndings took the world by sur-prise: no such precipitous decline hadbeen predicted by any atmospheric mod-els. Incleed, release of the data was de-layed because the ozone losses were solarge and so unexpected that the scien-tists involved at first suspected instru-ment error. When the measurementsmere finally confirmed, computers trans-lated the data into compelling color im-ages of the hale that appeared on theevening news and transformed the ozoneissue from an abstraction into a tangiblethreat. 14

In early 1986, Robert Watson’s effortsat consensus building paid off whenUNEP and the World MeteorologicalOrganization (WMO) released the firstcomprehensive international scientificassessment on ozone depletion, whichconcluded that dangerous levels ofozone depletion were likely if CFC pro-duction trends continued their steepclimb. This new information, combinedwith the wave of publicity about theozone hole, helped create the politicalwi l l needed to reach agreement inMontreal.15

Yet when diplomats convened therein September 1987, many gaps remainedin scientific understanding of the prob-lem. Uncertainty remained about therole of CFCs in creating the ozone holeover Antarctica. In addition, there wereno comprehensive estimates of measuredglobal ozone loss or detectable increasesin the UV radiation reaching the earth.The Montreal Protocol signatories werethus breaking new ground by decidingto move ahead with international con-trols in the absence of conclusive proofof environmental damage. Their actionsrepresented the first significant applica-tion of the “precautionary principle”-anemerging tenet of international environ-mental law that stipulates that lack of com-plete scientific certainty is insufficient

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Learning from the Ozone Experience

reason to delay an international policyresponse if such delay might result in se-rious or irreversible damage.16

Under the terms of the protocol, in-dustrial countries agreed to cut produc-tion and use of CFCs in half by 1998,and by 1992 to freeze production anduse of halons, a bromine-containingchemical then widely used in fire-fight-ing. (A bromine atom is about 50 timesas efficient as a chlorine atom in destroy-ing ozone, although there is far less of itin the stratosphere.) Countries with aper capita annual CFC consumption be-low 0.3 kilograms (mainly developingnations) were granted a 10-year exten-sion on the deadlines. In addition, theprotocol restricted trade in CFCs andproducts containing them with countriesthat were not members of the accord.These provisions were intended to en-courage as many countries as possibleto join the treaty, and to discourage thecreation of “CFC havens” where produc-tion would occur for export to treatymembers.17

In March 1988, a panel of scientistsorganized by NASA announced thattheir extensive review of al1 known glo-bal air- and land-based measurementsrevealed ozone losses two to three timesmore severe over heavily populatednorthern latitudes than had been pre-dicted by the models on which the pro-t o c o 1 w a s b a s e d . T h e r e p o r t a l s oconfirmed localized losses as high as 95percent over Antarctica, and providedpersuasive evidence that CFCs were theculprit in causing the seasonal Antarc-tic “ozone hole.” The new informationmeant that the ozone layer would notrecover even if the Montreal Protocolwere fully implemented.18

The protocol stipulated that the par-ties to it should convene in 1990 to re-view whether the accord was adequate,based on reports of panels of expertsthat assessed relevant scientific, environ-mental, technical, and economic infor-

98

m a t i o n . T h e p a n e l s r e p o r t e d t h a ttougher measures were both scientificallyurgent and technologically achievable.Fortunately, governments listened. Theprotocol was strengthened in London inJune 1990 to require a full phaseout inindustrial countries of both CFCs andhalons hy 2000. In addition, severa1 pre-viously unregulated ozone-depleting sub-stances were restricted for the first time,including methyl chloroform and carbontetrachloride. For developing countries,the 10-year grace period now applied tothese new requirements.19

NASA findings released in April 1991once again showed depletion proceed-ing twice as fast as expected over partsof the northern hemisphere-and sug-gested that 200,000 additional deathsfrom skin cancer in the United Statesalone could occur during the next 50years as a result. Still more alarming newsappeared in February 1992, when NASAreported chorine levels over New En-gland and eastern Canada that werehigher than any previously seen overAntarctica.20

Once again, new data spurred a cal1to revise the treaty. As in London, re-ports of expert panels strengthened thecase that further action was needed. InNovember 1992 in Copenhagen, thephaseout dates for industrial countrieswere advanced to 1994 for halons andto 1996 fòr CFCs, methyl chloroform,and carbon tetrachloride. In addition,negotiators took up the question ofhydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) ,which were hcing touted by the chemi-cal industry as a substitute for CFCs butwhich also deplete the ozone layer,though only 2-10 percent as much asCFCs over the long term. Under theCopenhagen agreement, al1 but 0.5 per-cent of HCFCs in industrial countrieswere to be eliminated by 2020, with acomplete phaseout scheduled for 2030.21

In Copenhagen, limits were placed onmethyl bromide for the first time. This

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chemical is widely used as a pesticidewhose fumes rid soil, agricultura1 com-modities, and storage areas of a rangeof soilborne and airborne pests such asinsects, worms, weeds, pathogens, androdents. However, it also releases bro-mine to the stratosphere; recent esti-mates suggest that as much as one thirdof the Antarctic ozone loss and 5-10percent of the global total may be causedby bromine. Methyl bromide only lastsfor some two years in the atmosphere, soit initially eluded restriction by theMontreal Protocol, which focused on long-term ozone loss. Under the Copenhagenagreement, industrial countries agreed tofreeze methyl bromicle emissions at 1991levels beginning in 1995.22

The latest round of revisions to thetreaty took place in November 1995 inVienna. Again, this followed new scien-tific and technical reports linked withthe protocol that made the case that fur-ther action was not only needed, butachievable. For instance, the 1994 reportof the protocol’s scientific assesstmentpanel asserted that, among possible fur-ther actions, d eliminating emissions ofmethyl bromide would make the largestsingle contribution to ozone-layer pro-tection. Meanwhile, the methyl bromidetechnical options committee was report-ing that substitutes exist for 90 percentof the uses.23

The Vienna meeting responded tothis information by strengthening con-trols on methyl bromide somewhat, al-though less than many NGO observershad hoped. Methyl bromide use is nowto be phased out by 2010 in industrialcountries and frozen in developing coun-tries at 1995-98 levels by 2002. The meet-ing also slightly strengthened HCFCrequirements for industrial countries.Ford developing countries, it imposed afreeze in HCFC consumption after 2015and a complete phaseout by 2040.24

Thus in the 10 years since Montreal,rapidly advancing science and technol-

ogy have contributed to a steady expan-sion in the requirements of the proto-col. So far, each revision that requiredratification has eventually been approvedby a large number of countries. As ofOctober 1996, 159 countries had rati-fied the original protocol and 111 haddone so for the London amendments,though only 61 had ratified the changesmade at Copenhagen.25

Meanwhile, those involved with nego-tiating other international environmen-tal accords are trying to replicate theways in which evolving scientific andtechnological information has beenbrought so successfully to the ozone ne-gotiating table. Intergovernmental pan-els of scientists have been assembled tostudy climate change and the loss of bio-logical diversiry, and the treaties on boththese issues set up groups to channelscientific and technological advice to thenegotiators. The experience with ozonehas taught the international communitythat it is important to design advisory bod-ies so that the chosen experts are inde-pendent of their governments, unbiased,and knowledgeable about the issues un-der consideration. And the process needsto be structured in a way that allows theiradvice to feed smoothly and constructivelyinto the policymaking process.26

I N D U S T R Y’S R E S P O N S E

The business community has joined sci-entists as a constant presente in ozonedebates over the years. Though by nomeans monolithic, as a general rule theposition of industry evolved from initialdenial of the problem to acceptance andin many cases enthusiasm for develop-ing substitute chemicals and processesfor ozone-depleting substances.

The story of industry’s involvementin ongoing ozone deliberations is an

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unusually complex one. Old businesssagas- s u c h as competitiveness battlesbetween European, Japanese, and U.S.companies, and delicate relationshipsbetween government regulators and theindustries they oversee-are suddenlybeing played out on an entirely newstage: that of international environmen-tal negotiations. Though it first arosewith ozone, this same dynamic is now atwork in a number of other internationalnegotiations, including those aimed atstrengthening treaties on climate changeand biological diversity, as well as effortsto restrict traffic in hazardous wastes andbanned chemicals and to controlpersistent organic pollutants.

During the first wave of public con-cern about ozone depletion in the sev-enties, chemical companies consistentlymaintained that the science was notstrong enough to justify regulatory ac-tion. They did, however, launch researchprograms that patented possible substi-tutes. But concern faded in the earlyeighties in the face of ambiguous scien-tific findings and the deregulatory zealof the Reagan administration in theUnited States. DuPont and other com-panies later admitted that they aban-doned or suspended the i r researchprograms into substitutes at that time.In earty 1986, the Alliance for Respon-sible CFC Policy, which representedsome 500 CFC producer and user com-panies in the United States, was still ar-guing that the science was too uncertainto justify action, and that developing sub-stitutes would be costly. Nonetheless, thegroup acknowledged later that year thatit would be possible to develop substi-tutes within five years if companies werepersuaded that restrictions on CFCswould create a market for them.27

Meanwhile, growing public pressureand a lawsuit by the New York-basedNatural Resources Defense Council call-ing on the Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) to take tougher action

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meant that the United States was likelyto move ahead with unilateral controlsif the international process boggeddown. U.S. business interests feared this:if there were to be controls on CFCs,they wanted to make sure they appliedequally to their competitors elsewhere-something that had not happened whenaerosols were conlvolled in the seven-ties. They may also llave been concernedabout possible future lawsuits from skincancer victims and damage to their pub-lic image. in late 1986, the Alliance forResponsiblc CFC Policy did an abruptabout-face. Concluding that the hand-writing was on the wall, the group be-gan to advocate limiting future CFCuse.28

European industry was slower to comearound, partly because of less public at-tention to the issue in Europe, whichmade companies there less inclined toview regulation as inevitable. In addition,some apparently believed that researchinto substitutes was more advanced inthe United States, which they fearedwould put European firms in a vulner-able position in the battle for dominancein CFC substitute markets.29

Eventually, however, the Europeancalculus shifted. One impetus may havebeen some pending U.S. legislation thatwould have required unilateral action ifmultilateral talks failed, with the provisothat trade restrictions would be imposedon the imports of countries that werenot cooperating. In addition, Europeancompanies realized it would be easierfor them to implement the productiontargets being proposed for the Montrealmeeting, as governments there had notyet eliminated CFC use in aerosols-asector with cheap and readily availablealternatives. Thus these countries still hada relatively inexpensive step available tohelp meet the 50-percent reduction tar-get, while the United States did not.30

The acquiesence of U.S. and Euro-pean industry to the protocol was key,

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as CFC production was then heavily con-centrated in these regions. Indeed, bythe late eighties, more than 80 percentof world CFC production capacity wasconcentrated in six U.S. and Europeanchemical companies: DuPont. Atochem,Allied-Signal. Imperial Chetnical Indus-tries, Hoechst, and Montefluos. But theindustrial interests of other countrieswere also at stake. Tht Japanese, in par-ticular, became involved in the negotia-tions because CFC-113 - widely used asa solvent in the electronics industry-was on the table.31

After the protocol was finalized, therace began in carnest to develop substi-tute chemicals and processes. In theUnited States alone, the annual salesvalue of CFCs at that time was 750 mil-lion. goods and services depedent onthe chemicals were worth $28 billion,and end.use equipment and productscontainig them were worth $135 bil-lion. The Montreal target sent a power-ful signal to the market that this wouldhave to change, launching a remarkableperiod of technological transformation.32

One key watershed in this processcame in March 1988, when DuPont re-sponded to the release of the protocol’sozone trends panel report with a holddecision: to get out of its $600-millionCFC business altogether by shortly after2000. This private-sector announce-ment-which went wel l beyond thestipulations of the protocol-helped re-define the political landscape, puttingpressure on government negotiators tostrengthen the accord. For those whohad pressed DuPont to take decisive ac-tion more than a decade earlier, how-ever, the moment was bittersweet.33

Though DuPont’s belated announce-ment was in the public interest, it alsobenefited the company. Besides the de-sire to protect its image. Dupont hopedthat it could profit from developing andmarketing substitute chemicals. Its CFCbusiness was becoming steadily less lu-

crative in any case. DuPont thus acceler-ated its research programs aimed at de-veloping and patenting alternatives. Thecompany announced in 1992 that it hadinvested $450 million in developing CFCsubstitutes since 1986, and that it ex-pected to put $1 billion into this by theend of 1995.34

Two types of compounds received thebulk of chemical companies’ efforts-HCFCs and hydrofluorocabons (HFCs).HCFCs were particularly attractive, asthey were already being produced on asubstantial scale. Unfortunately, bothhave significant environmental liabilities.As noted earlier HCFCs are themselvesozone-depleting substances, though sig-nificantly less so than CFCs. But HCFCsare far shorter--lived, which means thatthose emitted today will do most of theirdamage within the next 10-20 years-pre-cisely the period when the ozone layer isprojected to be at its most depleted.35

And like CFCs themselves, HCFCs andHFCs are both potent greenhouse gases.For instance, over the 100 years after itis injected into the atmosphere, a ton ofCFC-11 will have 4,000 times the globalwarming effect as the same amount ofcarbon dioxide (CO.,); a ton of HCFC-22 will have 1,700 times the global warm-ing effect, and a comparable amount ofHFC-134a will have 1,300 times the ef-fect. Beyond their contribution to glo-bal warming, HCFCs and HFCs share yetanother potentially worrisome side ef-fect: recent studies hypothesize that theyboth will break down in the atmosphereinto acids, including trifluoroacetic acid,which falls to earth in precipitation andcan accumulate in some areas in con-centrations high enough to be toxic toplants.. 36

Parties to the protocol stipulated atthe June 1990 London meeting thatHCFCs were to be regarded as transi-tional substitutes only-to be used tobuy time while more satisfactory long-term solutions were developed. Yet their

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use was allowed until well into the nextcentury, in part because the chemicalindustry argued that they would not in-vest in manufacturing thcse substitutechemicals if they were unlikely to re-coup their investment costs. Given theurgent need to move away from the farmore potent CFCs, governments yieldedto this argument.37

HFCs were left off the evolving nego-tiating agenda altogether because theyare ozone-benign, despite the fact thatthey are potent greenhouse gases. In thesegmented world of international envi-ronmental diplomacy, this was an issuefor the climate change talks, which didnot even get under way until 1989. TheFramework Convention on ClimateChange was completed in time for theJune 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, but itcontained no binding commitments, al-though negotiations are under way tostrengthen it. (Sce Chapter 1.)

Although the quantities of HFCs be-ing produced are minuscule comparedwith the amount of CO2, emitted annu-ally, use of these chemicals has grownrapidly as CFCs are phased out, fromless than 200 tons in 1990 to more than50,000 tons in 1994. According to pro-jections by the IPCC, annual HFC emis-sions could reach 148,000 tons by 2000and 1.5 million tons by 2050-roughlyequivalent in global warming impact toche current fossil fuel-based carbonemissions of France, Germany, Italy, andthe United Kingdom combined. Thismeans that widespread reliance on thesesubstitute chemicals will be solving oneenvironmental problem while contrib-uting to another-something that hashappened over and over again as theworld has tackled diverse environmentalchallenges.38

Given the substantial limitations ofthese chemical substitutes, it is fortunatethat they are not the only option. Theindustries that use CFCs discovered thatby redesigning manufactur ing pro-

102

cesses-and sometimes simply by usingnatural substances such as water-theneed to use CFC-like chemicals could bereduced dramatically, and in some caseseliminated altogether. (See Table 9-l.)39

Industries that use CFCs discoveredthat by redesigning manufacturingprocesses, the need to use CFC-likechemicals could be reduced dramati-cally.

The electronics industry was at thecutting edge of this trend. AT&T, forinstance, cooperated with a small Floridafirm to devolop a citrus fruit-derivedsubstitute for CFC-113 in cleaning elec-tronic circuit boards, and Hughes Air-craft discovered it could use lemon juicefor this same purpose. Breaking withtheir history, of competition, eight U.S.-based multinational companies cametogether at the instigation of the EPA in1989 to form the International Coop-erative for Ozone Layer Protection,whose mission is to promote the world-wide exchange of information about al-ternatives to ozone-depleting solvents.40

Particularly in this sector, the substi-tution process often proved to be of eco-nomic as well as environmental benefitto the companies involved, resulting inlower costs, simplified manufacturingprocesses, and improved reliability. TheCanadian Mint, for instance, decided inautumn 1995 switch its coin cleaningfrom a CFC-based process to an ultra-sonic water-based system. The new solu-tion cost only some $700-1,000 annually,while the CFCs had cost sume $150,000.The initial investment took just one yearto pay for itself. 41

Other industries also made the switchwith relative case. Foam packaging is acase in point. Even before the protocol

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Table 9-1. Substitutes for Ozone-Depleting Substances

InterimCompounds Applications Substitutes¹ Examples of “Not-In-Kind” Substitutes²

CFCs refrigerants

foaminsulation

aerosolpropellants

CFCs/MethylChloroform

electronicscleaners/degreasingsolvents

HCFCs, HFCs Hydrocarbon refrigeran ts (propane andbutane) were introduced in“Greenfreeze” domestic refrigerators byForon of Germany. The Calor companynow makes hydrocarbon refrigerants forcommercial refrigeration and airconditioning; these are used in U.K.offices and stores.

HCFCs, HFCs The largest foam manufacturer in Canada.Demilec, recenty unveiled .“Sealection500,” a flexible urethane foam buildinginsulation that is blown with water andis cheaper than its competitors. SomeEuropean companies use rigid foamblown with cyclopentane, a hydrocar-ben, to insulate refrigerators.

HCFCs, HFCs Airspray International in the Netherlandsmakcs air-powered spray devices.Systems sold by Blagden Spray inScandinavia use compressed nitrogen orair. In the United States, hydrocarbonpropellants prevail; these low-costalternatives save U.S. consumers anestimated $165 millian each year.

HCFCs, HFC, Design changes in the production pro-PFCs cesses for electronic goods reduced

hazardous lead waste nd the need toclean circuit boards at Texas Instru-ments; this saved the company over$300,000 in annual cleaning costs. wateris used for some electronics cleaning.Citric acid solvents are effectivedegreasers.

was completed, McDonald’s found itselffacing citizen pressure to stop usingpackaging made with CFCs. In August1987, it informed suppliers that they had18 months to eliminate CFCs from theirproducts. This forced the entire U.S.food-packaging industry to shift out ofCFCs in advance of any requirements todo so under the Montreal Protocol.Within 16 months of the announcement,the whole U.S. industry was CFCfree.With the cooperation of the EPA and a

number of environmental groups, theU.S. foam packaging industry took thenext step, moving beyond the interimHCFCs to completely ozone-safe substi-tutes. Yet another step came in Novem-ber 1990, when McDonald’s decided toeliminate foam packaging altogether infavor of paper in order to minimize solidwaste.42

For refrigeration and air condition-ing, HCFCs and HFCs were initially usedwidely as substitutes for CFCs. But

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Table 9-l. (Continuad)

InterimCompounds Applications Substitutes 1 Examples of “Not-In-kind” Substitutes2

Halons fire extin- HCFs, PCFs The Norwegian Fire Research Laboratoryguishers after five years of research, concluded

that water is as effective as halons in allinstances except small electrical fires.“lnergen,” a mixture of argon, nitrogen,and carbon dioxide, is widely used inEurope.

Methyl multiuse chlorinated Integrated pest management (IPM), aBromide pesticide pesticides, range of chemical and nonchemical

(fumigation such as tactics, has completely replaced methylof soil, “Telone” bromide in some countries. An IPMcommodi- and “DD” strategy based on composting replacedlies, storage mixtures methyl bromide for flower production inareas) Colombia and saves growers there about

$1,900 per hectare. Carbon dioxide isused tO treat stored grain in Indonesia,the Philippines, and Vietnam. InMissouri, Quaker Oats operates aproduction plant that uses heat to killpests in the building.

nonfluorocarbon substitutes are quicklygaining ground. For instance, ammoniaand simple hydrocarbons such as pro-pane and butane have been commercial-ized for use as refrigerants. Interestingly,the use of these nonfluorocarbon tech-nologies represents a return to coolantsused before the development of CFCs.Engineering changes tO the applianceshave made it possible to use smallerquantities of coolant, thus reducing therisks of flammability and toxicity thatprompted the shift to CFCs in the first.place. 13

With the phascout of methyl bromideshaping up as the next key step in re-pairing the ozone layer, the search foralternatives to it is beginning to get un-

104

der way in earnest. There is no onechemical that can be substituted for allof this pesticide’s many uses, so differ-ent strattegies will have to be devised foreach use. Just as replacing CFCs withHCFCs and other greenhouse gases maysolve one problem while contributing toanother, relying solely on other toxicchemicals to replace methyl bromidecou ld u l t ima t e ly endange r humanhealth. Some countries, including theNetherlands and Denmark, have movedaway from methyl bromide throughheavier reliance on nonchemical pestcontrol methods such as heat treatmentand crop rotation.44

Meanwhile, the unexpected success ofnonfluorocarbon alternatives, to CFCs

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has upset the business plans of DuPontand the other major chemical compa-nies. In 1989, DuPont had estimated thatglobal CFC consumption would be re-placed in 2000 by a combination ofHCFCs in 30 percent of the cases, byHFCs in 9 percent, by conservation in29 percent, and by “not-in-kind” (thatis, nonfluorocarbon) replacements in 32percent of uses. By 1992, the projectionshad changed to 11 percent HCFCs, 15percent HFCs, 26 percent conservation,and 45 percent not-in-kind.44

The chemical industry is thus realiz-ing much lower returns on its invest-ments in subs t i tu tes than in i t ia l lyanticipated. This explains its vociferouslobbying against proposals to speed thephaseout of HCFCs. In addition, nodoubt worried that HFCs could comeunder control through the climate treaty,severa1 chemical companies have begunto participate in those negotiations asmembers of the International ClimateChange Partnership, a coalition of com-panies and trade associations monitoringthe climate talks.46

Though it may not have helped thechemical industry, for society at large theimpressive spurt of technological inno-vation prompted by the Montreal Proto-col is a notable achievement. By 1994,the economic options committee of theprotocol’s technology and economic as-sessment panel was able lo declare tri-umphant ly that the replacement ofozone-depleting substances had been“more rapid, less expensive, and moreinnovative” than originally anticipated.As a result, the CFC phaseout in indus-trial countries passed by on 1 January1996, without great hardship. It will beworth remembering this as the battlesheat up over climate change. The argu-ments being put forth by some vestedindustrial interests today sound eerilysimilar to the dire warnings of economicdisruption often voiced in the early daysof the ozone debates.47

THE NORTH-SOUTH

PARTNERSHIP

In addition to involving scientists andindustry in neW and unique ways, theMontreal Protocol has set new prece-dents in North-South relations. It was thefirst international environmental accordtO face head-on the difficult equity ques-tions that form an important politicalbackdrop to efforts to set the world ona sustainable, course.

When the Montreal Protocol was firstnegotiated, developing countries usedonly a small amount of CFCs. Yet theirusage of them was projected to grow rap-idly in the years ahead as these coun-tries strove to raise living standards byproviding refrigerators, air conditioning,and other amenities to their citizens. Ifthese countries did not participate in theaccord, growth in developing-world CFCconsumption would likely soon swampany reductions in industrial countries.China and India were of particular con-cern. Though neither was at the time asignificant CFC consumer, together theyaccounted for nearly 40 percent of theworld’s population-and both had plansto increase dramatically the productionof consumer goods that could containCFCs. Developing countries were under-standably reluctant, however, to acceptapparent constraints on development fora problem not of their own making. Theyare now expressing similar views in theongoing climate change negotiations.48

Besides granting developing nationsa 10-year grate period, the original pro-toco1 also stipulated that industrial coun-t r i e s s h o u l d p r o v i d e f u n d i n g a n dtechnology to help others make the tran-sition. Yet in the days after the accordwas finalized, it became increasinglyclear that these provisions alone mightbe insuffcient to convince many devel-oping countries to join in the accord.Thus, by the 1990 London meeting, the

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Learning from the Ozone Experience ( 1 6 3 )

question of how to ensure the wide-spread participation of developing coun-tries in the treaty was at the top of thenegotiating agenda.49

After some tough bargaining, a pre-cedent-setting deal was struck in Lon-clon. Industrial countries agreed toreimburse developing countries for “allagreed incrementa1 costs” of complyingwith the protocol-in other words, alladditional costs above and beyond anythey would expect to incur as they de-veloped their infrastructure and con-sumer markets in the absence of theaccord. Studies conducted by EPA indi-cated that these costs were relativelylow-and paled in compar ison wi ththose that a damaged ozone layer wouldimpose. The initial agreement stipulatedthe creation of a $240 million InterimMultilateral Fund. Key developing coun-tries- including China and India-ex-pressed satisfaction with the outcome,and announced their intention to joinin the accord as a result.50

The fund was pathbreaking in a num-ber of respects. For one thing, it wascreated as a joint venture between threeU.N. agencies and the world Bank-or-ganizations not accustomed to cooper-ating. Assisted by a secretariat based inMontreal, the executive committee ofthe fund was given the task of oversee-ing the work of the fund’s four imple-menting agencies-UNEP, the UnitedNations Development Programme, theUnited Nations Industrial DevelopmentOrganization, and the World Bank. Themethod of voting stipulated for the ex-ecutive committee was also an importantinnovation. It is a middle ground be-tween the “one-nation, one-vote” systemof the United Nations and the “one-dol-lar, one-vote” procedure of the WorldBank. The goal is to reach a consensus.But if this proves impossible, a two-thirdsmajority vote is required that includes asimple majority of both donor and re-cipient countries. So far, the executive

106

committee has never found it necessaryto resort to voting, although the possi-bility that a given matter could be putto a vote undoubtedly influences thebargaining process.51

When the Global Environment Facil-ity (GEF) was established in 1991 to fì-nance other investments in developingcountries that benefit the global envi-ronment, it was modeled in many re-spects on the ozone fund. Experiencewith the fund has thus been an impor-tant warm-up for the GEF. Though theMultilateral Fund is clearly playing anessential role in helping developingcountries move away from reliance onODSs, it has nonetheless been at thecenter of ít number of controversies thathold lessons for the future.32

The fund has so far allocated morethan $540 million for nearly 1,300projects in 99 developing countries. Thebulk of the money goes tO private enter-prises to help them cover the costs ofconverting their processes or productlines to ozone-benign technologies. Suc-cessful completion of the projects is ex-p e c t e d t o e v e n t u a l l y p r e v e n t t h econsumption of more than 75.000 tonsa year oF ODSs weighted by ozone deple-tion potential (ODP)-a one-third re-duction from developing countriescurrent annual use uf some 230,000ODP-weighted tons. Yet the implement-ing agencies have been slow to spendthe money that the Executive Commit-tee has approved. Fortunately, this isbeginning to change as the fund ironsout some of the initial wrinkles in itsoperations. By the middle of 1996, some89 projects had been completed that,combined with partially completedprojects, will prevent the annual con-sumption of more than 12,000 ODP-weighted tons. These numbers areexpected to rise rapidly in the yearsahead.53

One of the most difficult issues for thefund is how to fulfill its mandate to un-

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derwrite the “agreed incremental costs”of converting to ODS substitutes. Thisproviso reassured developing countriesthat they woud not have to pay to helpsolve a problem they did little to create,and it let donor countries view cheir con-tributions as a direct subsidization oftheir own interest in protecting the glo-bal commons. The “incrementa1 costs”concept was soon replicated in theGlobal Environment Facility.54

Though at first glance the conceptmakes sense, implementing projects ac-cording to the criterion has been a chal-l enge . A p r imary p rob lem i s t ha tinvestments that will ultimately save acountry money (for example, throughusing a less expensive, non-CFC-basedprocess to clean electronic circuitry) areineligible for funding because they areseen as a benefit rather than a cost. Yetthese are exactly the kinds of projects thefund would ideally want to encourage.Though these projects could in theory befinanced with low-interest loans, the WorldBank-the main source for this type oflending-has resisted calls to providefunding for this purpose.55

Developing countries are well placedto be at the cutting edge of techno-logical transformation.

Another diffículty is the inherent ten-sion that arises in funding a phaseout atthe same time that the 10-year graceperiod allows consumption to increase.In some cases, donors have been hesi-tant to provide funds to countries whoare also expanding production of ODSsfor domestic use and in some cases evenfor export. And some developing coun-tries have hesitated to move too quicklyin phasing out ODSs out of concern thatit might jeopardize their funding appli-

cations. In future environmental conven-tions, it may make sense for funding eli-gibility to be contingent on good-faithefforts to implement national policiesconsistent with the treaty’s goals.56

The need to use funds as effectivelyas possible is particularly important,given that all promised contributionshave not been forthcoming. In 1992,governments agreed to make the In-terim Multilateral Fund permanent andin 1993 they replenished it with another$510 million for 1994-96-more thandouble the previous level. The highersum reflected the costs to developingcountries of meeting additional obliga-tions under the strengthened treaty aswell as the growing number of coun-tries that had joined in the accord. Butas of October 1996, donor countrieswere $154 million behind on theirpromised contributions. Just about halfof these funds were owed by countrieswith economies in transition-that is,those in Eastern Europe and the formerSoviet Union. Ironically, these countriesare themselves on the receiving end ofassistance for ozone depletion projectsfrom the GEF. Nevertheless, this pay-ment record compares favorably withpast experience with other environmen-tal trust funds: all told, donor countrieshave so far contributed 78 percent ofthe promised funds.57

The shortfalls in promised paymentshave become a political lightning rod inthe ongoing ozone negotiations. At theVienna meeting in 1995, some countrieshad proposed accelerating the timetablesfor developing countries further, but thiswas opposed by others, partially as a re-sult of donor-country unwillingness topledge more money. Both donor andrecipient countries agree that furthercommitments by developing countriesshould be matched by promises of newfunds. But they disagree on which shouldcome first. In response to developing-

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country agreement to controls on newchemicals at the Vienna meeting, donorcountries agreed to replenish the fundin 1997, though they have yet to decideby exactly how much.58

In some cases, governments in devel-oping countries are being pulled awayfrom ODSs by another aspect of theNorth-South partnership-internationaltrade and investment. The provisions ofthe protocol that restricted trade inODSs and in products containing themwith countries not party to the treatyhave been extremely successful in en-couraging widespread participation. Yetthey have. become controversial in recentyears, as international trade experts havequestioned whether they are compatiblewith rules under the General Agreementon Tariffs and Trade, now the WorldTrade Organization.59

As a general matter, export-orienteddeveloping countries tend to be aheadof the phaseout curb, as selling goods inindustrial countries requires keepingpace with developments there. Chinalearned this lesson the hard way: it sawits refrigerator exports decline by 58percent beiween 1988 and 1991 as de-mand for CFC-containing refrigeratorsin industrial countries plummeted. As aconsequence, the government movedaggressively to develop ozone-friendlyrefrigerators, and has said it will phaseCFCs out faster than required under theprotocol. Similarly, U.S. CFC labellingrequirements have prompted Mexico,Thailand, and Turkey to move forwardquickly in replacing CFCs.60

In addition, many multinational cor-porations adopt the same practices intheir overseas operations that they useat heme. In the Philippines, for instance,many foreign-owned electronics manu-facturers have already eliminated mostuses of ODSs as solvents. Similarly, ODSconsumption in Kenya fell by two thirdsbetween 1989 and 1993 due at least in

Learning- from the Ozone Experience

part to changes instituted by investingcompanies based in industrial countries.By May 1993, more than 60 manufactur-ers from Canada, Germany, Japan, Swe-den, and the United States had endedthe use of CFC-113 worldwide.61 .

Yet developing countries are also wor-ried that oid CFC-based technologies willbe dumped on them as industria1 coun-tries complete the phaseout. Already,there are reports of large numbers ofsecondhand CFC refrigerators being soldin parts of Africa as non-ODS modelstake off in Europe.62

Despite this threat, developing coun-tries are in fact well placed to be at thecutting edge of technological transfor-mation. Rather than being a net cost, inmany cases the transition to ozone-be-nign processes offers substantial eco-nomic opportunities. And because thegrate period meant that developingcountries did not have to rush to replaceCFCs, these nations have the advantageof not yet being heavily invested in tran-sitional chemical replacements. lt makesmore sense to leapfrog directly to thetechnologies of tomorrow than to investfirst in transitional technologies, andthen (for much larger populations, andat higher future costs) in the replace-ments that will ultimately be required.63

Fortunately, the ozone experience hasspurred an unprecedented leve1 of tech-nology cooperation internationally thatwill help developing countries make thistransition. For instance, the OzonActionprogram sponsored by UNEP’s Industryand Environment Office plays an essen-tial role as a clearinghouse for informa-tion about substitute processes andtechnologies. The private sector is alsoactive; working through the Interna-tional Cooperative for Ozone Layer Pro-tection, a number of companies haveshared important technological innova-tions free of charge to enterprises in thedeveloping world.64

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THE RECORD DATE

Ten years after the historic Montrealsigning ceremony, the response to theprotocol around the world has been sub-stantial indeed. (See Table 9-2.)

In the industrial world, many coun-tries have done more than is requiredby the protocol. As a result, when theofficial CFC phaseout date arrived inJanuary 1996, most industrial countries

were ready. Severa1 had planned to phaseout ozone-depleting substances beforethey were required to under the proto-col. The European Union (EU), for one,completed its move away from CFCs atthe end of 1994. The EU has also an-nounced it will phase out HCFCs by2015-15 years before the protocol re-quires it to. And the United States isobligated by its Clean Air Act to end theuse of methyl bromicle by 2001-nineyears ahead of current protocol require-

Table 9-2. Use of Chlorofluorocarbons and Halons in Selected Countries,1986 and 1994’

Use

Country or Region 1986 1994 Change

ChinaEuropean Comm./UnionRussia4

South KoreaMexicoBrazilThailandIndia .ArgentinaCanadaMalaysiaPhilippinesAustraliaVenezuelaIndonesiaSouth AfricaPolandUkraineUnited States

(tons weighted by substance’sozone-depleting potential2)

46,600 90,900343,000 39,700129,000 32,600135,000 19,700

1 1,500 13,1008,930 10.800

11.3004.6602,3905,500

23,2003,840

3,8903,1302.880

18,700 2.42010,600 1 ,680

1,850 1,530364 ,000 -91

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ments. A number of other counties, in-cluding Denmark, the Netherlands, andGermany, have adopted national ruleson methyl bromide that are significantlymore stringent than required. Over theyears, these kinds of unilateral initiativeshave put pressure on the internationalprocess, helping to build the politicalwill to toughen the accord in London,Copenhagen, and Vienna.65

The protocol granted countries flex-ibility in designing programs to meet theMontreal targets, and many differentapproaches have been tried. Consider-able effort has gone into designing flex-ible systems rather than complicatedregulations of the command-and-controlvariety. Such programs have reduced thecost of the CFC phaseout substantially.For instance, several governments-in-cluding Belgium, Germany, Mexico, theNetherlands, and Thailand-have suc-cessfully forged voluntary pacts with bothproducers and end-users of ODSs. Anda number of countries have used excisetaxes on CFCs to help discourage theiruse. This technique has been adoptedin Australia, Denmark, and the UnitedStates. In addition, severa1 countries, in-cluding New Zealand, Singapore, andthe United States, have relied on trad-able permit systems to implement theirMontreal obligations.66

Despite these successes, worrisomestumbling blocks in the protocol’s imple-mentation have also emerged. These cal1into question the assumption of ful1 com-pliance that lies behind current projec-tions for the ozone layer’s recovery. Itmay also foreshadow difficulties to befaced in translating future ambitious in-ternational agreements into action onthe ground.

For one thing, the economic and po-litical chaos in the former Soviet Unionand in some parts of Eastern Europe hasslowed progress in eliminating CFCs.The 9 countries that existed in this partof the world when the protocol was first

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signed have since divided into 27-only21 of which were signatories as of Octo-ber 1996. In May 1995, Russian PrimeMinister Viktor Chernomyrdin informedthe Montreal parties that Russia wouldbe unable to meet the January 1996phaseout target for CFCs. On behalf ofBelarus, Bulgaria, Poland, and Ukraineas well as Russia, he requested a four-year extension on the deadline for elimi-nating CFCs, carbon tetrachloride, andmethyl chloroform, and a three-year re-prieve for halons, as well as internationalassistance in meeting the new goals.67

The committee on implementation setup under the protocol considered therequest later in the year. It recom-mended against granting a formal ex-tension, as it feared this would create apoor precedent by suggesting that treatycommitments need not be honored. Butthe committee also advised the partiesto the treaty to respond to the situationwith cooperation rather than with sanc-tions so long as the countries involvedwere making a good-faith effort to rem-edy the situation. The GEF has sincemade a $60-million grant to Russia formoving away from ODSs, and the WorldBank is spearheading the formation of amultidonor aid program.68

The problems in Russia and elsewherein the region are also contributing toyet another- Achilles’ heel of the accord:t h e g r o w t h o f a b l a c k m a r k e t i nsmuggled CFCs that threatens to signifi-cantly undermine the phaseout in indus-trial countries. Russia is believed to be amajor source of this trade. Other coun-tries on the suspect list include Chinaand India. Estimates of the amount ofillegal trade are bound to be uncertain.Nonetheless, hints are available as to itssize, including the going legal price forCFCs, which will tend to stagnate if themarket is being swamped with illegalimports. The chemical industry-whichdoes not want the market for its substi-tutes to be undercut by this trade-esti-

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mated in late 1995 that as much as afifth of the CFCs in use worldwide wereillegally traded.69

The problem first became evident inthe United States, where the high priceof legal CFCs owing to the excise taxmade bootlegged CFCs particularly at-tractive. In addition, the enormous num-ber of car air conditioners in the UnitedStates creates a large demand for CFCsfor servicing, as using substitute chemi-cals requires a costly retrofit. Though itis impossible to know the exact dimen-sions of this illicit commerce, authori-ties estimated in April 1995 that illegalCFC traffic through Miami was secondonly to the drug trade in dollar value.Spurred on by the chemical industry, theU.S. government launched a majorcrackdown on CFC trafficking in Octo-ber 1994. The effort has so far led to 18convictions, the impoundment of morethan 450 tons of illegal CFCs, and thereceipt 0f at least $500,000 worth ofseized CFCs and cash from criminals try-ing to huy them from undercover gov-ernment agents. Recent inclications arethat smuggling is down as a result.70

Black market problems also exist else-where. For instance, in Taiwan therehave been 16 official seizures of CFCssince production and import became il-legal on 1 January 1996. Illegal trafficin ozone-depleting substances is also ofgrowing concern in Europe. which hasbeen slower than the United States tocrack down. The chemical industrythere is calling for tougher enforcementmeasures.71

hleanwhile, it remains to be seen towhat extent rising emissions in develop-ing countries will undermine the accom-plishments to date in the industrialworld. The protocol requires developingcountries to freeze CFC consumption in1999, and to phase it out altogether by2010. On the encouraging side, 58 de-veloping countries have stated a com-mitment to phase out CFCs earlier than

required. Five countries-Cameroon,Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand,and Vietnam-have said they will stopusing CFCs by 1998 except for servicingrefrigerators and other essential uses,and 21 more claim they will do so by200172.

Consumption of ODSs is reportedly al-ready falling in a number of developingcountries-including Argentina, Brazil,Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, and Venezuela.On the other hand, it continues to riserapidly in some countries with large popu-lations-and relatively large CFC con-sumption-including India, China, andthe Philippines. Altogether, developingcountries consumption of CFCs andhalons increascd by about one third from1986 to 1994, albeit from a small base.73

MOVING FORWARD

At a time when global environmentaltrends appear so daunting, and progresstoward reversing them seems so slow (seeChapter l), it is reassuring to remem-ber that in responding to the threat ofozone depletion, the international com-munity has largely proved itself up tothe task. Though the job is by no meanscomplete, without the Montreal Proto-col the world would be facing a cata-strophic situation indeed. (See Figure9-2.) 72

Future historians may well view thesigning of the Montreal Protocol in 1987as a defining moment-a point at whichit became clear that the very definitionof international security was undergoingfundamental change. In foreign minis-tries around the world, the focus hasshifted in the decade since Montrealaway from such cold war concerns asnuclear arms control treaties and towardthe burgeoning domain of environmen-tal diplomacy. U.S. Secretary of State

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Figure 9-2. Stratospheric Chlorine andBromine Levels Under Three Scenarios,

1950-2100

Warren Christopher made this new ap-poach official in April 1996 when heannounced a far-reaching initiative tointegrate enviromental concerns intoU.S. foreign policy.‘”

In a coincidence of timing, 1997 isnot only the tenth anniversary of theMontreal Protocol; it is also the year inwhich diplomats hope to complete ne-gotiations on a Kyoto Protocol to theclimate change convention that it ishoped will accomplish for global warm-ing what the Montreal Protocol did forozone depletion. In addition, diplomatsnearly weekly attend negotiations on is-sues as diverse as plant genetic re-sources, the threat to coral reefs, waterscarcity, land degradation, and overfish-ing. As all these crucial efforts continue,it is important to bear in mind some ofthe overarching lessons of the ozoneexperience.“’

For one, the Montreal Protocol pio-neered a new relationship between sci-entists and policymakers. The decisionto take precautionary action in Montrealin 1987 in the absence of complete proofof the link between CFCs and ozonedepletion was an act of foresight thatmust be replicated with other issues. It

is worth recalling that several countrieswent so far as to ban the use of CFCs inaerosols in the mid-seventies, when sci-entific understanding of ozone depletionwas still in its infancy. Few countries haveyet taken actions of comparable signifi-cance to address climate change, despitethe fact that the international consen-sus on this threat is considerably moreadvanced now than it was in the seven-ties on ozone. One lesson from theozone experience is that tlie longer wedelay action, the greater the potentialcosts and consequeces we can expectdown the road.”

The gaping hole in the ozone layerover Antarctica also serves as an impor-tant reminder that we may’ be in forsome large surprises in the years aheadas the human imprint on the earth growsso large that we are tampering with glo-bal ecological systems vital to life itself.Atmospheric scientists believe, for ex-ample, that rising concentrations ofgreenhouse gases could a1 some pointcause a sudden shift in ocean currentsand atmospheric flows, disrupting agri-culture and threatening many naturalecosystems (see Chapter 5). We are con-ducting a massive and somewhat reck-less experiment the consequelices ofwhich are dificult to predict. NotesNobel-laureate Sherwood Rowland:“One of the strongest warnings from theozone depletion experience is that theunexpected can work in both direc-tions- some : changes will ameliorate thesituation, others will make things worse,sometimes much worse."7 8

Beyond the pathbreaking partner-ships forged between scientists andpolicymakers, the experience with reac-tion to the depleting ozone layer alsobrought industry into the internationalenvi ronmenta l orbi t on an unprec-edented scale. Once the affected busi-nesses overcame their initial resistance,they realized that in many cases the pro-cess of phasing out use of ozone-deplet-

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ing substances offered economic oppor -tunities rather than large costs. This ex-perience demonstrates that bindingtreaty commitments can spur diverseforms of technological innovation thatare impossible to foresee and that makeearly cost projections a stab in the dark.Yet it is important to bear in mind thattechnologies seen as solutions to prob-lems may also bring with them impor-tant habilities of their own, as the turnto HCFs and HFCs has demonstrated.79

Binding treaty commitmcnts can spurdiverse forms of technological inno-vation that make early cost projec-tions a stab in the dark.

Meanwhile, once at the negotiatingtable, industry has decide to stay. Itsstrong presence is now felt in many, dif-ferent international environmental fo-rums, inc luding those on c l ima techange, biological diversity loss, and thecontrol of persistent organic pollutants.

In the climate change negotiations, anumber of U.S.-based industries-suchas coal and oil-that are concerned theywould suffer under an accord have par-ticipated in a group called the GlobalClimate Coalition that is engaging inunabashedly obstructionist tactics. Oth-ers, such as those represented by theInternational Climate Change Partner-ship, are more measured in their re-sponse. This group is dominated bychemical companies and manufacturersthat first joined forces on the ozone is-sue. Partially because of their experiencewith ozone depletion, these companiesseem to have accepted that stronger in-ternational action on climate is inevitable,and are hoping to influence its terms.80

Fortunately, there are still other busi-ness groups that have staked out posi-tions enthusiastically in favor of a strong

accord. For instance, business councilsfor sustainable energy have been formedin the last few years in Australia, Eu-rope, and the United States; they repre-sen t app l i ance manufac tu re r s andrenewable energy, energ services, co-generation, and natural gas companiesthat have calculated that a strong cli-mate treaty would help their bottomlines. The insurance industry has alsobecome a convert to the cause, as it isworried that extreme weather distur-bances lin ked with climate change willtranslate into steeply rising claims. Atthe most recent international negotia-tions on climate, both the U.S.-basedBusiness Council for Sustainable Energyand a group made up of nearly 60 ma-jor insurante companies from aroundthe world issued statements supportiveof a strong accord.81

On, the biodiversity issue, some U.S.industries were initially wary of the Con-vention on Biological Diversity, as theyfeared its provisions on intellectual prop-erty rights might jeopardize their pat-ents. Yet once the trealy was in place,industry soon became a strong supporterof U.S. ratification. Pharmaceutical com-panies, biotechnology firms, seed com-pinies, and o ther affected industrieswant the United States to have a seat atany table where decisions are made thatwill affed their interests.82

Beyond involving industry, respond-ig to the many global environmental

hallenges the. world faces will also re-quire an unprecedented degree of co-operation between the industrial anddeveloping worlds. If developing coun-tries follow the same resource-intensivepath that industrial countries did, theconsequences for the global environ-ment will be catastrophic. The ozonetreaty and its successive amendmentsrepresent the most advanced attempt todate to give concrete form to the ab-stract notion of global partnership ad-vanced at the Rio Earth Summit.

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Learning from the Ozone Experince

Experience with this partnership of-fers both reason for hope as well as somecause for concern. On the hopeful sideis the ability of the global marketplaceto diffuse technological gains worldwide,thus facilitating a widespread sharing ofthe results of innovation. On the worri-some side, however, bureaucratic bottle-necks have slowed down the globalresponse to the ozone challenge. In ad-dition, the difficulties that donor coun-t r i e s have expe r i enced i n r a i s i ngpromised funds suggests that more reli-able financing sources need to be iden-tified in the future.

Another important lesson from theozone experience is how important it isto design treaties so that they can beeasily updated to take account of newscientific and technical fìndings. We havealso learned that international institu-tions make a difference; in this case,

UNEP played an important initiationand leadership role. And the last 10 yearshave taught us that public concern canindeed translate into action by both in-

.dustry and government.83

Finally, the results since the MontrealProtocol was signed in September 1987have taught us that individuals matter.Though the accomplishments of theMontreal Protocol could not have oc-curred without the participation of mil-lions of people all over the world, ahandful of tireless individuals confrontedthe ozone challenge with the fervor ofcrusaders—scientists, diplomats, NGOactivists, business people, legislators, andgovernment officials among them. As weapproach the twenty-first century, a newgeneration of such people faces the taskof responding to other daunting envi-ronmental challenges that cry out forsimilar attention—and similar results.84

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Período en el que se utilizará:Septiembre- Diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo sostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaría Lopez Franco y Dr. Martín BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicación:ColombiaTítulo:Business and Economics ReviewEditorial:

Autor/editor:Barnes, Philip E.Capítulo/artículo:Green StandardsAño (fecha) de publicación:Octubre- Diciembre 1996Páginas-- De: Al:24-28 vol. 43

JACQUELINE

JACQUELINE

JACQUELINE

JACQUELINE

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"Green" StandardsPhillip E. Barnes

These new international environmental management standardsare fast becoming a condition for doing global business.

Environmental management con-tinues to be a global concern forindustry, government, and soci-

ety as a whole. The human populationis becoming more aware of its physicalenvironment and how its actions affectthe very ecological systems theydepend on for their future.

Due to more environmental aware-ness, organizations around the worldhave banned together to develop pro-grams for reducing environmentalimpacts. The most concentratedinternational effort undertaken byindustry, governments, and other inter-ested organizations is the IS0 14000Environmental Management StandardSeries. Although this series of environ-mental standards is voluntary andprocess-based, not performance-based, and has its doubters, it isexpected to be a powerful force,directly and indirectly, in leading orga-

nizations throughout the world to con-tinual environmental improvement.

BackgroundThe International Standards Organi-

zation (ISO) was established in 1946 todevelop manufacturing, trade, andcommunication standards. Based inGeneva, Switzerland, this internationalorganization is made up of nationalstandard bodies from 111 countries,

ISO has historically addressedmanufacturing or product standards.But in 1979, due to the interest in qual-ity control systems, IS0 began work-ing in the area of management systemstandards.

ISO 900 Series A goal was established by IS0 in

1979 to “make it possible for pur-chasers in the international market-

place to ensure that products theybought were manufactured in accor-dance with known, verifiable, andaccepted methods of controllingthe manufacture and distribution ofproducts.“¹

To meet this goal, IS0 TechnicalCommittee 176 (IS0 TC 176) wasestablished to develop the IS0 9000series. This series is made up of threemanagement system specificationstandards and two guidance docu-ments that developed a frameworka company can use to implement aquality system that will meet that com-pany’s quality criteria.

Although IS0 9000 is a voluntaryseries of quality management systemstandards, it has almost become acondition for doing business through-out the world Some countries, in fact,have made. it mandatory, i.e., have

Phillip E. Barnes is a Research AssistantProfessor in the Earth Sciences andResources institute (ESRI) at the Univer-sity of South Carolina. He is also a mem-ber of the U.S. Technical Advisory Group(TAG) of IS0 Technical Committee 207. Hecan be reached at (803) 777-2126.

B&E Review/Oct-Dec. 1996

“Due to more environmental awareness, organizationsaround the world have banned together to developprograms for reducing environmental impacts. Themost concentrated international effort . . . is the IS014000 Environmental Management Standard Series.”

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made it a product requirement. Com-panies that are IS0 9000-certified arenot only the large multinationals;small- and medium-sized enterprises(SME) have also found registrationbeneficial. The number of ISO 9000-certified companies continues to in-crease as global trade becomes morecompetitive.

DevelopmentThe success of IS0 9000 brought

about the idea of a set of internationalenvironmental management stan-dards. The emergence of the IS014000 series occurred with the devel-opment of the GATT negotiations onreducing nontrade barriers to tradeand with the United Nations’ 14 princi-ples for the environment.

In 1991, ISO formed the StrategicAdvisory Group on the Environment(SAGE). The formation of this strategicenvironmental group was broughtabout through a joint venture withthe International Electrotechnical Com-mission (IEC). The objective of SAGEwas to determine if an internationalenvironmental standard could achievethe following goals:

! Promote a common ap-proach to environmentalmanagement.

! Enhance an organization’sability to attain and measure.

! Improve environmental per-formance.

! Facilitate trade and removetrade barriers.

During its investigations, SAGEdetermined that although quality andenvironmental management issueswere common in various areas, envi-ronmental issues were unique enoughto warrant their own set of manage-ment standards. So in 1992, SAGE rec-ommended that IS0 Technical Com-mittee 207 (IS0 TC 207) be establishedto develop standards for environmentalmanagement systems. TC 207 is acommittee with participating and ob-serving members from industry, smalland large organizations, and govern-ments representing 70 countries.

Members from the various subcom-mittees and working committees havebrought to the planning table environ-

mental standards from their countries.One such standard, the British BS-7750, is the foundation of IS0 14000. “These standards are in

These standards are in varying varying degrees ofdegrees of development. IS0 14001,the environmental management sys- development.”tem standard: IS0 14004, the guid-ance standard for IS0 14001; and IS014010,14011, and 14012, the auditingstandards; are currently in draft form States have had EMS programs inand are expected to be published in place for several years. The establish-late 1996. ment of an EMS is usually integrated

The ISO 14000 series contains standards in the areas ofISO 14001 - Environmental Management Systems - Specification-

Certification StandardISO 14004 - Environmental Management System - Guidance StandardISO 14010,14011, and 14012 - Environmental AuditingISO 14020 through 14024 - Environmental LabelingISO 14031 - Environmental Performance EvaluationISO 14040 through 14043 - Life Cycle AssessmentISO 14060 - Environmental Aspects in Product Standards Guide

,

New documents that resulted fromthe June 1995 meeting of the subcom-mittee 2 working group 3 were

ISO 14013 - Management ofEnvironmental Audit Programs

ISO 14014 - Initial Reviews

ISO 14015 - Environmental SieAssessments

ISO 14001The Center of Energy and Environ-

mental Management (CEEM), in itsbooklet What is IS0 14000? describesan EMS as

that aspect of an organiza-tion’s overall managementstructure that addresses theimmediate and long-term im-pact of its products, services,and processes on the environ-ment. It provides order andconsistency in organizationalmethodologies through theallocation of resources, as-signment of responsibilities,and ongoing evaluation ofpractices, procedures, andprocesses.²

Many companies in the United

with the quality management systemor—another existing management sys-tem. An EMS provides a structure thatallows management the ability to bet-ter control the company’s environmen-tal impacts. By building the EMSaround regulatory issues, the companyis better positioned to stay in compli-ance. Companies that have put anEMS in place have done so with com-pliance as the engine that drives EMSimplementation.

But an effective EMS can go beyondcompliance, without a great deal ofexpense. Housekeeping changes andemployee training can be two low-costareas companies can use to improveenvironmental quality beyond compli-ance. How far an EMS goes beyondcompliance is determined by the com-pany’s environmental policy and man-agement’s commitment to it. As withany program, without managementsupport, an EMS will fail. More andmore managers are realizing that envi-ronmental management is strategydriven, not compliance driven.

The ISO 14001 environmental man-agement system standard providesthe basis for the implementation of an

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EMS. This is the only standard in theISO 14000 series for which companiescan be certified. Other standards in theseries are used as guidance docu-ments to assist in the development ofan effective environmental manage-ment system.

ISO 14001 is not performance relat-ed, but process related. By conformingto the ISO 14001 standard, a companyleams how to better manage its sys-tems and processes. It is anticipatedthat once ISO 14001 requirements aremet, continuing environmental im-provement will become a part of thecompany’s culture, and the negativeimpact on the environment willbe continually reduced.

ISO 14001 is a standard withcore elements that must beaddressed and incorporated intothe company’s EMS. Or, if acompany does not have a docu-mented EMS, ISO 14001 can bethe model the organization usesto develop one. Following are thecore requirements for ISO 14000certification.

1. Environmental Policy.The organization’s environmentalpolicy is required to include acommitment to continual im-provement, compliance with rel-evant environmental legislationand regulations, and the provi-sion of a framework for objec-tives and targets, communicatedto all employees and the public.

2 Environmental Aspects.The

significant environmental aspectsis the most diicult part of theEMS process.

3. Legal and Other Require-ments. Organizations must have aprocedure in place to identify theirlegal obligations. These include onesthe organization volunteers to complywith as a member of or subscriber toother environmental programs. Thisinformation must be kept up-to-dateand available to relevant employees.

4. Objectives and Targets.Organizations are required to establishand maintain environmental objectivesand targets. The objectives and targets

organization is required to have proce-dures in place to identify all environ-mental aspects it can control in orderto determine which have or can havesignificant impacts. The informationcollected is required to be kept up-to-date and considered in the environ-mental objectives. The environmentalaspects of an organization are thosethat are a result of that group’s activi-ties, products, and services. Watereffluent, air emissions, and energy useare examples of an organization’saspects.

According to companies experi-enced with BS 7750 and theEuropean Management and AuditScheme (EMAS), identifying the

must be documented and quantifiable.When establishing the objectives andtargets, the organization is required toconsider the legal requirements: signif-icant environmental aspects; technolo-gy; financial, operational, and businessrequirements; and the views of inter-ested parties.

5. Environmental ManagementProgram (EMP). Organizations arerequired to establish a program forachieving their objectives and targets.It must specify a time frame withinwhich they will be met and the personsresponsible. Implementation of newproducts or services will require revi-sion to the EMP.

6. Structure and Responsibility.Resources must be identified by man-agement to implement and control the

B&E Review /Oct.-Dec. 1996

environmental management system.Roles and responsibilityes must bedefined and documented and reportson the organization’s environmentalperformance must be provided to topmanagement.

7. Training, Awareness, andCompetence. Procedures must beestablished to properly train employ-ees concerning the importance of anenvironmental management system.There are several areas required in thedevelopment of employee awarenessthrough training and education in thiselement.

8. Communications. Communi-cation procedures must be estab-lished and maintained betweenvarious internal levels of the orga-nization and external interestedparties.

9. Environmental Manage-ment System Documentation.The organization is required todescribe the core elements of theenvironmental management sys-tem and how they interact. Theyare also required to provide direc-tion to related documentation. Thisinformation can be established inpaper or electronic form.

10. Document Control.Document control procedures arerequired to be established andmaintained. The control proce-dures must specify location, docu-ment reviews, current versions,

and obsolete document control forremoval and preservation.

11. Operational Control. Docu-mented procedures must be estab-lished to control operations and activi-ties that have been identified assignificant environmental aspects inthe organization’s policy, objectives,and targets, and any deviations as aresult of their absence. Requirementsof the organization to develop proce-dures related to significant environ-mental aspects must be communi-cated to suppliers and contractors.

12. Emergency Preparednessand Response. The organization isrequired to prepare procedures toidentify the potential for accidentsand emergency situations and howthe organization will respond. The

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organization must also document howit will prevent any situations that miti-gate environmental impacts. These pro-cedures must be reviewed, revised, andtested.

13. Monitoring and Measure-ment. The key characteristics of theorganization’s operations and activitiesthat have a significant impact musthave procedures established to moni-tor and measure them. Measuringequipment must be checked and cali-brated. The organization must alsohave a procedure by which to makesure it is in compliance with legislationand regulations.

14. Nonconformance and Cor-rective Preventive Action. Noncon-formance must be addressed and

investigated. Procedures must be 16. Environmental Managementestablished and maintained to ensure System Audit. Periodic EMS auditsaction will be taken to mitigate impacts are required to be performed in ordercaused by nonconformance. Proce- to determine if the environmental man-dures and actions taken must be agement system is conforming to theappropriate to the magnitude of the requirements of the standard, and ifproblems. Any changes to document- the EMS has been properly imple-ed procedures must be recorded. mented and maintained.

15. Records. The identification,maintenance, and disposition of envi-ronmental records must be estab-lished and maintained. These recordsare required to be legible, identifiable,and traceable to the activity, training,and product or services involved.Storage of the records must be han-dled in such a manner that they areprotected against damage and deteri-oration or loss.

17. Management Review. Topmanagement of the organization isrequired to review the environmentalmanagement system. This review, adocumented procedure, will ensurethe organization’s continuing environ-mental effectiveness.

AcceptanceAfter its publication in late 1996,

ISO 14001 is expected to be declared

ResourcesOrganizations

American National Standards Institute (ANSI)11 West 42nd St.New York, NY 10036Telephone (212) 642-4900

CEEM Information ServicesInternational Environmental Systems Update10521 Braddock RoadFairfax, Virginia 22032-2236Telephone (800) 745-5565, (703) 250-5900; Fax (703) 272-1734

Books and Articles

Christopher L. Bell, Environmental Management Systems and /SO 14001: A U.S. View (Washington, DC.:Environmental Watch, Sidley & Austin, December 1995).

Robert Ferrone, How Will /SO 14001 Save Us Money? International Environmental Systems Update CEEMInformation Services, Volume 2, Number 9, September 1995.

Caroline G. Hemenway, ed., What Is ISO 14000? Questions and Answers 2d ed. (Fairfax, Va.: CEEMInformation Services, ASQC Quality Press, The Quality Source, 1995).

Chris Roerden and Pat Meller, “Beyond ISO 9000: Environmental Management,” The Total Quality Review,July-August 1994.

Tom Tibor with Ira Feldman, ISO 14000, A Guide to the New Environmental Management Standards (BurrRidge, Ill.: Irwin Professional Publishing), 1996.

World Wide Web

http://www.quality.co.uk/iso140OO.htm#history

http://www.quality.co.uk/eco/benefits.htm#costsave

http://www.mgmt14k.com/14kccpa.htm

http://www.ansi.org

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the official U.S. environmental man-agement system standard by theAmerican National Standards Institute.But even in its draft form, ISO 14001 isreceiving a great deal of attention.Many companies are evaluating it, andsome companies are conforming to it.Many more are standing back andwaiting. It’s not that they aren’t proac-tive; they just don’t see the benefit,unless the regulators. or their cus-tomers, see the benefit.

Therefore, in the United States,the driving forces behind companies’implementing ISO 14001 are regula-tors and customers. In interviews withvarious manufacturing and servicecompanies, the author of this articlenoted that most larger companies (500employees and above), while making itclear that customers’ requirementswould be the major factor in theirimplementation of ISO 14001, saidthey were also very interested in howthe EPA will give specific recognitionto companies that have implementedthe standard. It is predicted that certi-fication to ISO 14001 will decrease thenumber of EPA audits and visits,reduce penalties, and provide recogni-tion to the company for its environ-mental efforts.

Small- and medium-sized compa-nies are also interested in the regulato-ry side, and are very concerned aboutcompanies’ requiring certification oftheir suppliers. Firms will more readilydeal with suppliers that have a goodenvironmental system. Most small-and medium-sized companies do nothave a documented EMS in place.They do have procedures for handlingregulatory issues; however, in site vis-its to small- and medium-sized com-panies, it is not unusual to find missingdocumentation, lack of employeetraining, and regulatory noncompli-ance. ISO 14001 has the structureand basic formula for implementing

“...in the United States,the driving forces behindcompanies’ implementingISO 14001 are regulatorsand customers.”

an effective EMS to help small- andmedium-sized companies comply withtheir regulatory obligations and main-tain their system to ensure continuingcompliance.

Along with better customer rela-tions and recognition from regulators,there are additional benefits that couldfollow from implementing ISO 14001:lower insurance rates, better ability toengage in international trade, betterinternal control of environmental is-sues, more attraction to potential cus-tomers, improved public relations, sav-ings from better waste management,increased employee awareness ofenvironmental concerns, and a foun-dation for continual environmental im-provement. Of course, if a companyhas a proven and established EMS,implementing ISO 14001 will add to itscredibility. If a company does not havean EMS in place, ISO 14001 is anexcellent foundation to begin buildingone. The guidance EMS standard,ISO 14004, provides company per-sonnel examples, term definitions,etc., to assist in EMS development.

ISO 14001 is predicted to becomethe leading voluntary environmentalmanagement system standard insideand outside the United States. Com-panies selling products and servicesinternationally and domestically willalso be affected by publication of thisstandard.3

ImplementationISO 14001 can be self-declared,

used between contracting parties. orcertified to, using an accredii regis-trar. It is anticipated that the majority ofcompanies implementing ISO 14001will do so to obtain certification.Implementing ISO 14001 takes time-a year or two. Depending on the com-pany’s existing systems and money,estimates for certification are between$40,000 and $100,000.

To begin implementation, educateall personnel on the company’s envi-ronmental policies. Get managementcommitment. lf your company has adocumented EMS, conduct a GapAnalysis comparing your EMS to ISO14001 requirements. If you are devel-oping your EMS, conduct an environ-mental review to determine where youare and the areas your companyneeds to work on to meet ISO 14001requirements.

Identifying the environmental as-pects of your company and the signif-icant impacts will be the most diicult.After the review, strategies and imple-mentation plans can be developed. Itis important to integrate the EMS withyour company’s ongoing activities andsystems already in place. Use ISO14004 as a guidance document, con-tact organizations such as the oneslisted in the box, or hire a consultantthat specializes in environmental man-agement systems and ISO 14000

¹Tom Tibor with Ira Feldman, ISO 14000, AGuide to the New Environmental ManagementStandards (Burr Ridge, III.: Irwin ProfessionalPublishing, 1996), 7.11,48.²Caroline G. Hernenway. ed., What is ISO14000? Questions and Answers 2d ed. (Fairfax,Va.: CEEM lnformation Services. ASQC QualityPress, The Quality Source, 1995), 20.Christopher L. Bell, Environmental ManagementSystems and ISO 14001: A U.S. (Wash-ington, D.C.: Environmental Watch, Sidley &Austin, December 1995). 1-8.

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Periodo en el que se utilizará:Septiembre- Diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo SostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaria Lopez Franco y Dr. Martín BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicación:NewtonTítulo:Pollution EngineeringEditorial: *

Autor/editor:Kirkpatrick, DavidCapítulo/artículo:Environmental Management Iso 14000 offer multiple rewardsAño (fecha) de publicación:Junio 1996Páginas De: Al:62-65 vol. 28

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................................. POLLUTION ENGINEERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EnvironmentalManagement, ISO 14000Offer Multiple Rewards

with ISO 14000 around the corner;

EMS wil l save money and provide market access .

.................. by David Kirkpatrick with Chuck Pouliot ................

Imagine a company where you’re a pollutionengineer and:•Production engineers come to you at thedesign stage for the environmental attributesthat should be included in the design objectives.

• People in other departments know that you also under-stand where the business is going.

• Your environmental objectives figure into the profit-and-loss objectives and statements.• Management uses the information you gather to enhanceand revise existing products, processes and objectives.• The whole organization believes your efforts contributeto a competitive advantage.

already are -scattered throughout the UnitedNow wake up to reality. Examples of this dream company

States and a growing number of companies arccreating a similar culture by adopting an envi-ronmental management system (EMS).

USA Participation in ISO Standards Development

These companies integrate environmentalissues into their business objectives. They takea proactive approach that explores environmen-tal concerns in virtually every aspect of theiroperations. Rather than treating environmentalcompliance as shackles on performance, theysee environmental excellence as good businessand a source of new opportunities.

Meanwhile, the development of internationalenvironmental standards is likely to spur morecompanies to enter environmental management.As U.S. organizations move into the global mar-ket, many find the need to adopt internationallyaccepted standards on quality to stay competi-tive. Likewise, they soon may need an interna-tional seal of approval on environmental man-agement to compete globally.

What is an environmentalmanagement system?EMS takes a proactive approach to managingenvironmental affairs. A set of procedures andwork instructions supports the organization andis part of the organization’s business strategy.Processes outline measurement, documentationand corrective action.

Sound a lot like a quality management sys-tem? It should. EMS uses the same componentsas the IS0 9000 quality standards. The four keyelements are:• Leadership. The top management of the orga-

R e p r o d u c e d w i t h p e r m i s s i o n o f c o p y r i g h t o w n e r . F u r t h e r r e p r o d u c t i o n p r o h i b i t e d .

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Should there be an international set ofenvironmental management standards?

Aware that international environmentalmanagement standards are being developed.

• Figure 2. Research indicates a need for EMS, but little awareness of development efforts.

nization must be committed to the development and imple-mentation of an EMS.• Infrastructure. Processes foster and grow the EMS. Support Functions. The EMS must be created to maintainthe system.• Education and Communication. The organization needs tocommunicate its business strategy and EMS developmentsto people inside and outside the organization.

There is a perception that the industry is going to gainmore than the environment. Well, why shouldn’t industry beprofitable and the environment be positively impacted?There is nothing that says there has to be an imbalance inthis equation. The proposed IS0 14000 standards docu-ments are an attempt to foster such an equilibrium.

Organizations with an EMS typically become more com-petitive and gain a competitive edge.

How does IS0 14000 relate to EMS?The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) isdeveloping international harmonized environmental man-agement system standards. The process began nearly fouryears ago. Technical Committee 207 (TC 207), a 53-coun-try action committee, is responsible for drafting the envi-ronmental management standards. All 103 ISO-membercountries had the opportunity to vote on the draft interna-tional standard. The draft was approved in January 1996.The final approval will take place at the Technical Com-mittee meetings this month in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

IS0 14000 will not be a set of worldwide numericallimits or standards. Rather, these voluntary standardswill set the bar for the effectiveness of enviromental man-

Benefits of an EMS

he return on environmental management system(EMS) activities is not always measured in

months or quarters. It may take years to see thereturn at the end of the product life cycle for long-life products. And it may not be measurable in termsof direct dollars. But companies that develop anenvironmental management system usually enjoythese benefits:•Efficiency. It costs more to run a compliance-dri-ven management system than one that manages envi-ronmental affairs as a business function.• Discipline in the handling of environmental issues.• Guidance in anticipating and managingcommunications.• Opportunities to market your management systemas a benefit to customers and markets.• An educated work force that continuously gener-ates ideas for improvement of the EMS.• Better overall control of environmental affairs.• Cost savings through programs such as pollutionprevention.• Potential to mitigate fines and penalties.• Potential to keep fines and penalties from recurring.• Improved compliance status and ability to complywith new regulations.• Fewer burdens to change production, products andactivities to meet compliance.

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . POLLUTION ENGINEERING .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IS0 14000 could become a prerequisite

to international trade

agement intended for the good of theenvironment and work place.

How will your job change?EMS and IS0 14000 bring significantchange for environmental professionalsand the organizations they work for.Under these systems and standards:• Environmental issues are integratedinto business strategies. Much like anorganization that has conformed to ISO9001 and integration of quality manage-ment, all business functions will integratethe common goal of environmental man-agement. Such harmonization within anorganization is critical to the success ofthe EMS.

T h e r e g i s t r a t i o n

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

m e c h a n i s m. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

f o r I S O 1 4 0 0 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

c u r r e n t l y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

d o e s n o t..............................

e x i s t .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In a company with an EMS, environ-mental managers become business man-agers. with input on planning and strate-gic decisions. They must be able toexpress the impact and benefits of envi-ronmental issues in terms of profit, costs, performance andcultural, legal and technical objectives with measurablegoals. Instead of focusing on compliance, environmentalmanagers have major influence on how a company doesbusiness. Environmental aspects of the products, activitiesand services of the organization are identified and made partof the business planning process, which contributes to thebottom line.

For too long, the environmental function of business hasbeen segregated and dismissed as merely an expense, eventhough most organizations cannot identify the true cost ofcompliance. The role of the engineer in the environmentalfunction is about to be recognized as a legitimate businessfunction, and the ISO 14000 standards are the means to

will continue to ask questions about yourorganization and you will need to be prepared to respond.Make your information easy to use, and it will get moreattention than information you knowiigly or unknowinglysupplied to public access databases.• Supply chains may need to conform to the same standards.After investing in its EMS, a company won’t jeopardize itsenvironmental integrity by using inputs from a supplier whodoesn’t live up to the same standards.• Environmental issues become every employee’s responsibil-ity. People who produce, ship or service a product must beable to recognize the environmental aspects of their work.• Long-term considerations gain equal status with short-terms factors. Planning for the end fate of your product in thedesign phase may seem silly, but it pays off by possibly

that end.• Environmental management adopts acollaborative approach. Working withintheir companies, especially with individ-ual business units, environmental profes-sionals must speak business language,not the alphabet soup of regulatory jar-gon. The business culture within theirown organization is firmly entrenchedand the individuals having the most influ-ence and experience in the culture alsocontrol all the finances. Return on invest-ment is still the strongest influence inbusiness decision-making.• The environmental professional be-comes an EMS salesperson. The harder itis to quantify the result in dollars or thelonger the return the more one needsbusiness savvy to sell it.• Environmental management documentsand tells the company’s story. The public

H o w D o I S O 9 0 0 0 a n d I S O 1 4 0 0 0 R e l a t e ?

The ISO 14000 conforming organization will lookand operate like an ISO 9000 conforming organiza-

of continuous improvement checking for adequacy andcompletion of corrective actions.

tion. Common elements in the two types of manage- • Process control and internal audits.ment systems include:. A four-level framework of policy, standard operating

The infrastructure developed under ISO 9000 can be

procedures, departmental procedures/work instructionused to aid in establishing an ISO 14001 certified EMS.

and forms/records.There are time ways for your organization to take advan-tage of these connections:

• A five-stage approach that includes defining policy,planning, implementation, checking and corrective

1. As an add-on to an ISO 9000 certified Quality Man-

action and management review.agement system.

• Document control, which may or may not involve2. A combined effort to integrate the quality and envi-ronmental systems.

information systems. In environmental management, theorganixation is responsible for knowing all applicable

3. As a stand-alone environmental management system.

federal, state and local regulations.Not everything has a direct comparison. For example,

• Corrective action. This process for change maps outthe requirement for an emergency preparedness plan in

the actions needed to fix a problem. It separates re-ISO 14001 has no counterpart in ISO 9001. But you can

finements from actual changes, ensures a timelymake indirect connections. The training portion of ISO

response, checks for effectiveness, then communicates9001 has the essential elements for implementing an

the solution.emergency preparedness program. And the recordkeep-

• Management review process. This is the highest leveling in ISO 9001 training can suffice for that requiredunder the ISO 14001 emergency planning element.

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reducing future costs because your name isnot linked to landfills. Companies must lookmore to EMS-compatible design processes.The Design for Environment (or Design forDisassembly) approach views reduction,reuse and recycling as an integral part ofobjectives.

ISO 14000 Environmental Standards

Support for such standards is highest among...

• Engineering skills conquer compliance-related issues. When attention shifts fromcompliance to continuous improvement,reengineering can lead to better pro-cesses. Instead of making endless repairs toa process with inherent environmentalrisks, many industries are moving to envi-ronmentally-friendly processes.

This does not mean the death of the legalaspect of EMS. Compliance will not goaway, but it no longer will be the only driver.And that is a major breakthrough. The singlefocus on compliance is analogous to the 100percent inspection concept in quality. Youcannot inspect in quality. You cannot devel-op environmental management throughcompliance alone.

What should you do?

. Figure 3. Research shows support for EMS and ISO 14000 is notconfined to companies operating on a global scale.

If your company is ISO 9000 registereduse the infrastructure developed for yourquality management system to developyour ISO 14000 EMS. Don’t reinvent thebasics of information management. Reporting mecha-nisms can be used again, too. The procedures and workinstructions in support of a quality management systemare valuable tools for the launching of procedures relatedto EMS. Copy their structure and form, as well as much ofthe manner in which they are handled as quality docu-ments and records.

If you have an EMS, have it reviewed. There are twoways to do this. The least expensive is to have a high-levelassessment, based on the proposed ISO 14001 EMS Stan-dard. This will provide a beginning and is neither time-con-suming nor costly. The other means is to participate in afull-scale initial review, which is a detailed gap analysisbased on the standard. These are more time-consuming andcostly and are usually an indication of intent to register orto develop a registerable EMS.

If you have no EMS, a high-level assessment tool willprovide the basis from which to get started. In addition,templates are available. For example, the Chemical Man-ufacturer’s Association Responsible Care Program isan industry-specific EMS concept that has saved dol-lars through process improvements and enhanced thechemical industry’s public image.

What’s ahead for ISO 140001To meet the intended 1996 publication of the ISO 14000 stan-dards, the TC 207 committee must review and approve draftsof a guide for developing an EMS; specifications in a reg-isterable EMS; general principles of environmental manage-ment system auditing; guidance on the practice of auditing anEMS; criteria for being an EMS auditor; and documents oneco-labeling and environmental aspects of products.

Other matters to be resolved before this year’s publica-tion include the development of the registration mecha-nism for ISO 14001. Registrars are performing registra-tions to national standards in Europe that have been foundacceptable to the Eco Management and Auditing Regula-tion (EMAR). These registrations are expected to use theexisting national standards as bridge documents to theeventual use of the IS0 14000 series of standards andguidance documents.

Once IS0 14000 is finalized, customers around theworld, especially in Europe, will start demanding it of sup-pliers. It quickly could become a prerequisite to interna-tional trade, so start preparing now.

And don’t think that EMS and ISO 14000 is only forglobal companies. Managing environmental issues andintegrating them with organizational objectives makes goodbusiness sense. With an EMS, your company can do goodfor the environment and do well on the bottom line.

David Kirkpatrick is manager of regulatory products forReality Interactive inc., Minneapolis, Minn., 612-996-6967.Assisting Mr. Kirkpatrick with this article is Chuck Pouliot,senior consultant for Grant Thornton, LLP, Minneapolis,Minn, 612-332-0001. Copies of the intended 1996 publica-tion of the ISO 14000 and ISO tracking information are avail-able from both Mr. Kirkpatrick and Mr. Pouliot.

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Lugar de Ia publicación:New YorkTitulo:Moving ahead with ISO 14000: Improving Environmental Management and advancingSustainable DeveloptmentEditorial:Jhon Miley and Sons. Inc.Autor/editor:Stephen WatsonCapítulo/artículo:The business implications of implementing ISO 14000Año (fecha) de publicación:1997Páginas De: Al:95-110

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11The Business Implications of

Implementing ISO 14000Stephen A. Watson, III

The IS0 14000 series of standards for environmental management systems(EMSs) are voluntary standards intended to aid companies that wish to improvetheir environmental performance. They owe their existence, at least in part, tothree widely shared views: (1) that existing environmental management sys-tems are either inadequate or ineffective; (2) that companies will want toimprove environmental performance for economic or social reasons; and (3)that governments and stakeholders will require companies to exercise greatercontrol of the impacts to the environment through new regulations. IS0 14000offers a solution—an “integrated” environmental management system, withcomponents designed to affect sound management in any size organizationand in any country. The standards are an embodiment of both the policy andpractice of environmental management.

This chapter is a consideration of the business implications of the IS014000 series of standards. How will a movement toward an integrated EMS berealized? Who will be in the best position to respond? ISO 14000 is a manage-ment system and it carries with it business consequences.

There has been a great deal of discussion—indeed, confusion—about theagreed scope of work for lSO/TC 207. The Technical Committee’s “Environ-ment Management Scope” includes “standardization in the field of environ-mental management, tools and systems” but excludes, among other elements,“setting environmental performance levels.” The dispute involves those who

accept and understand the IS0 mandate for a consideration of “processes” andsystems and those who favor continuous improvement and performance objec-tives for the management systems. The proponents of the former view, a viewshared by the United States, argue that IS0 (private sector)-crafted performanceobjectives would be in conflict with the authority granted to governmentalbodies and institutions that traditionally set environmental performance goals.The proponents of the latter position tend to view performance objectives as aprocess tool, not expressly excluded by the term “environmental performance

W a t s o n , S t e p h e n A . T h e B u s i n e s s I m p l i c a t i o n s o f I m p l e m e n t i n g I S O - 1 4 0 0 0 , e n M a r c u s

Ph i l ip A . , y John T . Wi l l i g , M o v i n g A h e a d w i t h I S 0 1 4 0 0 0 : I m p r o v i n g E n v i r o n m e n t a l

M a n a g m e n t y A d v a n c i n g S u s t a i n a b l e D e v e l o p m e n t , J h o n W i l e y & S o n s I n c . , 1 9 9 7 , p p .

9 5 - 1 1 0

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level.” In their view, “environmental performance level” seems to relate more

to measurements and technology than to process tools.The debate continues, with the dialogue focusing on “processes” versus

“end-goal requirements”. Lost in this debate, however, are some very important

concepts. First, the IS0 14000 series of standards is founded on a rather stronglyfelt “policy” statement, namely, that corporations will want to improve envi-ronmental performance for social or economic reasons. In this sense, the tone ofthe document is clear, and we may read in the statement above the word “will”as “should.” Second, the existence of the IS0 14000 series of standards is itself anevaluation or performance statement, a declaration that existing environmentalmanagement systems are inadequate and ineffective. The clear import of ISO14000 is that environmental management systems must be integrated systems,efficient and fully an integral part of the business processes. This is a powerful,and not very flattering, assessment of current business practices.

The 1SO 14000 standards call for a rather profound change in the way wemanage environmental matters. There is a great deal of power in the word“integrated.” Governments, industry, and stakeholders will work in concert tocraft new structures and administrative procedures. Business will modify orga-nizational structures and adjust corporate behavior to implement the stan-dard. Governments will adjust agency authorities and modify or abandonexisting regulatory schemes. The change will not be wholesale, and it cer-tainly will not be uniformly evident in each country, but it will occur. In theUnited States, the self-audit components of IS0 14000 have attracted theinterest of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Justice Depart-ment. The Department of Energy (DOE), under its new General Environmen-tal Protection Program, DOE 490, is adopting the IS0 14001 approach anddeveloping its own EMS. In Korea, the Korean Industrial Technology Associa-tion (KTTA) and Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), bothquasi-governmental bodies, are working in concert with the industrial sectorto effect the implementation of the IS0 14001 specifications. In Taiwan,Industrial Technology Research Institute (ETRI), also a quasi-governmentalbody, the government, and industry are all collectively engaged in a similarexercise. A Canadian court recently ordered an offending company to achieveIS0 14001 certification, in lieu of fines and further penalties. The U.S. aver-sions to end-goal requirements notwithstanding, lS0 14001 may, in and ofitself, be an end-goal performance objective for industries that wish to staycompetitive.

The two principal components of any business or administrative system arepolicy and practice. The policy component is the reason why we move frompoint A to point B. Although policies may be expressed as goals and objectives,

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they tend to be reduced in actual terms to costs and benefits. Practice, the prac-tical component of a system, is the means by which we move from point A topoint B. These are the systems, structures, and procedures that are adopted toimplement a policy.

IS0 14001, the specification document, identifies the elements of an envi-ronmental management system as environmental policy, environmental plan-ning, implementing and operating the EMS, checking and corrective action,and management review. IS0 14004, the guidance document, provides a fur-ther discussion of the elements and their subtopics, adding examples to aid theimplementation process. Collectively, IS0 14001 and 14004 define the “prac-tice” of EMS, defining in broad terms the means by which we build, implement,and operate environmental management systems.

The “policy” of the IS0 14000 standards is a reflection of their existenceand the arguments advanced to support the process. We build an EMS becauseit will allow businesses and organizations to meet regulatory demands and chal-lenges in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. We believe that EMSs allowfor better management of the environment, improving a business’s or organi-zation’s environmental performance. We believe that an EMS may make anorganization or business more efficient, providing a direct economic benefitthat improves the profitability of the enterprise. These statements or views aremore than an expression of a desire or belief; they are implicitly an end-goalperformance objective.

An Attempt to Shape the “Culture” of Environmental ManagementWhat IS0 14000 is doing is attempting a change of culture. Environment

is a top management priority under the IS0 14000 model. It is not so now inmany organizations. Environmental management is more often seen as beinga staff function. Line functions, or operations, are reserved for the activitiesthat advance the business purposes and revenue-generating activities of theorganization.

IS0 14001 calls for the integration of environmental matters with theother business objectives of an organization. Environmental issues become apart of the decision process. For many organizations, this may require both afunctional and structural change. Implementation can occur short of majorinstitutional changes, but an EMS may require more as it grows and matures.Consider the development of environmental systems shown in Table 11.1.

Twenty years ago, if you asked a Ford plant manager what his job was, his

response would be, “I make cars”; implicit within that statement was the word“profitably.” Today, when you ask that same Ford plant manager what his jobis, the answer is “I make quality cars (profitably).” Fifteen years from now, the

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Table 11 .1 Evolution of Environmental Systems

Current Post-ISO 14000

Environmental management is a staff Environmental management requires topfunction. management commitment and is everyone’s

responsibility

Environmental factors considered for sitingissues, waste streams, and environmentalconsequences of operations.

Environmental factors considered for allbusiness decisions.

IS0 9000 adds documentation andinstitutional controls at the point of materialprocurement, product manufacturing, andproduct distribution. Controls are added toexisting institutional structure.

IS0 14000, with top managementcommitment and “integration,” may requiresome institutional change.

IS0 9000 requires limited interface withgovernment bodies.

EMS systems are fueled by and affected bynew regulations and governmental initiativesEMS efforts are impacted by how governmentis shaped and operated. EMS is interdepen-dent and interactive.

ISO 9000 encourages a culture of “quality” IS0 14000 encourages a culture of soundenvironmental management.

answer may be, “I make quality cars in an environmentally responsible manner(profitably).” This is managing the culture of the environment, moving envi-ronmental from a staff function to a line function.

Everyone, especially line management, understands the role that profit plays

in an organization—no profit, no business and no jobs. Every employee under-stands that the corporation is in business to make money; it is a part of the cor-porate culture and our understanding of business. We recognize that our cost is afunction of labor and materials. Reduce the cost of labor, or the amount of timeit takes to produce a product or component. This labor/materials relationship isunderstood, if not accepted, at virtually all levels of a business organization.

Our corporate understanding of environmental costs is inadequate and notyet fully a part of corporate culture. In many instances, environmental profes-sionals still have to “make the connection” to demonstrate the impact that theiractivities will have on a product or services. The downside costs are often remote

in time and the “connection” is not always readily apparent. Where there is anunderstanding of environmental costs, it often fails to permeate down through

the organization. The relationship is not understood by all concerned.Business decisions are not inclusive, and environmental issues do not sur-

face because they are not a part of the corporate culture. Is there a corporationor business that would consider a new product without taking into account

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labor availability and costs? In these cases, the consideration of labor costsincludes recruitment, placement, on-the-job training, and benefits. It is a con-sideration of costs on many levels, a life-cycle approach. The IS0 14000 seriesof standards is an attempt to establish “environment” as a part of our businessculture.

Consider the case of quality control and quality assurance as a businessforce. Where quality has been adopted as a part of the corporate culture, every-one (particularly line managers) understands the role that quality plays in theproduct or service. Lower-quality service and products translate into lower salesvolume, customer dissatisfaction, and lost customers. There are higher costsassociated with repairs and returns. All this translates as lower profit. If every-one within a market sector plays on the same field, then quality is not an issue.But when one player makes quality a market discriminator, moving to makecustomer satisfaction, product usefulness, longevity, reliability, and service fea-tures of the product, they begin to capture market share and customers. Qual-ity, as a culture, becomes a requirement of business.

Business’s response to quality first manifests itself as system, management,and record-keeping requirements designed to manage the process of qualitycontrol and quality assurance. But this is only part of the process, an after-the-fact solution. When quality is adopted and believed to be a part of the job, seenas a requirement of doing business and of continued employment, qualitymoves from a monitor and validation function to a normative function; it issimply the way to do business.

The early efforts to “establish” a culture of quality varied. “Quality” meansdifferent things to different people. Products use components from all over theworld. There was a need, or a perceived need, to give meaning to the terms usedto define quality and the business systems used to measure that quality. Qual-ity, for companies without integrated manufacturing processes, meant thatvendor systems and controls had to be managed. Business systems subject tovalidation, accreditation, and monitoring could be relied on by producers thatsought a certain measure of quality from their vendors. Yet, there needed to besome mechanisms to make the process uniform, reliable, and verifiable. ISO9000 was the international community’s response to the needs of the interna-tional marketplace.

Quality became a market discriminator; in some cases, a “trade barrier.”

Quality, under the U.S. model, was managed individually by business andit was largely a response to external business or market pressures. Quality, underthe Asian model, was managed as concerted effort to attract and obtain marketshare. Governments participated in the process; consortiums and researchpools funded the projects necessary to make the better tools. Early businessefforts were protected and encouraged.


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An Integrated Management System-A Fundamental Changein the Way We Do Business

The ISO 14000 standard is a management system. Delete the word “envi-ronmental” from the standard and you have a treatise on sound business man-agement. In this century, there have been at least two significant managementrevolutions. The IS0 14000 series of standards has the potential to be the third.

The first revolutionary management change is historically tied to HenryFord and his assembly line production model. The United States was not thefirst, or perhaps even the best, manufacturer of automobiles. Automobiles wereproduced in a number of European nations. Europe was tied to a craft system oflabor and education, with manufactured products being built from the groundup and completed as units. Mr. Ford had access to a skilled, educated labor force.Conceiving and acting on assembly line production methods, rather than unitproduction, Henry Ford turned his automobile and company into a U.S. successstory. The assembly line production method took hold in other industries and,for 40 years, Europe and the rest of the industrialized world played catch-up.

The second major management revolution dates back to the late 1950s andthe quality management practices of the Asian economies. In the 1950s thephrases “Made in Taiwan,” “Made in Japan,” “Made in Hong Kong,” and “Madein Korea” were identified with cheap, substandard products. Asian industries,working in concert with their governments, addressed a wide variety of qualityand production issues over the course of the next 15 to 20 years. Research con-sortiums pooled resources to attack technology issues. Quality and attention todetail became a part of the corporate culture. Product returns were retained,analyzed, and studied to avoid repetitive problems. A great deal of attentionwas paid to the efficiencies of the production process. By the mid-1970s, “Madein Japan” meant quality, and higher value than the equivalent U.S. product.“Made in Korea” quickly followed suit.

The United States largely ignored this process and, by the late 1970s, severalkey U.S. industries had lost customers to their Asian competitors. For the next 20years, the United States played catch-up and, although industry paid greaterattention to image, quality, and production concerns, market share was still lost.

It is worth noting that the Japanese model did not work as intended. Theconcerted effort to address quality was more a function of competition and less

a function of partnering with the government. Government-sponsored consor-tiums were even less successful. The Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry(MITI) failed to sponsor a real winner in the 1960s (aluminum, aircraft manu-facturing, and aerospace) and the 1970s (biomedicine, mainframe computers,and telecommunications). These failed MITI efforts, however, bore fruit inunexpected ways. The “need” for both quality improvements and technologi-cal advances was raised to the level of a priority in Japanese business. Japaneseindustries that were not favored by MITI adopted the priority, making it a part

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of their corporate culture. These electronics and automotive companies, drivenby a competitive fire, achieved what the MITI-sponsored industries could not.

There is, on a side note, a lesson here. The government-mandated effort

under MITI met with only marginal success, but helped raise new managementissues and business priorities for Japanese industry. The marginal governmentaleffort helped fuel a process change. The IS0 14000 standards have the samepotential. Change may not be directly attributed to EMS and the efforts led bythe standard, but may, in fact, come about more as a result of competition. Someindustries and governments will rethink their own programs and processes. Indi-vidually, or perhaps even working together, they will build new business sys-tems. The IS0 14000 series of standards is raising business’s collective consensusabout EMS and management systems in general. Change is inevitable.

A Change in Management-Responsibility and StructureThe ISO 14000 series of standards reintroduces management concepts to

the environment. The intent is to give consideration to the fact that the envi-ronment is no different from any other aspect of business. We manage our busi-ness to maximize return on investment. Buy low, sell high, and keep cost down.We strive to reduce product losses. We manage the components of production.We manage energy costs, change industrial processes, and relocate plants. WhatIS0 14000 is really saying is that environmental matters, consequences, andcosts are, and have always been, a part of business. We simply have ignoredthem in our planning and production processes.

IS0 14000 should force business and governments to change on at least twolevels: (1) encouraging the integration of functions within companies and gov-ernments and (2) formalizing the integration of environmental issues withother decision factors in the thought processes of business.

Taking the latter point first, environmental costs, risk, and exposures wereoften not seen as business costs. They were incidental to business, rather thanan integral part of the business effort. Environmental professionals tended to beline or staff functions. Environmental issues were not a senior or top manage-ment function, charge, or responsibility.

If we accept this institutional model, management philosophies and busi-ness systems will have to change; this is a first-order change. Take an unman-aged item, adjust philosophies, roles, and responsibilities and manage theasset—within existing structures. We would manage the asset by adjustinggoals, priorities, and responsibilities, but not by changing structure and report-ing lines (as a rule). This is managing the culture of the environment (or a atleast a business response to managing the culture of the environment).

Consider, first, how we have managed environmental matters. In the

United States, there does not seem to be a “model” structure for the handling ofenvironmental matters. A 1991 survey of environmental managers by the

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National Association of Environmental Managers (NAEM) in Washington, D.C.,the Environmental Hazards Management Institute (EHMI) in Durham; NewHampshire, and Coopers & Lybrand in Boston, highlights the variety ofresponses. The results should displace some of the myths about just who isresponsible for environmental matters in U.S. corporations.

The study involved 500 environmental managers and represented a diversegroup, with the distribution of industries being as follows:

Industry Percentage

Electronic Equipment/InstrumentsChemicals & RefiningMetals & Fabricated Metal ProductsIndustrial Machinery/EquipmentPharmaceuticals & Personal CareRubber, Plastics, Stone & GlassFood ProductsWholesale & Retail TradeElectric, Gas & Sanitary UtilitiesExtractive industriesTransportation EquipmentMiscellaneous ServicesPaper & PrintingTransportation & Communication Services

16.0%15.013.07.06.56.56.56.56.04.04.04.03.03.0

The study first found that the environmental manager’s position generally“evolved” as the corporation became aware of its own environmental concerns.The duties of the environmental manager were usually grafted onto existingpositions or functional areas, because there was no structure in place to handlethe “issue.” As responsibilities evolved, the positions did, in some instances,gain an independent stature.

But contrary to an accepted belief, the study found that risk managers andsafety directors generally do not handle their company’s environmental mat-ters. This new “responsibility” belongs to individuals in a number of different

positions:

Functional Position Percentage

CFO or Risk ManagementField Plant FacilitiesGeneral CounselHuman Resources DepartmentEnvironment or Safety & EnvironmentAdministration or Regulatory AffairsEngineeringStaff functions (reporting to President)Operations

2%3457

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Environmental managers would be those individuals—whatever their offi-cial positions—who are perhaps most aware of what environmental services arerequired within a company.

The study also found that the duties of the environmental manager were,in large part, shaped by the functional area in which they served. For example,a functional finance environmental manager might better serve financial-driven considerations rather than the operational or technical concerns of theplants. While an individual’s title may have indicated “environmental” duties,the nature of those duties varied greatly among the companies.

The survey results revealed that corporate environmental managers tendedto have broad authority but little direct control over their company’s environ-mental infrastructure (facility-level operations). Facility-level environmentalmanagers were highly compliance-oriented and usually reported to plant man-agers rather than corporate management.

Environmental departments or managers seldom cover all the bases. Thedepth of the environmental manager’s knowledge of the corporation’s activitywill, to some extent, be reflected by his or her duties. An environmental man-ager’s duties, as indicate by the survey results, are largely compliance-oriented.The surveyed managers reported the following results:

Duty or ResponsibilityPercentage Indicating

Responsibility

Regulatory Compliance 70%Environmental Auditing 45Waste Minimization 45Permitting 40Hazardous Materials Identification 39Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Selection 39Training 36Safety 35Remediation 32Industrial Hygiene 30Recycling 25Risk of Discharge 19Public & Community Relations 18Transportation 15Energy & Conservation 12

The “duty’‘-related questions are of interest. If a function or responsibilityis not within the environmental manager’s duties, it may be a sign of a numberof problems: The nonperformance of a duty may reflect a resource need, anawareness problem, or the lack of a corporate commitment. Finally, the studyfound that the environmental managers generally complained that resourceneeds were not being met and that “management awareness” was lackingbeyond their immediate area.


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The environmental managers’ most common complaints or concerns were:

• Concern about their ability to keep their company in compliance;• Concern about their ability to successfully implement proactive envi-

ronmental programs; and

• Complaints about insufficient resources, regulatory overload, a lack ofcorporate awareness at all organizational levels, and a high perceivedlack of management support or interest in proactive environmental ini-

tiatives.

In many organizations, the management of environmental matters isuneven. The focus is disproportionally placed on compliance and remedialmeasures at the expense of planning, pollution prevention, and waste mini-mization. Where there is a greater level of control, the integration is not com-plete. One fundamental element of an EMS is top management commitment. Asecond is an integration of environmental issues at every stage of the businessprocess. The principle is simple: Get the right people involved and raise theappropriate questions. Consider the following two case studies.

Case Study No. 1: Chemical Plant Operations Working with Governmentto Draft Regulations to Fit Community Needs

The company has 10 sites under remediation, with three closed facili-ties being regarded as significant sites. Cleanup efforts at the three sig-nificant sites will continue throughout the next 20 years. The rest ofthe sites will be remediated to nonresidential levels.

Within the corporate structure, the remediation department of theenvironmental unit is responsible for the cleanup of the facilities. Risksare assessed to determine appropriate cleanup levels and they areapplied to an expected nonresidential end use. End uses are projected,but not subject to any sort of marketing inquiry.

Remediated properties are inventoried and disposed of by the cor-porate real estate department. This process nominally commences asthe site is nearing remediation, but begins only in earnest after the sitework has been completed.

To date, the company has not been able to transfer a single prop-erty. The effort to establish useful brownfield uses for three propertieshas failed, in spite of a significant corporate level commitment.

This case study addresses an “end-of-pipe” problem, one that is presentedin cases in which plants are decommissioned. Corporate environmental depart-


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ments and engineers saw the problem as one that was to be engineered, assess-ing a level of risk and designing a remediation plan that was appropriate to theend use. This was a failure of the planning process.

The governing U.S. environmental laws affecting both the remediation andthe resulting transaction were created and implemented from 1973 to 1989.When these laws and regulations were crafted:

• Government never foresaw the transfer of contaminated properties asan option;

• Banks and insurance companies never anticipated providing financialsecurity to contaminated property; and

• Industry never contemplated buying contaminated property.

The case study corporation’s efforts to date have failed for three reasons.First, the infrastructure and administrative processes that would be necessaryto accomplish the mission have not yet been created. EPA, at the federal level,is working on a series of pilot administrative programs, but has no favoredoption to date. There are several state pilots, but these are inconclusive. Banksand insurance institutions are years behind the agency’s efforts and thereis little work under way to develop the appropriate vehicle. Industry can han-dle the liability issues that would be associated with the transfer of properties,but this tends to be an ad hoc, case-by-case approach dealt with by legaldepartments.

Second, within the corporation, the decision to commence the initiativewas not inclusive. Several key departments and personnel were left out of thedecision process. Because the planners saw the problems as being, first, one of

engineering, and then of a real estate transfer, the legal department was con-sulted only for real estate and liability advice. The corporate acquisitions andinsurance departments, both staffed by personnel who would have raised otherquestions, were not in the loop. This was a systems or management-of-changefailure.

Third, there was a quality control failure. Some project transfers failedbecause the buyer lacked sufficient information about the site. The level of riskassessment that was required for the selection of a remedy was far less thanthat which was required to satisfy the information needs of a buyer or a finan-cial entity. This failure point, experienced by the real estate department, wasnever carried back to the remediation group and the pattern of informationgaps continued.

IS0 14000 envisions a fully integrated management and process decisionloop, with performance indicators and quality checks, many of which were notevident by this process.


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Case Study No. 2: Chemical Plant Operations lntegrating Business Systems

to Reduce losses to WorkersA chemical plant, a manufacturer of adhesives and coating com-pounds, operates seven plants in the United States. In 1989, workforceinjuries accounted for 2,700 lost work days. The company had anaggressive environmental, safety, and health program, but it had failedto reduce the number of worker injuries. Direct salaries and worker

benefits paid were in excess of $1.08 million. Medical and compen-satory payments would exceed $2.40 million.

Direct loss dollars for worker injuries accounted for $3.48 million.In the United States, a company will spend, on average, $7 for every $1in direct loss payments for worker retraining, replacement staff, admin-istration, and lost productivity. This left a significant projected bottom-line impact.

The first level of analysis in any systems approach is a review of the business

procedures and consideration at the company. How do the pieces fit together?We can begin by asking such questions as:

• Where do you start within the organization?• What really needs to be done?• How are you managing the scope of the effort?• Who is responsible for profit within the organization?• What are the costs of a product?

In this instance, top management reached the conclusion that while plant

operations were held responsible for cost, profit, and loss, reward systems—paidout in terms of bonuses and raises—were computed on the older formula of“material + labor + overhead = costs.” Overhead was defined to include admin-istrative costs, fixed assets, and incidental operating expenses at the plant, butfailed to capture direct losses that were attributable to worker injuries. Directcosts associated with worker injuries were charged off against corporate books,rather than the plant operations.

Top management altered the performance award schedule for plant man-agers and other senior plant level personnel. Bonuses would be paid out only ifthere were both a profit and no lost-time injuries for the labor force. A prof-itable bottom line, with losses to the workforce, was simply not acceptableunder the new structure. The direct and indirect costs of worker injuries werecharged back to the divisions.

The core existing environmental, health, and safety programs remained thesame. There was a greater emphasis placed on the programs, along with height-


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ened training efforts. Audit and performance goals were, as before, left to the

discretion of the responsible line management. Some new programs were added

as needs were identified, and efforts were made to reduce hazards and to engi-

neer for solutions. The sole significant change in this instance, however, was

top management commitment to the program.

In 1994, this company sustained three lost work days from injuries. The

next phase of the company’s program was to consolidate environmental and

safety and health operations. In the United States, worker safety issues are reg-

ulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) under

the Occupational Safety and Health Act. OSHA has been concerned with a vari-

ety of worker safety issues, including those dealing with chemical and process

hazards, but its jurisdiction ends at the plant boundaries. OSHA programs

involve training, recordkeeping and reporting requirements, audit protocols,

and process safety.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the treatment, stor-

age, and disposal of hazardous waste. EPA regulations also govern active waste

streams, involving plant emissions and wastewater discharges. Worker safety

and emergency planning regulations evolved that were specific to the chemi-

cals and hazards associated with the controlled compounds, but developed at a

slower pace than those promulgated by OSHA. There are extensive recordkeep-

ing and reporting requirements.

The Department of Transportation (DOT) regulates the transportation of

chemicals and hazardous waste. It, too, developed regulations involving worker

safety, reporting and recordkeeping, and spill control.

OSHA tended to develop its process-oriented safety regulations first. For

industry, the natural corporate interface was the human resources manager or

risk manager. Over time, OSHA compliance was vested in these departments.

EPA´s initial regulations involved permitting and releases, and eventually the

siting and management of hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities.

These were recognized as process or operational issues. At this level, the EPA

interface was a plant manager or plant operations supervisor.

With the onset of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-

sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980, a law governing closed—and often

abandoned—facilities, industry faced significant liability for closed and inactive

sites. The EPA interface for these facilities tended to be senior management or

the legal department on a financia1 basis, and plant-level personnel on an oper-

ational basis.

DOT regulations were accepted and recognized as a transportation issue

and rested with terminal operations.

Upon review, OSHA, EPA, and DOT regulate the same areas. Each provided

a regulatory framework, with training, recordkeeping, and reporting require-

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ments. Each governed aspects of process safety, emergency planning, and spill

control. Because industry established its own response mechanisms on a piece-

meal basis (largely in response to separate agency directives), most U.S. indus-

tries have three to four individuals dealing with the same or similar hazards and

materials at each plant or facility. Our case study company’s current manage-

ment plan is to reduce the administration cost of a successful and improving

environmental, health, and safety program by consolidating information data-

bases and operational responsibilities.

The belief is that this leaves less room for oversight and it will almost cer-

tainly result in operational efficiencies. Our case study client will manage the

hazard, task, or result, rather than the agency. There will be one training pro-

gram that is fully responsive to all of the governing regulations, rather than

nine programs responsive to the directives of three agencies and the state gov-

ernment. New regulatory directives issuing from an agency, regardless of the

agency, will be measured against the existing programs. In most instances, the

company expects to be required to make few or no changes.

ISO is also a management system that strikes to form, not simply culture.

Integrated management has two meanings, integrating environmental deci-

sions with all other business. The second order of management would be mod-

ifying the structures of business. This requires a reshaping of the U.S. business

and governmental systems.

Business Considerations and Transaction CostsThe environmental statutes and regulations of the United States impose a

high cost on business. There are fundamentally two types of costs: substantive

costs which relate to an act of compliance or site cleanup, and transaction

costs. Some environmental statutes create a liability. Under these statutes, the

substantive costs may take the form of investigation expenses, remediation

costs, fines, and penalties.

The cost of doing business with the government represents a transaction

cost. Congress and the severa1 states have, in effect, created a parallel, and

sometimes overlapping, scheme of environmental regulations. The authority to

promulgate, regulate, and enforce environmental laws has been widely dis-

persed among EPA, state and local authorities, and various other federal agen-

cies. A single “event,” whether it is a site cleanup or an accidental release, may

force a company to deal with as many as three or four agencies.

Transaction costs are the hidden costs associated with environmental laws

in the United States. There is an interlocking web of procedures and rules for

any given site, chemical, or waste release. The approval of a federal agency does

not necessarily guarantee the blessing of a parallel state agency with jurisdic-

tion over the site. The reverse also holds true, because a state agency can not


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speak for the federal office. A company’s administrative mistakes can be costly.

A single compliance or regulatory oversight may delay a plant project for years

or result in the imposition of severe fines. Under these circumstances, a com-

pany’s understanding of the requirements and procedures of the environmen-

tal laws becomes an essential part of the business planning in the United States.

Generally, a company’s structure allows it to operate within a given regula-

tory and business environment. lf it does not, it simply does not survive. Envi-

ronmental liability is, in part, a function of how a company reacts to the

environmental laws. In the United States, there is a highly regulated and “puni-

tive” enforcement system that taxes the resources of business. In this climate,

the expectation is that business will concentrate on reporting and regulatory

issues, rather than on prevention and safety. Environmental departments, to

the extent that they exist, would be consumed by the sheer task of keeping up

to date with regulations. Remediation, waste minimization, and loss prevention

would be, under these circumstances, back-burner issues for many companies.

In short, we might find that the diverse federal and state scheme of environ-

mental regulation is taxing the resources of many of the companies that do

business in the United States.

Corporations often find themselves unprepared to meet the challenges pre-

sented by changing technologies or markets. Granted, they may have effective

administrative procedures and systems for present business concerns, but these

systems often lack the flexibility to handle new regulatory initiatives.

ISO 14000’s concept of an EMS may fairly be regarded as fundamental

change in business and management principles. Top management commit-

ment to the environment, a systemic integration of environmental issues into

the decision-making process of an organization, and the reengineering of gov-

ernmental and business systems, taken together, may be the force that drives

the next generation of economic powers. Government and industry, working

together, can implement a change that drives down the cost of doing business

and improves the quality of life. The mission will be to build it better, faster,

cheaper, and cleaner.

There are two possible futures. If no single industry/nation partnership

emerges, ISO 14000 may still be a force. The changes will come about gradually,

perhaps as a result of piecemeal application of the principles of EMS, but it will

nevertheless occur. The early signs are that the concept will take hold. If how-

ever, industry/national pairings do emerge, the change is likely to be dramatic.

Early LeadersEarly indications are that the Asian and Scandinavian economies will latch

onto and adopt ISO 14000. Their motivations and starting points may be dif-

ferent, but the process is under way.


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Asia is the likeliest candidate. According to the 1993 World Bank study,

titled the East Asian Miracle, eight Asian economies supplied 9 percent of the

exported goods 30 years ago. Today that figure exceeds 21 percent. Japan, Hong

Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan are powerful economic forces. South Korea,

Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are rising economic powers. These countries

focus on the international economy, manage long-term issues, and focus on

creating a favorable economic climate. They see not adopting ISO 14000 as a

trade threat, a potential barrier. They will move quickly to certify to ISO 14001,

rather than risk a disruption of their industries and economics. Understanding

the culture of ISO 14000 and its benefits should soon follow.

Create a favorable environment, and domestic economics will flourish.

Eliminate redundancies in business structures and government administration,

and direct transactional costs that are tied to the management of the environ-

ment will drop. Plan for the environmental consequence up front, anticipate

the issue on resulting harm, and the bottom-line impact will dissipate. In the

United States, the electronics and semiconductor industry has, directly or indi-

rectly through higher insurance premiums, spent hundreds of millions of dol-

lars on sites with TCE and TCA groundwater contamination. If even a fraction

of that expense is avoided on the next environmental problem, the industry

will be stronger and better suited to manage its growth.

Build it better, faster, cheaper, and cleaner, and whoever builds it first may

win.

Stephen A. Watson, III, Esq. is director of regulatory services for Foster Wheeler EnvironmentalCorporation. Mr. Watson has strategic and operational responsibility for Governmental Affairs andRegulatory Services. He is his company’s principal corporate spokesperson before governmentalbodies and industry associations. Mr. Watson manages the Regulatory Services Division, a unitthat provides environmental consulting services to a wide range of domestic and internationalclients. Mr. Walson is a delegate and U.S. technical expert to the U.S. Technical Advisory Group(TAG) to ISO TC207, participating on SubTag 4, Environmental Performance Evaluation.


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Lugar de Ia publicación:San José, Costa RicaTitulo:Desarrollo sostenible y politicas económicas en america LatinaEditorial:DElAutor/editor:Kaimowitz, DavidCapitulo/articulo:La valorización del futuro: un reto para el desarrollo sostenible en America LatinaAño (fecha) de publicación:1992Pàginas-- De: Al:20-26

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y los politicos deben buscar información sobre los roles especificos ypotenciales de las mujer en el uso sustentable de los recursos naturales,tales como bosque, húmedales, tierras secas, costas y montañas. Lasacciones prácticas que planifiquen y ejecuten deberán tomar en cuentaesta información constante hacia las mujeres, para brindarles elconocimiento indispensable para utilizar los recursos de manerasustentable.

Conclusiones

Las discusiones e iniciativas en el camino del ambiente y eldesarrollo, por un lado, y el de la mujer y el desarrollo, por otro, hanestado aislados entre si por mucho tiempo. Evidencias a nivel regionaly global lograron ver la importancia de unir los dos, para encontrarsoluciones equitativas y efectivas a los problemas.

Las mujeres, por un lado, y el medio ambiente por el otro, hancontribuido a reconceptualizar el desarrollo, asignando así énfasis a laredistribución ( entre clases, razas, generaciones y sexos) y a la sus-tentabilidad como aspectos esenciales para asegurar la paz y lacontinuidad de la vida en la tierra.

Las tareas son gigantescas, global y localmente. Todos conocemosdatos acerca del estado de la situación ambiental en Centroamérica.También sabemos de los muchos esfuerzos y valiosos trabajos -comoeste Seminario- que se están realizando en el área por gran cantidadde organizaciones y programas. Hay estrategias lineamientos y muchasrecomendaciones de cómo llegar a un desarollo sostenible; Déjenmeagregar una sola: hay que dar a la mujer la oportunidad de contribuira esta empresa con todos sus conocimientos, habilidades y sabíduria.

La valorizacion del futuro:un reto para eI desarrollo sostenibIe

en América Latina

Dr. David Kaimowitz*

I n t r o d u c c i ó n

El 31 de enero de 1953, la ciudad de Rotterdam en Holanda, fueinundada por aguas maritimas , agitadas por una fuerte tormenta.Murieron 1835 personas y hubo grandes daños económicos. Losholandeses juraron no permitir que eso volviera a pasar. En respuesta,crearon el “Plan Delta”, un ambicioso programa de construcción dediques y exclusas, con un plazo de 25 años y un nivel de inversiónvalorado en miles de millones de dólares. El programa fue terminado,como estaba planeado, en 1988 (Eriikson, 1985).

Esa capacidad de planificación a largo plazo que demostraron losholandeses con el Plan Delta, de continuidad de las políticas durantevarios gobiernos de distintos partidos, apunta hacia uno de los elementos

centrales, y a menudo menospreciado, para lograr un desarrollo soste-nible: la valorización el futuro, y la capacidad de pensar, planear y

actuar en función de él.El concepto básico de desarrollo sostenible, planteado por la

Comisión Brundtland (1987), donde “se busca satisfacer las necesidadesdel presente sin c omprometer la capacidad de las geneticiones futuraspara alcanzar sus propias necesidades”, implica, sin duda, un compromisocon el futuro. Los costos y los beneficios de muchas acciones que serealizan hoy, solo se sentirán mucho más tarde. Muchas inversiones.necesarias para la sostenibllidad, tienen horizontes largos de recuperaciónde la inversión.

* Universidad de Wisconsin. Consultor Internacional, Costa Rica.

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Debido a factores económicos, políticos, institucionales y culturales,a las sociedadcs latinoamericanas les cuesta valorizar el futuro. En laAmerica Latina actual, existe una fuerte tendencia a vivir para hoy;todo se tiene que hacer “ya”, la gente anda constantemente en la“rebusca”, y los países van de crisis en crisis, El presente se ha vueltotan agitado, tan difícil, y a la vez tan rentable para la especulacióncoyuntural, mientras el futuro se torna cada vez mas imprescindible ylejano.

Este ensayo examina diferentes factores que dificultan la valo-rización del futuro en América Latina, y plantea algunos elementoscentrales para su superación. Tiene cuatro secciones. Las primeras tresdiscuten aspectos económicos, politico/ínstitucionales y culturales,respectivamente; la ultima enfoca el camino hacia adelante.

1. Los aspectos económicos

Un requisito básico del desarrollo es la inversión en actividadesque generan una parte importante de sus beneficios en el largo plazo.la preservación de la biodiversidad, la producción forestal, la con-servación de los suelos, la reducción de emisiones contaminantes, sonapenas algunos ejemplos en donde esto se duplica.

Sin embargo, nuestro mecanismo básico para asignar recursos, elmercado, es notablemente miope con respecto al futuro.

Con las típicas tasas de descuento y costos de oportunidad del capitalen el mercado, el futuro desaparece (para propósitos de la toma dedecisiones) después de unas pocas decadas (Page, 1991: 64).

Es bien conocido que los precios de mercado reflejan únicamentelas demandas de las generaciones actuales, quienes no tendran que viviren el planeta que dejan; las generaciones futuras no tienen voz ni voto(Norgaard, 1991).

Esta característica general de las economías de mercado (y de laseconomías socialistas tradicionales) fue reforzada durante la últimadecada por las altas tasas de interés real, producto do los grandes déficit,fiscales y de cuenta corriente de los EEUU, Para poder financiar estosdéficit y mantener el valor del dólar, el gobierno de los EE.UU. fueforzado a pagar intereses más altos, lo cual afectó todos los mercadosde capitales a nivel mundial, Eso hizo mucho menos rentable efectuarinversiones de larga duración. En el plano internacional estas subieronde un promedio de 2,64% anual entre 1963 y 1973, a un promedio de5,85% entre 1980 y 1989 (Banco Mundial, 1990). Esto quiere decirque en los años ochenta, alguien que decidiera ínvertir en sembrar Unárbol para ser cortado dentro de treinta años, deberá recibir unaretribución por su inversión mas de dos veces mayor que en los años

sesenta, para que esa inversión tuviera la misma rentabilidad que undolar ganado en un cultivo anual.

Recientemente, las tasas de interés de los EE.UU. han bajado. Noobstante, en muchos países de América Latina estas tasas todavía semantienen altas, debido a la incertidumbre que impera respecto a lainflación, los desbalances financieros nacionales y la deuda externa. EnCosta Rica, por ejemplo, actualmente se cobra hasta 12% de interés enterminos reales para los prestamos. Eso desincentiva la inversión alargo plazo.

La crisis de la deuda ha actuado como un creciente y permanenteincentivo del consumo presente sobre el futuro. Al empujar las tasas deinterés hacia arriba, la crisis ha determinado una lógica irrefutable enapoyo de estrategias de “extracción de recursos como las únicas viablesen el corlo plazo.

Algunos autores han criticado la idea de que tasas de interés altasperjudican la sostenibilidad, diciendo que ellas reducen la inversión, yque al haber eso, disminuyen la presión sobre el uso de los recursosnaturales (Krutilla y Fisher I975). Esa posición sólo es válida si unoacepta la idea de que el crecimiento economico es incompatible con lasostenibilidad. Pero reducir el crecimiento no es una opción ni viableni deseable para muchos de los paises de América Latina. Para quehaya desarrollo, y no solamente la sostenibilidad de la pobreza; habriaque fomentar inversiones en actividades más sostenibles, en lugar deconseguir la conservación de los recursos mediante el estancamientoeconomico.

Tambien inhibe la inversión productiva de largo plazo la gran mag-nitud de la variacíón en los niveles de inflación de año a año. Porejemplo, en Argentina la inflación anual pasó de 210% en 1982 a 688%en 1984: despues bajó a 82% en 1986, y volvió a subir a 388% en 1988.

Fluctuaciones igualmente fuertes se dieron en Brasil, Perú,Nicaraguay Bolivia, y en general fueron acompañadas por cambios significativosen los precios relativos (CEPAL, 1988). Estas fluctuaciones fuertes

llevan a que un inversionista que busca reducir los riesgos de pérdida,tienda a invertir en actividades de muy corto plazo que le permitianmayor liquidez, como el arbitraje y las actividades especulativas, endetrimento de esfuerzos productivos o conservacionista con una madu-ración mas larga. Esta misma situación, de fluctuaciones rapidas en losprecios relativos y niveles de ingreso, junto con la debilidad de lossistemas de información en la región, dificultan cualquier pronósticoacerca de las condiciones economicas del futuro. Al ser menos predecibleel futuro, se vuelve mas riesgoso invertir, y se tiende a descontar elvalor previsto de ingresos futuros a tasas aún mayores que las de mer-cado. Con un futuro tan poco claro, resulta demasiado riesgoso invertiren actividades que solo daran frutos en el mediano o largo plazo.

La fuga masiva de capitales, y mas generalmente, la movilidad del mismo, facilitada por la apertura en los mercados financieros y las

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revoluciones tecnológicas en las comunicaciones y el transporte, hacenque el capital dependa menos del estado futuro de los recursos naturalesen un lugar en particular. Por ejemplo, si una compañia maderera piensaque después de talar un bosque puede pasar a otro bosque virgen,tendra una actitud diferente que si sabe que sus ganancias futurasdependerán de la producción del bosque donde trabaja actualmente. Deigual forma, un productor de melones será más propenso a permitir losdesbalances ecológicos producidos por la sobre utilización de plaguicidas,si tiene la opción de después trasladar sus actividades a nuevos lugaresde producción, donde no existen esos problemas (Murray, 1991).

Finalmente, el creciente empobrecimiento de gran parte de lapoblación latinoamericana en los últimos años, puede haber fomentadouna mayor preocupación por el consumo inmediato y la sobrevivencia,una actitud que lleva a la mineria de los recursos naturales y una visiónde corto plazo, La imágen clásica de esto es aquel campesino pobrecultivando en tierras de ladera, que él mismo sabe que esta destruyendo,pero que representa su único medio de vida.

2. Aspectos políticos e institucionales

No sólo los empresarios y consumidores latinoamericanos tienenuna baja valorización del futuro. El mismo fenómeno se da entre lospolíticos

Los políticos en general, no suelen pensar mucho más allá de laspróximas elecciones. Esta tendencia se refuerza por la magnitud de lacrisis económica en muchos países y la existencia de altos niveles depobreza; lo cual hace que los políticos se sienten forzados a darlesrespuestas a la población a corto plazo. En parte, la tendencia a en-deudarse el máximo posible, sabiendo que serán otros los que tendránque pagar esas deudas, es sintomas de ese fenómeno.

Los gobiernos viven de crisis en crisis, “apagando incendios” y,por lo tanto, descuidando los problemas más subyacentes, como lanecesidad de plantear altemativas dc desarrollo que sean viables a largoplazo. Una de las palabras mas dañinas (y comunes) del vocabulariopolítico latinoamericano es la “coyuntura”. Los frecucntes cambios enel contexto político y económico dificultan concentrarse en los problemasestructurales, los cuales permanecen en todas las sociedades latinoame-ricanas.

Las mismas crisis económicas y políticas hacen que estos gobiernossean débiles. En la mayoría de las elecciones recientes en AméricaLatina los partidos gobernantes no fueron reelectos (aunque eso comienzaa cambiar con las elecciones en Argentina, Colombia y México -unaposible señal de cierta estabilización). Los efectos de la falta depermanencia de los partidos gobernantes son magnificados por el altonivel de politización partidaria del cuerpo público. No existe un cuerpoconsolidado de funcionarios públicos permanentes, como lo hay en casi

todos los países desarrollados, que permite mantener el curso deprogramas básicos de interés nacional, independientemente de losvaivenes políticos.

La capacidad de reflexión de la sociedad, y por consiguiente dc laprevisión de los problemas futuros y la formulación de posiblessoluciones, ha sido socavada. Las universidades, tradicionales centrosde refIexión, han sido debilitadas por la crisis, y su aporte al pensamientocritico ha sido reducido por la tendencia hacia la mercantilizacion de laeducación (Brunner, 1990). Quedan pocos paises en America Latinadonde los profesores universitarios tienen sifieciente seguridad económicay tranquilidad laboral para poder reflexionare investigar sobre el porvenirde sus sociedades. En varios paises ha decaido incluso de forma notablela publicación de nuevas investigaciones en las ciencias sociales.

Los organismos públicos de planifiación, otra fuente tradicionalde reflexión sobre el futuro, han perdido su estatus jerárquico y muchosde sus profesionales mejor apacitados. La misma palabra planificaciónha caído en desgracia. Sin embargo, resulta casi imposible pensar en undesarrollo sostenible sin el concepto de planificación. La acciónespontanea del mercado, solo, no llevara jamás a la sostenibilidad. Estaafirmación no constituye de ninguna forma una apología de las formas tradicionales de planificación o de intervención estatal que se han prac-ticado en América Latina hasta ahora. Es evidente que muchos de esosejercicios resultaron esteriles y poco productivos. Hoy se plantea el retoineludible de inventar nuevas modalidades de planificación. masajustadas a las necesidades del desarrollo sostenible.

En casi toda la región, las actividades de conservación de losrecursos estan siendo financiadas en gran parte por agencias externas(Lindarte y Benito, 1991). Estos fondos vienen como parte de proyectosde corta o mediana duración (diez años o menos), ya que los sistemasde asignación de los donantes también son completamente incapaces depensar en el largo plazo. Es mas la experiencia demuestra que la ayudaexterna ha sido sujeta a modas trazadas, haciendo creer a muchosgobiernos latinoamericanos que el “desarrollo sostenible” es simplementeuna moda más y, por lo tanto, no es sostenible.

Por último, habria que anotar el efecto nocivo para la valorizacióndel futuro, del alto grado dc desigualdad social y de la falta de espaciosdemocráticos en América Latina. Ningún llamado a favor de unapreocupación por las generaciones futuras puede tener acogida ylegitimidad, si la población se siente marginada de la toma de decisionesy se percibe que los costos y beneficios de los cambios no seránditribuidos de forma equitativa.

3. Aspectos culturales y sociales

En el plano sicológico, la mentalidad de incertidumbre y la sensaciónde crisis juegan papeles importantes en la percepción del futuro. Guerras,

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cambios frecuentes en los gobiernos, el senclonalismo de la prensa, lasfluctuaciones económicas, ayudan a crear una sensación de impotenciay a promover la pasividad y el cortoplacismo. La pobreza da sustentomaterial a la idea de que los hijos tienen que vivir en función de lasnecesidades do los padres, y no al revés, actitud poco conducente apriorizar las generaciones futuras.

El deterioro de las escuelas públicas, institución básica. desocialización nacional, limita el conocimiento y asimilación de la historiaentre la juventud —y sin un concepto de pasado, .dificilmente puedehaber una noción clara de futuro-. Esa tendencia esd reforzada por lageneralización de los valores y contenidos culturales de los mediosmasivos de comunicación de los EE.UU.; un país que nunca ha tenidouna concepción clara del peso de Ja historia, y con los niveles de ahorroper capita más bajos en eI mundo desarrollado. En Hollywood no hayfuturo; todo termina.—y generalmente de forma positiva—dentro de120 minutos.

El individualismo y el egoísmo, promovidos como valores positivospor aquellos que creen que “la mano visible” del mercado lo resuelvetodo soN fundamentalmente Incompatibles con una sostenibilidad queimplica una preocupación por personas que todavía ni siquiera hannacido. Sin idealismo no puede haber sostenibilidad.

4, El camino hacía el futuro

En cierto sentido, el camino hacia la valoración del futuro essimplemente revertir las condiciones que actualmente lo estánimpidiendo. Crear condiciones económicas y políticas estables, propiciaspara la inversión y visión hacia el largo plazo. Reconstruir y democratizarlas instancias de reflexión de la sociedad, y compartir de forma másequitativa sus riquezas. Profundizar el desarrollo de las instituciones yde la cultura nacional. No es casualidad que Costa Rica, que reúnevarias, aunque no todas, de estas condiciones, hayapodido avanzarhacia una estrategia de desarrollo sostenible más que algunos otrospaíses.

Todo eso suena lindo, pero, ¿cómo se llega allí? El primer paso esreivindicar la importancia del bien público y del desarrollo institucional,sobre el plan privado y la anarquía de mercados sin restricciones. Lasdos cosas son necesarias --bienes ptíblicos y privados, intervención ymercado-, no obstante, para el balance requiere girarse de nuevo hacíael bien común. El segundo paso es la concentración nacional —lademocracia en el sentido más amplio-, donde los diferentes sectoresde la sociedad se organizan y sus representantes buscan la formulaciónde un nuevo pacto social. El tercer paso es darnos cuenta de lo que estáen juego si fracasamos: nada menos que el futuro...; cl futuro de nuestroplaneta y nuestra humanidad,

Bíbliografía.

Banco Mundial. 1990. Informe sobre el desarrolla mundial. Washington D. C.Bruner, J. J. 1990. Educación superior en América Latina: cambios y desafíos.

México D. F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 205 p.CEPAL. 1988. Anuario estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe. Nueva York.Comisión Brundtland. 1987. Our Common Future. Londres: Oxford. Erickson, P. G. 1985. Roaming Round Holland. 5a edición. Utrecht, Holanda:

van Boekhoven, 144 pp.Krutilla, J. V.: Fischer, A. C. 1975. The Economics of Natural Enuironments.

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 292 pp.Lindarte, E.; Benito, C, 1991. “Instituciones, tecnología y políticas en la agri-

cultural sostenible da laderas en América Central”, pp. 77-188, en:Agricultura sostenible en las laderas centroamericanas. San José IICA/CIAT/CATIE/CIMMYT.

Murray, D. 1991. “Sustauibility: tho Paradigmatic Challenge to AgriculturalEconomics”. Sin publicar. 10 p.

Page, T. 1991. “Sustainability and the Problem of Valuation”, pp. 58-75, en:Ecological Economics,. The Science and Management of Sustainability(Constanza, R. ed.). Nueva York: Columbia University Press.

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Lugar de Ia publicación:New YorkTítulo:Environmental Challenge: Dynamics of Firm BehaviorEditorial:Wiley And SonsAutor/editor:Williams, HughCapítulo/artículo:Capítulo 4: Corporate Strategies for a sustainable futureAño (fecha) de publicación:1991Páginas De: Al:108-137

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Corpora te S t ra t eg ies fo r a

S u s t a i n a b l e F u t u r e

Hugh E. Williams, James Medhurst, and Kirstine Drew

Environmental resources are fudamental to economic and social develop-ment. The reversal of environmental degradation and depletion of envi-romental resources is now recognized as being essential if growth ineconomic activity is to be sustainable in the longer term. This principle hasreceivcd increasing recognition and acceptance by policy makers and thewider community and represents a major break with the traditional viewthat economic development could be based on the consumption of limit-less environmental resources. Environmentally sustainable economicgrowth is now widely accepted as being the goal for international, na-tional, and regional economies, with the twin objectives of economicdevelopment and improvements in environmental performance.

One of the major consumers of environmental resources and producersof environmental damage and pollution is manufacturing industry, tradi-tionally the bedrock of economic activity. Some business leaders nowwidely acknowledge that environmental protection measures have be-come, and will continue to be, a growing influence on how companiesoperate and, in some cases, on what they do. For some firms, environmen-tal protection and green consumerism will provide new business oppor-tunities; for many, adaptations will improve overall performance, bringsavings, and increase profitability. To others, however, meeting tougherenvironmental standards will be costly and, in extreme circunstances, mayforce closure. There is therefore a dynamic tension between maintaining

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and increasing levels of economic activity and securing improvements inenvironmental performance.

In recognition that some companies will need assistance in developingresponses to increasing environmental pressures, research into the charac-ter of environmental pressures and their potential impact on businesses isrequired. The authors have undertaken a number of studies (eg., ECO-TEC 1991a, 1991b) to inform the development of policies that encouragecompanies to improve their environmental performance. The observationsin this chapter draw heavily on this research.

The chapter first outlines the nature and range of environmental pres-sures on firms and, to provide some context for the empirical results,briefly indicates some aspects of the legislative context for firms in theUnited Kingdom. It then briefty describes the results of a study of theexpenditures made by U.K. industry to respond to environmental stan-dards. This provides one perspective on the driving forces—namely,costs—affecting company strategies. If firms are to make adequate re-

. sponses to environmental pressures they must first have a full awareness ofthe issues. The chapter next describes the results of a detailed survey offirms in the West Midlands of the United Kingdom, considers the firms’awareness of environmental pressures and their responses, and draws someoverall conclusions.

THE CHARACTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES ON FIRMS

A number of distinct, although interrelated, environmental pressures areresponsible for raising environmental awareness in industry and for stimu-lating responses. These include:

• Increasingly stringent environmental legislation and enforcement.• Increasing costs associated with pollution control, waste disposal, and

effluent disposal.• Increasing commercial pressure from the supply, consumption, and

disposal of both final and intermediate products.• Increasing awareness on the part of investors of companies environ-

mental performance in view of the cost implications associated withliability and the polluter-pays principle.

• Increasing training and personnel requirements, together with addi-tional information requirements.

• Increasing expectations on the part of the local community and the

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work force of the environmental performance of firms and their im-pact on the environment.

Each of these pressures is brought about by different actors, such asgovernment agencies, consumers, and investors. The pressures each bringsto bear are discussed below.

GOVERNMENT PRESSURE

It is not the purpose of this chapter to outline current and emerginglegislation in the United Kingdom and the European Community (EC). Itis necessary to note, however, that recent and upcoming European Com-munity directives will result in much more stringent legislation requiringhigher environmental standards to be achieved (e.g., in relation to efflu-ents and atmospheric emissions). Moreover, this legislation is much morecomprehensive and is likely to impact on a wider range of economicactivities and industrial processes. This wider impact will also be broughtabout by encouraging other actors to press for improved environmentalperformance; for example, the eco-labeling proposal (see below) will allowconsumers to exercise choice on the basis of environmental criteria.

The new legislation not only is aimed at preventing pollution by in-troducing higher standards, but also recognizes the vital importance ofinfluencing the management behavior of industry and increasing thetransparency of the firms’ environmental management operations (e.g.,the Environmental Audit Directive). The following are examples of thedirectives that are likely to cause these impacts:

1. A Hazardous Waste (Amendment) Directive has been proposed thatwill increase the number of waste streams defined as being hazardous.

2. The Draft Municipal Wastewater Directive primarily covers dis-charges from municipal wastewater treatment plants (vis-a-vis oxidizablesorganics, phosphorus, and nitrogen), but it also places similar biodegrad-able effluents from industry (e.g., food and drink) under the same controls.

3. The proposed Environmental Audit Directive, although likely to bevoluntary at first, provides for rights of public access to the auditedstatement; as a consequence, companies could face increased exposure tofinancial risk. There will also be significant resource implications for indus-try in terms of the management time required to undertake the administra-tive procedures. If implemented as proposed, this directive will also havethe effect of making companies take a much broader look at their environ-mental responsibilities.

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4. A regulation was passed in March 1992 that provided for a commu-nity eco-labeling award scheme. Eco-labeling provides an official technicalassessment of the life cycle of a particular product. The main aspects of thescheme embrace the concept of a “cradle-to-grave” approach whereby aproduct’s environmental impact assessment takes account of extraction,manufacturing, packaging, and disposal. The scheme is voluntary, and theproducts included will be determined by the need for firms to promoteeco-labeling as part of their marketing strategy and therefore will dependlargely on consumer pressure in particular product markets.

To provide some context for the empirical results presented here, it isimportant to note that there have been two major pieces of legislationenacted recently in the United Kingdom—namely, the 1989 Water Actand the 1990 Environmental Protection Act.

There are three major implications of the 1989 Water Act. First, indus-try will be subject to more rigorous policing of discharge contents; second,industry will be subject to higher trade effluent and discharge charges; andthird, industry will be subject to the possibility of the National RiversAuthority (NRA) imposing a cleanup program and associated costs wheregroundwater quality is threatened by leakage/seepage from a site.

The 1990 Environmental Protection Act introduces a system of inte-grated pollution control for major plants and more stringent control for allindustry. Major plants are required to prevent prescribed substances frombeing released or, where this is not feasible, to use BATNEEC (BestAvailable Technology Not Entailing Excessive Cost) for pollution controlon existing plants and best available technology for new investments. Inaddition, they must demonstrate proper management procedures andavailability of adequately trained staff, provide for regular monitoring ofthe process, and maintain and make available records of emissions, efflu-ents, and wastes.

Further, Part 2 of the act establishes a “Duty of Care” on waste pro-ducers and waste contractors. The main implication of this provision isthat industry will have to increase its expenditure on waste management toensure that its wastes are disposed of in a proper manner. Waste disposalcost will also increase significantly as waste operators implement highers tandards .

While environmental legislation represents the main pressure, increasing costs associated with managing industrial emissions are also an impor-tant factor. In particular, the rapidly rising cost of waste disposal and ofdischarging liquid effluent to sewers or waterways is exerting severe finan-cial pressure, thus providing a powerful incentive for industry to reduce

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both the volume and toxicity of its by-products. In addition, the costimplications of a major, pollution incident (including remediation at thesite, the effect on the company’s image, potentially major fines, and lostproduction) provide a powerful incentive for firms to invest in measuresthat will reduce the probability or impact of such an incident.

Many companies will wish to manage environmental audits to assesstheir companies’ pcrformance and compliance with legislation and toprovide the basis for future monitoring. This is likely to bring aboutsignificant investment and training requirements. Investment in pollutioncontrol is about not only short-term end-of-pipe solutions, but also thedevelopment of clean and cleaner technologies and plant managementtechniques that reduce waste and pollution discharges. This means theimprovement of existing operations or the introduction of new plants andprocesses. Hence, programs of improved management or of process adap-tation may need to be put in place to meet both environmental andfinancial criteria, and businesses will have to realign management practicesto respond to environmental objectives in addition to other companyobjectives. All of this implies increased management as well as investmentcosts. Furthermore, the increased costs resulting from environmental reg-ulation will affect companies not only directly, but also indirectly, asenvironmental costs feed through into the prices of raw materials, energy,water, and so forth.

CONSUMER AND SUPPLIER PRESSURE

Customer awareness of environmental issues represents a significant sec-ondary pressure that has resulted in an increase in corporate awareness andthe adoption of a range of responses by industry. Consumers are increas-ingly better informed and more aware of the environmental content andimpact of consumer products and are thus demanding that industry im-prove the environmental performance of its products. This has resulted inmaterial substitution and the development "green” products—for exam-ple, detergents. Firms are also increasingly seeking to purchase intermedi-ate products that will minimize their waste disposal, pollution control, andenergy costs. In addition, suppliers are providing advisory services to theircustomers on the use of particular products and the development of alterna-tive products in order to minimize their environmental impact. For exam-pie, certain chemical companies are helping their customers deal with theproblems of disposing of used solvents by taking back solvents after use andassuming responsibility for their treatment and disposal.

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Investors are increasingly examining the environmental records of poten-tial investments, and some are showing a tendency to invest in “greener”companies. This behavior is based on the expectation that these com-panies will benefit commercially from their green image and that thereare efficiency gains associated with the adoption of cleaner technologies.However, also of concern are the cost implications of liability issues.Legisiation introducing liability for environmental damage is not welldeveloped in the United Kingdom. However, the experience of the U.S.Superfund, administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agencyto fund the cost of cleaning up contaminated sites, has demonstrated thatthe costs associated with cleaning up contamination can be immense.Liability issues are likely to become increasingiy prominent in the UnitedKingdom through measures such as the Duty of Care (breach of whichwill result in criminal liability) and the draft EC directive introducingcivil liabitity for damage caused by waste. A more general liability direc-tive for environmental damage is also possible. The 1989 Water Actintroduced a provision whereby the NRA can clean up any site threaten-ing groundwater quality and recover the costs it incurs in so doing. Theever-changing standards in environmental legislation introduce a newelement of uncertainty into decision making with regard to the specifica-tion of new capital for plant and investment, thus increasing risk factorsand costs. .

COMMUNITY PRESSURE

Local communities represent a powerful pressure for improved environ-mental performance, particularly where firms are located in close prox-imity to residential areas. Where problems and nuisance associated withnoise, vibration, and odor occur, local communities, both directly andindirectly through complaints to local environmental health departments,are capable of bringing considerable pressure to reduce environmentalproblems.

WORK FORCE PRESSURE

The interests and aspirations of the work force and of trade unions repre-sent potential pressure where a strong interest in the environmental per-formance of a specific plant occurs.

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INVESTOR PRESSURE

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A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERINC ENVIRONMENTALPRESSURES ON FIRMS

The enviromental pressures discussed above affect firms at all stages ofactivity, influencing the nature and cost of inputs, the required productspecification, and sales service and responsibilities (see Figure 4.1). Forexample, introduccion of a carbon tax may affect energy prices and willcertainly increase transport costs. Water charges in the United Kingdomare also particularly affected by the need to pass on the costs of increasedinvestment in protection of water resources. The nature of the productproduced (and the materials or intermediate products used) also may besignificantly affected by environmental pressures—for example, legislationand conventions banning the manufacture of CFCs, customer pressureregarding the use of tropical hardwoods for furniture, or the impact ofgreen legislation and attitudes on the design of motor vehicles.

It has also been possible to identify a range of actors that influence, firmby firm, the way environmental pressures are articulated and managed.These actors, listed in Figure 4.1, act unilaterally and independently, butalso under the influence of the other actors interests and agendas. Thus,government pressures, particularly in the form of enforcement measures,influtnce the roles and impacts of other actors. For example, in the UnitedStates, the required improvement in the public reporting of firms’ environ-

FIGURE 4.1Environmental Pressures on a Firm

1 Business Management: The convencional activity of business management.2 Interest Groups: Groups thar mediate in the process of environmental management and

influence the nature of pressures and the response.3 Environmental Business Management: The practice of managing a business with attention

to the environmental sustainability of the activity and in response to environmentalpressures.

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the Envimnmental Challege Dynamies of firm llenanaur

mental performance improves the access of the community to informationand, hence, its impact. Another example, in the United Kingdom, is thelegal requirement to prepare registers of land ownership of land that ispotentially- contaminated. This could considerably affect asset values and,hence, the interest and impact of investors.

The box in Figure 4.1 labeled “Environmental Business Management”signifies the arrival of a new but necessarily integrated management re-sponsibility to monitor and improve environmental performance, whichreflects the pressures in force throughout a company’s operation and asarticulated by different actors. This new management responsibility islikely to be facilitated by the use of environmental auditing tools and torequire the revision of corporate strategy.

Corporate responses have to deal with all of these pressures, which haveboth short- and long-term time frames. The chapter next examines thescale of the most obvious impact on industries in the United Kingdom—namely, the costs of pollution control. These costs are the most visible to acompany and are frequently cited as reasons for not taking up the environ-mental change. Comparing pollution control costs with sales revenueplaces environmental pressures in the wider context of industry’s activitiesas a whole and hence gives some perspective to these pressures.

INDUSTRY’S EXPENDITURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

In 1988, ECOTEC undertook a detailed survey of the expenditures madeby some 117 firms in the United Kingdom. Firms were asked to supplydetailed information on the following components of expenditure: pollu-tion control equipment (PCE), PCE installation, and PCE operation(including charges for emissions, effluents and waste). These three com-ponents add up to what we have termed gross costs. In addition, firmswere asked to consider possible financial benefits resulting from pollutioncontrol measure, due, for example, to improved plant efficiency. Thesebenefits, where they have been quantified, are subtracted from gross coststo provide an estimate of net costs. All costs were annualized to giveaverage annual figures.

The net costs are presented in Table 4.1. The first column reports the netcosts per £1000 of sales revenue. The highest expenditure on pollution

control for a given level of output is made by the chemical industry, whilethe lowest expenditure per £1000 of sales revenue is made by the engineer-ing industry. These costs represent a first-order indication of the relativepropensity of industrial activities to generate pollution. The high expendi-

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TABLE 4.1

NET ANNUAL COSTS OF POLLUTION CONTROL IN

SUURCE: ECOTEC (1989).NOTES:¹ All figures for 1988 are in 1986 prices. For equivalent sterling purchasing power in 1990

prices, multiply values by 1.24. From 1988 to 1992, real growth in expenditure can beexpected

² Industries listed in the table are still likely to be the most significant sectors in terms ofenvironmental activity.

tures incurred in the chemical industry, for example, are due in part to therequirement to control very dangerous substances, especially in the or-ganic pharmaceutical industry. By comparison, the engineering industrygenerates relatively smaller amounts of less harmful substances.

The second column expresses net costs as a percentage of sales revenue.It can be seen that there are significant variations between broad industrysectors. However, it is important to note that no sector has dramaticallyhigh net costs when expressed as a percentage of sales revenue.

The third column indicates the estimated net cost of pollution control ineach of the selected industries. The highest level of expenditure is incurredby the chemical industry, as anticipated in the prior assumptions for thesurvey.

The net costs for selected industries, expressed as a percentage of com-pany sales revenue, were also analyzed by size of company. This analysisshould be treated with some caution given the limited number of respon-dents in certain firm size categories. The analysis, summarized in Table4.2, indicates a broad direct relationship between firm size and the relativeimportance of pollution control expenditures. This relationship occurs inthree of the five industries listed. However, in two industries the relation-

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TABLE 4.2NET ANNUAL COSTS OP POLLUTION CONTROL IN SELECTED

INDUSTRIES BY FIRM EMPLOYMENT SIZE

ship does not occur. In the chemical industry, which had the largestnumber of respondents, there appears to be a size threshold above whichpollution control expenditure becomes a much more significant item ofexpenditure—that is, when a firm employs more than 100 people. More-over, a slight decrease in the relative importance of pollution control expen-dirure occurs for the largest firms. In the food-processing industry, theconverse is the case. Small firms in this industry appear to have particularlyhigh costs; for firms above a certain size (more than 100 employees),pollution control expenditure appears to be significantly lower.

The survey revealed two forces driving expenditure on pollution con-trol: the "carrot” and the “stick.” The carrot is improved market perfor-mance, which results from a “clean” image. A number of larger firmsindicated that new corporate policies aimed at generating a better reputa-tion for environmental responsibility were leading to new investment inpollution control. The sticks are stronger or more vigorous enforcementpractices and the prospect of more stringent environmental policies. Anumber of firms were investing in pollution control to stay “ahead of thegame.” The carrot and stick phenomenon as an influence on pollutioncontrol expenditure is also related to company characteristics. The acceptance of greater environmental responsibility is also part of a wider recognition that the generation of wastes and pollutants indicates inefficient

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company practices. Investment in pollution control is therefore seen as aninvestment in a more efficient production process. On the other hand,companies that respond to the stick are those that perceive investment inpollution control as a cost burden to be minimizad at all times.

To some degree, these aspects are reflected in the survey findings relatedto the financial benefits that firms attributed to pollution control expendi-tures. Financial benefits accrue mainly from the selling and recycling ofwaste products. For example, one major oil-refining company is able tohalve the costs of crude oil inputs by replacing them with oil wastes fromthe refining process. These benefits are generally gained only by largercompanies. With a few limited exceptions, no firms with sales revenuebelow £5 million attributed any financial benefits to pollution control.This reflects in part the greater awareness of larger firms concerning thebenefits to be gained from well-planned and well-managed pollution con-trol procedures and their need for efficient use of resources and reductionof waste to improve economic efficiency.

The estimated percentage of gross PCE costs that financial benefitsrepresent, as shown in Table 4.3, varies from 14 percent in the quarrying/cement and paper and pulp industries to 3 percent in the metal-manufacturing industry. Across the industries included in this study, finan-cial benefits account for some 7 percent of gross costs. To an extent, thesebenefits represent an understatement of the full level of financial benefits,since firms readily admit to being unable to quantify all the benefits theyreceive, or indeed admit to having not considered that benefits mightactually occur. Variations between industries should therefore be inter-

TABLE 4.3ANNUAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS ATTRIBUTED TO POLLUTION CONTROL

IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES

FINANCIAL BENEFIT PERCENTAGE OFSELECTED INDUSTRY (£ MILLION) GROSS COST

Fuel Processing 1.3 4.0Metal Manufacture 9.3 3.3Quarring/Cement 14.3 14.4

Engineering 8.4 6.7Food Processing 31.2 9.9Paper and Pulp 32.1 14.4SOURCE: ECOTEC (1989).NOTE: all figures are in 1986 prices.

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preted carefully, since they reflect in part the ability of individual firms toquantify financial benefits.

The fact that pollution control costs as a percentage of sales revenuegenerally increase as firm size increases suggests, not surprisingly, thatlarger firms are more aware of the environmental pressures on them, evenif only those pressures arising primarily from legislation and enforcement.One might also expect that the prospect of potential savings from betterpollution control equipment or management practices might also influ-ence firms’ responses.

CORPORATE AWARENESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES

An earlier part of this chapter discussed the wide range of environmentalpressures that bear upon firms and the different aspects of firm activity theycan affect, from the purchase of inputs through process control andchanges to the product itself. Such an analysis suggests that firms should beresponding to environmental pressures as a part of overall strategic man-agement, affecting decisions on product development, future process tech-nology, and so forth, as well as current costs. ECOTEC thereforeundertook a series of detailed discussions in 1991 with a selected sample oftwenty-five firms in the subregion of the West Midlands of the UnitedKingdom. Table 4.4 shows the industry sectors, firm sizes, and number offirms surveyed.

A full corporate management response that examines not only thecurrent position of the firm, but also possible future conditions, impliesthat the firm will have a view as to the nature of current environmentalpressures and how these will change in the future. Thus, a series ofscenarios of future developments were discussed with firms in the survey,both to check their awareness of potential future environmental pressuresand as a basis for assessing their responses to both current and futurepressures. The following discussion summarizes the views of the firmssurveyed with regard to the impact of environmental pressures. The dis-cussion is set out in terms of each of the key business management ele-ments in Figure 4.1: inputs, processes, and outputs.

IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES ON INPUTS

The impact of environmental pressures on a firm is partly influenced by therelative contribution to total production costs of the different inputs. Onthe basis of the interviews, it is evident that there is a variation in the

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e 4.

4A

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lLE

OF T

HE F

IRM

S IN

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IEW

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The Environmental Change Dynamies of Firm Behavior

character of production costs between small and large companies, as illus-trated in Table 4.5. In large firms, raw materials and energy costs represent ahigher percentage of production costs and labor costs a lower percentage,reflecting the greater capital intensity of production in larger firms.

Raw MaterialsRaw materials costs generally account for the largest proportion of totalproduction costs. The impact of environmental pressures on raw materialspurchased by the firms interviewed stems principally from suppliers, par-ticularly overseas suppliers. These supplies, especially of metal products,are having to raise the price of raw materials in response to environmentalpressures. Examples include overseas supplies of brass, metal, and alumi-num and domestic supplies of steel products with a high selenium/cadmium content. Prices of these types of materials are increasing on theorder of 10 to 12 percent per year, principally because of environmentalpressures.

The impacts of price increases are increased costs and reduced prof-itability, because firms are severely curtailed in their ability to pass on priceincreases to their customers. Some companies said they would seek tosource more widely to avoid incurring additional costs.

In a few firms, raw materials price increases have also led to somechanges in production methods, particularly to minimize the amount ofwaste produced. For example, a tube-making operation altered its produc-tion process to minimize the amount of scrap steel produced.

Energy costs are a significant item in the production costs of most firms;they can account for up to 40 percent of production costs. Most of the

TABLE 4.5A TIPICAL BREAKDOWN OF PRODUCTION COSTS

cost ITEM SMALL FIRMS LARGE FIRMS

Raw Materials 50 60Labor 40 25Energy 5 10Other (Including Water and Waste) 5 5

Total Costs 100 100

SOURCE: ECOTEC (1991b).

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respondents think that energy prices will increase by some 5 percent in thenear future, although some believe that price increases in the next five yearscould be substantially higher.

High energy users have considered the effects of higher energy costs,having undertaken energy audits. In particular they have investigated theopportunities for switching to more fuel-efficient sources, especially forspace heating; plant layout is, however, a particular constraint in thisregard. Energy efficiency measures are undertaken for commercial reasonsand are not perceived to be a reaction to environmental pressures.

LaborIn the firms surveyed, the significance of environmental performance crite-ria in recruiting and retaining staff is not considered to be great. Therecession has in many cases reduced the work force and increased thesupply of skilled labor. In this context environmental criteria are lesssignificant than pay and working conditions in attracting and retainingstaff. However, a number of firms accept that in the future the perceptionsheld by potential recruits in relation to the firm’s environmental perfor-mance could become a significant factor.

Raw WaterThe firms surveyed generally did not consider increases in raw watercharges to be a significant issue. Heavy users of water have already installedmetering and are attempting to reduce consumption.

ConclusionsThe main impacts of environmental pressures on inputs are increasingcosts of energy and raw materials. Responses that minimize costs are beingmade, especially in relation to energy costs. Energy costs and increases arenot perceived to be environmentally determined.

IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES ON PROCESSES

The views held by firms clearly determine their judgment about the impactof environmental pressures, especially regulatory pressure. (There is amarked absence of information in most firms about the nature and volumeof emissions, and therefore about the effect of environmental pressures onthe industrial process.) These views are determined in part by the level andnature of the contacts firms had with regulatory agencies. This is animportant point, since it illustrates the degree to which firms are still

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reacting to externally generated pressures rather than making environmen-tal issues part of the internal management agenda. Responses specific tothe key environmental media were found.

Water PollutionTwo separate pressures with regard to water pollution can be identified:higher wastewater charges for companies disposing of effluents to sewers/water systems, and higher standards designed to reduce the concentrationof pollutants in wastewater streams. Tht respondents recognized that cur-rent charges would increase; some firms believed that since charges in 1990had risen 5 percent above inflation, even higher increases could be ex-pected. Firms suggested that tht effect of higher charges would not neces-sarily be significant and would be mitigated to some extent by their previousand current measures to reduce effluent volumes and concentrations.

Air PollutionThe respondents, patticularly small firms, had an extremely limited appre-ciation of the current and future effects of air pollution control on theiractivities. Very few of the firms surveyed have undertaken any analysis ofgaseous emission content, volumen, or concentrations, and most, with theexception of the larger companies, are ignorant as to the nature andvolume of their gaseous emissions. Judgments of the effects of higher airquality standards were therefore difficult for the firms to make.

A number of firms suggested that the effect of higher standards isdirectly related to the level of enforcement. Limited enforcement activitywould allow firms to continue to operate at lower standards, knowingly orunknowingly. Respondents cited the difference between air pollutioncontrol and water pollution control, where greater contact with waterpollution regulators has led to improved levels of pollution control.

Waste ManagementAll of the firms interviewed generate wastes, such as paint sludges, metalswarf, soluble cleaning oils, and so forth. In a limited number of cases, thewastes generated are hazardous. The majority of firms use specialist wastecontractors to collect and dispose of their waste, but a small number of thelarger firms have their own waste treatment and disposal operations.The general lack of awareness in relation to gaseous emissions ismatched by a similar lack of awareness of the provisions of the Environ-mental Protection Act in relation to waste management. Only the higestfirms were aware of the Duty of Care provision, and 3 number of thesefirms had not thought through the possible implications of this provision,

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particularly in relation to liability and land contamination.The majority ofcompanies surveyed are not aware of what happens to their waste aftercollection and do not consider that they have any responsibility for thewaste once it is collected. Ensuring the use of licensed waste contractors isa responsibility recognized by most companies, but the survey identifiedonly two companies that had carried out 3 thorough investigation of wastedisposal operations.

In terms of waste disposal charges companies expect a sharp increase inthese costs. This view is based on the realization that landfill capacity isbound to decline and that incineration is more expensive, rather than onany understanding of Part 2 of the Environmental Protection Act. Thesehigher charges are not generally considered to have a significant effect andhave not, of themselves, led to revised waste management procedures.

TechnologyThe impact of environmental pressures on the tcchnology, production,and pollution control methods of companies has been extensive; most ofthe companies surveyed have had to make investments and incur costs inresponse to environmental pressures. Significant expenditures have beenmade, for example, for noise and vibration reduction, with firms having totake action not only for health and safety reasons. In a few cases, theimpacts have been so great as to put the commercial viability of the firm atrisk, and these risks still persist.

In general, the respondents consider the impact of future environmentalpressures on production and pollution control technologies to be uncer-tain. The most significant effect the firms identified is the likely require-ment for the installation of pollution monitoring and sampling proce-dures, although firms are unclear as to the techniques and equipment thatwill be required. The uncertainty results from a lack of information inrelation to new environmental standards and a lack of guidance as to thebest technologies to use. Until these uncertainties are reduced, futureenvironmental pressures are unlikely to lead to significant changes inproduction or pollution control technology in most firms.

ManagementIn firms that are responding widely to environmental issues, the amount oftime allocated to environmental management tasks is generally perceivedto have increased over the past two years by up to 30 percent in some of thelarger firms. In the larger firms, and in highly polluting firms, there areexamples of new positions being created specifically to carry out environ-mental responsibilities. Some companies have established environmental

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committees that meet at regular intervals. The effect of environmentalpressures in quantitative terms ranges from approximately one-half to oneperson-year of additional management time.

The impact of environmental pressures on training is related to the typeof company response to these pressures, particularly the technical re-sponse, as changes in process and equipment create a demand for trainingof both operators and managers. Also, some companies that are subject tosevere environmental pressures, particularly in relation to compliance withlegislation, believe that managers must be kept up-to-date on both legisla-tion and new methods of pollution control and prevention. Some of themedium-size and larger companies surveyed suggested that training willbecome necessary if they are to implement monitoring and auditing pro-cedures successfully in the future.

The main impacts of environmental pressures on technology in the firmssurveyed are felt in relation to pollution control, especially effluent controland disposal. Firms had adopted an extensive range of technical responsesto comply with environmental standards. In terms of management, firmsare mainly reacting to the agenda set by government through legislationrather than promoting a positive environmental management responseaccording to an internally generated agenda. Firms are slow even toperceive the development of policies by government. .

IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES ON OUTPUTS

ProductsMost firms in the survey produce intermediate products and, conse-quently, do not consider their products subject to environmental pressuresfrom customers or final consumers. Discussions with these firms do reveal,however, that certain pressures exist. Legislative pressures exist for envi-ronmental reasons, such as noise performance standards, and commercialpressures exist as customers require supplier firms to assist them in produc-ing products that have fewer environmental effects resulting from use anddisposal. This is particularly true of vehicle manufacturers. A responsefrom the intermediate product manufactures that is perhaps typical ofthese manufactures in the United Kingdom is that they are very slow atinnovation and regard their role as one of responding to customer com-pany specifications.

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Distribution costs are generally insignificant as a proponion of operatingcosts, except where the company serves an export market, in which distri-bution costs can rise as high as 25 percent of total operating costs. Theeffect of higher fuel prices (reflecting environmental pressures) on distri-bution costs is likely to be mitigated by reviewing shipment loads. How-ever, four companies suggested that a switch to rail is a possibility if fuelprices rise sufficiently.

Producers of intermediate products have focused little attention upon thepotential impact of environmentally driven customer requirements. Largecompanies producing final products are much more aware of, and respon-sive to, green consumer pressures.

SOURCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURE

GovernmentThe survey respondents clearly perceive environmental legislation as themost powerful pressure. However, considering that firms are affected bylegislation only to the extent to which it is enforced, some firms believethat this pressure may not be so great. In this situation some firms believethat commercial pressure, from both suppliers and customers, Will becomemore significant.

The importance attached by different firms to legislation is also influ-enced by the extent to which they are exposed to environmental pressuresin other countries. Firms operating in northern European countries andthe United States are far more aware of the potencial effect that theEnvironmental Protection Act and BATNEEC guidance could have ontheir U.K. operations than are firms that are essentially U.K.-based. Thisdistinction is partly due to the size of the firm, since transnational firms arelarger, but large, U.K.-based firms are also less well informed and lessaware of the importance of environmental legislation than are firms withoverseas ownership.

Local Communities

A small number of companies in the survey are currently severely affectedby local community pressures to the extent that they have modified their

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processes and working operations and implemented pollution controlactivities. Some firms are still required to take corrective action that maythreaten their viability. Others for whom the impact has not been so greatexpect that this type of pressure will heighten as public and communitygroups become more aware and better informed due to increased publicaccess to information on firms environmental performance, provided forin the Environmental Protection Act, and a general increase in concern forthe environment.

CustomerCustomers, as noted above, are not perceived to be a source of environ-mental pressure, although there is recognition that a number of existingand future pressures are driven by environmental improvement objectives.In particular, suppliers of motor vehicle components recognize that theywill need to address the requirements of vehicle manufacturers as theyrespond to environmental pressures.

As discussed above, a perceived source of pressure is the suppliers of rawmaterials, particularly copper, aluminum, and steel, who pass on priceincreases to firms as a result of higher environmental costs. However,another significant issue that emerged in the survey was the environmentalpressure arising from the use of particular material inputs in productionprocesses that either have become subject to a ban or restriction (e.g.,cadmium, CFCs, asbestos, and some solvents) or cause releases that aresubject to increasingly stringent control (e.g., paints). The impact withregard to solvents and paints is likely to be very significant for companies inthe survey, as these materias are heavily used in a wide range of processes(e.g., degreasing, painting and coating, shot blasting, and pickling) thatare common to a number of the industry sectors surveyed.

Employees and Trade Unions

The work force and trade unions are not currently perceived by companiesin the survey to be exerting pressure for improvements in environmentalperformance. This finding stems partly from the low presence of unions inthc companies surveyed (particularly among the small companies) andpartly from the fact that trade union activity on enviromental issues hasbeen fairly limited to date, with health and safety issues having the mainimpact on firms. The trade unions have been slow to address environmen-tal issues due to a perceived conflict between their commitment to protect-ing jobs and the potential job losses associated with good environmental

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practice. However, there has recently been a shift in position in recogni-tion of the link between good environmental practice and health and safetyin the workplace, and due to concern for the living conditions of workersfamilies, who often live close to the workplace.

The firms surveyed do not currently believe that investors exert pressuresfor improved environmental performance. The majority of these firmshave not considered the likelihood of such pressures emerging. However,a small number of the larger, well-informed companies are aware of thepossible future implications and have begun to address the issue. In thiscontext, it is worth noting that few of the firms in the survey recognize thepotential liabilities associated with the possible contamination of theirsites. The large majority of firms own their sites and have been establishedthere for an average of thirty years, and, in some cases, for much longerperiods. Thus, while pressure from investors is generally not recognized byfirms, this does not imply that it does not exist.

ConclusionsGovernment legislation and enforcement remains the most tangible sourceof pressure on firms and the one that determines the character of companyresponses. Perceptions of the impact of other actors, and of the necessity ofresponding to these actors, are generally very limited.

CORPORATE RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES

The overall model in Figure 4.1 of how environmental pressures affectfirms suggests that firms should be developing responses that integrateenvironmental considerations into all aspects of management for bothcurrent operations and future planning. However, as the above discussionshows, few firms recognize that the pressures are as wide-ranging as themodel suggests, It is therefore not surprising that few of the firms inter-viewed had developed an environmental strategy or clear corporate envi-ronmental policies. The responses they have made are summarized below.

ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS

The undertaking of an environmental audit—not just a compliance auditbut one covering all business operations—is clearly a prerequisite for thepreparation of environmental strategies. Some of the firms surveyed have

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conducted partial or complete environmental audits, most often energyaudits as a basis for undertaking energy conservation measures. Even in thelargest companies, comprehensive and continuous procedures for mon-itoring solid waste, effluents, and gaseous emissions are frequently absent,partly because of the higt costs involved and partly because of uncertaintyover the very recent developments in monitoring techniques and equip-ment. The general absence of monitoring is a particular feature in theresponse (or lack of response) by firms. However, despite the absence of aframework provided by an environmental audit, the majority of medium-size and larger firms have prepared some form of response to environmen-tal pressures, particularly where technical solutions are required, in re-sponse to noise, effluent, fume, or odor problems.

Very few firms have considered undertaking environmental audits oftheir suppliers, and they seem to be skeptical of the idea. Exceptionsinclude, for example, vehicle manufacturers, who propose to instigateenvironmental audits of their suppliers, albeit at a technical rather than acorporate level. A number of supplier firms are having to respond to thedecision of British Aerospace, under the influence of the Minister ofDefense, to audit their suppliers. This suggests that the customer-intermediate supplier chain will only work to transmit environmentalpressures in certain circunstances.

TECHNICAL RESPONSES

The technical responses of the firms in the survey vary greatly. Firms at oneextreme are investing heavily to remove or reduce environmental prob-lems, while firms at the other extreme are undertaking only minimalresponses. A number of larger firms have brought in new waste minimiza-tion and waste recycling operations associated with production processes.Examples include selling back solvents to suppliers, selling scrap metal,selling packaging for reuse, and reusing wastewater within the productionprocess. A number of companies have invested heavily in R&D to removepollution problems through the introduction of clear production tech-niques. A good example is the investment by a number of manufacturers inthe vehicle industry in water-based paints and integrated pollution controlas a means of mitigating emissions of volatile organic compounds.

Despite significant investment, substantial technical problems remainfor many firms. Investment in noise reduction has typically occurred as aresult of health and safety considerations and regulations. However, anumber of firms believe that ensuring compliance with permitted noiselevels requires further investment, which would cause substantial financial

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difficulties. Other difficult technical problems are related to treatment ofeffluents, particularly those contaminated with metal (copper and nickel),in the light of likely increases in standards.

The majority of firms are still largely dependent on end-of-pipe pollu-tion control techniques. The range of potential technical responses isextensive, and the gradual introduction and assimilation of guidance inrelation to BATNEEC will generate extensive investment in productionand pollution control technologies. The detailed characteristics of thisfuture investment are, however, unclear to many firms.

The waste management practices of companies have not generally beensubject to review or revision resulting from changes affecting the wastemanagement industry. In the companies surveyed, awareness of thesechanges is very limited. Firms experiencing substantial increases in wastedisposal charges and anticipating further increases have not changed theirwaste management practices and do not anticipate doing so. Some largerfirms, while not fully conversant with Part 2 of the Environmental Protec-tion Act, do recognize a need to review legal responsibilities in relation towaste management, but the majority do not. Some firms are undertakingwaste audits with a view to clarifying their legal responsibilities and knowl-edge about the required levels of compliance.

PRODUCT REVIEW

The response to customer pressure is most developed in companies pro-ducing final consumer products; vehicle manufacturers are a good exam-ple. These large firms are responding to the need for more energy-efficientvehicles as the primary consideration, and weight reduction is their princi-pal aim. The pressures associated with vehicle disposal are also beingaddressed with standardization and reduction in the number of vehicleparts. Some issues remain, however: new recycling procedures involvingvehicle manufacturers in the collection, recycling, and scrapping of usedvehicles are still to be developed.

The response of firms producing intermediate products is generally toaccep that any market-driven environmental pressures will be articulatedby their customers through changes in product specifications. Futureresponses are unlikely to develop very far from this position. The excep-tios to this reactive approach occur in firms that produce intermediateproducts that are hazardous in use and disposal, such as chemicals. These

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firms have developed procedures and practices to advise and assist cus-tomers with the safe use and disposal of their products.

SECTOR AND SIZE OF FIRM

One major finding of the survey is that differences between companies indifferent industrial sectors in terms of both environmental impact andenvironmental response are not as significant as expected. A number offactors account for this. First, only two to five interviews were carried outin each sector, so that it was difficult to establish commonalities. Second, anumber of enviromentally significant processes—mainly, painting andcoating, plating, degreasing, welding, and metal working-are commonin many of the sectors studied. Hence, to a large extent, many of thecompanies interviewed are experiencing, or in the future will experience,similar problems. Third, many of the companies are simply not aware ofthe scale of nature of their environmental impacts and thus are unable todiscuss the particular pollutants associated with their processes. Fourth, itis evident that size of the company and whether it operates independentlyor as part of a group are far more significant factors that tend to dominatethe response.

Within this context it is possible to identify key findings pertaining tothe different industry sectors.

Environmental pressures exerted through the supply of raw materialsare most significant for companies working with metals-aluminum, steel,and brass.

Pressures related to emissions are most felt by companies operatingcoating and painting processes and degreasing and cleaning processes.These pressures affect component suppliers, vehicle manufacturers, smallmetal parts manufacturers, and printed circuit board manufacturers.

Pressures related to noise are evident throughout a numbcr of industrysectors, primarily those involved with metal working, and particularlycompanies operating presses, working with metal on metal, and doingmachine tooling. These include light engineering, heavy engineering, andvehicle manufacture.

Analysis of the responses to environmental pressures suggests a range ofresponses, governed by varying degrees of perception on the part of eachfirm as to the character and development of environmental pressures. Thetwenty-five firms surveyed have been mapped in Figure 4.2 according tothe extent of the impact of environmental pressure and the degree ofresponse, as judged by ECOTEC.

The assessment of the impact of environmental pressures takes into

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A SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF, AND RESPONSE TO, ENVIRONMENTALPRESSURES BY FIRMS IN THE STUDY AREA

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account both current and future pressures; therefore, ECOTEC’s judg-ment may differ from that of some of the firms, as they often have had onlya very limited understanding of potential future pressures. In addition,ECOTEC’s assessment of each firm’s response takes into account thedegree of success of the response in dealing with environmental pressure.Thus, a firm that has made an extensive investment in response to anenvironmental problem but has not succeeded in reducing the problemawas judged to have weaker response than a firm that has taken relativelyminot steps to address a particular problem but has succeeded in removingthe problem.

The analysis highlights two important points. First, the level of responseis broadly related to the extent of the impact of environmental pressures.Firms exposed to more extensive environmental pressures have respondedmore than firms with less exposure. Second, the extent of impact and levelof response are determined by the size of the firm. Small firms (thoseemploying less than 100 people) are, with a few exceptions, relativelyunaffected by environmental pressures and, given the relatively low level ofimportance attached to the issues, have not considered or prepared any realresponses.

The analysis also highlights particular groups of companies that experi-ence similar impacts and have undertaken similar levels of response.Group A in Figure 4.2 comprises large, multinational, overseas-ownedcompanies that are exposed to significant environmental pressures andhave taken, and/or are planning to take, a broadly corpotate response thatgoes beyond simply responding at a technical leve1 to particular pollutioncontrol problems.

. Group B comprises mostly medium-size companies that are not exposedto the highest impact of environmental pressures and have developed somemainly technical responses in response to particular problems. However,these firms are significantly less well advanced in their response and lack acoherent or strategic response to environmental pressures. Issues pertain-ing to waste management, liability, BATNEEC, and market pressures arelargely unaddressed in these companies. .

Group C comprises those firms that are most exposed to environmentalpressures, ranging from noise and air pollution abatement to material-handling difficulties, and are under pressure from regulators and localcommunities. These firms typically have invested heavily in attempting toaddress technical problems but are still a long way from resolving theirdifficulties. They are currently the most commercially vulnerable firms as aconsequence of environmental pressures.

Companies in Group D are under some environmental pressures, in

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some cases quite extensively so, without fully realizing that these pressuresexist. As a consequence, their environmental management response issubstantially limited. Although this situation is not an immediate problemin the firms interviewed, there are likely to be longer-term problems unlessthere are some changes in perception and response.

Companies in Group E are small firms that have a limited exposure toenvironmental pressures. As a consequence, responses are very limited.However, while issues relative to waste management and BATNEEC areless critical for these companies compared with larger firms, there remainsa significant lack of awareness as to the nature of environmental pressuresand suitable responses.

CONCLUSIONS

Figure 4.3 summarizes the general responses to environmental pressuresby firms in the detailer survey. The first two columns of boxes express theareas of current and future environmental pressures on companies in thesurvey. These pressures are taken across the full range of issues presented inFigure 4.1. The final column shows the current and planned responses offirms. The following three general points may be made:

• Current pressures are seen to bear primarily on the production processitself and arise primarily from legislation and the local community.

• There is a recognition that, while pressures on production processeswill increase in the future, there will be a much wider range of pres-sures on the company as a whole from many more sources.

• It is both interesting and significant that the current and plannedresponses of firms do not match very closely the expected wider rangeof pressures. Indeed, while many firms have started to respond topotential cost changes for energy and other inputs, technical responsesto tighter process control legislation and to wider market/customer/investor considerations are lacking.

Like other surveys and much anecdotal evidence, this survey shows thatit is the larger, multinational firms that are taking a more corporate andstrategic view of environmental pressures. The cost data indicates that it isthe larger firms that bear the highest costs of pollution control and that thismight account for the high level of awareness and response to environmen-tal pressures. However, it should be noted that a correlation exists betweensectors dominated by large firms and sectors that are subject to a significant

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Figura 4.3.A SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL RESPONSES OF FIRMS TO

ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES

KEYVery Limited Pressure/Response

Some Pressrrre/Response

Extcnsivc ssudksponsc

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Corporate Stragies for a Sustainable future

degree of public and legislative pressure (e.g., chemicals, oil refining,vehicles). Indeed the cost data suggest that the costs of pollution controlalone are unlikely to have trought about major changes in managementapproach; it may well have been wider issues of customer image andlegislative control on products that influenced many large multinationals.

The same pressures are clearly not felt by smaller firms and particularlymany producers of intermediate products. It is not clear that the producer-supplier chain is yet transmitting the signals very strongly, at least in theUnited Kingdom. Wowever, if we are to move to an industrial structurethat overall is more sustainable, it is clear that all firms must start to adoptthe wider model of environmental awareness outlined in Figure 4.1 and anappropriate and equally wide corporate environmental management re-sponse. The introduction of eco-labeling or audit trails, which go beyondthe firm to its suppliers and also consider the product, may be two ways totransmit signals more strongly through the economy as a whole. The otherapproaches would draw on many of the well-known strategies for helpingsmaller companies adopt new innovations (e.g., closer supplier-customerlinks and demonstration schemes).

There is much discussion as to how industry in general can be motivatedto adopt more sustainable strategies. At one end of the scale is what mightbe called the “normative model,” in which best-practice company manage-ment is carried out together with the articulation of the wider socialresponsabilities of companies. The International Chamber of Commerce’sprogram “Business Charter for Sustainable Development” is an example.A second model is built around the notion of environmental standards andimplemented through the market mechanism with the use of economicinstruments such as effluent charges and taxes.

Some broad conclusions emerge regarding these two different models—the normative model and the market model—for encouraging industryto move toward more sustainable strategies. It is not surprising that thelarger multinational companies are adopting the normative model, whichis illustrated in Figure 4.1. This is partly because of their wider exposure topressures (consumer, image, and enforcement pressures) and the sensitiveor high-profile nature of some of their products (e.g., chemicals). It mayWell also reflect the corporate cultures of such firms, which are more likelyto respond formally to social or community responsibility issues and tointegrate total quality managementbe seen as a part.

—of which environmental control may

Given the slow adoption of innovative management approaches byindependent and small to medium-size firms in the United Kingdom, italso is not surprising that most of the companies surveyed do not follow

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The Enviromental Challenge Dynamies of Fim Behavior

the normative, best-practice management approach. The literature onboth management innovation and barriers to diffusion gives clear, a prioriindications that these results are to be expected.

The market approach also appears to lack influence on company behav-ior. There are at teast three reasons for this. First, the easily observabledirect costs of pollution control, such as charges for waste disposal andeffluent treatment, are not large compared to other fixed costs and over-heads and hence do not emerge strongly as costs for consideration. Sec-ond, these firms (particularly small and medium-size enterprises) clearlylack data on the environmental pressures and requirements affecting themand therefore have little idea of the current costs of meeting these require-ments. Third, if the direct costs of current pollution control and wastedisposal practices do not appear to be large, or firms are unaware of them,it is much more difficult to identify and quantify future costs or impactsthat might be passed down the supply chain; hence, lack of informationand possibly the low financial impact will inhibit the passing of signalsthrough the market.

REFERENCES

ECOTEC. 1991a. The Black Country Environmental Initiative. Report preparedfor the West Midlands Regional Office, Departmentt of Environment, UnitedKingdom. Birmingham: ECOTEC.

ECOTEC. 1991 b. the Implications of Environmental Pressure for Industry. Reportprepared for Warwickshire County Council, Coventry City Council, and theBOC Foundation, United Kingdom. Birmingham: ECOTEC.

ECOTEC. 1989. Indumy costs of Pollution Control. Report prepared for theDepartment of Environment, United Kingdom. Birmingham: ECOTEC.

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Lugar de Ia publicación:BostonTitulo:Harvard Business ReviewEditorial:Harvard Business ReviewAutor/editor:Hart, StuartCapitulo/articulo:Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable WorldAño (fecha) de publicación:Enero- Febrero 1997Paginas--De: A:66-76

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The environmental revolution has been almostthree decades in the making and it has change for-ever how companies do business. In the 1960s and1970s, corporations were in a state of denial regard-ing their impact on the environment, Then a seriesof highly visible ecological problems created agroundswell of support for strict goverment regu-lation in the United States, Lake Erie was dead. InEuropa, the Rhine was on fire. In Japan, people weredying of mercury poisoning.

Today many companies have accepted their re-sponsibility to do no harm to the environment.Products and production processes are becomigcleaner; and where such change is under way, theenvironment is on the mend. In the industrializednations, more and more companies are “goinggreen” as they realize that they can reduce pollu-tion and increase profits simultaneously. We havecome a long way.

fer to as its carryig capacity. Increasingly, thescourges of the late twentieth century—depletedfarmland, fisheries, and forests; choking urban pol-lution poverty; infectious disease; and migration—are spilling over geopolitical borders. The simplefact is this: meeting our needs, we are destroyingthe ability of future generations to meet theirs.

The roots of the problem-explosive populationgrowth and rapid economic development in theemerging economies-are political and social issuesthat exceed the mandate and the capabilities of anycorporation. At the same time, corporations are theonly organizations with the resources, the technol-ogy, the global reach, and, ultimately, the motiva-tion to achieve sustainability.

It is easy to state the case in the negative: facedwith impoverished customers, degraded environ-ments, failing political systems, sud unravelingsocieties, it will be increasingly difficult for cor-

But the distance we’ve traveled will seem smallwhen, in 30 years, we look back at the 1990s. Be-yond greening lies an enormous challenge-and anenormous opportunity. The challenge is to developa sustainable global economy an esconomy that the planet is capable of supporting indefinitely. Al-though we may be approaching ecological recoveryin the developed world, the planet as a whole re-mains on an unsustainable course. Those whothink that sustainability is only a matter of pollu-tion control are missing the bigger picture. Even ifall the companies in the developed world were toachieve zero emissions by the year 2000, the earthwould still be stressed beyond what biologists re-

porations to do business. But the positive case iseven more powerful. The more we learn about thechallenges of sustainability, the clearer is that weare poised at the threshold of a historic momentin which many of the world’s industries may betrasformed.

To date, the business logic for greening has beenlargely operational or technical: bottom-up pollu-tion-prevention programs have saved companies

Stuart L. Hart is a faculty member in corporate strat-egy and the director of the Corporate EnvironmentalManagement Program at the University of MichiganBusiness School in Ann Arbor. His E-mail address iss/[email protected]

ARTWORK BY BRUCE ROGOVIN. 364

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Despite such intense use of energy and materials,

however, levels of pollution are relatively low inthe developed economies. Three factors account for

this seeming paradox: stringent environmental reg-ulations, the greening of industry, and the reloca-tion of the most polluting activities (such as com-

modity processing and heavy manufacturingn) to theemerging market economies. Thus to some extent

the greening of the developed world has been at tbe

expense of the environments in emerging econo-

mies. Given the much larger population base inthose countries, their rapid industrialization could

easily offset the environmental gains made in the

developed economies. Consider, for example, that

the emerging economies in Asia and Latin America

billions of dollars. However, few executives realize

that environmental opportunities might actuallybecome a major source of revenue growth. Green-

ing has been framed in terms of risk reduction,reengineering, or cost cutting. Rarely is greening

linked to strategy or technology development, andas a result, most companies fail to recognize oppor-

tunities of potentially staggering proportions.

Worlds in CollisionThe achievement of sustainability will mean bil-

lions of dollars in products, services, and technolo-

gies that barely exist today. Whereas yesterday´sbusinesses were often oblivious to their negativeimpact on the environment and today´s responsiblebusinesses strive for zero impact, tomorrow´s busi-

nesses must learn to make a positive impact. In-

creasingly, companies will be selling solutions tothe world’s environmenti problems.

Envisioning tomorrow´s businesses, therefore re-

quires a clear understanding of those problems. To

move beyond greening to sustainability, we mustfirst unravel a complex set of global interdependen-

cies. In fact, the global economy is really three dif-ferent, overlapping economies.

The market economy is the familiar world ofcommerce comprising both the developed nationsand the emerging economies.

1 About a billion peo-

ple—one-sixth of the world’s population-live in

the developed countries of the market economy.

Those affluent societies account for more than 75%

of the world’s energy and resource consumption

and create the bulk of industrial, toxic, and con-

sumer waste. The developed economies thus leave

large ecological footprints – defined as the amountof land required to meet a typical consumer´s needs.(See the exhibit “Ecological Footprints.”)

(and now Eastern Europe and the former soviet

Union) have added nearly 2 billion people to the

market economy over the past 40 years.

With economic growth comes urbanization. To-

day one of every three people in the worId lives in acity. By 2025, it will be two out of three. Demogra.

phers predict that by that year there will be wellover 30 megacities with populations exceeding 8million and more than 500 cities with populations

exceeding 1 million. Urbanization on this scalepresents enormous infrastructural and environ-

mental challenges.

Because industrialization has focused initially on

commodities and heavy manufacturing cities in

many emerging economies suffer from oppressive

levels of pollutions. Acid rain is a growing problem,

especially in places where coal combustion is un-regulated. The World Bank estimates that by 2010

there will be more than 1 billion motor vehicles in

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the world. Concentrated in cities, they will double

current levels of energy use, smog precursors, andemissions of greenhouse gas.

The second economy is the survival economy:the traditional, village-based way of life found in

the rural parts of most developing countries. It ismade up of 3 billion people, mainly Africans, Indi-

ans, and Chinese who are subsistence oriented andmeet their basic needs directly from nature. De-

mographers generally agree that the world’s popula-

tion, currently growing by about 90 million peopleper year, will roughly double over the next 40 years.The developing nations will account for 90% of

that growth, and most of it will occur in the sur-vival economy.

The third economy is nature’s economy, which

consists of the natural systems and resources thatsupport the market and the survival economies.Nonrenewable resources, such as oil, metals, andother minerals, are finite. Renewable resources.such as soils and forests, will replenish them-

selves–as long as their use does not exceed critical

thresholds.Technological innovations have created substi-

tutes for many commonly used nonrenewable re-

sources; for example, optical fiber now replacescopper wire. And in the developed economies, de-

mand for some virgin materials may actually di-minish in the decades ahead because of reuse and

recycling. Ironically, the greatest threat to sustain-

Owing in part to the rapid expansion of the mar-

ket economy, existence in the survival economy is

becoming increasingly precarious. Extractive in-

dustries and infrastructure development have, in

many cases, degraded the ecosystems upon whichthe survival economy depends. Rural populations

are driven further into poverty as they compete forscarce natural resources. Women and children nowspend on average four to six hours per day searching

for fuel wood and four to six hours per week drawing

and carrying water. Ironically, those conditions en-courage high fertility rates because, in the short

run, children help the family to garner needed re-sources. But in the long run, population growth in

the survival economy only reinforces a vicious cy-

cle of resource depletion and poverty.Short-term survival pressures often force these

rapidly growing rural populations into practices

that cause long-term damage to forests, soil, andwater. When wood becomes scarce, people burn

dung for fuel, one of the greatest—and least well-known—environmental hazards in the world today.

Contaminated dunking water is an equally graveproblem. The World Health Organization estimates

that burning dung and drinking contaminated wa-

ter together cause 8 millon deaths per year.As it becomes more and more difficult to live off

the land, millions of desperate people migrate toalready overcrowded cities. In China, for example,an estimated 120 million people now roam fromcity to city, landless and jobless, driven from theirvillages by deforestation, soil erosion, floods, ordroughts. Worldwide, the number of such “envi-ronmental refugees” from the survival economymay be as high as 500 million people, and the figureis growing.

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW January-February 19976 9

able development today is depletion of the world’srenewable resources.

Forests, soils, water, and fisheries are all being

pushed beyond their limits by human populationgrowth and rapid industrial development. Insuffi-

cient fresh water may prove to be the most vexingproblem in the developing world over the nextdecade, as agricultural, commercial, and residentialuses increase. Water tables are being drawn down at

an alarming rate, especially in the most heavily

populated nations, such as China and India.Soil is another resource at risk More than 10%

of the world’s topsoil has been seriously eroded.

Available cropland and rangeland are shrinking.

Existing crop varieties are no longer responding to

increased use of fertilizer. As a consequence, percapita world production of both grain and meat

peaked and began to decline during the 1980s. Mean-while, the world’s 18 major oceanic fisheries havenow reached or actually exceeded their maximumsustainable yields.

By some estimates, humankind now uses morethan 49% of the planet´s net primary productivity.

If, as projected, the population doubles over thenext 40 years, we may outcompete most other ani-mal species for food, driving many to extinction. Inshort, human activity now exceeds sustainabilityon a global scale. (See the exhibit “Major Chal-lenges to Sustainability.”)

As we approach the twenty-first century, theinterdependence of the three economic spheres isincreasingly evident. In fact, the three economieshave become worlds in collision, creating the majorsocial and environmental challenges facing theplanet: climate change, pollution, resource deple-tion, poverty, and inequality.

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Consider, for example, that the average Ameri-can todayconsumes 17 times more than his or her

Mexican counterpart (emerging economy) and hun-dreds of times more than the average Ethiopian(survival economy). The levels of material and en-

ergy consumption in the United States require large

quantities of raw materials and commodities,

sources increasingly from the survival economy

and produced in emerging economies.

In the survival economy, massive infrastructure

development (for example, dams, irrigation proj-

ets, highways, mining operations, and power gen-

ration projects), often sided by agencies, banks,and corporations in the developed countries, hasprovided access to raw materials. Unfortunately,such development has often had devastating conse-

quences for nature’s economy and has tended to

strengthen existing political and economic elites,with little benefit to those in the survival economy.

their terms of trade have become less favorable.Their purchasing power declines while their al-ready substantial debt load becomes even larger.The net effect of this dynamic has been the transfer

of vast amounts of wealth (estimated at $40 billionper year since 1985) from developing to developed

countries, producing a vicious cycle of resource ex-

ploitation and pollution to service mounting debt.

Today developing nations have a combined debt ofmore than $1.2 trillion, equal to nearly half of their

collective gross national product.

Strategies for a Sustainable WorldNearly three decades ago, environmentalists

such as Paul Ehrlich and Barry Commoner made

this simple but powerful observation about sus-tainable development: the total environmental

burden (EB) created by human activity is a function

At the same time, infrastructure development

projects have contributed to a global glut of raw ma-of three factors. They are population (P); affluence(A), which is a proxy for

terials and hence to a long-term fall in commodityConsumption; and tech-

nology (T), which is how wealth is created. The

prices. And as commodity prices have fallen rela- product of these three factors determines the totaltive to the prices of manufactured goods, the cur-rencies of developing countries have weakened and

environmental burden. It can be expressed as a for-mula: EB=PxAxT.


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BEYOND GREENING

Achieving sustainability will require stabilizingor reducing the environmental burden.That can be

done by decreasing the human population, lower-ing the level of affluence (cosumption), or chang-ing fundamentally the technology used to createwealth. The first option, lowering the human popu-

lation, does not appear feasible short of draconian

political measures or the occurrence of a major pub-

lic-health crisis that causes mass mortality.The second option, decreasing the level of afflu-

ence, would only make the problem worse, becausepoverty and population growth go hand in hand

demographers have long known that birth rates are

inversely correlated with level of education andstandard of living. Thus stabilizing the human pop.ulation will require improving the education and

economic standing of the world´s poor, particularly

women of childbearing age. That can be accom-plished only by creating wealth on a massive scale.

Indeed, it may be necessary to grow the world econ-

omy as much as tenfold just to provide basic ameni-

ties to a population of 8 billion to 10 billion,That leaves the third option: changing the tech-

nology used to create the goods and services thatconstitute the world’s wealth. Although population

and consumption may be societal issues, technol-ogy is the business of business.

If economic activity must increase tenfold over

what it is today just to provide the bare essentials toa population double its current size, then technolo-

gy will have to improve twentyfold merely to keepthe planet at its current levels of environmental

burden. Those who believe that ecological disaster

will somehow be averted must also appreciate the

commercial implications of such a belief over thenext decade or so, sustainable development will

constitute one of the biggest opportunities in the

history of commerce.Nevertheless, as of today few companies have in-

corporated sustainability into their strategic think-ing. Instead, environmental strategy consists large-ly of piecemeal projects aimed at controlling orpreventing pollution. Focusing on sustainability re-

quires putting business strategies to a new test.Taking the entire planet as the context in which

they do business, companies must ask whether

they are part of the solution to social and environ-mental problems or part of the problem. Only whena company thinks in those terms can it begin to de-velop a vision of sustainability—a shaping logicthat goes beyond today’s internal, operational focus

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on greening to a more extenal, strategic focus onsustainable development. Such a vision is needed

to guide companies through three stages of environ.mental strategy.

Stage One: Pollution Prevention. The first stepfor most companies is to make the shift from pollu-

tion control to pollution prevention. Pollution con-

trol means cleaning up waste after it has been cre-ated. Pollution prevention focuses on minimizing

or eliminating waste before it is created. Much like

total quality management, pollution preventionstrategies depend on continuous improvement ef-forts to reduce waste and energy use. This transfor-mation is driven by a compelling logic: pollution

prevention pays. Emerging global standards for en-vironmental management systems (ISO 14,000, forexample) also have created strong incentives forcompanies to develop such capabilities.

Over the past decade, companies have sought toavoid colliding with nature’s economy (and incur-

ring the associated added costs) through greening

and prevention strategies. Aeroquip Corporation, a

$2.5 billion manufacturer of hoses, fittings, and

couplings, saw an opportunity here. Like most in-dustrial suppliers, Aeroquip never thought of itselfas a provider of environmental solutions. But in1990, its executives realized that the company’sproducts might be especially valuable in meetingthe need to reduce waste and prevent pollution.

Aeroquip has generated a $250 million business byfocusing its attention on developing products that

reduce emissions. As companies in emerging econ-

omies realize the competitive benefits of using raw

materials and resources more productively, busi-

nesses like Aeroquip´s will conntinue to grow.

The emerging economies cannot afford to repeatall the environmental mistakes of Western devel-opment. With the sustainability imperative inmind, BASF, the German chemical giant, is helpingto design and build chemical industries in China,India, Indonesia, and Malaysia that are less pollut-ing than in the past. By colocating facilities that in

the West have been geographically dispersed, BASFis able to create industrial ecosystems in which the

waste from one process becomes the raw materialfor another. Colocation solves a problem commonin the West, where recycling waste is often infeasi-ble because transporting it from one site to anotheris dangerous and costly.

Stage Two: product Stewardship. Product stew-ardship focuses on minimizing not only pollutionfrom manufacturing but also all environmental im-pacts associated with the full life cycle of a product.As companies in stage one move closer to zeroemissions, reducing the use of materials and pro-

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happening in the developed nations. Properly exe-cuted product stewardship also offers the potentialfor revenue growth through product differentiation.For example, Dunlop Tire Corporation and Akzo

Nobel recently announced a new radial tire thatmakes use of an aramid fiber belt rather than the

conventional steel belt. The new design makes re-cycling easier because it eliminates the expensive

cryogenic crushing required to separate the steel

belts from the tire’s other materials. Because the

new fiber-belt tire is 30% lighter, it dramatically

improves gas mileage. Moreover, it is a safer tire be-cause it improves the traction control of antilock

braking systems.The evolution from pollution prevention to prod-

uct stewardship is now happening in multinational

companies such as Dow, DuPont, Monsanto, Xe-

rox, ABB, Philips, and Sony. For example, as part of

a larger sustainability strategy dubbed A Growing

Partnership with Nature, DuPont’s agricultural-

products business developed a new type of herbi-

cide that has helped farmers around the world re-duce their annual use of chemicals by more than 45

million pounds. The new Sulfonylurea herbicideshave also led to a l-billion-pound reduction in the

amount of chemical waste produced in the manu-facture of agricultural chemicals. These herbicidesare effective at 1% to 5% of the application rates of

traditional chemicals, are nontoxic to animals andnontarget species, and biodegrade in the soil, leav-ing virtually no residue on crops. Because they re-

quire so much less material in their manufacture,

they are slso highly profitable.

Stage Three: Clean Technology. Companies with

their eye on the future can begin to plan for andinvest in tomorrow´s technologies. The simple factis that the existing technology base in many in-

dustries is not environmentally sustainable. Thechemical industry, for example, while having made.

bioengineering of crops rather than the applicationof chemical pesticides or fertilizers represents asustainable path to increased agricultural yields.(See “Growth Through Global sustainability: AnInterview with Monsanto’s CEO, Robert B. Sha.

piro,”by Joan Magretta, in this issue of HBR)Clean technologies are desperately needed in the

emerging economies of Asia. Urban pollution there

has reached oppressive levels. But precisely because

manufacturing growth is so high—capital stockdoubles every six years—there is an unprecedented

opportunity to replace current product and processtechnologies with new, cleaner ones.

Japan’s Research Institute for Innovative Tech-nology for the Earth is one of several new research

and technology consortia focusing on the develop-ment and commercialization of clean technologies

for the developing world. Having been provided

with funding and staff by the Japanese government

and more than 40 corporations, RlTE has set forthan ambitious l00-year plan to create the next gener-

ation of power technology, which will eliminate orneutralize greenhouse gas emissions.

Sustainability VisionPollution prevention, product stewardship, and

clean technology all move a company toward sus-tainability. But without a framework to give direc-tion to those activities, their impact will dissipate.

A vision of sustainability for an industry or a com-

pany is like a road map to the future, showing the

way products and services must evolve and what

new competencies will be needed to get there. New

companies today have such a road map. Ironically,

chemical companies, regarded only a decade ago asthe worst environmental villains, are among thefew large corporation to have engaged the chal-lenge of sustainable development seriously.

substantial headway over the past decade in pollu-

tion prevention and product stewardship, is stilllimited by its dependence on the chlorine mole-cule. (Many organochlorides are toxic or persistentor bioaccumulative.) As long as the industry relieson its historical competencies in chlorine chem-istry, it will have trouble making major progress to-ward sustainability.

Monsanto is one company that is consciously de-veloping new competencies. It is shifting the tech-nology base for its agriculture business from bulkchemicals to biotechnology. It is betting that the

Companies can begin by taking stock of each com-ponent of what I call their sustainability portfolio.(See the exhibit “The Sustainability Portfolio.”)Is there an overarching vision of sustainabilitythat gives direction to the company’s activities? Towhat extent has the company progressed throughthe three stages of environmental strategy–frompollution prevention to product stewardship toclean technology?

Consider the auto industry. During the 1970s,

government regulation of tailpipe emissions forcedthe industry to focus on pollution control. In the

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1980s, the industry began to tackle pollution pre-

vention. Initiatives such as the Corporate Average

Fuel Efficiencyrequirement and the Toxic Release

Innventory led auto companies to examine theirproduct designs and manufacturing processes in or-der to improve fuel economy and lower emissions

from their plants.The 1990s are witnessing the first signs of prod-

uct stewardship. In Germany, the 1990 “take-back”

law required auto manufacturers to take responsi-bility for their vehicles at the end of their useful

lives. Innovators such as BMW have influenced thedesign of new cars with their design for disassem-bly efforts. Industry-level consortia such as the

Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles aredriven largely by the product stewardship logic of

lowering the environmental impact of automobilesthroughout their life cycle.

Early attempts to promote clean technology in-clude such initiatives as California´s zero-emission

vehicle law and the U.N. Climate Change Conven-

tion, which ultimately will limit greenhouse gases

on a global scale. But early efforts by industry incumbents have been either incremental-for exam-

ple, natural-gas vehicles—or defensive in nature.Electric-vehicle programs, for instance, have beenused to demonstrate the infeasibility of this technology rather than to lead the industry to a fundamentally cleaner technology.

Although the auto industry has made progress, itfalls far short of sustainability. For the vast majorityof auto companies, pollution prevention and prod-

uct stewardship are the end of the road. Most autoexecutives assume that if they close the loop in

both production and design, they will have accom-plished all the necessary environmental objectives.

But step back and try to imagine a sustainable vi-sion for the industry. Growth in the emerging mar-kets will generate massive transportation needs inthe coming decades. Already the rush is on to stakeout positions in China, India, and Latin AmericaBut what form will this opportunity take?

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Consider the potential impact of automobiles onChina alone. Today there are fewer than 1 million

cars on the road in China. However, with a popula-tion of more than 1 billion, it would take less than30% market penetration to equal the current size of

the U.S. car market (12 million to 15 million units

sold per year). Ultimately, China might demand 50

million or more units annually. Because China´s

energy and transportation infrastructures are still

being defined, there is an opportunity to develop aclean technology yielding important environmen-tal and competitive benefits.

Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institutehas demonstrated the feasibility of building hyper-cars-vehicles that are fully recyclable, 20 times

more energy efficient, 100 times cleaner, and

cheaper than existing cars. These vehicles retainthe safety and performance of conventional cars butachieve radical simplification through the use oflightweigh, composite materials, fewer parts, vir-tual prototyping, regenerative braking, and verysmall, hybrid engines. Hypercars, which are moreakin to computers on wheels than to cars withmicrochips, may render obsolete most of the com-petencies associated with today’s auto manufac-turing—for example, metal stamping, tool and diemaking, and the internal combustion engine.

Assume for a minute that clean technology like

the hypercar or Mazda’s soon-to-be-released hydro-gen rotary engine can be developed for a market

such as China’s. Now try to envision a transporta-tion infrastructure capable of accommodating so

many cars. How long will it take before gridlockand traffic jams force the auto industry to a halt?

Sustainability will require new transportation solu-tions for the needs of emerging economies with

huge populations. Will the giants in the auto indus-

try be prepared for such radical change, or will theyleave the field to new ventures that are not encum-

bered by the competencies of the past?A clear and filly integrated environmental strat-

egy should not only guide competency development, it should also shape the company´s relation-ship to customers, suppliers, other companies,policymakers, and all its stakeholders. Companiescan and must change the way customers think by

creating preferences for products and services con-sistent with sustainability. Companies must be-

come educators rather than mere marketers ofproducts. (See the exhibit “Building SustainableBusiness Strategies”)

For senior executives, embracing the quest forsustainability may well require a leap of faith.Some may feel that the risks associated with in-vesting in unstable and unfamilar markets out-weigh the potential benefits. Others will recognizethe power of such a positive mission to galvanizepeople in their organizations.

Regardless of their opinions on sustainability,executives will not be able to keep their heads in


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BEYOND GREENING

the sand for long. Since 1980, foreign direct invest- developing world while simultaneously increasingment by multinational corporations has increased its wealth and standard of living.from $500 billion to nearly $3 trillion per year. In Like it or not, the responsibility for ensuringfact, it now exceeds official development-assistance a sustainable world falls largely on the shouldersaid in developing countries. With free trade on the of the world’s enterprises, the economic engines of

rise, the next decade may see the figure increase by the future. Clearly, public policy innovations (atanother order of magnitude. The challenges pre- both the national and international levels) and

sented by emerging markets in Asia and Latin changes in individual consumption patterns will be

America demand a new way of conceptualizing needed to move toward sustainability. But corpora-

business opportunities. The rapid growth in emerg- tions can and should lead the way, helping to shape

ing economies cannot be sustained in the face of public policy and driving change in consumers’ be-mounting environmental deterioration, poverty, havior. In the final analysis, it makes good business

and resource depletion. In the coming decade, com- sense to pursue strategies for a sustainable world.panies will be challenged to develop clean tech- 1. The terms market economy, survival economy, and nature’s economynologies and to implement strategies that dras- warw suggested to me by Vandana Shiva, Ecology and the Politics of Sur--

tically reduce the environmental burden in the vival (New Delhi: United University Press, 1991).

Reprint 97105 To order reprints, see the last page of this issue.

The day Wall Street stopped asking its own questions and started asking Broadway’s questions.

CARTOON BY ED ARNO76

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Período en el que se utilizará:Septiembre- Diciembre 2000Nombre del curso:Liderazgo para el desarrollo SostenibleInstructor responsable:Dra. Rosamaría Lopez Franco y Dr. Martín BremerNo. de alumnos esperados: (contando el del instructor):200Nombre del editor o compilador:

Lugar de Ia publicación:Nueva YorkTítulo:State of the WorldEditorial:State of the WorldAutor/editor:David, RoodmanCapíulo/artículo:Capítulo 10 Building a Sustainable SocietyAño (fecha) de publicación:1999Páginas-- De: Al:169-188

JACQUELINE

JACQUELINE

JACQUELINE

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10

Building a SustainableSocietv

J

David Malin Roodman

The last thousand years of history havechanged the way many cultures see histo-ry itself. In traditional societies, wherelife’s rhythms were set by the seasons andby the rituals of birth and death, timeseemed cyclical. Technological innova-tion and cultural evolution occurred withimperceptible slowness, so the most dra-matic changes most people experiencedwithin their lives were drought, flood,famine, or war. Social change was tran-sient— and dangerous. Thus the Chinesecurse, “May you live in interesting times.”

As the planet industrializes, all this ischanging. The process of transformationthat industrialization has unleashed intechnology, society, and culture does notseem like a passing fad. And for billions ofpeople, it holds out the hope of a betterlife. It represents a new kind of change,and is giving rise to a new perception ofhistory, as linear and directed— as amarch of progress. Diseases are being van-quished, child mortality is falling,incomes are rising, people are crossingoceans in mere hours. Chinese tradition

to the contrary, life for millions of peoplein this interesting time is much more ablessing than a curse.

But as we assess our era at this millen-nial moment, it becomes clear that theold view of history is still relevant. Thechanges under way are indeed dangerousfor the planet and for humanity— not sim-ply a process of perpetual advancement.In many respects, the process is transientand unstable, and threatens to give the lieto the very view of history it spawned.

Farmers in the Indian state of Gujarat,for example, are drilling their irrigationwells some 1.5 meters deeper each year, inultimately futile pursuit of falling watertables. Mexico City is, for the moment,sinking, as residents pump up the waterbeneath them. The city has the misfor-tune of resting atop a geological sponge.Elevated train tracks, built flat in the1960s, look like roller coasters now, andold churches are buckling. In the UnitedStates, populations of honeybees, essen-tial for pollinating commercial crops,have shrunk precipitously, while frogs

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with extra legs and missing eyes have beenfound in northern states. Pesticides are aleading suspect behind both aberrations.On the northern Atlantic, Canadian war-ships have clashed with Spanish andPortuguese fishing trawlers in a “TurbotWar,” a bitter dispute reminiscent ofdebates over rearranging deck chairs onthe Titanic. The fish stocks the boats arecompeting for are collapsing beneaththem from overharvesting. l

All these trends are transient and dan-gerous. In Gujarat, for instance, eitherfarmers will slow their pumping to restorebalance within a few decades, or they willsuck the aquifers dry. Either way, foodproduction could plunge. Thus for all thetalk of the march of progress, our era alsoechoes the dangerous times of warbetween ancient Chinese dynasties thatinspired that curse.

If this is a transitional era, then the nat-ural question is, What will the new dynastylook like? What sort of world are we head-ed toward? So far, the world order emerg-ing is one almost no one wants. Humannumbers are growing, forests are shrink-ing, species are dying, farmland is erod-ing, freshwater supplies are dwindling,fisheries are collapsing, rivers are con-stricting, greenhouse gases are accumu-lating, soot is contaminating the air, andlead is contaminating our blood.

It is not too late, however, to changethe course of events, to build societiesthat are both environmentally sustainableand industrial (automated production isat the heart of many benefits of moderneconomic development). It is not too lateto build a world where the air is safe tobreathe, water is safe to drink, andresources are shared among all theworld’s people— to build a world, in otherwords, that most people recognize as theone they hope their children will inherit.That would be true progress.

Humanity’s departure from environ-mental sustainability has been a complexhistorical process. Its roots reach back 11

.


millennia to the Agricultural Revolution,when people first modified the environ-ment systematically and on a large scale.Restoring sustainability will be compara-bly complex— but it will need to occurmuch faster if we are to minimize harm tothe planet and to ourselves. More than amatter of inventing cheap solar panels orrecycling household trash, it will be athoroughgoing process involving everysector of society. Only by envisioning thisprocess can we develop a realistic under-standing of what it will take— and findgrounds for realistic hope.2

What, then, will it take to construct asustainable, modern society? Govern-ments will need to aggressively demarcateand defend environmental limits, work-ing domestically and cooperating interna-tionally. And they will have to do so inways that stimulate rather than stifle thecreativity of corporations. Businesses willneed to anticipate the transition and posi-tion themselves to exploit the huge invest-ment opportunities created. Nonprofitorganizations ranging from internationalenvironmental groups to neighborhoodchurches— collectively called “civil soci-ety”— will need to press both govern-ments and businesses forward. Andundergirding all their efforts will be edu-cated citizens operating in their capacitiesas voters, consumers, charitable donors,and owners of land and resources.

Each of these groups— governments,businesses, nonprofit groups, and citi-zens— can press the others toward thegoal of sustainability, in a somewhatchaotic dynamic less reminiscent of anengine firing on all pistons than an organ-ism working to survive. The odds of suc-cess may seem long, but the forcesarrayed in defense of the status quo havenever been weaker than they are today.Society has changed more profoundlyduring this century than in any before. Ifthings keep changing as fast— but for thebetter— then the new millennium’s history books will recall our generation as the

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one that showed the march of progress tobe more than a myth.

GE T T I N G T H E S I G N A L S RIG H T

There is little question that governmentswill have to apply much of the pressurethat will move modern society onto a sus-tainable path. The paradox is thatalthough they need to force major struc-tural changes on economies, they cannotplan those changes, precisely because ofthe magnitude and complexity involved.

This is particularly clear for the problem of global climate change. TheIntergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange has conservatively estimated thatthe atmosphere can sustain carbon emis-sions of no more than 2 billion tons peryear without serious disruption.Spreading that quota evenly among the10 billion people projected to share theplanet by 2100 yields a per-person quotaof half a kilogram (a pound) a day. In aRange Rover, you could drive 4 kilometers(2.5 miles) on that amount before havingto stop for the night. Not surprisingly, theUnited States, Japan, and other industrialnations are emitting carbon at a pace12-27 times this figure— and climbing.3

Since these unsustainable emissionsrates arise from the way industrialeconomies grow food, make things, andmove products and people about, revers-ing the trends necessarily requires trans-forming many aspects of home andwork life in the industrial world. And itwill require the development of new,clean technologies, a process of discoverythat is intrinsically unpredictable. In thecase of carbon emissions, a 90-95 percentreduction per person is needed in indus-trial nations— an end, in other words,to the fossil fuel economy as we know it.(See Chapter 2.) No government canplan all that4

Building a Sustainable Society

Markets, on the other hand, excelat engineering systemic change. Mar-kets helped make the Industrialand Information Revolutions possible.Properly harnessed, they can also guidethe next Industrial Revolution, the onetoward environmental sustainability. Thekey to making that happen is for govern-ments to stop subsidizing environmentalharm and start taxing it. That will trans-late environmental costs into the lan-guage of the market— prices— and helpenforce the “polluter pays principle,”which says that when people act in waysthat hurt the environment, they shouldfeel the costs of the damage they do.

So far, the world order emerging isone almost no one wants.

This commonsense proposal was firstcloaked in the authority of economics 80years ago by Cambridge don Arthur CecilPigou, and has become a textbook staplesince. But “polluter pays” has been prac-ticed much less than preached. As a result,when people flip on a light switch or getbehind the wheel of a car, they are able toignore the costs they impose on others—their neighbor’s asthma, or the minuteaddition they make to the atmosphere’sthickening blanket of greenhouse gases5

Worldwide, subsidies worth at least$650 billion— equivalent to 9 percent ofall government revenue— support log-ging, mining, oil drilling, livestock graz-ing, farming, fishing, energy use, anddriving. That amount far exceeds what isspent on environmentally protective subsi-dies, such as for soil-conserving farmingpractices. The U.S. government, forinstance, effectively spends tens of mil-lions of dollars each year paying loggers toclearcut some of the country’s only rain-forest, in the Tongass National Forest in

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Southeast Alaska. The government coverssuch costs as building logging roads, butthen charges far less for the trees hauledout on those roads. Towering, ancientSitka spruces have sold for $2 each.6

In India, state governments give cheapor free electricity to farmers, who use it topump water out of underground aquifersfaster than rain is recharging them.Though the subsidies are often defendedin the name of the poor farmer or urbanfood buyer, most of the money ends up inthe pockets of richer farmers, who canafford electric pumps. Similarly, govern-ments in industrial nations effectively gavefarmers $284 billion in 1996, through gov-ernment spending and price supports.Though this money flow is usually justifiedas helping small farmers, most of it goes tolarger farms, which produce most of thefood. Of U.S. agricultural support pay-ments, 61 percent went to the 18 percentof farms grossing more than $100,000 ayear (and typically netting at least$50,000). The aid also helps lock in anindustrial style of agriculture that dependsheavily on pesticides and contributes tosoil erosion and water pollution.7

Fortunately, governments have recent-ly cut some environmentally harmful subsidies. In 1988, Brazil ended the generousinvestment tax credits it had once offeredto ranchers and farmers who cleared landin the Amazon; officials believe thischange contributed to the temporarydeforestation slowdown at the time. Inthe United States, the Congress has yet toreform an 1872 law that gives miners firstrights to millions of hectares of publicland, but it has at least placed a tempo-rary moratorium on new claims every yearsince 1994.8

Since the mid-1980s, Belgium, France,Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdomhave all eliminated or radically reducedonce-high coal subsidies. The combinedcoal output of these five countries sank byhalf between 1986 and 1995. Meanwhile,the fossil fuel subsidies in nations outside

the industrial West, though still high, areless than half what they were a few yearsago, mainly because of halting, sometimespainful steps away from central govern-ment planning. (See Table 10-1.)9

Still, there are nearly $650 billion morein environmentally harmful subsidies.Cutting most of the remaining ones couldpay for an effective 8-percent cut in theglobal tax burden. Most of these cutswould occur in industrial nations, whichsubsidize pollution the most. In theUnited States, Germany, and Japan,where taxes average $6,000-7,000 a per-son, there would be a net tax cut ofroughly $500 per person or $2,000 perfamily of four.10

Subsidy reform, moreover, is only thefirst step in making prices tell the environ-mental truth. If governments are to makevisible the full environmental costs ofmany products and activities, they need to

Table 10-l. Subsidies for Fossil Fuel Use inSelected Developing and Former Eastern

Bloc Countries, 1990-91 and 1995-96

Region/ SubsidiesCountry 1990-91 1995-96 Change

(billion 1997 (percent)dollars per year)

China 25.7 10.8 - 5 8

Egypt 1.9 1.4 - 2 8India 4.5 2.8 - 3 7Iran 12.2 10.1 - 1 7Mexico 5.0 2.4 - 5 3Russia¹ 62.5 14.8 - 7 6Venezuela 3.2 2.5 - 2 2

All Developing 202.5and FormerEastern BlocCountries¹

84.2 - 5 8

¹ Estimates for Eastern bloc nations are particular-ly rough because of hyperinflation in the early 1990sand because widespread nonpayment of energy billsin some of these nations created hard-to-measure defacto subsidies.SOURCE: Worldwatch Institute, based on World Bank;see endnote 9.

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tax pollution and resource depletion, as tance— of least cost— in cleaning up thesome increasingly are. (See Table 10-2.) 11 country’s waters.13

One established and effective environ-mental tax regime is the system of waterpollution charges in the Netherlands.Since 1970, gradually rising charges onemissions of organic materials and heavymetals into canals, rivers, and lakes havespurred companies to cut emissions— butwithout dictating how. Between 1976 andthe mid-1990s, emissions of cadmium,chromium, copper, lead, mercury, nickel,and zinc into waters managed by regionalgovernments (which adopted the chargesearliest) plummeted 72-99 percent, andprimarily because of the charges.¹ ²

The Dutch example illustrates thestrengths of environmental taxes at theirbest. Companies that could prevent pollu-tion most cheaply presumably did somost. Companies would also have passedpart of the taxes on to their customersthrough higher prices, causing them toswitch to less-pollution-intensive prod-ucts. And demand for pollution controlequipment has spurred Dutch manufac-turers to develop better models, trigger-ing innovations that governments couldnever have planned, lowering costs, andturning the country into a global leaderin the market. The taxes have in effectsought the path of least economic resis-

Tax increases sound like the bad newsin “polluter pays.” But the good news,ironically, is that tax burdens are alreadysubstantial in most countries. So there areplenty of taxes that could be cut with themoney raised from environmental taxes. Atax shift would result-not a tax increase.Today, nearly 95 percent of the $7.5 tril-lion in tax revenues raised each yearworldwide comes from levies on payrolls,personal income, corporate profits, capi-tal gains, retail sales, trade, and built property-all of which are essentially penaltiesfor work and investment. It violates com-mon sense to tax heavily the activities soci-eties generally want while taxing lightlythe activities they do not want.l4

One of the world’s most environmen-tally proactive nations, Sweden, becamethe first to take up the tax-shifting idea.(See Table 10-3.) In 1991 the govern-ment took $2.4 billion from new taxes oncarbon and sulfur dioxide emissions,equal to 1.9 percent of all tax revenues,and used the money to cut income taxes.As concern grew over unemployment inWestern Europe, additional shifts in themid-1990s— in Denmark, Finland, andthe Netherlands, Spain, and the UnitedKingdom— focused more on cutting wage

Table 10-2. Experiences with Selected Environmental Tax Systems

Policy, Country, Year InitiatedToxic waste tax, Germany, 1991

Water pollution taxes, Netherlands, 1970

Sulfur oxide tax, Sweden, 1991

Ozone-depleting substance tax,United States, 1990

Carbon dioxide tax, Norway, 1991

Description, EffectToxic waste production fell more than 15percent in 3 years.Main factor behind 72-99 percent drop inindustrial discharges of heavy metals intoregionally managed waters.One third of 40-percent emissions drop during1989-95 attributed to charge.Smoothing and enforcing phaseouts.

Emissions appear to be 3-4 percent lower thanthey would be without the tax.

SOURCE: See endnote 11.

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Table 10-3. Tax Shifts from Work and Investment to Environmental Damage

Country, Year Initiated Taxes Cut On Taxes Raised On Revenue Shifted¹- -.

Sweden, 1991

Denmark, 1994

Spain, 1995

Denmark, 1996

Netherlands, 1996

United Kingdom,1996-97

Finland, 1996-97

Germany, 1999²

Personal income

Personal income

Wages

Wages, agriculturalproperty

Personal incomeand wages

Wages

Personal incomeand wages

Wages

Carbon and sulfur emissions

Motor fuel, coal, electricity, andwater sales; waste incinerationand landfilling; motor vehicleownership

(percent)

1.9

2.5

Motor fuel sales 0.2Carbon emissions; pesticide,chlorinated solvent, andbattery sales

Natural gas and electricity sales

0.5

0.8

Landfilling 0.2

Energy sales, landfilling 0.5

Energy sales 2.6‘Expressed relative to tax revenue raised by all levels of government. 2Planned but not enacted as of

October 1998.SOURCE: See endnote 15.

taxes. And in 1998, the new, left-of-centergovernment of Germany announcedplans to shift 2.6 percent of taxes fromwages to energy.15

Though significant, these shifts onlyhint at the long-run potential in tax shift-ing, especially if greenhouse gas emis-sions are taxed. Studies suggest that ifcarbon taxes were phased in worldwideover 50 years, reaching $250 a ton in2050, global emissions might roughlyplateau by then, as people and businessesused fossil fuels more efficiently and shift-ed to solar and other energy sources.(The full tax would add as much as 182 tothe pump price of a liter of gasoline, or694 for a gallon.) If the tax kept risingafter 2050, emissions might almost halt by2100. Climate models suggest that theamount of carbon dioxide in the airwould stabilize at about 65 percent abovethe preindustrial level, which is as small

an increase as can realistically be hopedfor. (The concentration is already up 30percent.) Revenues would peak mid-cen-tury at roughly $700 billion to $1.8 trilliona year, enough to pay for cuts of perhaps15 percent in conventional taxes on workand investment. Such taxes would alsomove the world a huge step closer to envi-ronmental sustainability.16

R E I N V E N T I N G RE G U L A T I O N

Though fiscal tools are powerful, it wouldbe a mistake for governments to expectthat they can simply get the environmen-tal prices right, and then let the markettake care of any problems. Even the mostdiligent tax authorities could not reach allthe places they would need to in order to

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safeguard the environment single-hand-edly. For example, it is impractical to mea-sure— and thus tax— the smog-producingchemicals spewing from each of a city’smillion cars. Regulations, in contrast,have slashed tailpipe emissions in manycountries by simply requiring that compa-nies make cleaner cars.

Still, there is considerable room forimproving regulations. Much of the firstgeneration of environmental policy inindustrial countries, starting in the 1970s,was born out of environmentalists’ deepdistrust of businesses, and seemed found-ed on the belief that the best way to makesure firms clean up was to tell them exact-ly how to do it. But by focusing on meansrather than ends— for example, by pre-scribing water filters considered advanceda quarter-century ago— the regulationshave favored established, end-of-the-pipefixes over cheaper and more effective pol-lution prevention techniques, such asusing nontoxic, citrus-based solvents. Inaddition, environmental laws in mostcountries are divided into fiefdoms— air,water, hazardous waste, and so on.Regulators dealing with one type of prob-lem are often effectively required to ignoreimplications for other problems. Rulescalling for sulfur scrubbers in smokestacks,say, produce solid waste problems in theform of toxic scrubber sludge.17

The patchwork texture of laws on thebooks worsens the situation. Many gov-ernments, for instance, heavily regulatewater pollution from factories while near-ly ignoring runoff of manure, fertilizer,and pesticides from farms. Other rules,such as zoning laws that limit the densityof new neighborhoods, are too rarelyeven thought of as environmental poli-cies, despite their major environmentaleffects. (See Chapter 8.) Worse, in richand poor countries alike, many regula-tions are poorly enforced. In the UnitedStates, recent government audits foundthat state and federal officials had failedto issue or renew hundreds of pollution


permits for factories+ and wastewater treat-ment plants that were still operating.Enforcement tends to be even weaker inpoorer nations.18

Fortunately, these shortcomings havenot escaped notice, and are leading togradual reform. One response has beenfor governments to make regulationswork more like taxes, in the sense ofzeroing in on results rather than pre-scribing solutions. The Duales SystemDeutschland (DSD) offers a particularlyfar-reaching example of this approach.Established by the German governmentin 1991, the system makes manufacturersof products such as detergents and toyslegally responsible for the plastic wrap,cardboard, bottles, and other packagingmaterial in which they ship their prod-ucts— even after the products are sold.(See Chapter 3.) Stores must accept theused cardboard boxes and shampoo bot-tles from customers; producers in turnmust accept materials from stores.l9

In principle, the German law forciblycloses the packaging materials loop in theeconomy but leaves businesses with flexi-bility in accommodating this new limit.Many companies, for instance, havefound ways to reuse or recycle their mate-rials, while others have opted for simplerpackaging. Though not without prob-lems, the system increased recycling ofpackaging materials to 4.8 million tons ayear by 1994— a substantial 70 percent ofall packaging materials— at a modest costof some $20 a year per German resident.Austria, France, and Belgium have sinceadopted versions of the DSD system.20

The Netherlands has been a leader inrethinking not only the structure of regu-lations but the process through whichthey are formed. In 1989, it released aNational Environmental Policy Plan afterconsulting with industry and public inter-est groups. Revised periodically, the planhas set national goals in eight problemareas, ranging from waste disposal to cli-mate change. The government has then

.

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taken various steps toward these goals,including taxes, regulations, and quasi-voluntary covenants with industry. Thecovenants in particular need not beobeyed to the letter, but good-faith effortsare essentially required. Otherwise, morespecific and more burdensome regula-tions may follow.21

The building industry in theNetherlands, for example, is well on itsway to meeting its commitment to recycle90 percent of its waste, mainly bricks andconcrete from construction and demoli-tion. Nationwide greenhouse gas emis-sions, on the other hand, have not fallenas hoped. But the country has phased outozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons(CFCs), as required by internationaltreaty, and should come close to its goal ofcutting pollutants that cause acid rain by80 percent between 1980 and 2000.22

GLOBAL CHALLENGES , GLOBAL

COOPERATION

The world’s 200 nation-states have dividedthe Earth among themselves in ways thathave little to do with geography, or withthe anatomy of the global economy. So asnatural resources, pollutants, trade, andinvestment increasingly course across arbi-trary borders, the international dimen-sions of the environmental crisis steadilyexpand. The crisis therefore calls for anequally international response, and onewith two main prongs. The treaties andinstitutions of international economicgovernance, such as the World Bank andthe World Trade Organization (WTO),will need to take the environmental impli-cations of their actions into fuller consid-eration. In addition, cooperation on theenvironment will be needed to protectoceans, seas, and many rivers, as well asbiodiversity, natural habitat, and theatmosphere.

The need for international governancein solving international environmentalproblems has become well recognized inthe latter half of the twentieth century, butin words far more than deeds. The WorldBank in particular, with its historical rootsin the rebuilding of Western Europe afterWorld War II, has long been a majorfinancier of giant public works projectssuch as coal plants and hydropower dams.In many developing countries, such pro-jects have wrought grievous harm. InSingrauli, in the Indian state of Bihar, theBank has lent billions to help build a giantcomplex of 12 open-pit mines and 11 coalplants. The huge projects have impover-ished many peasants by poisoning theregion’s soils and forests; the plants havealso become one of the world’s largestsources of greenhouse gases.23

The World Bank’s current president,James Wolfensohn, has apparently

worked hard to reform the institution inorder to incorporate environmental andother development concerns into its day-to-day operations. On balance, however,his efforts have so far deflected the courseof the bureaucracy he commands only afew degrees. According to the Bank’s ownfigures, it has lent six times as much forfossil fuel projects as for renewable ener-gy and energy efficiency since 1992, theyear its funders and clients signed thelandmark treaty on global climate changeat Rio. Moreover, the Bank still favorscoal, the dirtiest fossil fuel, much morethan private lenders do, at roughly 40percent of its energy portfolio comparedwith 20 percent for private lenders.24

Consultants for the Bank have con-cluded that if the institution evaluatedprojects as if a modest $20-a-ton carbontax were in place in client countries— inorder to give some weight to environmen-tal concerns— 40 percent of the energyprojects financed would fail a cost-benefittest. Of course, developing countriesshould be able to emit some carbon, espe-cially while rich nations emit so much

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more and renewable energy technologiesare maturing. Nevertheless, the Bankseems to be pushing developing countriesalong a development path bound to hitan environmental dead end.25

for international environmental bodiessuch as the U.N. Environment Pro-gramme (UNEP), and would negotiatestronger environmental treaties.

Through the World Bank and otherBretton Woods institutions— including theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) andthe World Trade Organization— nationshave shown the willingness and ability tobuild international institutions strongenough to defend one principle many seeas essential to long-term economic devel-opment, namely that trade and investmentshould flow easily across borders. In 1997and 1998, for example, the IMF condi-tioned emergency loans to Asian nationsin part on reforms that would, it hoped,draw private funds back into the countriesby making life easier for internationalinvestors. And in 1998, the WTO ruledagainst a U.S. law prohibiting importationof shrimp caught with nets lacking devicesthat protect endangered sea turtles, callingthe law an illegal restraint of trade. (SeeChapter 5.) 26

Most international treaties and agree-ments have been inadequate to theproblems at hand.

The power of these institutions makesthem equally capable of becoming strongsupporters of sustainable development.To do this, they would need to put intopractice a more sophisticated conceptionof development, one that elevates envi-ronmental protection (along with educa-tion, health, and advancement of women)from the current status of a poor relationin the international economic policyarena. Institutions that absorbed that newview would be as eager to defend the envi-ronment as they now are to defend inter-national capital.

To date, governments have ratifiedmore than 215 international environmen-tal treaties, on everything from acid rainto desertification. Most are regional inscope. Agreements aimed at protecting 14of the world’s regional seas have beenforged under the auspices of UNEP, forexample, and have been signed by morethan 140 nations. A few environmentaltreaties, however, are global, includingthe conventions on biodiversity and cli-mate change signed at the U.N.Conference on Environment andDevelopment, the Earth Summit, in Rioin 1992. Governments have also signednumerous action plans and commu-niqué s that lack binding legal status.28

But most of the treaties and agree-ments have been inadequate to the prob-lems at hand, either in design or inimplementation and enforcement. Theinstitutions they have created have typi-cally been given ambitious mandates inprinciple, but minimal authority andfunding. 29

There are hints that this view is gainingcurrency, and not just in the President’soffice at the World Bank. In late 1998, forexample, the WTO partly reversed itselfin the shrimp-turtle case, taking issue withthe way the U.S. law was implementedrather than dismissing it outright.27

Similarly, nations that accepted thisapproach would provide adequate funds

What can be said for these accords isthat the international negotiating confer-ences that made them have helped pavethe way for longer-term progress. For one,they have facilitated agreement on suchquestions as priorities for internationaldevelopment assistance. The Inter-national Conference on Population andDevelopment in Cairo in 1994, for exam-ple, marked the widespread acceptanceamong governments and their aid agen-

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State of the world 1999

cies of the importance of improving thelot of poor women in order to slow popu-lation growth.30

The conferences have also made prob-lems such as marine pollution and speciesextinction suddenly newsworthy. Atten-tion from the press corps leads to atten-tion from the public and can heightensupport for action. Coverage of environ-mental issues, for example, reached newlevels during the Rio conference. And byraising awareness, international confer-ences have helped catalyze organizationsof nonprofit groups, legislators, and busi-nesses within and across borders, creatingstronger lobbies for action both domesti-cally and internationally.

The Montreal Protocol is a tem-plate for effective treaties on muchtougher international environmentalproblems.

Still, if nations are to exercise effectiveinternational environmental governance,such conferences will eventually need toproduce more than beneficial side effects.They will need to forge strong treaties.Encouragingly, on a few issues theyalready have. In 1990, for example, theConvention on International Trade inEndangered Species of Wild Fauna andFlora banned cross-border trade in ivory.With markets dried up, elephant poach-ing in Africa plummeted and some herdsbegan to recuperate (although sometrade has been allowed again, and poach-ing is reportedly on the rise in somenations). In Western Europe, a series ofinternational agreements during the last20 years lie behind the steady decline inemissions of sulfur and nitrogen, themain causes of acid rain.31

Most spectacular has been the successof the 1987 Montreal Protocol on

Depletion of the Ozone Layer. This treatyrequired industrial countries to halt CFCproduction and importation in 1996.Each nation used a different mix of taxes,regulations, and education programsto comply. The accord calls for a globalphaseout by 2006, and for productionof most other ozone-destroying chemicalsto fall.32

In order to forge a strong treaty, signa-tories yielded sovereignty in severalnotable ways. To discourage individualnations from staying outside the treatyand becoming havens for CFC produc-tion, parties to the treaty accepted a rulethat forbids them from trading with non-parties in CFCs or products containingthem. (Whether this provision would sur-vive a challenge under WTO rules is notclear.) They also set up a fund throughwhich industrial nations can aid others inmaking the transition; some $750 millionhas been transferred so far. In addition,the Protocol requires consent from onlytwo thirds of the signatories, includingmajorities of more and less industrialcountries, to ratify accelerations of reduc-tions. Tighter timetables were in factapproved unanimously in 1990 and 1993,but the threat of majority rule may havehelped bring would-be stragglers into thefold of international consensus.33

In outline, the Montreal Protocol is atemplate for effective treaties on muchtougher international environmentalproblems, including biodiversity loss andclimate change. It recognizes that nationsthat are richer and have caused more of aproblem need to take the lead in solvingit. They may end up paying more(because they phase out CFCs faster andfund most of the research on substitutes),but precisely because they are wealthier,they are willing to spend more to preventskin cancer deaths and crop damage. Theresult, ideally, is a treaty that serves eachnation’s interest, and at a price each canafford. And because of the way nationshave yielded some sovereignty in this case,

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historians may cite the Montreal Protocolas an important, early instance of nationsforging global governance in order tosolve global problems.34

AN ECO-INDUSTRIAL

REVOLUTION

Debate over environmental issues oftencenters on the whys and hows of govern-ment action. That emphasis is warranted,but it risks overshadowing the role thatnongovernmental actors, includingbusinesses, will need to play in fashioninga sustainable society. The creativity andentrepreneurship of businesses, afterall, generated many of the economicand technological changes that shapedthe twentieth century. Businesses will playno smaller a role in an eco-industrialrevolution.

Of course, companies are not general-ly in the business of doing things out ofmoral duty. They exist primarily to makemoney. So the proper role of business increating a sustainable society would nec-essarily be subtle. On the one hand, busi-nesses would be the objects of change.They would be prodded along by strongenvironmental taxes and regulations,major international accords, and con-sumer pressure, and lured by the hugeinvestment opportunities created by gov-ernments rewriting the ground rules ofthe $38-trillion-a-year global economy. Onthe other hand, they could be agents ofchange as they devised technologies thatsaved fuel or recycled water cheaplyenough to trigger major shifts away fromunsustainable technologies.35

In practice, however, the distinctionbetween businesses as reactors and asactors is fuzzy. Ask CEO John Browne whyBritish Petroleum (BP) is investing $1 bil-lion in solar and wind energy R&D and hewill probably give two overlapping


answers: BP needs to prepare for a strongglobal climate treaty, which will dampendemand for oil. And BP wants to bringdown the price of solar energy in order tolead the world, profitably, toward change.Gauging how large each considerationlooms is as hard as predicting whichwill move faster— government policy ortechnology. Thus the holistic view thata shift toward sustainability would besystemic— driven by businesses, govern-ment, nonprofit groups, and consumerstogether— is perhaps most relevant.“Using uncertainty as an excuse for doingnothing,” explains Browne, “only margin-alizes us in an important and rapidly mov-ing debate.” Businesses have a role to playand an opportunity to exploit.36

The transition to sustainability wouldcontinue the economic dynamism thathas characterized the two centuries afterthe Industrial Revolution. Corporatebehemoths, such as BP, General Motors,and Dupont, that rose on the crest of thefossil fuel revolution could capture manyof the new opportunities. Or they couldbe elbowed aside by the Microsofts of thenew technological generation. (SeeChapter 2.) For every declining coalindustry, there would be a rising windpower industry. From businesses’ point ofview, government policy and consumerpressure would foreclose some profitopportunities, but open up others. Somejobs would regrettably be shed, but otherswould be created.

Regulations, a few environmentaltaxes, and consumer pressure are alreadygiving a taste of what may come. Sales oforganically grown food rose 19-fold in theUnited States between 1980 and 1996,from $180 million to $3.5 billion. TheMontreal Protocol is shutting down mar-kets for CFCs, but it has created billion-dollar demands for ozone-safealternatives and for the refrigerators andair conditioners that use them. The inter-national market for “environmental”goods and services that recycle, monitor

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and control pollution, and save energyreached roughly $450 billion in 1996.37

A full transition to sustainability wouldmake these markets seem small. Funda-mentally reconfiguring the global econo-my would cause demand for technologiesthat prevent pollution in the first place tomushroom. In fact, global wind powercapacity additions quintupled between1990 and 1997. Denmark, Germany,Spain, and India installed the most,thanks in part to strong subsidies. Thewind industry now employs 20,000 in theEuropean Union, up from practically zeroin the 1970s. The latest global sales dou-bling for solar cells, which are made fromsilicon, took only four years, a growth rateworthy of silicon computer chips.38

rooms. They want information and enter-tainment. The challenge for business,then, is to maximize the provision of suchservices while minimizing the productionof goods. Information and human intelli-gence then become the sources of mosteconomic value— as they already are insoftware, movies, financial services, andother dynamic sectors.40

Major investment opportunities wouldalso materialize within existing industries.Indeed, most industries would see neithermassive shrinkage nor massive growth onthe way to a sustainable world. Manywould, however, have to evolve in order tosurvive. A sustainable economy wouldneed some paper, chemicals, and steel,for example, but makers of these prod-ucts would have to overhaul how theyoperate in order to pollute much less andrecycle much more.

It is during such times of turbulencethat the industrial pecking order is mostoften rearranged. Those who anticipatechange in the business environment—indeed, press it forward— will gain ontheir competitors. A growing list of cor-porations seem to be taking this messageto heart with respect to sustainability.39

The techniques for generating moreservice with less environmental harmare many. (See Chapters 3 and 4.)Appliances, vehicles, even houses can bemade both more efficient and more effi-ciently. Their usefulness can be stretchedby making them more durable and easierto repair, upgrade, disassemble, and recy-cle. The Xerox Corporation, for instance,says that it sees itself as selling copies ratherthan copiers. When it provides a customerwith a machine, it guarantees an agreedlevel of copier service for an agreed num-ber of months. The company will replaceor upgrade parts in its modularly designedunits at no extra cost to the customer. Andwhen a contract expires, Xerox takes itsmachine back in order to reuse it or scav-enge it for parts. The company now recy-cles more than a million parts a year,saving some $100 million annually.41

The key conceptual shift manufactur-ers need to make in becoming more sus-tainable is to see themselves as sellingservices rather than goods. As WilliamMcDonough, dean of the University ofVirginia School of Architecture, pointsout, consumers do not buy televisionsbecause they feel a powerful need tobring a box of circuit boards, toxic com-pounds, and metals purified at great envi-ronmental expense into their living

As Xerox’s experience suggests, devis-ing these new ways of providing serviceswill often cost much less than feared— somuch so that frequently it will profit com-panies to press ahead of the environmen-tal policy curve. One study of the costs ofenvironmental laws for businesses found adozen policies in the United States forwhich costs had been estimated bothbefore and after entering into force. Allbut one policy turned out to cost half orless of what was originally projected,mainly because of unforeseen technologi-cal advances. And some saved money.42

As the CFC phaseout deadlineapproached in the early 1990s, for exam-ple, electronics giants such as AT&T,General Electric, and Texas Instrumentsworked together to find alternatives to

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CFCs for cleaning new circuit boards.Eventually they settled on a more radicaland efficient approach: soldering compo-nents together so neatly that they neededno cleaning in the first place. By 1992, theyhad refined the technique and halted CFCuse. One company, Nortel, spent $1 mil-lion on the switchover, but saved $4 mil-lion in CFC purchase and disposal costs(and CFC taxes). The new process alsoraised efficiency and product quality.43

One reason "greener" can turn outcheaper is that the goal of environmentalprotection can energize employees, whoare not just corporate cogs but humanbeings concerned about what they aredoing to their communities and to theirchildren’s futures. People do better workwhen they care more about it. In addition,lack of time prevents companies frominvestigating all of the millions of processchanges they could make. Thus practicesthat waste resources and money can per-sist for decades. Nortel, for example, foryears stuck to money-wasting circuit boardcleaning techniques simply because theyhad worked reasonably well in the past.The CFC phaseout, however, focused itscorporate heart and mind. Engineerswere put on the job of finding affordablealternatives, and in a matter of years theysucceeded beyond expectation.44

Economies of scale also help compa-nies cut the cost of environmentallybenign technologies. The more widgets-or water purifiers, or solar cells-a com-pany makes, the better it becomes atmaking them, which allows it to bringdown prices, stoke demand, and makeeven more widgets. This virtuous circlecan arise in any manufacturing businesswhere change is afoot, which is why tech-nologies often develop in unpredictablewaves and pulses. Between 1975 and 1997,for instance, the price of a watt of solarcells dropped from $89 to $4.25 (in 1997dollars)-or 30 percent for every dou-bling in cumulative sales. At this rate,another 10-fold increase in cumulative


sales would bring prices to $1 per watt,often considered the threshold for com-petitiveness with coal and natural gas.45

Trends like that may explain whyToyota has begun selling an innovativeelectric-gasoline hybrid car, a sporty four-seater called the Prius, that gets twice themileage of conventional models. Toyota isreportedly losing as much as $10,000 onevery Prius that rolls out of the factory,but is evidently banking on the expecta-tion that the more experience it developswith the new technologies, the more itcan cut costs and sharpen its competitiveedge in this strategic new market.46

Still, there is little reason to expect thatbusinesses can bring about an eco-indus-trial revolution on their own. When twotechnologies compete, an overwhelmingadvantage usually goes to the one with thehead start. Solar power, for instance, mustcompete with oil- and coal-burning tech-nologies on an economic playing fieldthat has been tilted in favor of fossil fuelsfor a century by subsidies and lax envi-ronmental laws. As a result, for every dol-lar that has been spent developing solarpower, a hundred or a thousand havebeen spent refining its competitors. Thusgovernments will need to exercise sub-stantial policy muscle to tip the markettoward environmentally sound technolo-gies. When that happens, the businessesthat are best prepared will likely reapmost of the profits for doing right by theenvironment.

CIVIL SOCIETY FOR A

SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY

The disintegration of communism in theEastern bloc unleashed a wave of environ-mental horror stories. From the “BlackTriangle” at the nexus of East Germany,Czechoslovakia, and Poland to the east-ern reaches of Siberia, there were reports

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of polluted forests where no birds chirpedand no leaves sprouted from the trees, ofwhole nuclear reactors dumped intoArctic waters, of high cancer rates andmysterious clusters of children born with-out left forearms. Intriguingly, there werealso reports, less publicized, that environ-mental groups, such as Ecoglasnost inBulgaria, were a significant conduit forthe groundswell of discontent that toppled communist regimes in 1989.41

The abysmal environmental record ofthe former Eastern bloc teaches an impor-tant lesson: a sustainable society almostcertainly must be founded on a strong civilsociety, which is defined here as the realmin which people may work as individualsor in groups to shape their world on anonprofit basis, without the sanction ofviolence that undergirds governmentaction. Civil society includes voters, con-sumers, churches and mosques, politicalparties, unions, and a dizzying variety ofother nongovernmental groups. In theWest, where civil society comparativelythrived, pressure from voters and inde-pendent groups led governments andsome businesses to take local environmen-tal problems seriously. But Soviet dictator-ship clamped down on civil society. As aresult, local environmental problems hadto become acute before there appeared aglimmer of response in those countries.

Still, Westerners should not take toomuch pride in the contrast. While rivers,seas, and forests are generally healthier inthe West, lifestyles there are also grosslyunsustainable. (See Chapter 3.) Demo-cratic nations may have reduced localenvironmental problems, but by import-ing fish, timber, food, and minerals fromthe rest of the world and exporting pollu-tants such as carbon dioxide, they aredoing more than their part to spoil theglobal commons. That points to the needfor global environmental governance. Butjust as domestic civil society has had topress for domestic government action onthe environment, a strong, global civil

society, in which researchers, activists, pol-icymakers, and citizens link up across bor-ders, will be needed to press forinternational action.

In the final analysis, it is the power ofindividuals, channeled through civil soci-ety, that will drive governments, interna-tional institutions, and businesses towards u s t a i n a b i l i t y .

Fortunately, recent trends here are pos-itive. Polls show the global public becom-ing more worried about environmentalproblems every year. According to a 1998survey by Environics International cover-ing 30 nations a.. different as China andItaly, majorities in 28 feel that their gov-ernments need to do more to protect theenvironment. And during the 1990s, therehas been a halting but global shift towarddemocracy and space for civil society.Increasingly, public concern about theinadequacy of governmental action on theenvironment is voiced, and is heard.48

The process is at work even in China, acountry hardly known for brooking dis-sent. In Jiangsu province, a man whose4,800-strong flock of ducks earned himthe local name “King of Ducks”-and agood living from the eggs-awoke onemorning in 1994 to find his piece of riverpitch black. Within days, all of LuShihua’s clucks were dead. In response,Lu and his neighbors launched a classaction lawsuit against the polluters-state-owned distilleries and soymilk factoriesupstream. The villagers won, setting aimportant new precedent in China(though the case was under appeal as ofearly 1998). Given the strength of the cen-tral government in China, it is likely thatthis victory was a product of pressure fromboth below and above: of the plaintiffs’courage and persistence and of a greateropenness in Beijing toward criticism ofhighly polluting state enterprises.49

As this example shows, getting thingsdone in the civil sphere, as in businessand government, usually takes organiza-tion. In the environmental realm, the

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groups that have so far made the most dif-ference are of a type usually labeled,somewhat vaguely, as notgovernmentalorganizations, or NGOs.

The rise of nongovernmental groupshas been one of the most striking andhopeful developments in societal struc-ture in the last quarter-century. The grad-ually increasing space for civil societyworldwide has given them room to grow.The seeming inability of governments tosolve complex, modern problems such aspoverty and environmental degradationhas provoked them. And the spread of lit-eracy and cheap electronic communica-tion has nurtured them.50

In western democracies, environmen-tal NGOs abound. On the Indian subcon-tinent, a huge number of small grassrootsgroups operate, drawing on a Gandhiantradition of self-help. In the Panchmahalsdistrict of India’s Gujarat state, forinstance, scores of villages have organizedcommittees to protect and regeneratelocal forests in the last 10 years-foreststhat began declining after the govern-ment took them over from the departingBritish. In Latin America, a comparablenumber of Christian Base Communities,born out of the liberation theology move-ment of the 1980s, unite Catholicism withsocial action. Thousands more groupsoperate throughout the rest of Asia andsub-Saharan Africa. North Africa, on theother hand, has relatively few NGOs.51

The Internet has spurred many NGOefforts. In 1997, a ragtag coalition ofgroups ranging from the Third WorldNetwork in Malaysia to the Council ofCanadians used the World M’ide Web,electronic mail, and electronic confer-ences to quickly organize opposition tothe Multilateral Agreement on Invest-ments. The prospective treaty to liberalizeinternational investment rules was beingnegotiated behind the closed doors of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operationand Development (OECD) . “if a negotia-tor says something to someone over a

glass of wine,” boasted Maude Barlow,__chair of the Council of Canadians, “we’llhave it on the Internet within an hour, allover the world.” In April 1998, the OECDannounced a six-month delay in negotia-tions, acknowledging that the NGOs hadaroused enough opposition in manycountries to derail the process. A similarnetwork spearheaded the campaign tofinalize a new treaty to ban land minesworldwide. 52

Polls show the global public becomingmore worried about environmentalproblems every year.

Building a Sustainable Societry

Increasingly, NGOs are linking up totest the limits of existing international lawas well. In Nicaragua, the indigenouscommunity of Awas Tingni is workingwith the U.S.-based Indian Law ResourceCenter (ILRC) in a bid to regain controlof its its homeland. With ILRC assistance,the community filed a petition in 1995 atthe Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights, arguing that the govern-ment had violated international as well asnational law by unilaterally granting tim-ber concecssions to foreign loggers onAwas Tingni land. In 1998, the commns-sion, an investigative body, found firmlyin favor of the community and filed suiton residents’ behalf in the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, whichis part of the Organization of AmericanStates (OAS). The finding embarrassedthe Nicaraguan government, but whetherit will lead OAS members to raise the legalstanding of indigenous land claimsremains to be seen.53

Though policymakers may find theresults unpleasant in the short run, itseems clear that fostering NGOs will servesociety and government stability in the

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long run. Governments can support civilsociety in several ways. One essential stepis to protect freedoms of press and assem-bly, something that often still runs againsttheir nature. The Malaysian government,like many, has an uneasy relationship withNGOs. In 1997, it raided the offices ofthree of them in an apparent attempt tosilence its critics.54

Another key step is for governments tomake themselves more accountable to allthe governed, since special interests oftenwork to block progress. This calls forstrengthening the more egalitarianavenues of influence over public policyformation, such as elections, while lessen-ing those that favor the wealthy few, suchas campaign donations.

Almost all governments maintain com-fortable relationships with moneyed inter-ests, which reduces the power of civilsociety as a whole. One of the most pow-erful men in Indonesia, for example, isBob Hasan, a long-time friend and aide offormer President Suharto. UnderSuharto, the government sold Hasanhuge logging concessions in the nation’srainforests at prices far below true worth,turning him into a billionaire even as itimpoverished thousands of villagersdependent on the forests. Hasan almostcertainly channeled some of his loggingprofits back to Suharto relatives and otherkey officials.55

One useful tack against corruption isfor governments to make sure that offi-cials who formulate and implement policyare paid well, in order to reduce theappeal of bribes. Also critical are adop-tion and enforcement of strong anti-cor-ruption laws, periodic auditing ofofficials, and an independent judiciary;enforcement will never stamp out corrup-tion, but it will increase the risks forpotential bribe takers. Finally, reducingthe discretion of bureaucratic decision-makers and making their actions publicwill further reduce the appeal of bribes.Sunlight is the best disinfectant.56

In industrial democracies, campaigndonations create similar problems. In the1995-96 U.S. election cycle, oil and gascompanies gave $11.8 million to congres-sional candidates to protect tax breaksworth at least $3 billion over the period.Timber lobbies donated $3.6 million,mainly to members of committees thathave set the U.S. Forest Service’s timbersale quotas high enough to propel wide-spread clearcutting on public lands.57

Almost every industrial democracy hasadopted its own mix of campaign financereform measures during the last fewdecades, drawing from such ingredientsas public financing, limits on contribu-tions and spending, and bans on politicaltelevision advertising. Some have workedbetter than others. In Canada, forinstance, a 1974 package of reforms com-bined disclosure requirements, tax creditsfor private donations, strong spendingcaps for political parties, and direct public financing. These reforms limited cam-paign spending for the most recentfederal elections to 80¢ per capita, com-pared with $9 in the United States. Andthe reforms appear to have facilitated therise of new political parties.58

In addition to making sure the deck isless stacked against civil society groups,governments can give those groups addi-tional cards to play. In particular, govern-ments can release information abouttheir own activities and those of business-es. The United States pioneered a potentsystem in this spirit, under a law whosepassage owed much to support from envi-ronmental groups. In 1986, it began col-lating and publishing data on toxicchemical emissions from industrialplants. The database, known as the ToxicsRelease Inventory (TRI) , for the first timegave citizens the right to know how muchof various chemicals was being emitted bylocal industry.59

Especially now that it is available overthe World Wide Web, the TRI has becomean invaluable tool for local groups press-

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ing factories to clean up, as well as forinvestors concerned about the associatedcosts. The negative publicity that inde-pendent groups generate from the datagives them clout with companies a hun-dred times as big. One study found thatstock prices for firms on the TRI listdropped an average 0.2-0.3 percent($46 million) the day the first resultswere released in 1989, with larger lossesfor heavier polluters. And the companiesthat lost the most value then cut theiremissions the most, apparently inresponse. The TRI has inspired imitatorsin Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic,Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands, SouthAfrica, Switzerland, and the UnitedKingdom. 60

In a potentially far-reaching step, the55 nations of the U.-N. EconomicCommission for Europe, which coversNorth America and Europe, signed a con-vention in 1998 that obliges them toincrease public access to information andbroaden public participation in govern-ment decisionmaking related to the envi-ronment — in a word, to increase“transparency.” The treaty also requiresmembers to promote the same goals forinternational institutions they belong to,such as the World Trade Organization,which has been extremely secretive in itsdeliberations. The convention mightresult in the WTO court releasing tran-scripts of cases with environmental impli-cations. Most likely, signatories willimplement the convention in fits andstarts-pushed forward by NGOS.61

THE POWER OF AN EDUCATED

CITIZENRY

What is remarkable about nonprofit, non-governmental organizations is that theywield power despite their seeming lack ofit. They have no army or police force, no

power to tax or regulate or ratify bindinginternational accords. The for-profit sec-tor dwarfs them financially. Their sourceof strength is far less tangible: it lies ineducation, broadly defined. Many NGOsare supported by foundations and indi-vidual donors motivated by understand-ings they have gained of major socialproblems. And many in turn work to edu-cate the public and persuade policymak-ers about the need for action. Thissuggests that the fundamental challengein building a sustainable society is one ofeducation. What people think and feelabout the world affects what they do asvoters, consumers, and resource owners,and as government officials, internationaldiplomats, and employees.

It is encouraging to note that mindsetscan change quickly in response to educa-tion. In developing nations, educationcampaigns, along with increased availabil-ity of family planning services and contra-ception, are one major reason thatfertility rates fell remarkably quicklybetween the early 1960s and the first halfof the 1990s-from 6.0 births per womanto 3.3. (These figures exclude China,where particularly coercive policesreduced fertility even faster.) If this hope-ful trend were to continue, fertility in thedeveloping world would drop to the sus-tainable rate of slightly more than 2 chil-dren per woman by 2010-15. (Populationgrowth would continue for some decades,however, because so many women will stillhave their childbearing years ahead ofthem.) The transition from high birthrates and high death rates to low birthrates and low death rates, which took 150years in what are now the more industrialcountries, would then have taken only 50in developing countries.62

One striking reason fertility has fallenis that women are more educated not justabout family planning, but generally.Many studies have found that a woman’seducation level is among the strongest, ifnot the strongest, predictor of how many

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children she will have. (See Figure 10-l.)Women who spend more time in schoolmarry and have children later. They alsowork more in the formal economy andearn more. This gives them more to losefinancially if they stay at home with youngchildren, as well as less need for childrento support them in old age. Educatinggirls also improves women’s economicand social status, and thus is one of thebest ways to make economic developmentboth equitable and sustainable.63

A more specific role for educators liesin teaching children and adults about theenvironment— how it functions, how theydepend on it, and how they affect it.Children in particular respond to theselessons. The seeds of understandingplanted now will produce concerned citi-zens in a generation’s time. One purposeof education is to give people the toolsthey need to become responsible citizens.Teaching students about the environmentmerely extends the understanding of “cit-izenship” to encompass their responsibili-ties as citizens of planet Earth.

Environmental education soundsstraightforward, but doing it may wellrequire major changes in how students are

Figure 1 O-l. Fertility Rate by Education Levelof the Mother, Selected Countries

taught. Education today teaches discon-nection. Disciplines such as political sci-ence, economics, moral philosophy,anthropology, biology, psychology, chem-istry, and thermodynamics are severedfrom each other even though each, incombination with the others, helps explainour environmental predicament. More-over, points out David Orr, a professor atOberlin College in Ohio, the very experi-ence of classroom learning teaches discon-nection, since it typically occurs in artificialindoor environments, which are main-tained with environmentally costly flows offossil fuels and water and which psycholog-ically isolate students from the naturalworld. As a result, the structure of educa-tion itself trains students to ignore the eco-logical consequences of their actions.64

“Ecological literacy” is above all an abil-ity to connect, to synthesize knowledgefrom the gamut of disciplines in order tosee the big picture. To become ecologi-cally literate, Orr argues, students need toexperience education less as an exercisein taking dictation than as an ongoingdialogue, in which ideas are formulated,tested against everyday experience, andrevised. This forces students to thinkabout how the physics of solar cells andthe chemistry of petroleum, say, shape theworld economy and geopolitics.65

One of the most promising paths tosuch experience is for students to helpmanage their own campuses and neigh-borhoods. At the University of JorgeTadeo Lozano in Bogatá, Colombia, forexample, students and administratorshave joined to launch a campus recyclingprogram that aims to collect 17 tons amonth of plastic, organic waste, andpaper. In Ankara, Turkey, students andstaff at the Middle East TechnicalUniversity have spearheaded the refor-estation of 1,500 hectares (3,750 acres) ofwasteland into the largest green space inthe city. In the United States, studentpressure is perhaps the main reason 80percent of campuses now recycle.66

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Building a Sustainabb Society

The world’s oldest institutions of edu-cation-though often not thought of assuch-are arguably institutions of reli-gion. Like universities and schools, theyseek to help people understand theworld. Like NGO leaders, religious lead-ers are primarily motivated by moralbeliefs, and try to teach society how totranslate those values into action. Some3.5 billion people, more than half theplanet’s population, belong to organizedreligions. And the values of environmen-talism-respect for the Creation, theimportance of human health, and theright of the next generation to a securefuture-are nearly universal, so it is notsurprising that all major religions can beread as environmentalist. A Buddhistmeditation, for example, runs, “Cut downthe forest of your greed, before cuttingreal trees.” Hinduism holds India’sGanges river to be sacred. And the Bookof Genesis says, “The Lord God took theman and put him in the Garden of Edento work it and take care of it."67

As moral educators, spiritual leaderscan help people discover environmental-ism within themselves and help themthink about how to apply that ethic intheir lives. In the United States, for exam-ple, the National Religious Partnershipfor the Environment, a coalition ofgroups from several faiths, lists more than150 environmentally active congregationsnationwide. These range from a Jewishyouth group in San Diego that buildsnature trails and does monthly cleanupsin two parks to a Baptist congregation inCollinsville, Alabama, campaigning tounseat officials who approved a locallandfill that parishioners say is pollutingthe groundwater. Meanwhile, in theIndian city of Varanasi, a hereditaryHindu priest and hydroelectric engineernamed Veer Bhadra Mishra heads a foun-dation that is working on low-cost ways toclean up the Ganges, which is heavily pol-luted despite its sacredness.68

H.G. Wells foreshadowed much of the

twentieth century when he wrote that“human history becomes more and morea race between education and catastro-phe.” The sort of education that will saveus from catastrophe is not just a matter ofdisseminating information, for the planetis now awash in information. The educa-tion needed, rather, is the sharing of wis-dom. Our knowledge of the natural worldhas raced far ahead of our wisdom inusing it. As a result; we are razing ourforests, grinding down our mountains,siphoning off our rivers, paving ourplains, modifying our climate, pollutingour air, and tainting our blood. We areproducing, in other words, a world noneof us wants.69

Environmental education may requiremajor changes in how students aretaught.

There is an alternative path. It cannotbe described to the last detail, but it can beoutlined convincingly. And there are hintsthat we are moving toward that path. Windand solar power sales are skyrocketing.Waterconserving practices are spreading.Population growth is slowing. We can alsodraw hope from the rapidity of changeduring the century just ending.Technologies once hardly dreamed ofbecame commonplace a generation later.Public attitudes, about smoking for exam-ple, also evolved rapidly in many countries.

The turning of the new millenniumbrings a historic moment of truth forglobal society. Will we rescue what is goodin the modern economy while teaching itto cherish natural wealth and humanhealth? Will we fashion an economy fit forthe long haul?

Crossing over to a sustainable path willbe a long and complex process. Govern-ments need to play a large role, working

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within their borders and cooperatingacross them. Businesses will need to takemany of the risks, generate many of theinnovations, and create the new jobs. Andpressing them all forward will be civil soci-ety in its many forms, grounded in aneducated citizenry.

Like any economic revolution, this onewill involve upheaval and even some sacri-

fice. In order to make way for new indus-tries-and thus new jobs, investmentopportunities, and products-others willbe shed. But the benefits will be healthyair, safe drinking water, a secure food supply, and protection for the planet’s diver-sity of species-in short, a planet we canbe proud to leave for our children. Thechoice is ours to make.

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Lugar de Ia publicación:San José, Costa RicaTitulo:Desarrollo sostenible y politicas económicas en america LatinaEditorial:DElAutor/editor:Kaimowitz, DavidCapitulo/articulo:La valorización del futuro: un reto para el desarrollo sostenible en America LatinaAño (fecha) de publicación:1992Pàginas-- De: Al:20-26

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y los politicos deben buscar información sobre los roles especificos ypotenciales de las mujer en el uso sustentable de los recursos naturales,tales como bosque, húmedales, tierras secas, costas y montañas. Lasacciones prácticas que planifiquen y ejecuten deberán tomar en cuentaesta información constante hacia las mujeres, para brindarles elconocimiento indispensable para utilizar los recursos de manerasustentable.

Conclusiones

Las discusiones e iniciativas en el camino del ambiente y eldesarrollo, por un lado, y el de la mujer y el desarrollo, por otro, hanestado aislados entre si por mucho tiempo. Evidencias a nivel regionaly global lograron ver la importancia de unir los dos, para encontrarsoluciones equitativas y efectivas a los problemas.

Las mujeres, por un lado, y el medio ambiente por el otro, hancontribuido a reconceptualizar el desarrollo, asignando así énfasis a laredistribución ( entre clases, razas, generaciones y sexos) y a la sus-tentabilidad como aspectos esenciales para asegurar la paz y lacontinuidad de la vida en la tierra.

Las tareas son gigantescas, global y localmente. Todos conocemosdatos acerca del estado de la situación ambiental en Centroamérica.También sabemos de los muchos esfuerzos y valiosos trabajos -comoeste Seminario- que se están realizando en el área por gran cantidadde organizaciones y programas. Hay estrategias lineamientos y muchasrecomendaciones de cómo llegar a un desarollo sostenible; Déjenmeagregar una sola: hay que dar a la mujer la oportunidad de contribuira esta empresa con todos sus conocimientos, habilidades y sabíduria.

La valorizacion del futuro:un reto para eI desarrollo sostenibIe

en América Latina

Dr. David Kaimowitz*

I n t r o d u c c i ó n

El 31 de enero de 1953, la ciudad de Rotterdam en Holanda, fueinundada por aguas maritimas , agitadas por una fuerte tormenta.Murieron 1835 personas y hubo grandes daños económicos. Losholandeses juraron no permitir que eso volviera a pasar. En respuesta,crearon el “Plan Delta”, un ambicioso programa de construcción dediques y exclusas, con un plazo de 25 años y un nivel de inversiónvalorado en miles de millones de dólares. El programa fue terminado,como estaba planeado, en 1988 (Eriikson, 1985).

Esa capacidad de planificación a largo plazo que demostraron losholandeses con el Plan Delta, de continuidad de las políticas durantevarios gobiernos de distintos partidos, apunta hacia uno de los elementos

centrales, y a menudo menospreciado, para lograr un desarrollo soste-nible: la valorización el futuro, y la capacidad de pensar, planear y

actuar en función de él.El concepto básico de desarrollo sostenible, planteado por la

Comisión Brundtland (1987), donde “se busca satisfacer las necesidadesdel presente sin c omprometer la capacidad de las geneticiones futuraspara alcanzar sus propias necesidades”, implica, sin duda, un compromisocon el futuro. Los costos y los beneficios de muchas acciones que serealizan hoy, solo se sentirán mucho más tarde. Muchas inversiones.necesarias para la sostenibllidad, tienen horizontes largos de recuperaciónde la inversión.

* Universidad de Wisconsin. Consultor Internacional, Costa Rica.

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Debido a factores económicos, políticos, institucionales y culturales,a las sociedadcs latinoamericanas les cuesta valorizar el futuro. En laAmerica Latina actual, existe una fuerte tendencia a vivir para hoy;todo se tiene que hacer “ya”, la gente anda constantemente en la“rebusca”, y los países van de crisis en crisis, El presente se ha vueltotan agitado, tan difícil, y a la vez tan rentable para la especulacióncoyuntural, mientras el futuro se torna cada vez mas imprescindible ylejano.

Este ensayo examina diferentes factores que dificultan la valo-rización del futuro en América Latina, y plantea algunos elementoscentrales para su superación. Tiene cuatro secciones. Las primeras tresdiscuten aspectos económicos, politico/ínstitucionales y culturales,respectivamente; la ultima enfoca el camino hacia adelante.

1. Los aspectos económicos

Un requisito básico del desarrollo es la inversión en actividadesque generan una parte importante de sus beneficios en el largo plazo.la preservación de la biodiversidad, la producción forestal, la con-servación de los suelos, la reducción de emisiones contaminantes, sonapenas algunos ejemplos en donde esto se duplica.

Sin embargo, nuestro mecanismo básico para asignar recursos, elmercado, es notablemente miope con respecto al futuro.

Con las típicas tasas de descuento y costos de oportunidad del capitalen el mercado, el futuro desaparece (para propósitos de la toma dedecisiones) después de unas pocas decadas (Page, 1991: 64).

Es bien conocido que los precios de mercado reflejan únicamentelas demandas de las generaciones actuales, quienes no tendran que viviren el planeta que dejan; las generaciones futuras no tienen voz ni voto(Norgaard, 1991).

Esta característica general de las economías de mercado (y de laseconomías socialistas tradicionales) fue reforzada durante la últimadecada por las altas tasas de interés real, producto do los grandes déficit,fiscales y de cuenta corriente de los EEUU, Para poder financiar estosdéficit y mantener el valor del dólar, el gobierno de los EE.UU. fueforzado a pagar intereses más altos, lo cual afectó todos los mercadosde capitales a nivel mundial, Eso hizo mucho menos rentable efectuarinversiones de larga duración. En el plano internacional estas subieronde un promedio de 2,64% anual entre 1963 y 1973, a un promedio de5,85% entre 1980 y 1989 (Banco Mundial, 1990). Esto quiere decirque en los años ochenta, alguien que decidiera ínvertir en sembrar Unárbol para ser cortado dentro de treinta años, deberá recibir unaretribución por su inversión mas de dos veces mayor que en los años

sesenta, para que esa inversión tuviera la misma rentabilidad que undolar ganado en un cultivo anual.

Recientemente, las tasas de interés de los EE.UU. han bajado. Noobstante, en muchos países de América Latina estas tasas todavía semantienen altas, debido a la incertidumbre que impera respecto a lainflación, los desbalances financieros nacionales y la deuda externa. EnCosta Rica, por ejemplo, actualmente se cobra hasta 12% de interés enterminos reales para los prestamos. Eso desincentiva la inversión alargo plazo.

La crisis de la deuda ha actuado como un creciente y permanenteincentivo del consumo presente sobre el futuro. Al empujar las tasas deinterés hacia arriba, la crisis ha determinado una lógica irrefutable enapoyo de estrategias de “extracción de recursos como las únicas viablesen el corlo plazo.

Algunos autores han criticado la idea de que tasas de interés altasperjudican la sostenibilidad, diciendo que ellas reducen la inversión, yque al haber eso, disminuyen la presión sobre el uso de los recursosnaturales (Krutilla y Fisher I975). Esa posición sólo es válida si unoacepta la idea de que el crecimiento economico es incompatible con lasostenibilidad. Pero reducir el crecimiento no es una opción ni viableni deseable para muchos de los paises de América Latina. Para quehaya desarrollo, y no solamente la sostenibilidad de la pobreza; habriaque fomentar inversiones en actividades más sostenibles, en lugar deconseguir la conservación de los recursos mediante el estancamientoeconomico.

Tambien inhibe la inversión productiva de largo plazo la gran mag-nitud de la variacíón en los niveles de inflación de año a año. Porejemplo, en Argentina la inflación anual pasó de 210% en 1982 a 688%en 1984: despues bajó a 82% en 1986, y volvió a subir a 388% en 1988.

Fluctuaciones igualmente fuertes se dieron en Brasil, Perú,Nicaraguay Bolivia, y en general fueron acompañadas por cambios significativosen los precios relativos (CEPAL, 1988). Estas fluctuaciones fuertes

llevan a que un inversionista que busca reducir los riesgos de pérdida,tienda a invertir en actividades de muy corto plazo que le permitianmayor liquidez, como el arbitraje y las actividades especulativas, endetrimento de esfuerzos productivos o conservacionista con una madu-ración mas larga. Esta misma situación, de fluctuaciones rapidas en losprecios relativos y niveles de ingreso, junto con la debilidad de lossistemas de información en la región, dificultan cualquier pronósticoacerca de las condiciones economicas del futuro. Al ser menos predecibleel futuro, se vuelve mas riesgoso invertir, y se tiende a descontar elvalor previsto de ingresos futuros a tasas aún mayores que las de mer-cado. Con un futuro tan poco claro, resulta demasiado riesgoso invertiren actividades que solo daran frutos en el mediano o largo plazo.

La fuga masiva de capitales, y mas generalmente, la movilidad del mismo, facilitada por la apertura en los mercados financieros y las

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revoluciones tecnológicas en las comunicaciones y el transporte, hacenque el capital dependa menos del estado futuro de los recursos naturalesen un lugar en particular. Por ejemplo, si una compañia maderera piensaque después de talar un bosque puede pasar a otro bosque virgen,tendra una actitud diferente que si sabe que sus ganancias futurasdependerán de la producción del bosque donde trabaja actualmente. Deigual forma, un productor de melones será más propenso a permitir losdesbalances ecológicos producidos por la sobre utilización de plaguicidas,si tiene la opción de después trasladar sus actividades a nuevos lugaresde producción, donde no existen esos problemas (Murray, 1991).

Finalmente, el creciente empobrecimiento de gran parte de lapoblación latinoamericana en los últimos años, puede haber fomentadouna mayor preocupación por el consumo inmediato y la sobrevivencia,una actitud que lleva a la mineria de los recursos naturales y una visiónde corto plazo, La imágen clásica de esto es aquel campesino pobrecultivando en tierras de ladera, que él mismo sabe que esta destruyendo,pero que representa su único medio de vida.

2. Aspectos políticos e institucionales

No sólo los empresarios y consumidores latinoamericanos tienenuna baja valorización del futuro. El mismo fenómeno se da entre lospolíticos

Los políticos en general, no suelen pensar mucho más allá de laspróximas elecciones. Esta tendencia se refuerza por la magnitud de lacrisis económica en muchos países y la existencia de altos niveles depobreza; lo cual hace que los políticos se sienten forzados a darlesrespuestas a la población a corto plazo. En parte, la tendencia a en-deudarse el máximo posible, sabiendo que serán otros los que tendránque pagar esas deudas, es sintomas de ese fenómeno.

Los gobiernos viven de crisis en crisis, “apagando incendios” y,por lo tanto, descuidando los problemas más subyacentes, como lanecesidad de plantear altemativas dc desarrollo que sean viables a largoplazo. Una de las palabras mas dañinas (y comunes) del vocabulariopolítico latinoamericano es la “coyuntura”. Los frecucntes cambios enel contexto político y económico dificultan concentrarse en los problemasestructurales, los cuales permanecen en todas las sociedades latinoame-ricanas.

Las mismas crisis económicas y políticas hacen que estos gobiernossean débiles. En la mayoría de las elecciones recientes en AméricaLatina los partidos gobernantes no fueron reelectos (aunque eso comienzaa cambiar con las elecciones en Argentina, Colombia y México -unaposible señal de cierta estabilización). Los efectos de la falta depermanencia de los partidos gobernantes son magnificados por el altonivel de politización partidaria del cuerpo público. No existe un cuerpoconsolidado de funcionarios públicos permanentes, como lo hay en casi

todos los países desarrollados, que permite mantener el curso deprogramas básicos de interés nacional, independientemente de losvaivenes políticos.

La capacidad de reflexión de la sociedad, y por consiguiente dc laprevisión de los problemas futuros y la formulación de posiblessoluciones, ha sido socavada. Las universidades, tradicionales centrosde refIexión, han sido debilitadas por la crisis, y su aporte al pensamientocritico ha sido reducido por la tendencia hacia la mercantilizacion de laeducación (Brunner, 1990). Quedan pocos paises en America Latinadonde los profesores universitarios tienen sifieciente seguridad económicay tranquilidad laboral para poder reflexionare investigar sobre el porvenirde sus sociedades. En varios paises ha decaido incluso de forma notablela publicación de nuevas investigaciones en las ciencias sociales.

Los organismos públicos de planifiación, otra fuente tradicionalde reflexión sobre el futuro, han perdido su estatus jerárquico y muchosde sus profesionales mejor apacitados. La misma palabra planificaciónha caído en desgracia. Sin embargo, resulta casi imposible pensar en undesarrollo sostenible sin el concepto de planificación. La acciónespontanea del mercado, solo, no llevara jamás a la sostenibilidad. Estaafirmación no constituye de ninguna forma una apología de las formas tradicionales de planificación o de intervención estatal que se han prac-ticado en América Latina hasta ahora. Es evidente que muchos de esosejercicios resultaron esteriles y poco productivos. Hoy se plantea el retoineludible de inventar nuevas modalidades de planificación. masajustadas a las necesidades del desarrollo sostenible.

En casi toda la región, las actividades de conservación de losrecursos estan siendo financiadas en gran parte por agencias externas(Lindarte y Benito, 1991). Estos fondos vienen como parte de proyectosde corta o mediana duración (diez años o menos), ya que los sistemasde asignación de los donantes también son completamente incapaces depensar en el largo plazo. Es mas la experiencia demuestra que la ayudaexterna ha sido sujeta a modas trazadas, haciendo creer a muchosgobiernos latinoamericanos que el “desarrollo sostenible” es simplementeuna moda más y, por lo tanto, no es sostenible.

Por último, habria que anotar el efecto nocivo para la valorizacióndel futuro, del alto grado dc desigualdad social y de la falta de espaciosdemocráticos en América Latina. Ningún llamado a favor de unapreocupación por las generaciones futuras puede tener acogida ylegitimidad, si la población se siente marginada de la toma de decisionesy se percibe que los costos y beneficios de los cambios no seránditribuidos de forma equitativa.

3. Aspectos culturales y sociales

En el plano sicológico, la mentalidad de incertidumbre y la sensaciónde crisis juegan papeles importantes en la percepción del futuro. Guerras,

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cambios frecuentes en los gobiernos, el senclonalismo de la prensa, lasfluctuaciones económicas, ayudan a crear una sensación de impotenciay a promover la pasividad y el cortoplacismo. La pobreza da sustentomaterial a la idea de que los hijos tienen que vivir en función de lasnecesidades do los padres, y no al revés, actitud poco conducente apriorizar las generaciones futuras.

El deterioro de las escuelas públicas, institución básica. desocialización nacional, limita el conocimiento y asimilación de la historiaentre la juventud —y sin un concepto de pasado, .dificilmente puedehaber una noción clara de futuro-. Esa tendencia esd reforzada por lageneralización de los valores y contenidos culturales de los mediosmasivos de comunicación de los EE.UU.; un país que nunca ha tenidouna concepción clara del peso de Ja historia, y con los niveles de ahorroper capita más bajos en eI mundo desarrollado. En Hollywood no hayfuturo; todo termina.—y generalmente de forma positiva—dentro de120 minutos.

El individualismo y el egoísmo, promovidos como valores positivospor aquellos que creen que “la mano visible” del mercado lo resuelvetodo soN fundamentalmente Incompatibles con una sostenibilidad queimplica una preocupación por personas que todavía ni siquiera hannacido. Sin idealismo no puede haber sostenibilidad.

4, El camino hacía el futuro

En cierto sentido, el camino hacia la valoración del futuro essimplemente revertir las condiciones que actualmente lo estánimpidiendo. Crear condiciones económicas y políticas estables, propiciaspara la inversión y visión hacia el largo plazo. Reconstruir y democratizarlas instancias de reflexión de la sociedad, y compartir de forma másequitativa sus riquezas. Profundizar el desarrollo de las instituciones yde la cultura nacional. No es casualidad que Costa Rica, que reúnevarias, aunque no todas, de estas condiciones, hayapodido avanzarhacia una estrategia de desarrollo sostenible más que algunos otrospaíses.

Todo eso suena lindo, pero, ¿cómo se llega allí? El primer paso esreivindicar la importancia del bien público y del desarrollo institucional,sobre el plan privado y la anarquía de mercados sin restricciones. Lasdos cosas son necesarias --bienes ptíblicos y privados, intervención ymercado-, no obstante, para el balance requiere girarse de nuevo hacíael bien común. El segundo paso es la concentración nacional —lademocracia en el sentido más amplio-, donde los diferentes sectoresde la sociedad se organizan y sus representantes buscan la formulaciónde un nuevo pacto social. El tercer paso es darnos cuenta de lo que estáen juego si fracasamos: nada menos que el futuro...; cl futuro de nuestroplaneta y nuestra humanidad,

Bíbliografía.

Banco Mundial. 1990. Informe sobre el desarrolla mundial. Washington D. C.Bruner, J. J. 1990. Educación superior en América Latina: cambios y desafíos.

México D. F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 205 p.CEPAL. 1988. Anuario estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe. Nueva York.Comisión Brundtland. 1987. Our Common Future. Londres: Oxford. Erickson, P. G. 1985. Roaming Round Holland. 5a edición. Utrecht, Holanda:

van Boekhoven, 144 pp.Krutilla, J. V.: Fischer, A. C. 1975. The Economics of Natural Enuironments.

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 292 pp.Lindarte, E.; Benito, C, 1991. “Instituciones, tecnología y políticas en la agri-

cultural sostenible da laderas en América Central”, pp. 77-188, en:Agricultura sostenible en las laderas centroamericanas. San José IICA/CIAT/CATIE/CIMMYT.

Murray, D. 1991. “Sustauibility: tho Paradigmatic Challenge to AgriculturalEconomics”. Sin publicar. 10 p.

Page, T. 1991. “Sustainability and the Problem of Valuation”, pp. 58-75, en:Ecological Economics,. The Science and Management of Sustainability(Constanza, R. ed.). Nueva York: Columbia University Press.

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Lugar de Ia publicación:

Nueva YorkTitulo:Managing Planet EarthEditorial:Reading from Scientific American MagazineAutor/editor:W. H. Freeman and CompanyCapítulo/artículo:EpílogoAño (fecha) de pub!icación:1990Páginas -- De: Al:137-138

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Epilogue

How fo secure our common future

Gro Harlem Brundtland

When the 20th century began, neitherhuman beings nor human technologyhad the power to radically alter the global

ecosystem. Today, as the century draws to a close,human beings in ever-increasing numbers have thatpower, and as a result of their activity on the planet,major unintended changes are taking place in theatmosphere, the biosphere and the hydrosphere.These changes outstrip our present ability to cope;the world’s financial and political institutions areout of step with the workings of nature.

Poverty is a major cause and also a major effect ofglobal environmental problems. It is futile to seeksolutions to environmental disturbances withoutconsidering them from a broad perspective that en-compasses the factors underlying world povertyand the inequalities within and among nations, Fordeveloping countries, poverty lies at the heart of allissues. The poor are forced to eat next year’s seedcorn, to cut scarce forests for fuel-wood. Althoughsuch practices may be rational short-term tactics forsurvival, in the longer term they can only result indisaster.

Yet it is both futile and an insult to the poor to tellthem that they must remain in poverty to “protectthe environment.” The World Commission on Envi-ronment and Development concluded in its 1987report, “Our Common Future,” that sustained eco-

nomic growth, which is a precondition for the elimi-nation of mass poverty, is possible only within amore equitable international economic regime. Thecommission called for a new era of economicgrowth—growth that enhances the resource baserather than degrades it. We know now that growthand development need not be environmentally de-grading, that in fact growth can create the capitaland the capacity necessary to solve environmentalproblems. And without growth, how can we pro-vide for twice the present population some time inthe next century, when we cannot provide for ev-erybody today?

Those of us who live in the industrialized worldhave an obligation to ensure that international eco-nomic relations help rather than hinder the pros-pects for sustainable development. It is our duty, aswell as in our own self-interest, to do so. Commod-ity prices must be adjusted to provide a fair interna-tional distribution of income. Official development-assistance programs and private loans to developingcountries, as well as private investment, must beimproved, both in quality and in quantity. Policies—both national and international—will have to bechanged so that capital transfers are sensitive toenvironmental impacts and can contribute to long-term sustainability.

Energy is another area of vital importance. As

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138 ! EPILOGUE

nations continue to develop they will require more,not less, total energy; their industrialization andrapidly growing populations will depend on it. Yetglobal energy consumption, even at its presentlevels, has already created serious environmentalwoes. How can an increase in energy use be toler-ated without further deterioration of the global eco-system? The solution, we believe, is to place energy-efficiency policies at the cutting edge of nationalenergy strategies, regardless of the relatively lowprice of such traditional fuels as coal and petroleum.

The commission found no absolute limits togrowth. Limits are indeed imposed by the impact ofpresent technologies and social organization on thebiosphere, but we have the ingenuity to change.And change we must. The report of the commissionoffers governments and international institutions anagenda for change. After a period of standstill andeven deterioration in global cooperation, the timehas come for higher aspirations, for increased politi-cal will to address our common future.

The United Nations system with all of its special-ized agencies has the capacity to reach our commongoals. We call for a fundamental commitment by allgovernments and institutions to make sustainabledevelopment the guiding principle of the interna-tional community. To secure our common future,we need a new international vision based on coop-eration and a new international ethic based on therealization that the issues with which we wrestle areglobally interconnected. This is not only a moralethic but also a practical one—the only way we canpursue our own self-interests on a small and closelyknit planet.

Environment and development have come to thetop of the international agenda. Policies to promotesustainable development must be devised by na-tions both in the Northern and in the SouthernHemisphere, and they must also take into account

the imbalances in international economic relationsthat prevail today.

Our ambition should now be to make the 1990’s adecade of rapid social, economic and environmentalcooperation rather than confrontation. A global eco-nomic consensus for growth should be developed.To be consistent with sustainable development,such a consensus must observe ecological limita-tions. It should include sound economic policieswithin developing countries and be particularlysensitive to the poorer nations in Asia, Africa andLatin America.

It is time for a global economic summit. Would itnot be timely to consider both our economic andenvironmental concerns at such a summit, given thecritical linkage between the two? The large ecologi-cal issues—the greenhouse effect, the disappearingozone layer and sustainable utilization of tropicalforests—are tasks facing humankind as a whole.The World Commission on Environment and De-velopment presented innovative ideas on how tomobilize additional financial resources. The time isnow ripe to explore these problems both institution-ally and financially.

Our generation is the first one to have seen planetearth from a distance. And from that perspective itis all too apparent that our species is dependent on asingle tiny, fragile globe floating in space, a closedand vulnerable system.

The report of the commission offers a challengingagenda. We were asked to offer strategies for thefuture and to provide motivation for adopting newpolicies. In demonstrating the real threats to bothour present and our future and showing that work-able solutions are at hand, our report provides thatmotivation. We hope that it will ultimately achieveits purpose of generating the debate and discussionthat are necessary to revitalize international co-operation.

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